id,title,publish_date,update_date,status,content_type,authors,topics,summary,pdf_url,html_url
R48948,Suspension of the Federal Gas Tax: In Brief,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:50Z,Active,Reports,Ali E. Lohman,,"In May 2026, the average price of a gallon of gasoline for U.S. consumers had increased more than $1.50 compared with the price in February 2026. President Trump and multiple Members of Congress have proposed suspending the federal excise tax on gasoline as a way to potentially offset this price increase. The gas tax rate is established in statute by Congress. While some Members of Congress have previously proposed suspending the gas tax, no such law has ever been enacted. 
Reducing the price of gas by 18.4 cents per gallon could provide some relief to consumers. Suspending the gas tax may not reduce consumer prices by exactly 18.4 cents per gallon. Gasoline suppliers, distributers, refiners, and blenders could choose to reduce prices by more or less than 18.4 cents per gallon or not reduce prices at all. Suspending the gas tax may not reduce consumer prices by exactly 18.4 cents per gallon. Gasoline suppliers, distributers, refiners, and blenders could choose to reduce prices by more or less than 18.4 cents per gallon or not reduce prices at all.
The gas tax is the primary source of revenue for the federal Highway Trust Fund. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the balance in the Highway Trust Fund’s two accounts, the mass transit and the highway account, will approach zero in FY2027 and FY2028 respectively, which could delay reimbursements to state and local governments for work completed on federally-funded transportation projects and delay initiation of new transportation projects. Suspending the gas tax could cause the balances in the mass transit account and highway account to approach zero sooner. If, as in some current proposals in the 119th Congress, this reduction in revenue were coupled with a general fund transfer, this reduction would not affect the health of the Highway Trust Fund, but it would increase the budget deficit.
The gas tax is also the primary source of revenue for the Leaking Underground Storage Tank (LUST) Trust Fund, which helps the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states cover costs of responding to leaking underground petroleum storage tanks in cases where the owner or operator does not clean up a site. In the United States, these leaking tanks have been a leading source of groundwater contamination and a threat to public drinking water. If the LUST Trust Fund were to not receive funding from the federal gas tax the remaining balance would be depleted over time. A general fund transfer to the LUST Trust Fund would enable continued petroleum tank cleanups and other activities to protect groundwater, but would increase the budget deficit.
Key words: gasoline, gasoline tax, gas tax, fuel tax, Highway Trust Fund, Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48948/R48948.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48948.html
LSB11432,Congressional Authority to Regulate Presidential Recordkeeping,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:17Z,Active,Posts,Todd Garvey,,"When Richard Nixon stepped from the White House lawn onto Marine One after resigning the presidency in the wake of the Watergate scandal, he could well have assumed that some of the most familiar remnants of his administration—hundreds of audio tape recordings of conversations he had in the oval office—would remain under his control. There was, at that point, a long tradition of Presidents retaining ownership of their papers and records after leaving office. Consistent with that practice, President Nixon soon reached an agreement with the Administrator of General Services ensuring that the tapes, along with more than 40 million pages of records, would be taken in former President Nixon’s custody to California, where the agreement explicitly permitted the oval office recordings to eventually be destroyed. 
Once word of this arrangement reached the legislative branch, Congress acted quickly to enact the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA), which effectively abrogated the agreement and directed the Administrator to take “complete possession and control” of the former President’s records. That law marked the beginning to a new legislative approach to the preservation of presidential records. President Nixon challenged the PRMPA as a violation of the separation of powers, among other claims, but the Supreme Court rejected those arguments in its 1977 decision of Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. 
Soon after, Congress solidified its new approach to the ownership and preservation of presidential records by enacting the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (PRA). That law established that “[t]he United States shall reserve and retain complete ownership, possession, and control” of the records of future Presidents by ensuring their preservation in the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). The PRA continues to govern the retention and preservation of presidential records to this day.
On April 1, 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) expressed its opinion that the PRA is unconstitutional and that, as a result, “the President need not further comply with its dictates.” “As a matter of custom,” OLC opinions are treated as binding on the executive branch, but do not bind the courts or Congress.
This Sidebar summarizes the PRA and the OLC opinion. It then briefly addresses some of the arguments made by DOJ against the PRA, including (1) the opinion’s assertion that Congress has no authority to regulate presidential records and (2) the opinion’s characterization of the PRA as a statute designed to facilitate congressional access to presidential records. 
The Presidential Records Act 
The PRA is the statutory framework governing the retention, preservation of, and future access to presidential records. Under the PRA, records that Presidents and their staff create while discharging their official duties—but not those records of a “purely private or nonpublic character”— are owned and controlled by the United States. In other words, presidential records are the public property of the American people, not the personal property of any specific President. As described above, this approach represented a break from historical practice as all Presidents before Nixon had retained ownership of their records.
The PRA was not Congress’s first foray into the regulation of executive branch records. Congress enacted the Federal Records Act in 1950, which governed the retention and preservation of agency records, but that law has never applied to presidential records. It also enacted the Presidential Libraries Act of 1955, which authorized, but did not require, the Administrator of General Services to “accept and take title to” the “papers and other historical materials” of Presidents to place them into a presidential library. 
Besides establishing public ownership of presidential records, the PRA also created procedures (to be supplemented by executive branch regulations) governing the creation, preservation, retention, and disposal of presidential records both during and after a presidency. During a presidency, the law requires that a President
take all such steps as may be necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of the President’s constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented and that such records are preserved and maintained as Presidential records.
The incumbent President exercises exclusive responsibility over custody, control, and access to records created during the President’s administration, but these records may not be destroyed except in narrow circumstances. 
After a President leaves office, the Archivist of the United States (the head of NARA) “assume[s] responsibility for the custody, control, and preservation of, and access to, the Presidential records of that President.” Although the PRA provides for the eventual public access to presidential records held by NARA, the law does not permit such access until 5 years after the end of the presidency, and the President may further restrict access to certain categories of documents—for example, records relating to appointments to federal office—for up to 12 years after the President’s term of office ends. Even after the expiration of the 5- or 12-year period, both former and incumbent Presidents may intervene at any time to assert claims of any “constitutionally based privilege” to prevent public access to those records. 
Finally, the PRA contains a special access provision. Under that provision, NARA can, regardless of the previously described temporal limitations, make presidential records available to (1) an incumbent President, if needed for the conduct of official business; (2) the courts, pursuant to subpoena in a criminal or civil proceeding; or (3) to Congress, pursuant to subpoena from a committee of jurisdiction, “if such records contain information that is needed for the conduct of its business and that is not otherwise available.” Access under this provision, however, remains subject to “any rights, defenses, or privileges which the United States or any agency or person [including the President or former President] may invoke.” 
The OLC Opinion
When he signed the PRA, President Jimmy Carter raised no constitutional objections to the new statute and instead noted how the law included an appropriate “safeguard” by providing a legal process for the “resolution of constitutional questions raised by disputes over the release of presidential records.” Subsequent Presidents, though sometimes raising concerns over the role played by executive privilege in disputes over access, have all acknowledged the law’s applicability. On April 1, 2026, however, DOJ posited that the PRA is unconstitutional because it “exceeds Congress’s enumerated and implied powers” and “aggrandizes the Legislative Branch at the expense of the Constitutional independence and autonomy of the Executive.” 
With respect to Congress’s authority, OLC began by noting that every law enacted by Congress must be supported by either an enumerated or implied constitutional power. OLC recounted the long history of Presidents retaining ownership over their documents prior to the 1970s and Congress’s non-intervention in that tradition, which it viewed as a “telling indication” that Congress possesses no such power to regulate presidential records. 
OLC determined that, in its view, the PRA could not be sustained under any of a number of possible sources of authority. The law could not be supported by the Congress’s implied oversight power, it reasoned, because the PRA is “unsupported by any valid legislative need”; or the legislature’s power over agencies, since that power does not extend to the office of the President; or the spending power, since that power cannot be used to “regulate coordinate branches of government”; or the Necessary and Proper Clause, since the law “restricts rather than empowers the President.” 
With respect to Nixon, OLC asserted that the Court’s 1977 opinion is both “distinguishable” and “wrong.” The opinion is distinguishable, according to OLC, because the PRMPA “sought a discrete set of identified materials under extraordinary circumstances” and was therefore a much narrower statute than the PRA, which “establishes a permanent regime governing all presidential records.” In any event, according to OLC, Nixon was also wrongly decided and does not reflect the Court’s current, “more thoughtful approach” to evaluating the separation of powers. The memorandum instead characterized the Nixon opinion as representative of the “ancien regime’ of the Court’s mid-twentieth century’ approach to separation of powers.” The opinion stops short of explicitly calling for Nixon to be overturned, but it does seem to suggest DOJ’s view that Nixon is the type of “fundamentally misguided” decision that the Court may revisit. 
Finally, OLC determined that, because constitutional “infirmit[ies] pervade[] the entire statute,” the “PRA is invalid in its entirety.” As a result, the memorandum concludes, “the President need not further comply with its dictates.”
Counterarguments to the OLC Position
The OLC legal position has supporters but has also been the subject of some criticism. This section notes counterarguments to two specific aspects of the memorandum’s legal reasoning: (1) the determination that the PRA exceeds Congress’s legislative power and (2) the characterization of the PRA as a statute designed to facilitate congressional access to presidential records. 
OLC’s conclusion that Congress lacks authority to enact the PRA is open to at least two counterarguments. First, although OLC is correct that the Court in Nixon did not identify the source of Congress’s power to dictate the custody and preservation of Nixon’s records, the Court explicitly stated in that case that Congress had authority to do so. In arriving at that conclusion, the Court explained that there was “abundant” precedent for congressional regulation of executive branch documents and that these previous statutes had “never been considered invalid as an invasion of [executive] autonomy.” While the earlier statutes applied only to agency records, the Court nevertheless explicitly concluded in Nixon that Congress had a “similar” power over presidential records that was based on its “important interests” to “preserve the materials for legitimate historical and governmental purposes.” “Congress,” the Court held, “can legitimately act to rectify the hit-or-miss approach that has characterized past attempts to protect these substantial interests by entrusting the materials to expert handling by trusted and disinterested professionals.” OLC, as noted above, asserts that this reasoning applies only to the PRMPA and not the PRA, and that it was flawed in that the opinion failed “to appreciate the Article II consequences of permitting Congress to regulate presidential records.”
Second, the OLC opinion did not address what may be Congress’s strongest source of constitutional authority for regulating government records: Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution states that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Although this provision, in light of its reference to “territory or other property,” has often constituted the source of Congress’s power over federal lands and other real property, the Supreme Court has stated that Congress’s “power of regulation and disposition was not confined to territory, but extended to other property belonging to the United States,’ so that the power may be applied . . . to the due regulation of all other personal and real property rightfully belonging to the United States.’” This interpretation of Article IV has roots as far back as Justice Joseph Story’s influential Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, published in 1833. Prior to enactment of the PRMPA and PRA, presidential records were viewed—including at least implicitly by Congress—as the private property of the President that created them. Long after Nixon had left office, for instance, the D.C. Circuit determined that “at the time when PRMPA was passed, President Nixon’s presidential papers were exclusively the property of the President.” As a result, the court held that the PRMPA—though constitutional under Nixon—was a taking of the former President’s property requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. (The DOJ settled with the Nixon estate in 2000, agreeing to pay $18 million for his presidential records.) If, however, presidential records are now government property, as Congress determined they are in the PRA, Article IV may be a source of authority for the congressional regulation of government records, whether held by agencies or the President. 
The National Study Commission on Records and Documents of Federal Officials, an advisory body established as part of the PRMPA to “study problems and questions with respect to the control, disposition, and preservation of records and documents produced by or on behalf of Federal officials,” agreed with this interpretation. The Commission’s final report announced its conclusion that, under Article IV, Section 3, “Congress has the authority to declare documentary materials generated by Federal officials in connection with their official duties to be public property . . . and to provide for their disposition.” Whether a “President, Congressman, or any other elected or appointed public official,” the Commission endorsed the principle that any “individual who seeks or accepts public office should recognize that materials created in the discharge of the business of the public belong to the public.” 
OLC’s characterization of the PRA as a law that empowers Congress at the expense of the President also appears subject to various critiques. The OLC analysis frames the PRA as a congressional attempt to aggrandize its own access to presidential records, rather than regulate the handling of presidential records within the executive branch. This approach allows OLC to marshal separation-of-powers arguments that the Court has applied in the context of congressional investigations, including language from Trump v. Mazars, a case involving congressional access to the personal financial records of a sitting President. This framing also creates a context in which OLC can draw upon principles associated with interbranch comity and the accommodations process—a long-standing arrangement in which congressional access to sensitive executive records is sometimes resolved through good faith negotiation, and compromise. For example, the OLC analysis asserts the PRMPA and the PRA “interrupted” a historical arrangement where “Presidents owned and controlled presidential papers, and Congress obtained such papers through political negotiation and interbranch accommodation.”
Although OLC views the PRA as a tool for Congress to access presidential records, the PRA provides Congress with no right of access to the records of incumbent Presidents and contains only one provision pertaining to congressional access to records of a former President held by the NARA—a provision that similarly governs access by incumbent Presidents and access in litigation through judicial subpoenas. The rest of the law regulates the creation, preservation, and disposition of presidential records by and within the executive branch. As noted above, the law provides the President with exclusive control over his records while in office and then transfers custody of those records to NARA—an executive branch agency—once the President leaves office. This framing of the PRA as a law primarily concerned with record retention and eventual public access, rather than congressional access, is arguably confirmed by the law’s legislative history. The House Report associated with the law identifies the PRA’s dual purposes: 
(1) to establish the public ownership of records created by future presidents and their staffs in the course of discharging their official duties; and (2) to establish procedures governing the preservation and public availability of these records at the end of a Presidential administration. 
The importance of this distinction between congressional regulation of presidential records within the executive branch and congressional access to presidential records was underscored in Nixon. There, the Court indicated that President Nixon’s asserted separation-of-powers concerns were weakened by the “highly relevant” details that “control over the materials remains in the Executive Branch”; that the official charged with administrating the law was a “himself an official of the Executive Branch”; and that the “career archivists” charged with doing an initial screening of presidential records “similarly are Executive Branch employees.” This all remains true under the PRA. 
As described in Nixon, however, the PRMPA, unlike the PRA, did “not make the presidential materials available to the Congress—except insofar as Congressmen are members of the public and entitled to access when the public has it.” In comparison, as noted above, the PRA special access provision gives congressional committees of jurisdiction, along with the incumbent President and the courts, limited access to presidential records once transferred to NARA. Still, the terms of the PRA do not appear to aggrandize Congress’s existing authority to access these records. Instead, the PRA makes clear that access to presidential records by Congress remains “subject to any rights, defenses, or privileges which the United States or any agency or person may invoke,” including executive privilege. Committee access is further restricted by the fact that the committee must articulate how the requested records are “needed for the conduct of its business” and that the records are “not otherwise available.”
As a result, the PRA does not appear to expand Congress’s ability to access presidential records beyond what the body already possesses as part of its constitutional power of inquiry. If, for example, a committee were to request presidential records under the special access provision, both former and incumbent Presidents would be free to invoke any applicable legal privileges to NARA and subsequently ask a court to block Congress from accessing protected records. President Trump, for example, filed such a lawsuit in 2021 when a House investigative committee sought records from his first term. 
Even assuming that, as OLC asserts, congressional access to former Presidents’ records under the PRA’s special access provision was unconstitutional, that determination likely would not free the President from complying with the PRA’s other provisions, especially those on record retention and preservation. The OLC opinion concludes that the entire PRA must fall, since constitutional problems “pervade[] the entire statute,” The Supreme Court has made clear that courts should take a restrained approach when considering the effect one problematic provision has on the rest of the relevant statute. The default rule is to “sever” an unconstitutional provision and permit the rest of the statute to continue in force if the rest of the statute can stand on its own, unless it is evident that Congress would not have enacted the remainder of the statute independently of the invalid part. In light of the purposes articulated by Congress in enacting the PRA—public ownership of presidential records and the preservation of and eventual public access to presidential records—it would appear that the congressional access provision is ancillary to the central purpose of the statute and that the other preservation and ownership provisions can operate independently. Supporting this interpretation, Congress clarified its intent by including a severability clause in the PRA, which explicitly provides that “[i]f any provision of this Act is held invalid for any reason by any court, the validity and legal effect of the remaining provisions shall not be affected thereby.” 
Conclusion
When enacted, the PRMPA and PRA marked a clear shift from private ownership of presidential records to public ownership. Since that time, the PRA has governed the creation and preservation of presidential records, and no court has questioned the law’s facial constitutionality, nor, until the recent OLC opinion, has an incumbent President. Congress has various tools at its disposal if it wishes to respond to the executive branch’s determination that the President is not bound by the PRA, including amending or repealing the PRA or focusing its legislative and oversight powers on the White House’s ongoing compliance with existing law. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11432/LSB11432.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11432.html
IN12693,FEMA Review Council: Final Report,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:38Z,Active,Posts,"Diane P. Horn, Erica A. Lee, Elizabeth M. Webster",,"On Thursday, May 7, 2026, the FEMA Review Council (FRC), established by President Donald J. Trump to undertake a “full-scale review” of the agency, held its final meeting and voted to approve its final report of findings and recommendations. 
Establishment of FEMA Review Council (FRC)
Executive Order (EO) 14180 established the FRC in January 2025 to evaluate FEMA’s operations, staffing levels, alleged political bias, and role in federal emergency management. At approximately the same time, President Trump dismissed all members of the National Advisory Council, which Congress established to advise the Administrator on all aspects of emergency management.
Under the terms of the E.O., the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense co-chaired the FRC; broader membership included FEMA and nonfederal representatives. In past meetings, then-Co-Chair Kristi Noem echoed the President’s calls to eliminate FEMA as it currently exists; other members advocated narrower reforms, including reducing FEMA assistance for smaller disasters. 
The FRC was to publish a report with findings and recommendations in late 2025; subsequent EOs extended this deadline to no later than May 29, 2026. News reports described draft FRC reports and conflicts over proposed reforms, particularly a proposed 50% staffing cut. 
FRC Requests for Information
The FRC solicited information from the public in March 2025 and received more than 11,700 comments. According one outside group’s analysis, most comments were “overwhelmingly supportive ... of maintaining FEMA’s capacity, and of making good-faith reforms.” The FRC summarized the feedback and cited as common problems “bureaucratic inefficiencies, delays in funding, inconsistent program administration, workforce constraints, and insufficient engagement with local governments.” 
Additionally, the FRC reported receiving 1,387 survey responses (from nonfederal and non-governmental partners); engaging 50 states, territories, and at least 20 tribal nations; and conducting 17 listening sessions, including in the District of Columbia.
Selected FRC Report Recommendations 
A summary of selected FRC final approved recommendations and stakeholder perspectives are below.
Evaluating and redistributing FEMA’s workforce beyond DC to “realize ... efficiencies while reducing staff.” Several key emergency management organizations implored the FRC to preserve FEMA’s workforce; according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), recent staff reductions have exacerbated persistent workforce challenges.  
Changing the criteria FEMA uses to evaluate whether the President should declare a major disaster. The FRC proposed increasing the cost thresholds used to evaluate the need for assistance for rebuilding public and nonprofit facilities (i.e., Public Assistance (PA)), to account for inflation. It also proposed simplifying procedures to determining the need for Individual Assistance (IA), using factors like damage to primary residences. In recent years, GAO and FEMA have both determined that PA cost thresholds are too low. On multiple occasions, FEMA has suspended previous proposals to change how it evaluated the need for PA, following significant criticism. FEMA revised the procedures to evaluate the need for IA in 2019 to establish “more objective criteria.” Some states expressed concerns that the revised procedures lack transparency and do not adequately represent a state’s actual financial capacity to manage disasters. 
Transforming PA to an up-front lump-sum formula grant to a state, tribe, or territory (STT) based on hazard characteristics and affected population. This is a change from the current reimbursement-based model based on site-by-site damage assessments. In the new model, STTs would administer project funds, in part to reduce FEMA administrative costs. These changes echo some congressional and industry proposals; though some past awards based on up-front, large-scale estimates have experienced delays and cost overruns. The FRC further recommended implementing sliding scale cost shares for PA and mitigation, to incentivize STT preparedness measures. 
Continuing the move to risk-based pricing for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) through Risk Rating 2.0, with premiums priced on risk to individual properties rather than community profiles. The FRC further recommended that FEMA evaluate the development of a centralized clearinghouse to transfer NFIP policies to private insurers.
Restructuring the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (post-disaster funding to reduce future disaster losses) by modifying advance assistance, available 30 days after a declaration, and prioritizing projects to mitigate repetitive losses and harden critical infrastructure. The future of pre-disaster mitigation funding is not discussed in the FRC report.
Expediting assistance to disaster survivors and reducing overhead costs by consolidating existing IA programs that address housing and other critical disaster-related expenses into a single direct payment for survivors whose homes are rendered uninhabitable that is reflective of the disaster survivor’s needs (with limitations on the assistance amount). The existing IA program is not tied to uninhabitability, and some reports indicate concern that the FRC’s proposed change could mean survivors whose homes are not rendered uninhabitable may be ineligible to receive assistance for certain needs (e.g., funeral expenses, medical costs). The FRC further recommends FEMA focus on emergency/temporary housing and enable STTs and local governments to determine optimal local housing solutions.
Implementation of Recommendations
Executive actions may implement several recommendations including changing FEMA’s criteria to evaluate the need for a major disaster declaration. Other recommendations would more likely require legislation, including many proposed changes to the structure of disaster grants programs. The FRC indicated that it is “imperative” to implement recommendations in a phased approach over two to three years.
Relationship to Proposed Legislative Reforms
Several bills introduced within the 119th Congress (for example, H.R. 3251, H.R. 2247, H.R. 3347, H.R. 316) would fundamentally revise FEMA’s authorities to deliver disaster relief. One bill incorporating fundamental reforms, H.R. 4669, the Fixing Emergency Management for Americans (FEMA) Act of 2025, was ordered to be reported as amended by the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure in September 2025. News reports indicated that Committee leadership planned to advance the FEMA Act of 2025 irrespective of FRC recommendations. No companion legislation has been introduced to date in the Senate; one report indicates that formal Senate action on the bill was likely on hold until the release of the FRC’s findings. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12693/IN12693.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12693.html
IF13228,Department of Labor’s Proposed Regulation on Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives,2026-05-15T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:13Z,Active,Resources,"John J. Topoleski, Elizabeth A. Myers",,"Introduction
The fiduciary standards in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406) require that individuals (referred to as fiduciaries) who make decisions in private-sector pension plans adhere to specified standards of conduct. The standards include an obligation to act prudently and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries. Among the individuals who are fiduciaries are those who choose plan investments in defined contribution (DC) plans (such as 401(k) plans).
In DC plans, participants have individual retirement savings accounts in which contributions by employees, employers, or both are invested. DC plans typically offer their participants a variety of investments, such as mutual funds, collective investment trusts (CITs), target date funds, employer stock, and annuities or other lifetime income products. The investment options that DC plan sponsors provide to their participants are called designated investment alternatives (DIAs).
In recent years, various stakeholders have expressed interest in expanding investment options in 401(k) plans to include alternative assets, such as private investments (e.g., private equity) and digital assets (e.g., cryptocurrencies). Proponents say that the benefits of incorporating these investments include the potential for higher investment returns and increased portfolio diversification. Opponents note the risky and speculative nature of these investments, the high and sometimes opaque nature of private equity fees, and concerns about the liquidity of these investments.
ERISA does not restrict the investments a 401(k) plan sponsor can offer; however, plan sponsors generally act cautiously for a number of reasons, such as the obligation to act prudently and the possibility of lawsuits by plan participants for perceived violations of fiduciary duty. 
Regulatory History
In 1979, DOL issued a regulation titled “Investment Duties,” which said that a fiduciary has satisfied their duties if they have given “appropriate consideration to those facts and circumstances” relevant to the particular investment and has “acted accordingly.”
In recent years, DOL has addressed the use of alternative assets in DC plans. In response to efforts to include cryptocurrency in DC plans, on March 10, 2022, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a Compliance Assistance Release, “401(k) Plan Investments in Cryptocurrencies,’” in which the department expressed  “serious concerns” about plan fiduciaries’ decisions to allow DC plan participants to invest in cryptocurrencies. On May 28, 2025, DOL rescinded the March 2022 compliance release.
Regarding private equity, in a June 3, 2020, Information Letter, DOL indicated that offering “a professionally managed asset allocation fund with a private equity component,” as described in the letter, would not violate the fiduciary’s duties. On December 21, 2021, DOL issued a supplemental statement cautioning its applicability outside of the context of the 2020 Information Letter. On August 12, 2025, DOL rescinded the supplemental statement. 
On August 7, 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order 14330 directing DOL to clarify its “position on alternative assets and the appropriate fiduciary process associated with offering asset allocation funds containing investments in alternative assets under ERISA.” The executive order defined “alternative assets” as private market instruments (such as private equity and private credit that are not traded on public exchanges), real estate, digital assets, commodities, infrastructure projects, and lifetime income investment strategies.
DOL’s 2026 Proposed Regulation
On March 31, 2026, DOL issued a proposed regulation titled “Fiduciary Duties in Selecting Designated Investment Alternatives,” indicating that it “supplements and expands on the 1979 Investment Duties Regulation.” The proposed regulation “clarifies, and provides a safe harbor for, a fiduciary’s duty of prudence” under ERISA “in connection with selecting designated investment alternatives for a participant-directed individual account plan, including asset allocation funds that include alternative assets.” DOL is accepting comments on the proposed regulation through June 1, 2026. 
While E.O. 14330 specifically addressed alternative assets, DOL describes the proposed regulation as “asset neutral” and therefore applicable to any potential DIA. The proposed regulation defines a DIA as an investment alternative “designated by the plan into which participants and beneficiaries may direct the investment of assets held in, or contributed to, their individual accounts, including a qualified default investment alternative.” The proposal specifically excludes brokerage windows from the definition of DIAs. A brokerage window is an arrangement within a DC plan through which participants may purchase a wide range of investments beyond those selected by the plan. About 25% of plans offer brokerage windows.
DOL indicated that the goal of the proposed regulation is “to alleviate certain regulatory burdens and litigation risk that interfere with the ability of American workers to achieve, through their retirement accounts, the competitive returns and asset diversification necessary to secure a dignified and comfortable retirement.” To support this goal, DOL identifies three key principles of the proposal: (1) it affirms ERISA as a law grounded in process, (2) ERISA gives maximum discretion and flexibility to plan fiduciaries in selecting DIAs, and (3) when fiduciaries follow a prudent process, arbiters of disputes should defer to fiduciaries under a presumption of prudence.
The proposal begins with a discussion of the general duties of prudence by plan fiduciaries and statements that selecting DIAs is a fiduciary act and that prudent fiduciaries have maximum discretion to select investments to further the purposes of the plan. DOL notes that there is no requirement or restriction on DIAs that are otherwise legal. For example, a plan could not include an investment in a  sanctioned program or country. 
The proposal notes that fiduciaries have the “duty to act prudently when establishing a plan investment menu to maximize risk-adjusted returns” and that prudence “requires appropriate consideration of all relevant factors.”
Safe Harbor Factors in the Proposed Regulation
The proposal provides a process-based safe harbor for fiduciaries to use when selecting DIAs. DOL identifies six (non-exhaustive) factors for a fiduciary to “objectively, thoroughly, and analytically” consider when selecting DIAs. If fiduciaries follow the process with respect to the factors (which may include relying on recommendations from outside fiduciaries), then “the plan fiduciary’s judgment with respect to the particular factor or factors, including the relationship between the factors, is presumed to have met the duties” in ERISA.
The six factors in the proposed regulation include performance, fees, liquidity, complexity, performance benchmarks, and valuation. Within the six factors, the proposal provides 20 examples in total as illustrations of what DOL believes would (and would not) be considered prudent processes. The factors are summarized as follows:
Performance. DOL indicates that fiduciaries do not have to try to achieve the highest absolute returns. Rather, this factor says to consider the “risk-adjusted expected returns, over an appropriate time-horizon, of the designated investment alternative, net of anticipated fees and expenses.”
Fees. DOL notes that fiduciaries are not required to choose DIAs with the lowest fees. Rather they must determine that the fees are “appropriate, taking into account its risk-adjusted expected returns and any other value” that the DIA brings to the plan. DOL says that “a prudent plan fiduciary could choose to pay more in exchange for greater services.”
Liquidity. Liquidity refers to how easily an investment can be bought or sold. Some investments, such as mutual funds, are considered liquid because they can be redeemed for cash quickly, while others, such as annuities, may restrict or impose fees when cashing out. The proposal says that fiduciaries must consider whether the DIA has sufficient liquidity to be able to meet both the plan’s liquidity needs (such as a change in the plan’s investment menu) and participants’ liquidity needs (such as withdrawals). The proposal notes that “because participant-directed individual account plans are long-term retirement savings vehicles, particularly for participants early in their careers, there is no requirement that a fiduciary select only fully liquid products.”
Valuation. The DIA must be “capable of being timely and accurately valued in accordance with the needs of the plan.” Securities that are not publicly traded must be “valued through a conflict-free, independent process no less frequently than quarterly, according to procedures that satisfy” Financial Accounting Standards Board Topic 820.
Performance Benchmarks. Each DIA must have a meaningful benchmark in order to evaluate the performance of the DIA. The proposed regulation defines a meaningful benchmark as “an investment, strategy, index, or other comparator that has similar mandates, strategies, objectives, and risks to the designated investment alternative.”
Complexity. The fiduciary must determine that it has the skill to evaluate the complexity of DIAs and, if not, then it “must seek assistance from a qualified investment advice fiduciary, investment manager, or other individual.” The proposal provides examples of complexity as fees in private assets and participant needs (such as choosing appropriate investments based on participants’ characteristics such as ages and risk tolerances).
Skidmore Deference
The proposal suggests that the “regulation should carry persuasive weight to courts under Skidmore [Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)].” Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright v. Raimondo [603 U.S. 369 (2024)], courts no longer defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute, but courts may give such interpretations “due respect,” under Skidmore, based on the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning and the agency’s expertise. In its proposal, DOL suggests that courts should find the agency’s reasoning persuasive such “that fiduciaries that comply with the regulation should be found to have followed a prudent process.” 
Duty to Monitor DIAs
The proposed regulation does not address the duty to monitor DIAs at regular intervals after their selection, and DOL notes that it anticipates issuing interpretive guidance on this in the near term. It says that DOL “generally is of the view that the factors and processes (or substantially similar factors and processes) outlined in the proposed regulation—including the illustrative safe harbor examples—apply to this ongoing duty.”",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13228/IF13228.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13228.html
R48947,Department of Transportation FY2027 Funding Request,2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:20Z,Active,Reports,"William J. Mallett, John Frittelli, Ben Goldman, Ali E. Lohman, Jennifer J. Marshall, Naseeb A. Souweidane, Rachel Y. Tang",,"The Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for the federal regulation and funding of most modes of U.S. transportation. DOT is mainly organized into operating administrations that each oversee a mode of transportation (e.g., Federal Aviation Administration [FAA]) or maintain responsibility for a certain aspect of transportation (e.g., Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration). Two DOT offices—the Office of the Secretary (OST) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG)—have department-wide responsibilities. DOT also includes the Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation (GLSDC), a wholly owned government corporation that operates and maintains two locks on the St. Lawrence Seaway and other aspects of navigation infrastructure.
The Trump Administration’s FY2027 budget request for DOT by operating administration and office was released in April 2026. This report compares the President’s request with FY2026 enacted funding. This report also presents enacted funding for FY2022-FY2025 to provide additional context for the funding request. For surface transportation modes, FY2022-FY2026 is the period covered by the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA; P.L. 117-58), which authorizes federal spending on surface transportation. Congress reportedly is developing new surface transportation reauthorization legislation, but such legislation had not been introduced as of the publication of this report. For aviation, FY2022-FY2026 spans time periods covered by the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-254) and the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (P.L. 118-63). (FAA is the Federal Aviation Administration.) CRS derived requested and enacted funding data primarily from DOT’s “budget estimates” documents. 
Overall, DOT’s budget request for FY2027 ($113.9 billion) is 23% lower than FY2026 enacted funding ($148.5 billion). The reduction comes mainly from
the absence of a Trump Administration request for the provision of multiyear advance appropriations beyond FY2026 (as was provided in Division J of the IIJA), which would be a reduction of about $12.9 billion for Amtrak and other railroad grants alone;
a requested reduction in annual appropriations for the Federal Transit Administration’s (FTA’s) Capital Investment Grant Program from $1.7 billion in FY2026 to $1.2 billion for FY2027;
a requested reduction in annual appropriations for OST’s National Infrastructure Investments from $145 million in FY2026 to $0 for FY2027; and
a requested reduction in annual appropriations to OST for the Essential Air Service program from $514 million in FY2026 to $142 million for FY2027. 
DOT’s budget request proposes a funding increase for some of its areas of responsibility, including funding increases for
FAA to hire more air traffic controllers,
shipbuilding programs administered by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), and
OST to establish a “DC Safe & Beautiful Fund.”
The FY2027 budget request would increase DOT full-time equivalent (FTE) staff by about 1,400, from 52,600 in FY2026 to 54,000 in FY2027. Most of the increase would come from adding employees at FAA. MARAD FTE staff also would increase. The budget request would reduce FTEs in most other administrations and offices, mainly expected from centralization of some administrative support services (e.g., information technology) in OST. According to data from DOT, some modal administrations had fewer staff in FY2026 than in FY2025. The agencies that experienced some of the largest staff reductions in percentage terms from FY2025 to FY2026 were the Federal Highway Administration (-24%), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (-23%), FTA (-20%), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (-10%), and Federal Railroad Administration (-9%). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48947/R48947.10.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48947.html
R48946,National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) FY2027 Budget and Policy Issues: In Brief,2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:19Z,Active,Reports,"Anya L. Fink, Mary Beth D. Nikitin",,"The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is a semiautonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). NNSA is responsible for maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, carrying out nuclear nonproliferation activities and nuclear and radiological emergency response, and providing nuclear reactors and fuel to the U.S. Navy. (For additional information on NNSA and its sites, see CRS Report R48194, The U.S. Nuclear Security Enterprise: Background and Possible Issues for Congress.)
For FY2027, NNSA requested $32.80 billion—$7.40 billion (29%) more than the FY2026 enacted discretionary amount of $25.40 billion. Of this, $27.44 billion was requested for programs related to development, production, certification, and maintenance of the U.S. nuclear warhead stockpile (i.e., the Weapons Activities account) and $2.39 billion for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear counterterrorism (i.e., the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation account). NNSA also requested $2.39 billion for the Naval Reactors program, carried out in collaboration with the U.S. Navy, and $577.10 million for NNSA federal salaries and expenses. 
Congress generally authorizes funding for NNSA in an annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and provides funding for NNSA through an annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. In authorizations and appropriations hearings for NNSA’s FY2027 budget request, some Members have discussed oversight issues, such as proposed funding increases and warhead development activities in the Weapons Activities budget, NNSA’s plutonium pit production strategy and costs, proposed cuts to the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation budget and staff, costs and schedules of NNSA projects, NNSA’s long-range plans to modernize infrastructure, NNSA’s potential contributions to the monitoring and verification of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and U.S. policy on testing nuclear weapons. This report profiles NNSA’s FY2027 budget request and tracks selected legislative activity. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48946/R48946.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48946.html
LSB11431,Congressional Redistricting: High Court Narrows Voting Rights Act in Louisiana v. Callais,2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T17:54:44Z,Active,Posts,L. Paige Whitaker,,"On April 29, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Callais significantly narrowed the circumstances under which a racial vote dilution challenge to a redistricting map can be made under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended (VRA). In Callais, the Court held that the State of Louisiana engaged in an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander” when it created a second majority-minority district in its congressional redistricting map to comply with Section 2. Applying standards revised in Callais, the Court determined that because Section 2 did not require the creation of the second majority-minority district, there was no compelling governmental interest that justified the state’s use of racial considerations in creating the map. In so ruling, the Court held that Section 2 is violated “only when the evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” 
This Legal Sidebar provides a brief history of Section 2 of the VRA in the context of redistricting and related legal framework, discusses the lower court litigation and the Supreme Court ruling in Callais, and offers some considerations for Congress.
Section 2 of the VRA and Legal Framework
Ratified in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that the right “to vote shall not be denied or abridged” based on race or color, and provides Congress with the authority “to enforce” the Amendment “by appropriate legislation.” Invoking that authority in 1965, Congress enacted the VRA to achieve the Fifteenth Amendment’s goal of bringing “an end to the denial of the right to vote based on race.” 
A key provision of the VRA, Section 2, prohibits discriminatory voting practices or procedures, including those alleged to diminish or weaken minority voting power (known as minority vote dilution). Section 2 prohibits any voting qualification or practice applied or imposed by any state or political subdivision (e.g., a city or county) that results in the “denial or abridgement” of the right to vote based on race, color, or membership in a language minority. The statute further provides that a violation is established if, “based on the totality of circumstances,” electoral processes “are not equally open to participation by members of” a racial or language minority group in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to elect representatives of their choice.
Section 2 has been invoked primarily to challenge congressional and state legislative redistricting maps in vote dilution cases. The Supreme Court has previously interpreted Section 2, under certain circumstances described in more detail below, to require the creation of one or more majority-minority districts in a redistricting map. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. In earlier cases, the Court determined that the creation of such districts can avoid minority vote dilution by helping ensure that racial or language minority groups are not submerged into the majority and thereby denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice.
The 1986 landmark Supreme Court ruling in Thornburg v. Gingles established three preconditions that challengers to redistricting maps alleging racial vote dilution under Section 2 must meet: (1) “the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district”; (2) “the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive”; and (3) the minority group “must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Subsequent Supreme Court case law explained that the first Gingles precondition requires that a district be “reasonably configured,” which requires adherence to traditional redistricting criteria, such as being reasonably compact and contiguous. After meeting the three preconditions, Gingles further provided that a challenger must demonstrate, based on “the totality of the circumstances,” that the political process is not “equally open” to minority voters. 
In cases following Gingles, some redistricting maps that were created to comport with Section 2 were challenged as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In such challenges, if racial considerations are the “predominant factor” in how a map is designed, then courts apply a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review that requires the government to show that the map is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Case law in this area has thus signaled a possible tension between complying with the VRA and conforming to standards of equal protection.
Lower Court Litigation in Louisiana v. Callais
The dispute in Callais began when the Louisiana legislature redrew its congressional map following the 2020 census and created one majority-minority district out of the six congressional districts apportioned to the state. Voters in the state and civil rights organizations sued in federal district court, arguing that Section 2 required the creation of two majority-minority districts. Following litigation, the Louisiana legislature redrew the congressional redistricting map, creating a second majority-minority district.
In another Louisiana federal district court, self-described “non-Black voters” in the state sued, arguing that the newly redrawn map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. After determining that considerations of race predominated in drawing the second majority-minority district, a divided three-judge federal district court panel applied a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review, requiring the creation of the district to be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” Assuming without deciding that compliance with Section 2 was a compelling interest for the creation of a second majority-minority district, the district court determined that such compliance would be “narrowly tailored” if it comported with the requirements set forth in Gingles for proving a Section 2 vote dilution claim and thereby seeking the creation of one or more majority-minority districts in a redistricting map. 
In Callais, the district court determined that the challenged majority-minority district did not meet the first Gingles precondition because, in view of “the State’s Black population [being] dispersed,” the legislature created the district “as a bizarre’ 250-mile-long slash-shaped district that functions as a majority-minority district only because it severs and absorbs majority-minority neighborhoods from cities and parishes all the way from Baton Rouge to Shreveport.” Therefore, the district court held that the map was “an impermissible racial gerrymander” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined the State from using the map for any election. The Supreme Court stayed the decision pending an appeal. The State of Louisiana appealed to the Supreme Court under a provision of federal law permitting direct appeals from district court three-judge panels. In November 2024, the Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated Louisiana v. Callais with the related case, Robinson v. Callais. 
Supreme Court Ruling in Louisiana v. Callais
On April 29, 2026, in a major decision, the Supreme Court in Louisiana v. Callais held that the State of Louisiana engaged in an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander” when it created a second majority-minority district to comply with Section 2 of the VRA. The Court determined that Section 2, as interpreted by the Court in Callais, did not require the creation of the second majority-minority district and, therefore, there was no compelling governmental interest justifying the state’s use of racial considerations in drawing the district. The Supreme Court accordingly affirmed the district court’s judgment in the case and remanded. 
In sum, the Court in Callais established a more stringent standard that a challenger to a redistricting map alleging racial vote dilution under Section 2 must meet. Prior to Callais, as discussed above, a challenger was required to show that the design of a redistricting map resulted in minority vote dilution by meeting the standards set forth in Gingles, among other requirements. In Callais, the Court determined that to comport with the Fifteenth Amendment, a challenger now needs to present evidence that “supports a strong inference” that a state intentionally created a redistricting map that provides minority voters with less opportunity to elect preferred candidates. In so ruling, the Court determined that the Gingles standards required an update to align with the text of Section 2 and to reflect changes in society that have occurred since the Court decided Gingles in 1986. As a result of the Court’s modifications to the Gingles standards, Section 2 challengers now must show that a state drew a redistricting map based on racial, and not political, considerations and present evidence of current-day, intentional voting discrimination that is based on race.
Majority Opinion
Writing for the Court, Justice Alito reviewed the legal framework that existed when the Callais litigation began. As the Court explained, while states in racial gerrymandering lawsuits have asserted that compliance with Section 2 provides a compelling governmental interest under a strict scrutiny standard of review, the Supreme Court has assumed without deciding that the VRA could provide a compelling governmental interest. In Callais, the Court held that compliance with Section 2, only “as properly construed” by the Court in the case, provides a compelling reason for race-based redistricting. 
The Court held that Section 2 is violated “only when the evidence supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” According to the Court, in any legislation enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, there needs to be “a congruence and proportionality” between the constitutional guarantee sought to be enforced and the law enacted to accomplish that goal. In view of the Court’s long-held determination that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits only state action that is taken with a discriminatory intent, the Court reasoned that any law seeking to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment likewise must focus on intentional discrimination. Therefore, the Court concluded, so long as Section 2 serves to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination that is intentional, it is congruent and proportional. 
The Court emphasized that Section 2 “does not demand a finding of intentional discrimination.” Instead, according to the Court, Section 2 “imposes liability only when the circumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred.” As an example, the Court envisioned a circumstance in which, after applying the state’s redistricting algorithm, the resulting computer-generated maps contained majority-minority districts that the state rejected without a valid reason. In such an instance, the Court said there would be a strong inference of racial motivation and therefore, the Fifteenth Amendment would authorize the imposition of Section 2 liability without necessitating a court to ascertain if the “the state legislature as an institution as opposed to certain individual members or the State’s hired mapmaker, was motivated by race.” In contrast, the Court explained, the Fifteenth Amendment does not authorize Section 2 to invalidate a map simply because it does not contain one or more majority-minority districts.
In the Court’s view, Section 2 does not apply when a state creates a redistricting map on the basis of factors unrelated to race. These factors include, as the Court outlined, traditional redistricting criteria such as creating compact and contiguous district boundaries, maintaining political subdivisions, preserving existing districts, and protecting incumbents. In that same vein, the Court stressed that Section 2 cannot be invoked to counter the constitutionally permissible goal of partisan gerrymandering. According to the Court, when a state defends its redistricting map as a partisan gerrymander, challengers are required to “disentangle race from politics’ by proving that the former drove a district’s lines.’” In so doing, the Court announced that the challenger must be able to exclude the possibility that partisan goals animated how a district was drawn, and if either race or politics could account for how a district is drawn, a challenger will not prevail.
Turning to the three-pronged Gingles framework for proving racial vote dilution under Section 2, the Court in Callais determined that an “update” was needed so that it comports with the text of the statute and reflects developments in society that have occurred since the Court decided Gingles in 1986. In that vein, the Court cited four historical developments. First, the Court observed that “vast social change” has occurred throughout the nation, specifically in southern states where many challenges under Section 2 have arisen, resulting in Black-voter participation at similar or higher levels as the remainder of the electorate. 
Second, the Court contrasted the current two-party system in states where Section 2 suits are most frequently filed with the one-party system that was in place in 1986 in the area in which the Gingles case arose. According to the Court, in that time and place, “an overwhelming majority of white voters did not vote for any black candidate in the Democratic party primary elections,” where the ultimate general election winners were chosen; and in general elections, “white voters in heavily Democratic areas often ranked black candidates last among Democrats.” Such disparities in voting—within the same political party—demonstrated that minority voters had less opportunity to elect candidates of choice due to their race, not due to their party affiliation, the Court observed. Today, by comparison, in areas where both major political parties are strong and where there is a high correlation between party preference and the race of a voter, the Court warned that a challenger “can easily exploit §2 for partisan purposes.” 
Third, the Court stated that as a result of its 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, holding that claims of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering are not justiciable in federal court, federal law permits states to draw districts for partisan advantage. As a result, without an update to the Gingles framework, the Court reasoned that a challenger to a redistricting map under Section 2, in areas where party affiliation and race are closely correlated, could unacceptably disguise a partisan gerrymandering claim as racial vote dilution claim.  
Fourth, the Court observed that since Gingles was decided in 1986, advancements in the use of computers in the redistricting process have occurred. Therefore, the Court reasoned that challengers to redistricting maps under Section 2 can rely on computer technology to generate large numbers of maps that achieve a state’s traditional redistricting goals while also establishing “greater racial balance,” if such a map is possible to produce.
Informed by the four historical developments, the Court modified the three preconditions set forth in Gingles and the “totality of circumstances” showing that a plaintiff needs to make in a Section 2 vote dilution case. With modification, the Court indicated that the first Gingles precondition is now met when challengers produce an alternative map containing a proposed majority-minority district that does not “use race as a districting criterion” and complies with the state’s “legitimate districting objectives,” such as traditional redistricting criteria. The Court explained that if the state’s goals involve partisan gerrymandering, protection of incumbents, or other goals that are constitutionally permissible, then the challengers must produce an alternative map that likewise achieves those goals. If challengers cannot produce such a map, then the challengers have failed to show that the state’s redistricting map was prompted by racial considerations, in the Court’s view.
The modified second and third Gingles preconditions are now met, the Court held, when challengers show “that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” The Court went on to explain that if a challenger can provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation, that will be crucial for distinguishing between a district that was drawn for political as opposed to for racial purposes. Finally, the Court determined that the “totality of circumstances” analysis needs to focus on evidence relating to current-day intentional discrimination in voting based on race, as prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment, and not on racial discrimination that occurred in the past. The Court acknowledged that it may be difficult for challengers to present such evidence because the VRA has been successful in ending racial discrimination in voting.
Applying the revised legal framework to the second majority-minority district in Louisiana, the Supreme Court concluded that the facts in the case required affirmance of the district court ruling. The Court indicated that strict scrutiny applied “because the State’s underlying goal was racial” in creating the redistricting map, and accordingly, the state had to prove that its use of racial considerations was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Under strict scrutiny review, the Court determined that there was no compelling interest justifying the use of race because it was unnecessary for the state to create a second majority-minority district to comport with Section 2. Applying the newly revised first prong of the Gingles framework, the Court found that the challengers did not meet the standard because they failed to produce an alternative map that met the state’s non-racial goals—specifically, the state’s political goals—including incumbency protection. Likewise, the Court said that the challengers did not meet the second and third prongs of Gingles because, to prove racially polarized voting, the challengers presented “evidence that black and white voters consistently supported different candidates, but their analysis did not control for partisan preferences.” Further, even if the challengers had met the updated Gingles framework, the Court determined that they still would not have demonstrated “an objective likelihood of intentional discrimination” under a totality of the circumstances analysis. The Court concluded that because Section 2 did not require the State of Louisiana to create a second majority-minority district, there was no compelling governmental interest that justified the state’s use of race in creating the redistricting map, and therefore, held the map “an unconstitutional gerrymander.”
Concurrence
Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence, joined by Justice Gorsuch, criticizing prior Supreme Court cases that he viewed as interpreting Section 2 of the VRA in a manner that “effectively g[ave] racial groups an entitlement to roughly proportional representation.’” By construing Section 2 to authorize the creation of congressional districts “along racial lines,” Justice Thomas maintained that the Court had “rendered §2 repugnant to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.’” Justice Thomas also argued, as he did more than 30 years ago in Holder v. Hall, that he would have gone further than the Court in Callais to hold that Section 2, based on its statutory text, does not apply to redistricting maps.
Dissent
Justice Kagan wrote a dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, criticizing the Court majority in Callais for having made “a nullity of Section 2 and threaten[ing] a half-century’s worth of gains in voting equality.” Instead of providing an “update” to Section 2, Justice Kagan characterized the Court in Callais as “eviscerat[ing] the law.” Justice Kagan argued that as a result of the Court’s ruling, a challenger to a redistricting map under Section 2 not only needs to prove vote dilution, but also a “race-based motive,” which is “nearly impossible.” When a state defends a map in court that creates racial vote dilution, unless there is “smoking-gun evidence of race-based motive,” Justice Kagan maintained that a “State need do nothing more than announce a partisan gerrymander.”
Considerations for Congress
The Supreme Court decision in Louisiana v. Callais significantly limits the circumstances in which states can constitutionally be required, under Section 2 of the VRA, to create majority-minority districts in congressional, state, and local redistricting maps. Specifically, the Court in Callais modified what a challenger to a redistricting map must show to prove racial vote dilution under Section 2: “evidence [that] supports a strong inference that the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity because of their race.” The Court’s ruling in Callais will likely affect how redistricting maps are drawn in the future. Existing majority-minority districts that were designed to comport with Section 2 might be challenged as unconstitutional racial gerrymanders in view of Callais. More immediately, prompted by the ruling, some state legislatures are considering or have already enacted modifications to their redistricting maps that eliminate majority-minority districts for the upcoming 2026 congressional elections. 
If Congress seeks to respond to the Supreme Court ruling in Callais, within the bounds of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress could enact race-neutral standards for congressional redistricting maps. For example, in the current Congress, legislation has been introduced that would require states to establish independent congressional redistricting commissions to combat partisan gerrymandering, prohibit mid-decade redistricting, and require at-large congressional elections. Congress might also choose to consider race-neutral amendments to the VRA or further prohibitions on intentional racial discrimination in elections. Alternatively, Congress could choose to amend Section 2 of the VRA to codify the modified Gingles framework from Callais or the modified evidentiary standard for Section 2 claims.  ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11431/LSB11431.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11431.html
IF13227,The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA),2026-05-14T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T13:53:13Z,Active,Resources,"Elizabeth Weber Handwerker, Jon O. Shimabukuro",Labor Standards,"Introduction
The McNamara-O’Hara Service Contract Act (SCA) of 1965, 41 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6707, requires the payment of locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits to employees working pursuant to contracts that
are made by the federal government or the District of Columbia;
involve an amount greater than $2,500; and
have a principal purpose of furnishing nonconstruction services in the United States by service employees.
The SCA was intended to establish labor standards for service employees who were generally not covered at the time by the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) or by state minimum wage laws. Because, at the time of passage, federal contracts were typically awarded to the lowest bidder and labor costs were the predominant factor in most service contracts, companies providing the lowest wages were more likely to be successful. The Johnson Administration advocated for service contract proposals in Congress, saying they would prevent low-bid federal contracts from depressing wages.
This In Focus examines the SCA and how it is currently implemented and enforced by the Wage and Hour Division (WHD) of the Department of Labor (DOL).
Coverage
Service Employees
The SCA defines a service employee as “an individual engaged in the performance of a contract made by the Federal Government ... the principal purpose of which is to furnish services in the United States.” The definition does not encompass those determined to be “bona fide executive, administrative, or professional” employees for purposes of the FLSA. Typical covered positions include cooks, medical assistants, and gardeners. 
Covered Contracts
The SCA applies to contracts exceeding $2,500 for services furnished in the “United States,” which includes any state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Outer Continental Shelf, American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Wake Island, and Johnston Island. The SCA does not apply on military bases within foreign countries. 
The SCA does not apply to contracts for construction services (many of which are covered instead by the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931); purchases of goods (many of which are covered by the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act of 1936); the carriage of freight or personnel; the furnishing of services by radio, telephone, telegraph, or cable companies; public utility services; and the operation of postal contract stations. It also does not apply to employment contracts for direct services to a federal agency by an individual.
Typical examples of covered service contracts involve the provision of guard services, janitorial services, cafeteria services in federal buildings, and the provision of call centers answering questions about federal programs.
Wage Determinations and Other Requirements
Monetary Wages
WHD generally determines prevailing wages using median (or sometimes mean) wages for the occupation and locality as estimated annually by the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Wage determinations may also be based on wage rates included in collective bargaining agreements, where they have been determined to prevail in a locality for specified occupational classes of employees. When changes in prevailing wage determinations increase or decrease employee compensation during a multiyear service contract, a contractor may request an adjustment in the price of the service contract.
Wage determinations can be affected by executive action involving federal contracts. In 2014, Executive Order (E.O.) 13658 established an hourly wage floor of $10.10 for workers performing work on federal contracts, including those subject to the SCA, beginning on January 1, 2015, with annual adjustments for inflation thereafter. In 2021, E.O. 14026 established a higher hourly wage floor for service contracts beginning January 30, 2022. In 2025, Section 2(d) of E.O. 14236 revoked E.O. 14026, but the earlier E.O. 13658 remains in effect for some multiyear service contracts awarded between January 1, 2015, and January 29, 2022. The hourly wage floor for workers on these contracts has been adjusted for inflation to $13.65 per hour (unless the prevailing wage is higher).
Federal agencies must obtain wage determinations for every new service contract, extension, or major modification. These determinations (which list required wages and benefits) are available for most commonly employed occupations by locality at sam.gov; where they are not already published, agencies request wage determinations from WHD. The sam.gov website also links to the SCA Directory of Occupations, which describes work done in each occupational classification so that agency staff can select the most appropriate wage determination for each position.
Fringe Benefits
The SCA requires contractors to provide covered workers with locally prevailing fringe benefits, such as pensions, health insurance, and life insurance benefits that are not otherwise required by federal, state, or local law. Since 1997, WHD has determined the dollar amount of required health and welfare benefits using the benefits component of the BLS Employment Cost Index (ECI) for all employees in private industry rather than through an evaluation of the fringe benefits commonly provided for individual occupations in each locality. The SCA allows the Secretary of Labor to deviate from the requirement that fringe benefits be determined for various classes of service employees in a locality when it is “necessary and proper in the public interest.” 
In July 2025, WHD updated the benefit rate to $5.55 per hour. Employers may either pay this amount directly to employees or pay a third party to provide these benefits. Under E.O. 13706, certain federal contractors are required to provide paid sick leave to their employees. The fringe benefit rate for employers subject to the SCA and the E.O. is $5.09 per hour. Hawaii state law uniquely requires most employers to provide health insurance coverage for their employees, and costs associated with providing this benefit are deducted from the nationwide fringe benefit rate. The required SCA fringe benefit rate in Hawaii is $2.42 per hour ($1.96 per hour for employers subject to the SCA and E.O. 13706).
The SCA also requires service contracts to provide vacation and holiday pay for workers “as determined ... to be prevailing for such employees in the locality.” SCA vacation benefits are often linked to length of service, for example, “2 weeks paid vacation after 1 year of service, 3 weeks after 5 years, and 4 weeks after 15 years.” In addition, many SCA wage determinations require paid federal holidays. The value of these benefits is not included in the health and welfare benefits described above. 
Additional Requirements
The SCA requires contractors to maintain safe and sanitary workplaces and requires that employees receive notices of required compensation. DOL regulations mandate recordkeeping for contractors to show they have complied with the prevailing wage and fringe benefit requirements. New contractors providing substantially similar services as a previous contractor with a unionized workforce are required to pay wages and benefits no lower than those provided under an existing collective bargaining agreement. For multiyear contracts, the SCA requires adjustment of wages and fringe benefits at least every two years.
Enforcement
WHD enforces the SCA by conducting investigations of alleged violations. If WHD determines that a contractor has failed to pay the appropriate wage and fringe benefits, it can withhold payments due on the contract or on any other contract between the federal government and the same contractor, and use withheld payments to compensate employees in compliance with the SCA. If the withheld payments are insufficient to compensate the employees, the federal government may bring an action against the contractor in any court of competent jurisdiction. Federal courts have confirmed that the SCA does not confer a private right of action; that is, an employee may not sue the contractor for unpaid wages or fringe benefits.
A contracting agency may cancel its contract with a contractor that has violated the SCA on written notice to the contractor and execute a new contract for another entity to complete the contracted work. Added costs associated with the new contract may be charged to the original contractor.
The SCA directs the Comptroller General to distribute a list of entities that have violated the SCA to federal agencies. Unless the Secretary of Labor determines unusual circumstances warrant further contracting, an entity on the list may not be awarded another federal contract for three years from the list’s publication date. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has indicated that, subject to the reasonable application of the Secretary’s guidelines, unusual circumstances may exist when a violation was not willful and there is no history of past violations. 
Information on WHD enforcement of the SCA since FY2013 is available on the WHD website. Over the period from FY2013 to FY2025, the number of SCA compliance actions declined from 916 to 387 compliance actions per year. WHD enforcement data available since FY2005 show 2%-4% of the violations WHD identified each year were SCA violations. On average, identified SCA violations involved about 30 employees, with an average amount of back pay owed per employee of about $2,750. A 2020 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found the most common type of SCA violation identified by WHD during FY2014–FY2019 was underpayment of fringe benefits. This report recommended improvements in communication between WHD and federal contracting agencies regarding SCA violations and debarments. 
Relevant Legislative Proposals
Legislation that would have adjusted the monetary threshold for SCA applicability and either expanded or limited the law’s coverage has been introduced in Congresses since 2017. The Service Contract Modernization Act, introduced in the 117th (S. 2963) and 118th Congresses (S. 335), would have adjusted the SCA’s $2,500 threshold for inflation in future applications. The Outdoor Recreation Enhancement Act, introduced in the 115th Congress (H.R. 2771), would have amended the SCA to exempt contracts with the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agriculture involving outdoor recreational activities. In the 119th Congress, the Strengthening Job Corps Act of 2025 (H.R. 2281) would codify the SCA’s application to Job Corps operators and service providers and extend its requirements to academic and career technical instructional employees on federal contracts. These employees generally are not subject to the SCA because of their exempt status under the FLSA.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13227/IF13227.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13227.html
R48945,Housing Cost Burdens in 2024: In Brief,2026-05-13T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T10:38:04Z,Active,Reports,"Mark P. Keightley, Maggie McCarty","Homeownership & Housing Finance, Housing-Related Assistance to Communities & Tribes, Public & Assisted Housing, U.S. Economy",This report uses the 2024 American Community Survey to quantify the prevalence of housing cost burden in the United States in 2024. The report describes differences in housing cost burden rates among renters and homeowners across various demographic groups and income brackets. ,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48945/R48945.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48945.html
IN12692,U.S. Aircraft Combat Losses in Operation Epic Fury: Considerations for Congress,2026-05-13T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T16:38:00Z,Active,Posts,"Jennifer DiMascio, Daniel M. Gettinger","Fighter Aircraft, Air, Land, Sea, Space & Projection Forces, Defense Authorization, Defense Budgets & Appropriations, Defense Readiness, Training, Logistics & Installations","Overview
On February 28, 2026, the United States, in coordination with Israel, initiated military operations against Iran under the designation Operation Epic Fury (OEF). The conflict has involved air, maritime, and missile combat engagements across the Middle East. The pace of combat activity declined amid a ceasefire in April. Within weeks, some strikes resumed, and conditions remain fluid. 
The Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation,” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025) has not published a comprehensive assessment of combat losses in OEF. During a May 12, 2026, hearing, Acting Pentagon Comptroller Jules W. Hurst III testified that the department’s cost estimate for military operations in Iran has increased to $29 billion. “A lot of that increase comes from having a refined estimate on repair or replacement costs for equipment,” he said. 
Listed here are 42 fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, including uncrewed aircraft (i.e., drones), reportedly lost or damaged in OEF, according to news reports and statements by DOD and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). The number of aircraft damaged or destroyed may remain subject to revision due to multiple factors, which may include classification, ongoing combat activity, and attribution.
Reports of OEF Aircraft Losses and Damage 
Four F-15E Strike Eagle fighter aircraft
On March 2, 2026, CENTCOM reported that three F-15Es were shot down and destroyed by friendly fire over Kuwait; all six aircrew ejected safely and were recovered.
On April 5, 2026, CENTCOM reported that one F-15E was shot down and destroyed during combat operations over Iran; both aircrew were safely recovered during separate search-and-rescue operations.
One F-35A Lightning II fighter aircraft
A March 19, 2026, news article reported that Iranian ground fire damaged one F-35A during combat operations over Iran. 
One A-10 Thunderbolt II ground-attack aircraft
In an April 6, 2026, news conference, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force General Dan Caine stated that on April 3, enemy fire struck one A-10 that subsequently crashed and was destroyed during search-and-rescue operations; the pilot ejected and was recovered safely. 
Seven KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft
On March 12, 2026, CENTCOM reported that two KC-135s were involved in an incident over friendly airspace; one aircraft crashed in Iraq, resulting in the deaths of all six aircrew. The second KC-135 made an emergency landing at an undisclosed location in the region where U.S. forces are hosted. 
A March 14, 2026, news article reported that five KC-135s were damaged while on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during an Iranian missile and drone attack.
One E-3 Sentry airborne early warning-and-control system aircraft (AWACS)
A March 28, 2026, news article reported that one E-3 was struck and damaged while on the ground at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia, during an Iranian missile and drone attack. A May 7, 2026, news article reported that the E-3 had been parked on an unprotected taxiway.
Two MC-130J Commando II special operations aircraft
An April 5, 2026, news article reported that two MC-130Js supporting search-and-rescue operations for a downed F-15E were intentionally destroyed on the ground in Iran after becoming unable to depart; all aircrew were safely evacuated. 
One HH-60W Jolly Green II combat search-and-rescue helicopter
On April 6, 2026, General Caine said in a press conference that on April 5, one HH-60W sustained damage from small-arms fire supporting search-and-rescue operations for a downed F-15E in Iran. 
Twenty-four MQ-9 Reaper medium-altitude long-endurance uncrewed aircraft
An April 9, 2026, news article reported that the U.S. military had lost 24 MQ-9 Reapers since the start of U.S. military operations against Iran.
One MQ-4C Triton high-altitude long-endurance uncrewed aircraft
An April 14, 2026, news article citing a U.S. Navy document reported that one MQ-4C crashed in a mishap. 
Potential Issues for Congress
These reported incidents may raise several considerations for congressional oversight: 
Information available to Congress. It is unclear whether DOD has provided Congress an accounting of the aircraft lost in OEF. Congress may assess whether or not it has sufficient information and time to evaluate the potential effects of aircraft losses in U.S. military operations and potential DOD plans or programs to develop or procure replacements.
Budgetary impacts. Aircraft losses could generate unplanned costs for their replacement, repair, or sustainment. Congress may consider whether or not to approve, reject, or modify potential reprogramming actions or supplemental appropriations or to make adjustments to planned procurement and readiness accounts.
Force sufficiency. It is unclear how the extent of aircraft losses may affect DOD’s ability to meet current operational requirements, maintain global force posture, and respond to unforeseen contingencies. Congress may assess whether losses in certain high-demand platforms that are aging and limited in number, such as the E-3 Sentry, create capability gaps or increase risk in other theaters. 
Industrial base capacity. Congress may assess whether current production lines and supply chains are capable of replacing lost aircraft within time frames needed to meet DOD operational requirements. Congress may seek information about the extent to which competing demands—including foreign military sales or production constraints—may affect DOD’s ability to regenerate capacity.
Operational risk. Reported losses may provide insights into the survivability of U.S. aircraft in contested environments. Congress may assess whether reported losses reflect changes in the threat environment or in adversary capabilities. Congress may also assess whether any changes to the threat might signal the need to adjust U.S. operational concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, or basing posture.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12692/IN12692.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12692.html
IF13226,Seabed Mining on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf: Background and Recent Developments,2026-05-13T04:00:00Z,2026-05-16T04:53:13Z,Active,Resources,"Caitlin Keating-Bitonti, Laura B. Comay",,"As part of a national effort to secure reliable supplies of critical minerals, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14285 of April 24, 2025, “Unleashing America’s Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources.” One potential source of offshore critical minerals is the federally managed U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS; Figure 1). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), within the Department of the Interior (DOI), has authority under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA; 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1356c) to lease areas of the U.S. OCS for the development of offshore energy and non-energy marine minerals, including critical minerals. (This authority is separate from U.S. seabed mining authority in areas beyond U.S. jurisdiction, which are administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.) For U.S. OCS marine minerals, BOEM’s roles include evaluating the OCS for mineral resources and leasing submerged lands for mineral development. Pursuant to the OCSLA, BOEM has issued regulations (30 C.F.R. §§580-582) addressing leasing for non-energy marine minerals.
E.O. 14285 directed the Secretary of the Interior to “identify which critical minerals may be derived from seabed resources” and to “establish an expedited process for reviewing and approving permits for prospecting and granting leases for exploration, development, and production of seabed mineral resources” consistent with applicable law, among other actions. In June 2025, DOI announced that BOEM and its sister agency, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, were “updating [critical mineral] policies across all stages of development” to “reduce delays, improve coordination and provide greater certainty for industry, all while upholding key environmental safeguards.” On February 24, 2026, BOEM published a proposed rule to make “administrative revisions” to its mineral leasing regulations. Some stakeholders have supported these executive actions, while others have expressed concerns about potential societal and environmental costs of seabed mining.
Congress is considering executive actions and legislative proposals related to seabed mining on the OCS. Some Members have introduced legislation that would codify E.O. 14285 (H.R. 3803) or mandate actions on aspects of the order (e.g., H.R. 4018, S. 2860). In the 119th Congress, some committees (e.g., House Committee on Natural Resources) have held hearings to consider whether seabed mining can help diversify U.S. critical mineral supplies and how such activities should be regulated.
Figure 1. U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)
/
Source: CRS, modified from BOEM, “Outer Continental Shelf.” 
Notes: CNMI = Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. The OCS (i.e., federal waters) generally extends from the outer boundaries of state-controlled waters (generally 3 nautical miles [nmi] from shore) to 200 nmi from shore (royal blue). In some areas, the United States has claimed extended continental shelf (ECS) beyond this 200-nmi limit based on geological and geophysical data, thereby extending the outer limits of the OCS (navy blue). In cases where the OCS abuts a neighboring country’s continental shelf, the OCS may measure less than 200 nmi from the U.S. shoreline.
Seabed Deposits on the OCS 
Seabed deposits with critical minerals may occur across the OCS, but not all deposits on the OCS may be economically viable to mine. Five types of OCS seabed deposits that may contain critical minerals are listed below from nearshore to deeper-water environments:
heavy mineral sands—mud- and sand-sized grains deposited by a river or glacier in a marine nearshore environment;
phosphorites—sedimentary rocks containing a high concentration of calcium phosphate that generally occur along continental shelves, slopes, and seamounts;
polymetallic sulfide deposits/hydrothermal deposits—mineral accumulations formed from hot waters emitted at seafloor spreading ridges and in areas of undersea volcanic activity;
ferromanganese crusts—mineral encrustations that form on hard surfaces from seawater rich in dissolved metals occurring in volcanically active regions; and
polymetallic nodules—potato-shaped rocks composed of concentric mineral layers that form around a hard nucleus, such as a shark tooth, lying on the deep seafloor.
OCS Areas Currently Being Considered for Critical Mineral Leasing
In response to E.O. 14285 and pursuant to its statutory authority under OCSLA (43 U.S.C. §1337(k)), BOEM has initiated the process for four potential mineral lease sales in federal waters offshore of American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Virginia, and Alaska. To date, BOEM has not issued any leases for critical mineral activities. BOEM’s critical mineral leasing process may start with an unsolicited request for a lease sale or by BOEM’s own initiative. In either case, BOEM may publish a request for information and interest (RFI) specifying areas or minerals to be considered. The RFI may be followed by additional steps to pursue a marine mineral lease sale. 
Unsolicited Requests for Mineral Lease Sales
American Samoa. On April 8, 2025, BOEM received a request from the Impossible Metals company to commence a leasing process for exploration and potential development of critical minerals on the OCS offshore of American Samoa. During an April 2025 House Committee on Natural Resources hearing, Impossible Metals confirmed it had previously requested a lease sale for polymetallic nodules on the OCS off American Samoa in 2024. At that time, BOEM opted not to initiate leasing steps.
On June 16, 2025, in response to Impossible Metals’ second request, BOEM published an RFI for a lease sale for OCS minerals offshore of American Samoa. BOEM’s most recent activity in this matter, as of the date of this publication, was to complete its Area Identification (Area ID) decision memo. The memo determines the OCS areas that are to undergo environmental review for a proposed critical mineral lease sale, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§4321 et seq.). The American Samoa Area ID memo identifies an area larger than the original RFI area for consideration for a potential lease sale. The memo also discussed industry interest in ferromanganese crusts and polymetallic nodules in the area.
Virginia. On November 13, 2025, BOEM received an unsolicited lease sale request from Odyssey Marine Exploration focused on heavy mineral sands and phosphorites offshore of Virginia. While BOEM announced that it had “initiated the process for a potential mineral lease sale” off Virginia, as of the date of this publication, BOEM had not published an RFI related to this unsolicited request.
BOEM-Initiated Mineral Leasing Proposals
CNMI. On November 12, 2025, BOEM published an RFI for a mineral lease sale on the OCS offshore of the CNMI. According to the RFI, while the area lies east of the CNMI, its southern boundary “is approximately equal distance between ... Guam and Rota, the southernmost island of the CNMI.” The RFI area is a prospective region for ferromanganese crusts and polymetallic nodules. BOEM’s most recent activity in this matter, as of the date of this publication, was to complete its Area ID decision memo for the CNMI, identifying the OCS areas that are to undergo environmental review for a potential critical mineral lease sale. The CNMI Area ID memo identifies an area larger than the original RFI area, including a new area located west of the CNMI. Industry commenters had expressed “interest in polymetallic sulfides to the west of the CNMI.”
Alaska. On January 29, 2026, BOEM published an RFI for a lease sale for minerals on the OCS offshore of Alaska. BOEM anticipates that Alaska’s OCS contains heavy mineral sands and ferromanganese crusts. The Alaska RFI area covers over 113 million acres, an area larger than California. Portions of the RFI area lie above 75°N, at water depths over 7,000 meters, and on the U.S. extended continental shelf (ECS; Figure 1). Russia, a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “does not recognise” the U.S. ECS, as the United States is not a party to the convention. BOEM’s most recent activity in this matter, as of the date of this publication, was to close the RFI comment period on April 1, 2026.
Potential Questions for Congress
As the federal government works to strengthen and diversify the U.S. domestic critical mineral supply chain, Congress may consider questions related to critical minerals on the OCS, including but not limited to the following.
Is there sufficient scientific knowledge to reduce seabed mining impacts to the marine environment? Are BOEM’s mining mitigation measures sufficient to reduce potential environmental impacts?
Do BOEM’s regulations for marine minerals pose economic burdens for the U.S. mining industry?
What role, if any, should states and U.S. territories have in BOEM’s critical mineral leasing process? Should coastal states and territories receive a share of the revenue the federal government collects from seabed mining leases?
Could a mineral lease sale on the U.S. ECS lead to geopolitical disagreements, particularly with Russia?
In the absence of U.S. onshore processing facilities, where should marine minerals harvested by U.S. companies be processed? Should the United States include marine minerals in domestic stockpile initiatives as a means to encourage the construction of domestic processing facilities?
For Further Reading
For further discussion of OCS seabed mining and issues for Congress, see CRS Report R48302, Critical Minerals on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf: The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s Role and Issues for Congress.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13226/IF13226.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13226.html
R48944,Energy and Water Development: FY2027 Appropriations,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T14:52:56Z,Active,Reports,"Mark Holt, Anna E. Normand",,"The Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies appropriations (E&W) bill funds civil works activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the Department of Defense; the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill’s funding.
Overall Funding Totals
President Donald Trump submitted his FY2027 budget request on April 3, 2026. The request includes $67.597 billion in discretionary appropriations for energy and water development agencies, an increase of $5.866 billion (10%) above the FY2026 enacted amount, excluding emergency appropriations, mandatory appropriations, rescissions, offsets, and adjustments. The E&W budget request for FY2027 includes offsets totaling $4.917 billion from unobligated appropriations transferred from the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58). 
Energy and Water Development Appropriations, FY2026 and FY2027 Actions
(in millions of nominal dollars and % change from FY2026 enacted)
AgencyFY2026 EnactedFY2027 Request
(% Change)
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers10,435 6,663 (-36%)
Bureau of Reclamation/CUP1,650 1,292 (-22%)
Department of Energy49,12459,330 (21%)
Independent Agencies522 312 (-40%)
Total Appropriations61,73167,597 (10%)
Rescissions and Offsets-3,692-4,917
Adjusted Total58,03962,680 (8%)

Sources: P.L. 119-74 and related H.R. 6938 explanatory statement; President’s FY2027 Budget Appendix, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/appendix_fy2027.pdf.
Notes: Enacted amounts do not include supplemental or reconciliation appropriations. CUP = Central Utah Project.
Selected Key Issues
Zero Funding Request for Wind, Solar, and Hydrogen Research and Development (R&D). No appropriations are requested for FY2027 for Wind, Solar, and Hydrogen R&D, which received $480 million in FY2026. 
Proposed Elimination of Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities. All but one of the federal regional commissions and authorities would be terminated by the FY2027 request; the Appalachian Regional Commission annual appropriation would be reduced from $200 million in FY2026 to $120 million in FY2027 (-40%). 
Requested Increase for National Nuclear Security Administration. The FY2027 request for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is $7.398 billion (29%) over the FY2026 enacted amount of $25.404 billion. NNSA is a semiautonomous DOE agency responsible for nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons nonproliferation, and naval reactor R&D.
USACE Account Reorganization. The budget request proposes a 36% cut to USACE and a new District Salaries and Expenses account. This account would fund the salaries of USACE district and field office employees, plus other operational costs, separately from direct study and project costs, which would be funded in traditional study and project accounts.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48944/R48944.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48944.html
R48943,Income and Poverty by State and Congressional District,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T15:07:57Z,Active,Reports,"Ben Leubsdorf, Joseph Dalaker",Poverty,"Members of Congress may assess the economic well-being of households in the geographic areas they represent: states and congressional districts. This report describes two widely used statistical measures: median household income (a single number that represents the middle of the income distribution) and the poverty rate (the percentage of the population that lives in poverty, with income below a dollar threshold that represents needs for a low level of material well-being). It also provides current estimates for states and U.S. House districts based on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS), a large-scale survey of U.S. households. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48943/R48943.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48943.html
R48942,Yemen: In Brief,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T15:22:56Z,Active,Reports,Christopher M. Blanchard,"Middle East & North Africa, Yemen","Yemen has been politically, economically, and militarily divided for more than a decade; its slow-burning internal conflicts are at risk of reigniting amid multisided confrontations between regional and global actors. Yemen descended into conflict in 2014 prompting years of foreign military interventions, regional security disruptions, and lingering confrontations that have posed national security challenges for the United States and its partners. As of 2026, the Iran-backed Ansar Allah movement (aka the Houthis, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization) and its aligned de facto government control the national capital, Sana’a, and much of western Yemen, home to most of Yemen’s population. A Saudi Arabia-based, internationally recognized government (IRG) nominally administers non-Houthi held areas at the direction of a Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), whose members represent anti-Houthi forces with distinct agendas. 
Until January 2026, the PLC included leaders of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), an independence-seeking coalition of southern Yemeni forces backed by the United Arab Emirates. That month, Saudi military strikes halted an STC campaign to assert security control across the south, leading to the expulsion of STC figures from the PLC and simmering IRG-STC tensions. With Saudi support, the IRG is seeking to unify Yemeni factions and consolidate command and control over forces in non-Houthi held areas. As of April 2026, the IRG’s reach remains limited, local authorities and armed groups remain influential, and STC supporters continue to call for self-determination.
Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Israel all act in Yemen in pursuit of what their governments perceive to be their national interests. As the leader of an anti-Houthi multilateral coalition and now chief sponsor of Yemen’s residual national government, Saudi Arabia has played a prominent if inconclusive role in Yemen’s politics and security. Differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE within the Saudi led anti-Houthi coalition, including over UAE support to the STC, resulted in confrontation and Saudi military intervention in Yemen in late 2025, followed by the UAE’s exit from Yemen and increased Saudi engagement across non-Houthi held areas. Saudi-Houthi talks, brokered by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Yemen, have continued in Amman, Jordan, but no new steps toward implementation of a UN-sponsored conflict resolution roadmap have been announced.
From 2023 to 2025, the Houthis disrupted shipping in the Red Sea corridor by launching drone and missile attacks against commercial and naval vessels, along with hundreds of attacks on Israel. Since 2025, the Trump Administration has sought to manage Houthi disruptions through force, sanctions, and limited negotiation. From March to May 2025, the Administration launched Operation Rough Rider, a campaign of strikes on Houthi targets that degraded but did not eliminate the Houthis’ missile and drone capacities. A May 2025 U.S.-Houthi ceasefire ended Houthi attacks on U.S. vessels, but maritime transit had not returned to pre-crisis levels even before the U.S.-Israeli military operations against Iran began in February 2026. 
As of May 2026, the Houthis had conducted limited new attacks on Israel in the context of the 2026 U.S./Israel-Iran conflict but had not resumed strikes on vessels. Disruptions to transit in the Strait of Hormuz increased the importance of the Red Sea corridor for international energy markets. These conditions could make renewed Houthi attacks on targets in Gulf States and/or vessels near Yemen more consequential. As the Houthis weigh their possible leverage, they may consider Iran’s support capacity, likely U.S. and regional responses, and the risks of renewed conflict.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48942/R48942.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48942.html
R48941,"Combating Robocalls and Robotexts: Background, Selected FCC Activity, and Legislative Activity in the 119th Congress",2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T15:22:54Z,Active,Reports,Patricia Moloney Figliola,,"Curtailing robocalls and robotexts presents challenges for lawmakers, regulators, the telecommunications industry, and consumers. Robocalls are calls made with an automatic telephone dialing system—usually referred to as an “autodialer”—that transmits a message made with a prerecorded or artificial voice. Robotexts are text messages also made using autodialers. An autodialer is any equipment that can “store or produce telephone numbers ... using a random or sequential number generator” and dial those numbers. The term robocall generally encompasses both robocalls and robotexts. 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulates robocalls and robotexts. Both are generally illegal if they are made to any mobile phone (and in the case of robocalls, to a nonbusiness landline) without the recipient’s prior express written consent. Three laws are the primary basis for the FCC’s authority to regulate robocalls:
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA; P.L. 102-243) restricts the use of autodialers, the use of prerecorded/artificial voice messages, and unsolicited advertisements both by voice phone call and by fax. The TCPA and its implementing regulations generally prohibit prerecorded advertising calls to residential landline numbers unless the called party has given prior express written consent. 
The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-331) prohibits any person, in connection with any voice service or text messaging service, to “cause any caller identification service to knowingly transmit misleading or inaccurate caller identification information with the intent to defraud, cause harm, or wrongfully obtain anything of value.” 
The Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act (TRACED Act; P.L. 116-105) expanded the actions the FCC could take to fight illegal robocalls. The TRACED Act is the basis for many of the tools targeting illegal robocalls. For example, the TRACED Act led to implementing the protocol designed to limit the completion of illegal robocalls and prevent caller ID spoofing.
FCC regulations have provided the framework through which the telecommunications industry has developed network-based tools to stop robocalls from reaching customers. The telecommunications industry, both service providers and equipment manufacturers, and third-party application (app) developers have created end-user tools for consumers to block suspected robocalls and robotexts, including built-in phone features, carrier services, and apps. Combining one or more methods may provide a more effective defense for consumers than any single approach.
Through legislation and rulemaking, the FCC uses several methods to fight illegal robocalls, but scammers may adapt their methods over time, such as adopting internet-based calling systems and artificial intelligence (AI), making technical solutions partly effective. The FCC has taken a range of enforcement actions to stop illegal robocalls, including revoking certain certifications of service providers, disconnecting noncompliant voice service providers from the U.S. telephone network, issuing fines, and publicly classifying some entities as threats to communication services. 
Four bills have been introduced in the 119th Congress that would affect robocall regulation: The Foreign Robocall Elimination Act (H.R. 6152/S. 2666) would direct the FCC to establish a task force on unlawful robocalls; the Quashing Unwanted and Interruptive Electronic Telecommunications Act (H.R. 1027) would establish a disclosure requirement for robocalls that use AI to emulate a human being and increase forfeiture and fine amounts for certain violations of the TCPA; and the Creating Legal and Ethical AI Recordings Act (H.R. 334) would provide statutory authority to apply standards to systems that transmit artificial or prerecorded telephone messages generated using AI. Further, H.R. 6152 would require voice providers to post a bond before being able to conduct business, potentially pushing them and their insurers to more rigorously prevent scam traffic. Congress may consider a range of options to target robocalls and texts, including passing one or more of the pending bills, expanding the FCC’s authority to collect the civil penalties it issues for illegal robocalls, examining recent FCC actions for consistency with congressional intent, or deferring to the FCC to continue its efforts to stop robocalls.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48941/R48941.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48941.html
IF13225,Farm Bill Primer: Horticulture Title,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-13T16:38:12Z,Active,Resources,"Zachary T. Neuhofer, Jason O. Heflin",,"Congress has included a horticulture title in the farm bill since the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-234). The horticulture title of a farm bill generally contains reauthorizations, amendments, and new programs that support specialty crops (defined as fruits, vegetables, tree nuts, dried fruits, horticulture, and nursery crops including floriculture; 7 U.S.C. §1621 note); organic agriculture (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§6501-6524); local, regional, and urban food systems; hemp production; and pesticide regulation. Initially, the horticulture title consisted primarily of programs that supported specialty crops and organic agriculture. In subsequent farm bills, the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79) and the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334), Congress expanded the title to include programs related to local and regional food systems, hemp production and cultivation, and pesticide regulation. These programs are administered primarily through the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), although the primary law regulating pesticides, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA; 7 U.S.C. §§136-136y), involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
This CRS In Focus provides a summary of existing programs and provisions that support specialty crops; organic agriculture; local, regional, and urban food systems; and hemp production and cultivation. It also discusses proposals that would amend pesticide provisions, including provisions currently subject to litigation pending before the Supreme Court. This summary does not discuss pending legislation or include all the programs in the farm bill that directly or indirectly support these issue areas and which receive support from other titles, such as the commodity, trade, research, nutrition, and crop insurance titles.
Farm Bill Programs
The 2018 farm bill amended, reauthorized, and codified programs in the horticulture title through FY2023. Congress enacted three one-year extensions of the 2018 farm bill, most recently in the FY2026 agriculture appropriations law (P.L. 119-37). Some programs in the horticulture title received increases or continuations in mandatory funding in the FY2025 budget reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21). Additionally, the 2018 farm bill definition of hemp was amended in Section 781 of P.L. 119-37.
Specialty Crops
Specialty crop support in the horticulture title includes Specialty Crop Block Grants (SCBG). SCBG is administered by USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) and provides grants to state departments of agriculture that “enhance the competitiveness of specialty crops.” The program received an increase in mandatory funding from $85 million to $100 million per year in P.L. 119-21. USDA is authorized to distribute grants through SCBG through FY2026. The 2018 farm bill also authorized discretionary appropriations for programs that support specialty crops. Some examples include an allocation for market news data collection for specialty crops and grants to support the maple syrup industry.
In a future farm bill, Congress may consider reauthorizing expiring specialty crop programs or altering mandatory funding levels for programs, such as SCBG. Additionally, Congress may consider reauthorizing or changing the authorized discretionary appropriations for specialty crop programs. Some in the agriculture industry and some Members of Congress have proposed amending existing specialty crop programs or creating new programs to enhance the marketing and promotion of specialty crops or to support mechanization of specialty crop production. Others may contend that farmers have sufficient funding opportunities for these efforts or that funding should be reduced to support other efforts.
Organic Agriculture
The horticulture title includes authorizations and support for agriculture products certified organic under USDA’s National Organic Program (NOP). The 2018 farm bill made changes to the USDA organic certification process to enhance enforcement, limit program fraud, and fund technology upgrades. The 2018 farm bill also reauthorized organic programs that receive mandatory spending, including the Organic Certification Cost Share Program and the Organic Production and Market Data Initiative. These programs received funding from P.L. 119-21 through FY2031. 
Following the extensions of funding to organic programs in P.L. 119-21, Congress may consider whether to amend organic standards, reauthorize or amend appropriations for organic programs, or create new programs. Some in the industry and some in Congress have expressed support for additional technical assistance, outreach, and education to support organic production across existing USDA programs. Some have also proposed to make further amendments to organic certification standards and organic enforcement. Additionally, some have proposed expanding market data collection for various commodities, while others have questioned the federal role in assisting and promoting organic agriculture.
Local, Regional, and Urban Food Systems
Support for local, regional, and urban food systems in the farm bill includes the Local Agriculture Market Program (LAMP) and the Office of Urban Agriculture and Innovative Production (OUAIP). LAMP is an umbrella program created in the 2018 farm bill that consists of grant programs that support the marketing and promotion of farmers’ markets and local food, regional partnerships, and the production of value-added products. LAMP programs receive $50 million in annual mandatory funding and are authorized through FY2026. OUIAP, created in the 2018 farm bill, provides grants and technical assistance to a variety of operations such as community farms and gardens and rooftop farms. The farm bill authorizes $25 million in annual appropriations for OUAIP through FY2026. 
In a future farm bill, Congress may consider whether or not to reauthorize USDA to provide grants for expiring local, regional, and urban food system programs, such as LAMP. Additionally, Congress may consider reauthorizing or amending the authorizations of appropriations for local and urban food programs. Some in the industry and some in Congress have proposed creating new local food programs or amending the scope of existing programs. This could include expanding the types of eligible businesses that may participate and expanding the eligible activities for grants. Others have supported reducing funding and emphasis for local food programs.
Hemp Production
The 2018 farm bill changed the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. §802) to exclude hemp from the definition of marijuana and amended 7 U.S.C. §1639o to define hemp as the cannabis plant (hemp is a variety of cannabis sativa) and any part or derivative of the plant with a delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) concentration of 0.3% or less. The 2018 farm bill also directed USDA to create a regulatory framework for hemp cultivation (i.e., hemp production plan), and producers were made eligible for federal crop insurance and agricultural research programs. 
Section 781 of P.L. 119-37 further amended the statutory definition of hemp, changing the THC limit to a total THC concentration of less than 0.3% rather than only a delta-9 THC concentration of less than 0.3%. The new definition explicitly includes industrial hemp (i.e., hemp used for non-cannabinoid purposes) while providing for certain exclusions, such as products that contain cannabinoids that were synthesized or manufactured outside the plant. Additionally, the law directed the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to publish lists of cannabinoids within 90 days of enactment. The new hemp definition is to become effective on November 12, 2026. For more on the changes to the definition of hemp, see CRS In Focus IF13136, Changes to the Statutory Definition of Hemp and Issues for Congress. 
Congress may consider whether or not to take further action on hemp after the statutory changes to the definition of hemp in P.L. 119-37. Some in the industry and some in Congress have expressed interest in repealing the new hemp definition, delaying the effective date of the new hemp definition, or further amending the statutory definition of hemp (e.g., increasing the allowable delta-9 THC content). Others expressed support for definitional changes along the lines of P.L. 119-37 prior to its enactment. If no further changes are made to the statutory definition of hemp established in P.L. 119-37, Congress may choose to amend existing statutes for hemp production plans to reflect the new definition of hemp, such as by updating the standards for state and USDA hemp production plans to reflect the change to a statutory definition based on total THC limit rather than only delta-9 THC. Additionally, Congress may consider whether to further differentiate the statutory requirements for producers of industrial hemp and those producing hemp for cannabinoid purposes. 
Pesticide Regulation
Prior farm bills have included provisions amending various aspects of the FIFRA. Among other changes, these amendments excepted certain plant-incorporated protectants—pesticides intended to be produced and used in a living plant—from import notification requirements (P.L. 113-79; 7 U.S.C §136o(c)). They also amended the consultation process required under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. §1536) for pesticide registrations and registration reviews (P.L. 115-334; 7 U.S.C. §136a(c)).
Substantial proposed changes to FIFRA have appeared in unenacted farm bills. Some of these provisions would have established further exemptions for certain plant-incorporated protectants and required additional coordination among agencies for certain regulatory activities under FIFRA. Others would have addressed ongoing issues of concern to industry groups and other interest groups about the relationship between state and federal law in FIFRA’s preemption provision in Section 24 (7 U.S.C. §136v), which, among other things, prohibits states from enacting pesticide labeling or packaging requirements in addition to or different from those under FIFRA. One proposal would have prohibited political subdivisions of a state (e.g., towns, counties, and municipalities) from regulating pesticides that are subject to regulation under FIFRA, effectively reversing a 1991 Supreme Court opinion, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, in which the Supreme Court held that Section 24 does not preempt town ordinances regulating the use of pesticides. Another proposal would have required Section 24(b)—which prohibits states from enforcing “any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under” FIFRA—to “be applied” to prohibit states and courts from enforcing requirements in addition to or different from labeling or packaging approved by EPA, including requirements related to warnings. Currently, federal circuit courts disagree as to whether Section 24(b) preempts state law tort claims based on a manufacturer’s alleged failure to warn of harms stemming from pesticide sale or use. For more on this circuit split, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11304, Preemption in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (2025). This issue is before the Supreme Court in Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, No. 24-1068. 
Congress may consider these issues again, including the application of FIFRA to plant-incorporated protectants and the preemptive effect of FIFRA as applied to localities. Congress may also again consider whether FIFRA should preempt state law failure-to-warn claims.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13225/IF13225.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13225.html
IF13224,Federal Requirements for Student Consumer Information Transparency in Higher Education,2026-05-12T04:00:00Z,2026-05-14T14:52:59Z,Active,Resources,Rita R. Zota,"Postsecondary Education, Colleges & Universities, Direct Loan Program, Federal Student Aid Programs, Higher Education, Pell Grants, Student Loans","In light of rising college costs and growing student loan debt, the availability of practical information about college costs, value, and quality has garnered congressional interest. Students and their families may consult various sources to inform their decisions about pursuing postsecondary education, such as publications with college rankings, school guidance counselors, or family and friends. The federal government also plays a role in ensuring student consumer information transparency in higher education. This In Focus describes statutory requirements of the Department of Education (ED) relating to student consumer information transparency, ED’s implementation of these requirements, and some prevailing issues with and gaps in existing requirements.
Existing Higher Education Act Transparency-Related Requirements
The Higher Education Act (HEA) is the primary federal law governing postsecondary education in the United States. It includes several requirements for ED-administered data collection and reporting on institutions of higher education participating in HEA Title IV student aid programs (e.g., Federal Pell Grants and Direct Loans) (IHEs). These requirements were designed to contribute to college transparency for students and their families in making decisions about applying to and attending college. 
For example, Section 131 of HEA requires that ED establish definitions for and collect and publish data on, for each IHE, measures of tuition and fees and cost of attendance (COA) for full-time undergraduate students and the number of undergraduate students who received and their average amount of financial assistance.
Section 132(i) of HEA requires ED to annually collect and make publicly available other additional information on COA and financial assistance, such as COA for first-time, full-time undergraduates by whether they live on or off campus and information about annual grant aid awarded to undergraduate students, including by specific source of aid. Section 132(i) requires ED to collect other comprehensive information, such as 
enrollment by student characteristics (e.g., the percentages of first-time, full-time, or degree- or certificate-seeking students enrolled at an IHE, disaggregated by race and ethnic background);
graduation rates within expected time for degree completion (e.g., the percentages of first-time, full-time, or degree- or certificate-seeking undergraduate students enrolled at an IHE who obtain a degree or certificate within 100%, 150%, and 200% of the normal time for graduation from the student’s program); and
number of degree completions (e.g., the number of certificates, associate degrees, baccalaureate degrees, master’s degrees, professional degrees, and doctoral degrees awarded by the IHE).
Section 132(i) authorizes ED to collect this information through the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and requires ED to publish it on the College Navigator website (see “Administration of HEA Requirements”). In addition, ED must make available on College Navigator 
college affordability and transparency lists, which identify IHEs that are highest and lowest in metrics such as COA or net price for each academic year (§132(c)); 
state higher education spending charts, which provide comparisons among states in changes in spending, tuition and fees, and the provision of state financial aid at public IHEs (§132(g));
a college pricing summary page for each IHE, including key cost indicators (§132(i)); and
a multiyear tuition calculator, developed by ED, to assist students and their families in estimating tuition and fees in future years (§132(j)).
Section 132(h) requires ED to develop a net price calculator that allows prospective students to enter information about themselves to obtain estimates of what they would likely pay to attend an IHE after factoring in any grants and scholarships. IHEs are required to make available a net price calculator, such as the ED-developed one, on their websites.  
Administration of HEA Requirements
ED’s National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) and its Office of Postsecondary Education (OPE) play primary roles in administering HEA requirements relating to student consumer information transparency in higher education. 
NCES annually administers the IPEDS through a series of 12 surveys. NCES uses IPEDS to collect from IHEs information required by Sections 131 and 132(i), as well as institutional data required by other statutes. In addition, Section 487 of HEA requires that an IHE enter into a program participation agreement (PPA) with ED to participate in Title IV student aid programs. A PPA is a document in which the IHE agrees to comply with the laws, regulations, and policies applicable to Title IV programs. Failure to meet any PPA requirements may result in the loss of Title IV eligibility or other sanctions. Section 487(a)(17) requires that IHEs complete the IPEDS surveys as part of their PPA. NCES also administers the College Navigator website where it publishes data collected primarily through IPEDS, including data required under Sections 131 and 132(i).
OPE, with support from NCES, administers other Section 132 requirements, such as college affordability and transparency lists and state higher education spending charts, using data sourced from IPEDS. OPE created the College Affordability and Transparency Center (CATC) website to consolidate all of the statutorily required student consumer transparency resources, as well as the ones created administratively. For example, OPE created a Net Price Calculator Center to assist student consumers with locating individual institutional net price calculators. The College Navigator website includes a link to the CATC.
Other administrative student consumer transparency tools include the College Scorecard (Scorecard), which ED launched in 2015. ED intended it to note “key indicators about the cost and value of institutions” with an eye toward making institutional comparisons a more interactive experience. Unlike other student consumer information resources, the Scorecard does not source data primarily from IPEDS, which is largely limited to statutorily required data. Using administrative datasets, ED added measures of postgraduate earnings and student loan repayment outcomes to the Scorecard to complement data sourced from IPEDS. While the Scorecard includes data by field of study as well as by institution, availability is limited to estimates that are based on large enough cell sizes to minimize disclosure of information about an individual.
On October 10, 2023, ED published the Financial Value Transparency and Gainful Employment regulations. As part of the rule, IHEs must report student-level data on costs and student aid for each student receiving Title-IV aid for an applicable program of study. Additionally, under the rule, by July 1, 2026, ED is to establish a website that makes publicly available information about IHEs and applicable programs. On April 20, 2026, ED published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to update these reporting requirements.
Current Student Consumer Information Transparency Approach Limitations
While implementation of existing HEA requirements contributes to increasing student consumer information transparency in higher education, limitations to this approach may prevent a student from obtaining complete and personalized information about college prices, outcomes, and value.
Incomplete Data Sources
The utility of existing transparency initiatives may be limited by the underlying data sources, which is primarily IPEDS. Because the institutional burden to report these data can be high, the IPEDS data collection generally hews closely to statutorily required data elements. That approach may limit ED’s ability to produce information that more precisely reflects a student and their family’s specific circumstances. For example, relatively few data elements collected in IPEDS require disaggregation by race or ethnicity or by different income bands. Many statutorily required metrics concern first-time, full-time undergraduate students, not other student types (e.g., part-time students). Required COA metrics generally reflect published prices and do not account for institutional discounting practices or price reductions for individual students. In addition, IPEDS data are reported in the aggregate at the institutional level, not at the student-level, which restricts analyses examining relationships among different student characteristics, such as part-time status and income.
These data limitations are not unique to IPEDS. Similarly, the other administrative data utilized in the Scorecard are not reflective of the entire universe of students but are limited to Title-IV aided students. This could lead to the provision of earnings estimates that are biased in a non-random way. 
Optimal Student User Experience
It is unclear to what extent existing student consumer information transparency resources are utilized by students and their families and whether such resources are viewed as helpful. One study found evidence to suggest that behavioral changes in where students applied to school may be related to the Scorecard, but there is little evidence from this study or elsewhere about actual user experience with the various resources. Some issues that may detract from a positive user experience could be (1) the extent of student and parent knowledge of these resources and how to access them; (2) whether each of the statutorily required and administrative transparency measures contribute to more informed decisionmaking among student consumers; (3) to what degree, if any, the various resources are duplicative in nature and contribute to student consumer confusion; and (4) whether the existing suite of resources could be streamlined to mitigate any such confusion.
Legislative Proposals
Various bills have been introduced in the 119th Congress to improve student consumer information transparency in higher education. The College Transparency Act (H.R. 4806 and S. 2511) would authorize ED to establish and maintain a secure, privacy-protected student-level postsecondary data system to enable the provision of complete and personalized information to students and more accurate analyses of higher education outcomes, costs, and financial aid. The Student Financial Clarity Act of 2025 (H.R. 6498) would replace most of the existing Section 132 requirements with the collection of detailed institution- and program-level measures that would be made publicly available on the Scorecard website. The Net Price Calculator Improvement Act (S. 1557) would require ED to develop a universal net price calculator that would generate personalized estimates of net prices across institutions based on a concrete set of student-user inputs.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13224/IF13224.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13224.html
R43434,"Policy and Legislative Research for Congressional Staff: Finding Documents, Analysis, News, and Training",2026-05-11T04:00:00Z,2026-05-15T13:52:58Z,Active,Reports,"Sarah K. Braun, Tilly Finnegan-Kennel, Ellen M. Lechman, Michele L. Malloy",,"This report is intended to serve as a finding aid for congressional documents, executive branch documents and information, news articles, policy analysis, contacts, and training, for use in policy and legislative research. It is not intended to be a definitive list of all resources, but rather a guide to pertinent subscriptions available in the House and Senate in addition to selected resources freely available to the public. This report is intended for use by congressional offices.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R43434/R43434.25.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R43434.html
IF13223,The Federal Role in Hazardous Wildfire Fuel Treatments,2026-05-11T04:00:00Z,2026-05-13T09:08:03Z,Active,Resources,Alicyn R. Gitlin,,"Introduction
Hazardous fuels are combustible vegetation that accumulates on the landscape, presenting a threat of starting and spreading wildfires that resist control. Hazardous fuels and their associated wildfire threats cross land management and ownership boundaries. Federal and nonfederal land managers mitigate hazardous fuels (hazardous fuel treatments) for various reasons, including altering fire behavior; protecting desired uses or resources; and promoting overall ecosystem health. Much of the debate surrounding hazardous fuels and wildfire mitigation focuses on how to protect life and property in the wildland-urban interface (WUI), where human development abuts undeveloped wildlands.
More than 50 bills introduced during the 119th Congress pertain to treating hazardous fuels. Most prominent among these is the Fix Our Forests Act (H.R. 471, S. 1462), which would affect various aspects of treatment planning, environmental compliance, contracting, implementation, litigation, research, and assistance, among other things.
Federal Role and Statutory Authorities
Hazardous fuels generally are managed by the owner of the underlying land. Five federal land management agencies (FLMAs) across two departments are responsible for the majority of hazardous fuels treatments on federal and tribal lands—the Forest Service (FS), under the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA); and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), National Park Service (NPS), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), under the Department of the Interior (DOI). The federal government also provides assistance to nonfederal groups to address hazardous fuels on nonfederal lands. 
No federal law explicitly requires hazardous fuels mitigation from a broad perspective. Instead, various statutes implicitly authorize the FS, BLM, NPS, FWS, and BIA to mitigate hazardous fuels as part of their mandates to manage and protect the lands and resources under their jurisdictions (e.g., 16 U.S.C. §551, 43 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq., 54 U.S.C. §100101, 16 U.S.C. §668dd(a)(4)(B)).
On federal lands, hazardous fuels treatments are planned by the FLMAs, sometimes in collaboration with stakeholders such as states, tribes, wood products industries, conservation and recreation groups, researchers, or firefighters. FLMAs generally lead fuel treatment planning and environmental compliance on the lands they manage. Contractors or state partners implement the treatments.
Congress has, at times, provided specific authorities related to hazardous fuels management on federal lands. Prominent among these is the Healthy Forests Restoration Act, which pertains primarily to lands managed by BLM and the FS (HFRA, 16 U.S.C. §§6501 et seq.). HFRA contains various provisions related to planning, implementation, and administrative processes for specified land management projects on FS and BLM land, including hazardous fuel treatments. HFRA also includes provisions regarding grant programs, cross-boundary collaboration, and other items.
Fuel Types and Fire Behavior
The term hazardous fuels has no standardized or broadly applicable statutory definition. Existing statutory definitions pertain to specific areas of federal land or other specific circumstances. Statute defines certain activities on federal lands as “authorized hazardous fuel reduction project[s]” for the purpose of HFRA (16 U.S.C. §6511(2), 16 U.S.C. §6512(a)). 
Wildland firefighters classify fuel types and other fuel characteristics to predict a fire’s heat output (intensity) and rate of spread. Examples of surface fuel types include grass, shrub, and timber understory (biomass on the forest floor). Ladder fuels exist between the surface and canopy (crown), creating vertical continuity. In forests, crown characteristics such as canopy cover percentage, base height, and density determine the probability that a fire can move from the surface into the crown of an individual or small group of trees (called torching) or, in high winds, move through the crown as a wind-driven, high-intensity crown fire. A crown fire can sustain a greater rate of spread in a forest than a surface fire. A grass fire with no trees to slow the wind can spread faster than a forest fire.
A conflagration is a rapidly moving, destructive fire. Conflagrations are often spread when burning trees and twigs produce firebrands—flaming hot fuel particles carried by wind and convection currents—that cause new ignitions (spotting) ahead of the fire’s leading edge.
Within each fuel type, fuel moisture, chemistry, and density all determine flammability, with moisture being the most important factor. Dead fuels dry more quickly than live fuels. Fine fuels (called flash fuels)—especially grasses—dry out quickly, ignite easily, and spread fire rapidly. Large fuels with less surface area per volume (heavy fuels) take longer to absorb moisture, and to lose moisture, than fine fuels. Heavy fuels take longer to ignite than flash fuels, and can burn for a longer amount of time.
Types of Hazardous Fuel Treatments
Fuel treatments can inhibit wildfire ignitions, reduce heat output, and slow wildfire spread. Land managers choose mitigation approaches on the basis of various factors, such as cost, terrain, human safety, wildlife occupancy, public opinion, workforce, and local industries. Options for fuel treatments include the following:
Burning. The use of fire to mitigate hazardous fuels and reduce the chances for future extreme or uncharacteristic fire behavior is an established, widely used practice. Burning to achieve resource benefits can occur as a prescribed fire, where the ignitions are planned, or as an unplanned ignition (i.e., lightning) allowed to burn under supervision. Qualified personnel or land owners might ignite prescribed fires in predetermined locations, under predetermined conditions, to meet desired resource objectives. Prescribed burning generally is subject to various legal requirements, such as personnel qualifications, permitting, and liability considerations.
Cultural burning refers to the Indigenous practice of cultivating fire on the landscape, and was a part of life for many Native Americans for millennia. Cultural burning might be applied for wildfire mitigation or other purposes. The reasons for cultural burns will vary among cultural affiliations.
Mechanical Treatments. Mechanical treatments involve the manipulation, and may also include the removal, of hazardous fuels with tools and equipment, such as hand tools, chainsaws, and heavy machinery. Mechanical fuel treatments rearrange and resize fuels. The total amount of fuel (fuel load) is not decreased unless crews remove the cut biomass after the treatment (Figure 1). Crews can haul fuels from the site, redistribute them on the surface, burn them, or use some combination of these approaches. 
Figure 1. Fuel Loads
/
Source: CRS.
Notes: A fuel load is not decreased (left) unless the fuels are removed from the site (middle, right). Fuels can be hauled away, redistributed, burned, or a combination of approaches.
Grazing. Targeted grazing is defined by the American Sheep Industry Association as “the application of a specific kind of livestock at a determined season, duration, and intensity to accomplish defined vegetation or landscape goals.” Targeted grazing differs from normal livestock grazing because the goal is vegetation management instead of animal production. Concentrated livestock consume and trample fine fuels.
Herbicide. Herbicide application is the controlled use of chemicals to kill or suppress unwanted vegetation. Some common uses for herbicides in hazardous fuels control include reducing the presence of specific undesirable species or clearing areas to bare soil. Herbicides can be applied manually, with vehicles, and aerially. Personnel applying certain herbicides require licensing at the jurisdictional level where they make the herbicide applications. The Environmental Protection Agency ensures applicator certification programs meet minimum standards.
Strategic Treatment Configurations. Land managers can configure hazardous fuel treatments of varying intensities across a landscape for purposes such as optimizing limited budgets or facilitating wildland firefighting operations. For example, fuel breaks are strips or blocks of land where reduced fuels change wildfire behavior and provide firefighters with places to respond to wildfires. Fuel breaks are often strategically located to protect values at risk. Shaded fuel breaks are a type of fuel break that retains enough crown cover to keep the surface cool and moist, in order to resist surface fires. Firebreaks are created with the intent of stopping fire spread or to provide a control line for firefighters to work; the fuels are completely removed down to the bare soil or a road. Firebreaks may be created as a precautionary measure before a fire starts or during firefighting operations. 
An approach called Potential Operational Delineations (PODs) combines local knowledge and spatial analysis to create planning units. PODs are collaboratively developed. Fire managers and other stakeholders identify networks of features such as roads, fuel type changes, or water bodies to outline units. Land managers prioritize treatments appropriate to each of the units, which become strategic zones for fire response.
Issues for Congress
An issue facing Congress is the pace and scale at which hazardous fuels mitigation occurs. Related considerations include determining the appropriate number, size, and location of treatments; the appropriate level of environmental compliance; workforce capacity; and whether and how to assist state, tribal, and private landowners. 
A related issue is how to track fuel reduction accomplishments and choose the appropriate performance metrics to determine treatment effectiveness. The FS and DOI annually report hazardous fuels treatments as acres treated. The acres treated metric is hard to interpret because (1) multiple treatments on the same part of the landscape—which sometimes are required to maintain or measurably decrease fire hazard—may be counted multiple times, and (2) the metric does not reveal whether the treatments effectively reduce wildfire risk to pertinent resources.
The DOI is consolidating its wildland fire activities, including hazardous fuel treatments, within a new bureau, the U.S. Wildland Fire Service (WFS) (S.O. 3448). Both DOI and FS requested in their budget justifications that FY2027 appropriations for hazardous fuels go to the new WFS instead of the FS. Congress directed the Secretary of Agriculture, in consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, to contract with an independent researcher to study the impacts of the proposed consolidation on several topics, including the hazardous fuels reduction program (P.L. 119-74 and explanatory statement). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13223/IF13223.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13223.html
IF13222,"Fees to Administer Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act: Authority, Implementation, and Reauthorizing Legislation",2026-05-11T04:00:00Z,2026-05-12T15:23:05Z,Active,Resources,"Jerry H. Yen, Angela C. Jones",,"In June 2016, the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act (LCSA; P.L. 114-182) amended Title I of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA; 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.) to provide the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with more authorities to gather information regarding various industrial and commercial chemicals. EPA uses this information to evaluate risks to human health and the environment and to determine if regulation may be warranted. LCSA supplements the discretionary appropriations for TSCA implementation by authorizing the collection of fees from chemical manufacturers and processors. These fees partially cover EPA’s costs for reviewing chemicals for risks. This fee collection authority expires at the end of FY2026. This In Focus discusses the authority to collect fees under TSCA, associated rulemakings, the relationship between discretionary appropriations and fee receipts, selected issues regarding the fees, and proposed reauthorization legislation. 
Section 26(b) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, as amended
LCSA amended TSCA Section 26(b) (15 U.S.C. 2625(b)) to authorize the collection of fees from chemical manufacturers and processors to partially cover certain EPA costs of implementing the TSCA amendments. EPA may collect fees in a given fiscal year if appropriations for the Chemical Risk Review and Reduction (CRRR) program project match or exceed what was appropriated in FY2014 to the program project. In EPA’s FY2015 budget justification, the agency reported allocating $58.6 million in FY2014 to the CRRR program project. This allocation was part of the $93.8 million appropriated for the Toxics Risk Review and Prevention program within the agency’s Environmental Programs and Management (EPM) account. Since FY2017, annual appropriations have included a provision that directs EPA to allocate to the CRRR program project an amount not less than the amount EPA allocated for the program project for FY2014.  
Fee collections are initially limited to 25% of EPA’s annual costs of administering certain TSCA activities and are not to exceed $25.0 million per year. After 2019 and every three years thereafter, EPA may adjust fees to ensure that collected fees are sufficient to cover 25% of such annual costs. Upon calculating the total amount of fees that EPA may assess, Section 26(b) authorizes EPA to promulgate a rule to set fee amounts associated with certain submissions or activities under TSCA. Specifically, Section 26(b) authorizes EPA to set fees for the submission of testing information under Section 4, the submission of new chemicals and significant new uses of chemicals under Section 5, the request to protect certain submitted information as confidential business information under Section 14, and risk evaluations of existing chemicals under Section 6. Additionally, Section 26(b) directs EPA, after consultation with the Small Business Administration, to promulgate a rule to prescribe standards for determining whether entities may qualify as a small business concern for purposes of reduced fee payments. 
Section 26(b) requires the deposit of collected fees into the TSCA Service Fee Fund in the U.S. Treasury. Section 26(b) also provides that the TSCA Service Fee Fund be subject to accounting and auditing requirements. 
Fee Rulemakings
In October 2018, EPA finalized a rule to collect fees from those entities required to submit information and those that manufacture chemicals subject to an agency risk evaluation under the amended TSCA. Based on an EPA estimate of $80.2 million per year to carry out Sections 4, 5, 6, and 14, the rule established different fee amounts depending on the type of information being submitted to EPA or whether the risk evaluation was EPA-initiated or manufacturer-requested. For example, the fee for submitting a notice for a new chemical was set at $16,000 unless the submitter qualified as a small business concern. The fee for an EPA-initiated risk evaluation of an existing chemical was set at a total of $1.35 million combined for all entities subject to the fee unless the entity qualified as a small business concern. The rule established fee amounts only for FY2019, FY2020, and FY2021, and provided for adjustments to the fees for inflation and other factors once every three years (i.e., after FY2021). When the 2018 rule was promulgated, EPA expected to collect $20.0 million per fiscal year in TSCA fees under the rule. 
In February 2024, EPA finalized a rule to adjust the collection of TSCA fees and make certain other changes. To inform its adjustment of TSCA fees, EPA reevaluated the total annual costs to carry out Sections 4, 5, 6, and 14 as $146.8 million (an 83% increase from the 2018 estimate). Based on this estimate, EPA adjusted the fees. For example, EPA increased the fee for the submission of a notice for a new chemical to $37,000 unless the submitter qualified as a small business concern. The fee for an EPA-initiated risk evaluation of an existing chemical was increased to a total of $4.29 million combined for all entities subject to the fee unless the entity qualified as a small business concern. With the increase in various fees, EPA estimated (in its 2024 rule) that the agency would collect $36.7 million per year in TSCA fees under the rule.  
Discretionary Appropriations and Fee Receipts
Within the past 10 fiscal years, EPA allocations to the CRRR program project have increased. Earlier in this period, between FY2016 and FY2022, EPA reported allocating an average of $59.7 million per fiscal year to this program project. For FY2023 and FY2024, EPA reported allocating $82.8 million per fiscal year to this program project. In its FY2026 budget justification, EPA stated that the agency allocated $96.4 million to the program project in FY2025. Since FY2017, annual appropriations have included a provision that provided funding to the TSCA Service Fee Fund at the beginning of the fiscal year to be offset by fee receipts later in that fiscal year. Funding provided in advance of fee receipts has ranged between $3.0 million and $10.0 million.
From FY2019 through FY2024, EPA annually collected between $2.7 million and $5.5 million in TSCA fees, except for FY2021, when EPA collected $28.6 million due to the initiation of risk evaluations for existing chemicals under Section 6. In its FY2026 budget justification, EPA estimates TSCA fee receipts for FY2025 and FY2026 to be $4.8 million and $26.2 million, respectively. The expected increase in fee receipts is due to the initiation of the next round of risk evaluations for existing chemicals under Section 6. 
Selected Issues
The expiration of TSCA fees at the end of FY2026 provides Congress an opportunity to review EPA’s implementation of the TSCA amendments and decide how or whether to reauthorize fees. Additionally, Congress may oversee the accuracy with which EPA estimates fee receipts and the extent to which EPA reviews are timely with its current funding.    
Fees Reauthorization
Since 2018, TSCA fees have been intended to supplement discretionary appropriations to cover certain agency costs of implementing TSCA. If Congress were to allow the authority to collect TSCA fees to lapse, funding to carry out TSCA would solely rely on discretionary appropriations, as was the case prior to 2018. If Congress were to reauthorize TSCA fees, policymakers would encounter several decisions. For example, Congress could maintain the same split between fees and discretionary appropriations for covering costs. Alternatively, Congress could change this split to require chemical manufacturers and others to contribute more or less in fees. 
Chemical manufacturers have noted that higher levels of user fees may discourage chemical innovation by raising the cost of commercializing chemicals. Generally, chemical manufacturers seek to commercialize new chemicals with more desirable properties and characteristics (e.g., reduced toxicity) that may replace less desirable existing chemicals. EPA acknowledges that higher fees generally correlate with fewer new chemical notifications.
Congress also may consider the distribution of fees across the regulated community, particularly the extent to which fees are discounted for small business concerns. In setting fees, EPA has determined that small business concerns generally are entitled to an 80% discount on fees. Congress may clarify the standards for EPA to determine whether an entity may qualify as a small business concern or explicitly specify the extent to which EPA must discount fees for small business concerns. Congress may also consider enacting a fee schedule to explicitly set fees for the type of information being submitted to EPA or whether the risk evaluation for a chemical was EPA-initiated or manufacturer-requested.  
Timeliness of EPA Decisions with Fees
The timeliness of EPA decisions (e.g., risk evaluations) under TSCA has been a long-standing issue. The extent to which EPA decisions may be expedited with additional resources depends in part on the complexity of decisions that the agency is expected to make. For example, review of chemicals associated with relatively limited exposure scenarios or low toxicity may be more straightforward and take less time than review of chemicals associated with many complex exposure scenarios or relatively greater toxicity. Additional funding may not necessarily expedite reviews, especially those that are more complex. 
Prior to 2016, EPA’s statutory responsibilities for the review of new chemicals under TSCA were different. EPA had discretion in reviewing new chemicals for unreasonable risk under Section 5. In practice, EPA screened new chemicals to focus on reviewing those that were more likely to present unreasonable risk than others. LCSA amended TSCA to require EPA to review every new chemical for unreasonable risk. EPA asserts that this amendment significantly increased its workload. As the 90-day time frame for review was retained, EPA has reported delays in new chemicals review. 
Reauthorizing Legislation
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce discussion draft, dated January 14, 2026, would reauthorize TSCA fees for another 10 years upon enactment. Additionally, the House discussion draft would direct EPA to submit more detailed accounting information on the TSCA Service Fee Fund—such as the amount of funding for each category of activity in which fees receipts were used and the number of actions EPA took per category of activity—to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Also, the House discussion draft would require EPA’s annual audit of the TSCA Service Fee Fund to include an analysis of the number of rules, orders, and consent agreements issued under Section 4, and the number of notices received, reviewed, and pending under Section 5. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works discussion draft, dated February 26, 2026, would reauthorize TSCA fees until the end of the fiscal year that is 20 years after the enactment of LCSA (i.e., September 30, 2036). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13222/IF13222.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13222.html
R48940,Current Foreign-Born Population by State and Congressional District,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:23Z,Active,Reports,"Tilly Finnegan-Kennel, Ben Leubsdorf","Census, Temporary Immigration, Unauthorized Foreign Nationals, Permanent Immigration","The United States in 2024 was home to an estimated 50.2 million foreign-born individuals, who lived in every state and congressional district. This report provides a snapshot of recent U.S. Census Bureau estimates for the foreign-born population (i.e., people now living in the United States who were not U.S. citizens at birth) in each state, as well as estimates for the foreign-born population in each congressional district. It also discusses alternative and additional sources of data on the foreign-born population. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48940/R48940.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48940.html
IF13221,Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery: A Primer,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:25Z,Active,Resources,Joseph V. Jaroscak,,"In response to some disasters, Congress has provided supplemental funding for long-term disaster recovery and other related purposes under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program’s statutory authority (42 U.S.C. §§5301 et seq.). Administered by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), this assistance is commonly referred to as CDBG-DR funding. 
Since FY1993, Congress has appropriated, and HUD has allocated, more than $111 billion in CDBG-DR funds. Roughly $65 billion of this total has been provided since FY2016. During this period, Congress also began to provide dedicated supplemental CDBG appropriations for certain mitigation activities, which are included in the totals.
Overview
CDBG-DR funding is intended to support needs unmet by other forms of federal disaster assistance, including Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) grants and Small Business Administration loans. Typically, Congress directs HUD to allocate CDBG-DR funds for use in the “most impacted and distressed areas” in jurisdictions with major disaster declarations under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.; Stafford Act)—see for example P.L. 118-158.
CDBG-DR is not a program with its own standing authorization or regulations. Instead, CDBG-DR funds, generally, are subject to the conventional CDBG program’s statutory authority and regulatory requirements. The text of CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations typically include specific statutory directives and authorize HUD to establish waivers and alternative requirements as circumstances may require, which can make each instance of CDBG-DR appropriations unique. 
Grants Management Process
Although directives in appropriations acts and aspects of HUD’s grant administration may vary, the CDBG-DR funding and disbursement cycle typically follows a common series of general steps governed by congressional requirements and overarching HUD regulations. The basic steps in the CDBG-DR funding and disbursement process are listed below:
Congress provides funding through a supplemental appropriations act, which defines eligibility and may include specific guidelines for the use of funds;
HUD sets allocation amounts and establishes rules for the use of funds provided in the corresponding CDBG-DR supplemental appropriations act;
Eligible grantees (i.e., states, localities, U.S. Territories, or federally recognized tribes) draft CDBG-DR action plans and certifications, engage in public participation, and submit the documents to HUD;
HUD reviews and approves action plans and certifications, negotiates grant agreements, and obligates funds;
Grantees implement action plans and expend CDBG-DR funds; and
HUD monitors grantee program activities and expenditures.

Eligible Activities and Requirements
Broadly, eligible uses in the conventional CDBG program’s statute and regulations (42 U.S.C. §5305 and 24 C.F.R. §570.201) establish the baseline of eligible CDBG-DR activities. Provisions in supplemental appropriations acts or HUD rulemaking could modify eligible activities and associated requirements.
Typically, grantees need to demonstrate that a proposed CDBG-DR activity has a direct “tie-back” or connection to the disaster for which funds were provided. Additionally, CDBG-DR activities must meet one of the conventional CDBG program’s three national objectives:
to principally benefit low- and moderate-income (LMI) persons;
to aid in the prevention or elimination of slums or blight; or
to provide an urgent need for the purposes of health or safety.
In general, grantees are required to utilize 70% of their funds for activities that principally benefit LMI populations. In some cases, HUD has relaxed the LMI requirement to 50%, typically pursuant to authority provided by Congress in a supplemental appropriations act. For the purposes of CDBG-DR, LMI is defined as at or below 80% of the area median income.
Oversight Findings 
The ad hoc nature of the CDBG-DR process, some argue, has allowed Congress and HUD to adapt grant requirements to the specific needs of affected communities. Some analysis indicates that it may have also contributed to coordination and planning challenges. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported instances of protracted CDBG-DR rulemaking periods, inconsistent administrative time frames, and funding delays. Some grantees have also expressed concern to GAO regarding the administrative burden of simultaneously managing multiple CDBG-DR grants with differing sets of requirements. Additionally, GAO has highlighted ongoing fraud risk associated with CDBG-DR funds.
Some HUD Office of Inspector General (HUD-OIG) audits have identified potential deficiencies in HUD’s grantee guidance, monitoring processes, and grantee data collection, which may pose risks related to improper payments and challenges with preventing or identifying waste, fraud, and abuse. 
HUD Administrative Reforms
HUD has instituted some measures to standardize CDBG-DR processes within the current framework. For example, on January 8, 2025, HUD published a “Universal Notice” in the Federal Register to standardize and clarify the CDBG-DR rulemaking process. According to HUD, the Universal Notice is a uniform rulemaking document designed to accompany an Allocation Announcement Notice (AAN) when Congress provides supplemental appropriations and rulemaking authority for CDBG-DR. The Universal Notice outlines waivers and alternative requirements for three key phases of the grants management process, carried out by CDBG-DR grantees: 
Action Plan development;
financial certification and oversight of funds; and
implementation.
HUD’s stated intent in establishing a Universal Notice is to “provide grantees and the public with increased transparency, consistency, and more timely access to CDBG–DR funds, helping to minimize program delays and accelerate recovery.”
The first AAN subject to the Universal Notice requirements was published on January 16, 2025, and provided allocations for disasters occurring in 2023 and 2024 pursuant to P.L. 118-158. HUD amended the Universal Notice on March 19 and March 31, 2025. According to HUD, the amendments were intended to conform with several executive orders and a presidential memorandum issued between January 20 and February 19, 2025, on subjects pertaining to cost of living and diversity, equity, and inclusion practices. HUD also announced a 60-day extension for CDBG-DR grantees that were subject to the initial Universal Notice requirements.
Prior to establishment of the Universal Notice, HUD took initial steps to standardize CDBG-DR processes by including a “consolidated notice” as an appendix of allocation announcements in the Federal Register. HUD adopted this practice for disasters occurring in 2020, 2021, and 2022, as well as selected 2023 disasters. The consolidated notice—and its accompanying guidance—outlined uniform CDBG-DR processes and requirements for grantees covered by these allocations and rulemaking. 
Recent Proposed Legislation
GAO has recommended congressional action on authorization of a federal unmet needs disaster recovery program. HUD’s Congressional Budget Justifications (CBJs) for FY2023-FY2025 expressed support for congressional authorization of CDBG-DR. HUD’s FY2026 and FY2027 CBJs did not include such language. 
In the 119th Congress, some Members of Congress have proposed legislation that would authorize CDBG-DR within HUD or establish a similar new program to provide for unmet disaster recovery needs in another agency.
Reforming Disaster Recovery Act
A version of a Reforming Disaster Recovery Act has been included in two housing-related legislative packages that were agreed to in the Senate during the 119th Congress (S.Amdt. 4308 and S. 2296 Division I, Title LV, Section 5505). The bill would formalize HUD’s role in disaster response and recovery. Specifically, it would authorize CDBG-DR as a standing program, establish a dedicated fund for the program within the Treasury, and create the Office of Disaster Management and Resiliency within HUD’S Office of the Secretary to oversee and coordinate the agency’s disaster preparedness and response functions. 
Natural Disaster Recovery Program Act
A Natural Disaster Recovery Program Act of 2025 (H.R. 316) would establish a dedicated fund in the Treasury and authorize FEMA to provide assistance for unmet disaster recovery needs of states and tribal governments, among other provisions. 
Considerations for Congress
Past congressional hearings on CDBG-DR have addressed HUD’s role in the disaster recovery process. Topics have included the efficacy of CDBG-DR assistance and considerations pertaining to potential authorization.
Permanently authorizing CDBG-DR would designate HUD as a principal disaster management agency, with a more direct and official role in disaster management. Although HUD does currently have disaster management responsibilities, including its administration of CDBG-DR, permanent authorization could formally broaden HUD’s scope in this policy area. This could require further consideration on HUD’s staffing and technical capacity to carry out potentially expanded and formalized functions pertaining to disaster mitigation, response, and recovery.
If Congress authorizes CDBG-DR or another form of unmet needs assistance into a standing disaster recovery and mitigation program, it would face consideration of what the best agency is to administer it. HUD or another economic development-focused agency may be a potential choice, depending on the priorities of the authorization legislation, or an agency with more regular disaster management responsibilities.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13221/IF13221.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13221.html
IF13220,Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Member Office Management Considerations,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:22Z,Active,Resources,"Sarah J. Eckman, R. Eric Petersen",,"Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies: the U.S. Military Academy (USMA); U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA); and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). A fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. These institutions provide college-age Americans with a tuition-free, four-year undergraduate education and prepare them to be officers of some of the U.S. uniformed services. Upon graduation, service academy graduates are commissioned as officers in the active or reserve components of the military or the merchant marine for a minimum of five years.
This In Focus provides some management considerations for addressing service academy nominations, a timeline for congressional nomination actions (Figure 1), and statutory and regulatory requirements for allocating congressional nominations to service academies. Additional information is available in CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, CRS In Focus IF13219, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Candidate Qualifications and Noncongressional Nominating Authorities, and CRS Infographic IG10096, U.S. Service Academy Nominations: Timelines. 
Congressional Considerations
The nomination of constituents to one of the service academies can provide Members of Congress with the opportunity to perform community outreach and other representational activities. In some states and congressional districts, nominations are highly competitive. Others are less competitive, and some offices do not receive expressions of interest from enough applicants to fill the number of nominations allocated. As a result, some congressional offices may need to dedicate considerable staff resources to the selection process to identify qualified candidates, while others can incorporate service academy nominations alongside other constituent service activities.
The nomination authorities, number of appointments, and criteria establishing the qualifications of potential service academy appointees are set in statute, federal regulations, and policies established by each academy. Each congressional office with nominating authority can develop its own process for managing its service academy nominations and selecting nominees.
Some congressional offices have adapted and modified approaches like those used by USMA, USNA, USAFA, and USMMA to make their nomination decisions. These might include evaluation of several broad components of a potential nominee’s qualifications for appointment, such as character, scholarship, leadership, physical aptitude, and motivation. Other congressional offices reach decisions through the consideration of a candidate’s academic preparation, extracurricular participation, and community service, and the recommendations of those familiar with their activities in those areas. To make these assessments, congressional offices often require prospective nominees to apply, which can be a combination of self-reported qualifications and additional documentary materials.
Figure 1. Academy Nominations Timeline for Member Offices
/
Source: CRS compilation based on information from the service academies’ websites and congressional guides. Graphic created by Brion Long, Visual Information Specialist.
Notes: Timeline provides generalized information representing when events and activities most frequently occur.
In addition to establishing criteria for nomination decisions, each congressional Member office may determine how to administer the nomination decisionmaking process. Some offices handle nominations internally, assigning the task of managing applicant files and developing nomination recommendations to a staff member. Other offices assign staff to oversee nomination-related activities but delegate the screening and development of nomination recommendations to a volunteer panel. A nominations review panel could include educators, service academy alumni, representatives of veterans’ groups, and other community leaders from a Member’s state or district. The use of volunteers in congressional offices is governed by regulations issued by the Select Committee on Ethics in the Senate and by the Committees on House Administration and Ethics in the House.
The service academies offer guidance and support for congressional Member offices regarding the nomination and appointment process. Coordination with the service academies may help Members of Congress assist constituents throughout the appointment process. The service academies, for example, may be able to help identify prospective nominees or academy alumni, and clarify institutional policies. The service academies may encourage congressional Member offices to host Academy Days in their districts, which are informational sessions for prospective nominees, similar to college admissions fairs.
Appointment Criteria
Appointment and nomination criteria for the service academies are established by statute, regulations issued by the appropriate executive branch authority, and policies set by each academy. Three service academies—USMA, USNA, and USAFA—are housed in the military branches of the Department of Defense (DOD). (Pursuant to Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, DOD is also “using a secondary Department of War designation.”) USMMA is governed by regulations issued by the Department of Transportation.
Department of Defense Academies
Three service academies—USMA, USNA, and USAFA—are overseen by three military branches of the DOD. Allocations for nominations by Members of Congress of prospective appointees to these academies are established by statute and are substantially similar for each academy. The number of positions, or charges, subject to congressional nomination at each DOD academy includes
10 from each state, 5 of whom are nominated by each Senator from that state;
5 from each congressional district, nominated by the Representative from the district;
5 from the District of Columbia, nominated by the Delegate from the District of Columbia;
4 from the U.S. Virgin Islands, nominated by the Delegate from the U.S. Virgin Islands;
6 from Puerto Rico, 5 of whom are nominated by the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, and 1 who is a native of Puerto Rico nominated by the Governor of Puerto Rico;
5 from Guam, nominated by the Delegate from Guam;
3 from American Samoa, nominated by the Delegate from American Samoa; and 
3 from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, nominated by the Delegate from the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.
When a congressionally nominated academy position is vacant, a Member of Congress may nominate up to 15 people for possible appointment. As DOD service academy cadets or midshipmen who received a congressional nomination graduate, or as their appointments are otherwise terminated, a nominating Member office can make new nominations to fill any vacated positions in the next regular admissions period. Typically, one appointment per DOD academy per Senator and Representative is available annually. In some years, however, a congressional office might have the opportunity to make nominations to fill multiple vacancies at an academy. The service academies can provide congressional offices with information about the number of appointments available for Members to nominate. 
Nominees to DOD service academies may be submitted by Members of Congress in three categories: without ranking, with a principal candidate and nine ranked alternates, or with a principal candidate and nine unranked alternates. When the Member specifies a principal candidate, that individual is to be appointed to a DOD academy if he or she meets all other admission criteria. If the principal candidate is disqualified, the service academy is to appoint the first fully qualified, ranked alternate, if specified by the Member. In circumstances where Members do not specify a principal candidate or ranked alternates, one individual from among the Member’s nominees who is found to be fully qualified is to be appointed by the academies to serve as a cadet or midshipman.
Congressional nominees who are not initially offered appointments and are designated by the academies as qualified alternates may receive an appointment via a noncongressional authority. Nominees who are not initially offered academy appointments may be offered admission to an academy preparatory program. These are one-year programs, hosted at other military schools. Students who complete the preparatory program can reapply to the academy and seek renomination during the appropriate admissions cycle. Noncongressional appointees from a Member’s state or district are not counted as part of the Member’s statutory allotment of appointees, nor are students appointed to an academy prep school.
United States Merchant Marine Academy
Members of Congress nominate individuals for appointment to USMMA. The number of seats in an entering class at this service academy is allocated by regulation issued by the Secretary of Transportation (46 C.F.R. 310.53), who is also the appointment authority for the academy. Under the regulation, each Member of Congress may nominate 10 candidates per vacancy to compete for admission to the academy. Members of the House of Representatives may nominate candidates from anywhere within their state. The regulation allocates four vacancies to nominees from the District of Columbia and one vacancy each to nominees from Puerto Rico, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa. The regulation states that nominating officials may select individuals for nomination by any method they wish, including a screening examination.
United States Coast Guard Academy
Procedures for appointments to USCGA are established by regulations issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security. Additional qualifications may be set by the superintendent of USCGA, who is responsible for appointments to the academy. No congressional nomination is required for admission to this service academy.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13220/IF13220.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13220.html
IF13219,Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Candidate Qualifications and Noncongressional Nominating Authorities,2026-05-08T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:24Z,Active,Resources,"Sarah J. Eckman, R. Eric Petersen",,"Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies. These schools are the U.S. Military Academy (USMA); U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA); and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). A fifth service academy, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (USCGA), does not require a congressional nomination for appointment. 
Although it is an essential component of the appointment process, a congressional nomination does not guarantee an individual’s admission or appointment to a service academy. Each academy requires the submission of a preliminary application to initiate the admissions process. In addition to requesting a nomination from a Member of Congress or another nominating official, an individual seeking appointment to a service academy must separately apply to the service academies to which he or she seeks to be appointed. Even when a candidate meets all these requirements and is deemed to be qualified for admission, he or she may not receive an official appointment, due to the limited number of spaces available at each service academy.
This In Focus provides applicant qualification information for USMA, USNA, USAFA, USMMA, and USCGA; a timeline of actions for prospective nominees (Figure 1); and discussion of noncongressional appointment authorities to some service academies. It can be used to inform congressional staff of basic candidate qualifications or be provided to constituents who aspire to enroll in a service academy and seek a congressional nomination. Additional information for congressional offices is available in CRS In Focus IF13220, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: Member Office Management Considerations, CRS Report RL33213, Congressional Nominations to U.S. Service Academies: An Overview and Resources for Outreach and Management, and CRS Infographic IG10096, U.S. Service Academy Nominations: Timelines.
Acceptance and successful completion of a service academy appointment requires at least a nine-year obligation, including four years of tuition-free preparation at an academy and five years of active duty service as an officer in the regular or reserve components of the military or the merchant marine.
Applicant Qualifications
To qualify for an appointment to any service academy, an applicant must meet the following criteria:
U.S. citizen or national; at least 17 years of age and not yet 23 years of age on July 1 of the year the applicant would enter an academy (25 years of age for USMMA);
unmarried;
not pregnant, and without legal obligation to support children or other dependents;
demonstrate comprehensive academic preparation; demonstrate leadership in athletics and other extracurricular activities;
take the SAT or ACT (or CLT for applicants to USMA, USNA, or USAFA);
pass a comprehensive medical examination administered by the Department of Defense Medical Examination Review Board; and
pass the Candidate Fitness Assessment for academies to which the applicant is applying: USMA, USNA, USAFA, USMMA, USCGA.
Beyond what is required in federal law and regulation, each academy can further specify academic, physical, and leadership requirements for admission. The extent and nature of eligibility and recommended preparation varies by academy. Links to each academy’s expectations are provided in Table 1.
Figure 1. Timeline for Potential Applicants to Service Academies
/
Source: CRS compilation based on information from the service academies’ websites and congressional guides. Graphic created by Brion Long, Visual Information Specialist.
Notes: Timeline provides generalized information representing when events and activities most frequently occur. ** All four academies accept SAT and ACT results. USMA, USNA, and USAFA accept CLT results.
Table 1. Service Academy Applicant Preparation Links
USMA
https://www.westpoint.edu/admissions/steps-to-admission

USNA
https://www.usna.edu/Admissions/Apply/FAQ.php

USAFA
https://www.academyadmissions.com/requirements/academic/

USMMA
https://www.usmma.edu/node/8266

USCGA
https://uscga.edu/admissions/admission-requirements/

Source: Service academies.
Noncongressional Nominating Officials
Although congressional offices provide most of the nominations each year, a smaller number of nominations to the Department of Defense (DOD) service academies—USMA, USNA, and USAFA—are made by executive branch officials. (Pursuant to Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, DOD is also “using a secondary Department of War designation.”) All qualified nominees not selected for appointment through the congressional nomination process are considered qualified alternates for the purposes of selection by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the academy superintendents to their respective academies. Applicants requesting congressional nominations are also eligible for nominations from the Vice President. Vice presidential nominations are made for the nation at large, and applicants may apply for those through the White House with supporting materials submitted through each DOD service academy. Other nomination and appointment sources are only available to those with a military service-connection. The governor of Puerto Rico may also nominate a candidate who is a native of Puerto Rico to each academy. The distribution of nominations by noncongressional authorities is listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Distribution of Noncongressional Nominations to Department of Defense Service Academies, by Authority
Nominating Authority
Number and Type

President
100 children of living or deceased members of the Armed Forces with eight years of service.
The President is also authorized to appoint an unlimited number of children whose parents have been awarded the Medal of Honor.

Vice President
Five, at large.

Service Secretary
85 enlisted members each of the regular and reserve services of the Secretary’s branch.
20 honor graduates of designated honor schools in any military branch, and from members of the Secretary’s service Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).
150 qualified alternates who received congressional nominations but were not appointed, in order of merit.

Service Academy Superintendent
50, at large.
65 children of deceased, 100% disabled, or missing/captured Armed Forces veterans or missing/captured federal civilian personnel. 

Governor, Puerto Rico
One, who must be a native of Puerto Rico.

Source: 10 U.S.C. 7442, USMA; 10 U.S.C. 8454, USNA; and 10 U.S.C. 9442, USAFA.
At the conclusion of the nomination and academy admissions processes, in his capacity as commander in chief of the military, the President is the appointing authority for all DOD service academy admissions.
USMMA nominations are governed by regulations issued by the Department of Transportation. USCGA does not require a congressional nomination for appointment.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13219/IF13219.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13219.html
R48939,"National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts",2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:54:53Z,Active,Reports,"Carlos Acevedo, Emily M. McCabe, Cory R. Gill","Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Budget & Appropriations","National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs (NSRP) appropriations legislation funds many U.S. nondefense international affairs activities. Between FY2008 and FY2025, the bill was titled Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations. Within NSRP appropriations, the Department of State and Related Programs (Title I) portion makes up about one-third of the funding, and the various foreign assistance accounts compose the remainder. For FY2026, NSRP is one of 12 appropriations acts that fund the federal government. 
Congress appropriated NSRP funds for FY2026 in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (Division F of P.L. 119-75). Division F of the act is divided into seven titles. Each title funds a variety of government activities, ranging from government agencies’ operational and administrative costs to direct grant funds for private nonprofit or multilateral organizations. By title, NSRP provisions set out activities as follows:
Title I—Department of State and Related Programs funds State Department diplomatic programs and general operations, including Foreign and Civil Service personnel salaries and training, public diplomacy and cultural exchange programs, information technology maintenance and modernization, dues to the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, international broadcasting, and embassy construction and diplomatic security. It also provides funding to U.S. diplomacy-focused nongovernmental organizations and legislative commissions.
Title II—Administration of Assistance funds general operations and oversight of foreign assistance but not foreign assistance programs.
Title III—Bilateral Economic Assistance is the primary funding source for the U.S. government’s humanitarian and international development programs. It includes bilateral assistance for disaster relief, global health, and economic development activities, as well as funding for several independent development-oriented agencies, notably the Millennium Challenge Corporation and Peace Corps.
Title IV—International Security Assistance is the primary title for U.S. security cooperation programs abroad outside of the Defense appropriations bill. It includes counternarcotics and rule-of-law strengthening programs; nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and demining programs; some assistance to foreign militaries; and some funding for international peacekeeping efforts.
Title V—Multilateral Assistance contributes funds to several multilateral finance and grant-making institutions.
Title VI—Export and Investment Assistance funds the three U.S. government export promotion agencies: the Export-Import Bank, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and the Trade and Development Agency.
Title VII—General Provisions guides the allocation of funds appropriated in other titles and lays out restrictions and priorities for programming.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48939/R48939.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48939.html
R48937,"Congressional Votes on Surface Transportation Authorizations, 1978-2021",2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:53:59Z,Active,Reports,Lena A. Maman,Transportation Funding,"Prior to 1978, Congress enacted separate highway and public transportation authorization acts. Congress began passing multiyear surface transportation authorization acts in 1978. These acts were often extended prior to the passage of subsequent multiyear acts. This report compiles congressional votes on enacted multiyear legislation related to surface transportation authorizations as well as information regarding the extensions of these acts. CRS obtained the information presented in this report from Congress.gov, the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, and the Federal Highway Administration.
The current surface transportation authorization, which is Division A of the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58), expires on September 30, 2026.


",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48937/R48937.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48937.html
LSB11430,Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from April 2026,2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:54:56Z,Active,Posts,"Michael John Garcia, Alexander H. Pepper",Jurisprudence,"The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants.
This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from April 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”).
Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys.
Bankruptcy: The Fourth Circuit held that a Chapter 13 plan’s technical compliance with the “means test” calculation of disposable income under 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) did not immunize the plan from the requirement in Section 1325(a) that the plan be proposed “in good faith,” as the two are separate, independent requirements. Chapter 13 debtors generally must devote their disposable income to paying unsecured creditors. Prior to 2005, bankruptcy courts evaluated the calculation of disposable income on a case-by-case basis, including whether claimed expenses were reasonably necessary. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) created the “means test,” providing a statutory formula for calculating the reasonably necessary expenses and disposable income of debtors with above-median income. Under Section 1325(b)(3) and Section 707(b)(2)(A)(iii), such debtors may deduct certain payments on secured debts from their disposable income. The debtor in this case owned three luxury vehicles subject to secured loans. He proposed a Chapter 13 plan in compliance with the “means test” that would have paid off the secured loans on the vehicles but paid only 7.7% of his unsecured debts. The bankruptcy court, affirmed by the district court, determined that the plan did not meet the good faith requirement of Section 1325(a). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’ ruling, rejecting the debtor’s argument that, after BAPCPA, the good faith inquiry cannot consider expenses claimed under the “means test.” The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that its approach differed from that of the Ninth Circuit, which has held that the good faith analysis cannot consider a debtor’s retention of “luxury” items in compliance with the “means test” (Goddard v. Burnett).
Civil Procedure: A divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought in federal court under state law against a federally chartered corporation, concluding that federal courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. By statute, federal courts have “diversity jurisdiction” to hear certain civil suits arising under state law that exceed a certain monetary value when there is “diversity” of citizenship among the parties—for example, the parties are citizens of different states. In 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), Congress provided that a corporation generally “shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . . ” (italics added). The panel majority disagreed with the Fourth Circuit, which has read the connecting “and” in Section 1332(c) to mean that either condition is sufficient for diversity jurisdiction analysis, so that a federally chartered corporation would be treated as a citizen of the state of its principal place of business for purposes of evaluating whether diversity existed. By contrast, considering the text and legislative history of Section 1332(c)(1), the Second Circuit panel majority instead concluded that the “and” connecting the two clauses serves to limit the provision’s application only to those corporations that have both a state of incorporation and a state that serves as its principal place of business. Because federally chartered corporations are not incorporated by a U.S. or foreign state, the majority concluded that Section 1332(c) did not provide a mechanism for federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction over them (Schneiderman v. Am. Chem. Soc’y). 
Civil Procedure: The Ninth Circuit held that postjudgment interest on an award of attorneys’ fees began to accrue when a district court entered a judgment awarding fees, not when the district court earlier approved a settlement that created a legal entitlement to attorneys’ fees. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, “[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment” in civil cases and that “interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment.” In this case, a relator settled a False Claims Act (FCA) suit. Under the FCA, relators who win or settle an FCA claim are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees, but the FCA does not address postjudgment interest. The Ninth Circuit held that a “money judgment” triggering interest requires a definite and certain designation of the amount owed (in addition to identified parties), rejecting the relator’s argument that interest should begin to accrue when a party secures an unconditional entitlement to attorney’s fees. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit concurred with the Third, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, and disagreed with the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the text of Section 1961 is conclusive, rejecting the policy and equitable concerns relied on by some other circuits (United States ex rel. Thrower v. Acad. Mortg. Corp.).
Civil Procedure: The Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of a suit seeking to compel the release of a statewide list of registered voters, but rejected arguments that plaintiffs lacked constitutional standing to sue, where the plaintiffs’ injury was premised on the denial of information to which they were allegedly entitled under the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA). The plaintiffs alleged that the State of Hawaii violated Section 20507(i)(1) of the NVRA by failing to disclose state voter registration data. On the merits, the panel split with the First Circuit and held that Section 20507(i)(1) does not provide plaintiffs with a right to voter registration lists, but does entitle them to information about state efforts to ensure those lists’ accuracy. Before reaching that decision, however, the circuit court considered whether the denial of information under the NVRA and other government sunshine laws (i.e., laws requiring the disclosure of government information on request) constitutes a concrete injury providing standing to bring suit. The Ninth Circuit panel held that it does, relying on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Federal Elections Commission v. Akins and Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of Justice, in which the Court held that the denial of a request for information made available by a sunshine law gave rise to a cognizable injury. The panel disagreed with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, which read the Supreme Court’s later decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez as requiring plaintiffs bringing suit under information-disclosure statutes to show adverse consequences resulting from the denial of information. The Ninth Circuit decided that TransUnion did not address government sunshine laws or abrogate earlier caselaw concerning standing to bring suit in such cases. The panel also split with the Third Circuit, which held that a denial of an information request under the NVRA is not the type of information denial that supports standing under Akins and Public Citizen (Pub. Int. Legal Found, Inc. v. Nago). 
Firearms: Vacating a lower court’s preliminary injunction, the First Circuit allowed the State of Maine to enforce a 72-hour waiting period requirement before a seller could deliver a firearm to a purchaser, holding that the law did not facially violate the Second Amendment. The panel observed that its analysis of the law’s compatibility with the Second Amendment was governed by the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association., Inc. v. Bruen, which first looks at whether the conduct regulated by the challenged law is covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment and, if so, requires the government to prove that the law is consistent with the nation’s historical firearms tradition. The First Circuit decided the case at step one of the Bruen framework, holding that the state’s waiting period requirement was not covered by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The panel reasoned that the text of the Second Amendment protects a person’s right to have and carry firearms, whereas state laws regulating the purchase or acquisition of firearms concerned conduct antecedent to that right. The panel described lower courts as split on when or whether laws regulating the purchase of firearms violated the Second Amendment, including a Tenth Circuit decision that found that a seven-day waiting period likely was unconstitutional (Beckwith v. Frey).
Immigration: The Second Circuit held that an alien taken into immigration custody after having unlawfully entered the country years earlier could not be treated as an “applicant for admission” subject to detention without bond during the pendency of removal proceedings. In many cases, an alien may be released from custody on bond or on his or her own recognizance during the pendency of removal proceedings. Except in narrow circumstances, however, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) directs that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained [during removal proceedings]” (italics added). A separate provision, Section 1225(a)(1), provides that an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted” shall be treated as an “applicant for admission,” but does not provide any corresponding specification on who is treated as an “alien seeking admission.” The Second Circuit agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the two terms are not coextensive, and that an “alien seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) includes only those aliens not lawfully admitted who are encountered at the border, and not those found unlawfully present within the United States. The panel noted its disagreement with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which have treated “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission” as synonymous terms, meaning that aliens present in the United States but not lawfully admitted are subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) (Cunha v. Freden).
Labor & Employment: The Second Circuit revived unseaworthiness and maritime negligence claims brought by a former volunteer firefighter injured while traveling on a boat owned by the defendant fire district. Under the warranty of seaworthiness, vessel owners have a duty to furnish a vessel reasonably fit for its intended use. In a 1946 decision, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, the Supreme Court extended this duty beyond employed seamen to non-seamen working on the vessel and doing seamen’s work. In 1972, Congress amended the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA) to increase benefits payable to workers covered by that Act, but also to eliminate those workers’ ability to bring a claim for unseaworthiness. The firefighter was not a seaman and, as a public employee, was not eligible for LHWCA compensation. Circuit courts have split on whether non-seamen excluded from the LHWCA may still bring an unseaworthiness claim under Sieracki after the LHWCA amendments. The Second Circuit held that such claims are possible, agreeing with the Fifth and D.C. Circuits, and disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit. Separately, the Second Circuit held that the firefighter could pursue a federal negligence claim under general maritime law even though he had received benefits under a state law that provides that its remedies are exclusive of all other remedies against an employer. Weighing complex precedents regarding federalism and admiralty law, the Second Circuit held that courts must balance state and federal interests. In adopting a balancing-test approach, the Second Circuit concurred with the Eleventh Circuit and disagreed with the Third and Fifth Circuits, which have adopted a categorical rule in favor of federal maritime remedies. Applying balancing, the court concluded that the firefighter might be able to prove maritime negligence claims that could not be barred by state law. The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of the firefighter’s claims and remanded for further proceedings (In re Verplanck Fire Dist.).
Labor & Employment: A divided D.C. Circuit held that the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) has jurisdiction over certain facilities even when they are not located at an extraction site, processing plant, or related road. Under 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1), a “mine” subject to MSHA jurisdiction includes extraction sites (Section 802(h)(1)(A)); related roads (Section 802(h)(1)(B)); and a list of items and places, including “facilities,” that are used in, to be used in, or resulting from mining-related activity (Section 802(h)(1)(C)). An MSHA inspector issued citations to an independent trucking company for improper safety conditions in the repair of mining-related trucks at a separate facility. The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission vacated the citations and the Secretary of Labor, through the MSHA, petitioned for D.C. Circuit review. In 2023, the same panel majority held that the statutory definition of “mine” was ambiguous and would have remanded the case to permit the Secretary to offer an interpretation of the text that would then be entitled to Chevron deference. The Supreme Court vacated that decision in light of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo. Returning to the D.C. Circuit, the Secretary argued that the list in Section 802(h)(1)(C) is defined functionally without a locational limit, while the trucking company argued for a narrow geographical limit. The panel majority rejected both interpretations as inconsistent with the text, context, and legislative history of the statute. It instead held that a “facility” is a “mine” when it is “necessarily connected with the use and operation of extracting, milling, or processing coal and other minerals,” and that, without determining the outer limits of that definition, the trucking company facility at issue was covered. In rejecting a narrower locational limit, the D.C. Circuit panel majority split with the Sixth Circuit. The panel majority separately held that the roles of the MSHA and the Commission in the case did not create an Article III justiciability concern (Sec’y of Labor v. KC Transport, Inc.).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11430/LSB11430.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11430.html
IG10097,The Decennial Census,2026-05-07T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T13:53:05Z,Active,Infographics,Taylor R. Knoedl,"U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Census","/
Information as of May 7, 2026. Prepared by Taylor R. Knoedl, Analyst in American National Government and Jamie Bush,
Visualization Information Specialist. For more information see CRS Report IF12909, The Decennial Census of Population and
Housing: An Overview.
The Decennial Census
The U.S. Census Bureau provides statistical data about the nation's people and economy through over 130
different surveys, including its foundational survey: the decennial census. The decennial census is mandated
by Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, in order to determine each state's apportionment of seats in the
House of Representatives.
Preparing for and conducting the decennial census typically takes over ten years, beginning the prior decade and
extending into the next decade.
Phone
Mail
Enumerators went door-to-door to
complete the Census Bureau’s nonresponse
follow up (NRFU) operation for respondents
that did not self-respond to the survey.
Online
 Determine initial
timelines and testing
schedule
 Other relevant
research to support
decennial census
operations
 Begin initial design
research and testing
 Engage with public on
planning
 Complete initial
operations design
 Continue research and
testing, including
large-scale tests
 Finalize operational
planning, supported
by results from
large-scale testing
 Conduct the decennial
census; initial release of data
and products, including
reapportionment totals and
redistricting data
 Conduct close-out activities,
including the
post-enumeration survey
(PES)
Data Collection
The Census Bureau collected responses to
the decennial census survey using three
initial methods in 2020. Collected data are
protected by confidentiality standards in
Titles 13 and 44 of the U.S. Code.
67%
Data Tabulation and Product Release
The Census Bureau aims to enumerate every person within the United States and its territories.
Census Bureau President Congress
State Population Counts for
Reapportionment
13 U.S.C. §141(b)
Post-Enumeration Survey (PES)
The Census Bureau conducts a Post-Enumeration
Survey at the conclusion of the decennial census
to assess the accuracy of the decennial census.
Early Planning Design Selection Development &
Integration
Peak Production
& Close-out
53.6%
33%
12.1%
1.3%
Data sent to states for redistricting
States receive demographic data for redistricting,
which includes voting age population, geographic
data, and data on other variables.
Data Tables & Products
Data from the decennial census are used for many
purposes, including to inform various policy
decisions, guide federal funding, oer the public
insights on population trends, and help the private
sector make informed business decisions.
Timeline
Data Collection
2019 - 2021 2021 - 2024 2025 - 2029 2029 - 2033
Enumerator
Separate from initial three methods
Data collected are protected by confidentiality standards in Titles 13 and 44 of the U.S. Code.
Population counts are used for
reapportionment of seats in the
House of Representatives. This
primarily consists of total
residents of each state. For more
information, please see CRS
Report: Apportionment and
Redistricting Process for the U.S.
House of Representatives.
Privacy Enhancing
Techniques
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10097/IG10097.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10097.html
IN12690,The FY2027 President’s Budget in Historical Context: Revenues,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:17Z,Active,Posts,D. Andrew Austin,"Budget, Public Finance & Taxation, Legislative & Budget Process, Executive Budget Process","On April 3, 2026, the Trump Administration submitted its budget for FY2027, which proposes to constrain nondefense spending, maintain spending on border security and immigration enforcement, and increase defense spending. In February 2026, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued its budget and economic outlook along with its current-law baseline projections. This Insight discusses the Administration’s fiscal proposals in the context of longer-term budgetary trends and highlights selected events and legislation.
Revenue Trends
Figure 1 shows federal receipts by major category as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) since FY1962. Federal receipts exceeded outlays (gray line) in five years (FY1969, FY1998-FY2001). In all other years, the government ran a deficit, which required borrowing through the sale of Treasury securities. Economic conditions and employment levels affect tax receipts, as do major tax measures. 
Individual income tax collections reflect economic conditions, rising when employment and asset values increase and fall during recessions, and they are also the largest component of federal receipts, accounting for an estimated 8.6% of GDP in FY2026. Payroll taxes, such as for Social Security and Medicare, are the next largest revenue source, accounting for an estimated 5.7% of GDP in FY2026. Corporate income taxes as a share of GDP fell from 3.5% in FY1962 to an estimated 1.2% in FY2026. 
Major Tax Legislation
The Revenue Act of 1964 (P.L. 88-272) lowered high Korean War-era marginal tax rates. Acts in the 1970s adjusted the tax code to offset bracket creep, where inflation pushed households into higher tax brackets. The 1981 Kemp-Roth act (P.L. 97-34) indexed brackets and cut marginal rates by about a quarter. A 1983 act (P.L. 98-21) aimed to stabilize Social Security’s finances for the coming 75 years by raising Social Security tax rates, phasing in a two-year increase in the full retirement age, and curtailing certain benefits. The 1986 Tax Reform Act (P.L. 99-514) lowered marginal rates and curtailed many tax preferences while aiming for budget neutrality. The 1993 omnibus act (P.L. 103-66) increased certain taxes, helping to reduce deficits. Those taxes, constraints on federal spending, and the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent so-called “peace dividend” helped achieve budget surpluses in the late 1990s. 
Figure 1. Federal Receipts by Major Category as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, FY1962-FY2031
Figure is interactive in HTML report version.
/
Source: CRS calculations based on Office of Management and Budget and Bureau of Economic Analysis data. 
Notes: Revenue and outlay data are for fiscal years. Acts are shown in the calendar year in which they were enacted. FY2026 values are estimated and those for later years reflect Administration proposals and projections. Blue labels in HTML version are clickable links. Kemp-Roth = Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981; OBRA = Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; EGTRRA = Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003; ARRA = American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; ATRA = American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012; Recon. Act = Reconciliation Act. P.L. 117-169 is the budget reconciliation measure commonly referred to as the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA).

In 2001, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16) lowered individual tax rates, expanded child and earned income tax credits, and shielded many taxpayers from the alternative minimum tax. Over the 10-year horizon, EGTRRA was estimated to increase the deficit by $1.35 trillion, although longer-term costs were limited by a provision to sunset reduced rates at the end of 2010. That sunset provision allowed the measure to avoid a Byrd Rule objection, which bars consideration of measures that increase the deficit beyond the 10-year budget-scoring window. In 2003, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA; P.L. 108-27) accelerated some EGTRRA tax reductions, increased the child tax credit, and lowered tax rates on dividend and long-term capital gains income. Federal deficits increased sharply after 2001 due to those tax cuts, the end of the dot-com boom, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and increased spending in other areas, such as veterans programs.
Deficits increased even more sharply in the wake of the 2008-2010 financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession. A 2008 measure (P.L. 110-185) authorized stimulus checks, and the 2009 ARRA (P.L. 111-5) provided a larger degree of economic stimulus, including an estimated $182 billion in tax reductions. A 2010 measure (P.L. 115-312) extended various lowered rates that were about to sunset. In late 2012, concerns that a “fiscal cliff” could undermine a slow recovery from the Great Recession led to passage of a measure (P.L. 112-240) that extended most of the JGTRRA tax cuts that were slated to expire.
The 2017 reconciliation act (P.L. 115-97) permanently lowered the corporate income tax rate to 21%, lowered some individual income tax rates, and capped the state and local tax (SALT) deduction, among other changes. CBO in 2018 estimated that the act would increase federal deficits by $1.8 trillion over the 10-year budget window. The deep economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic complicates later assessments of the act’s fiscal costs.
The 2025 reconciliation act (P.L. 119-21) extended most of the 2017 reconciliation act individual and corporate tax provisions. It also exempted certain overtime and tips income from taxation and extended and expanded certain farm subsidies, among other provisions. Over the 10-year budget window, the act was estimated to decrease revenues by $4.5 trillion relative to a current-law baseline, while increasing defense funding by $150 billion and Department of Homeland Security immigration-related funding by about $130 billion. Several tax provisions expired in 2025, such as pandemic-era enhanced subsidies for health insurance and the work opportunity credit.
FY2027 Administration Budget
The Administration’s topline budget summary mentions no major revenue proposals.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projects federal receipts as a share of GDP will rise from 17.1% in FY2026 to 18.3% in FY2032, largely due to an increase in individual income taxes from 8.2% of GDP in FY2026 to 9.2% of GDP in FY2031, before adjusting for changes in tariff policy. CBO projects more modest growth in total receipts, from 17.5% of GDP in FY2026 to 17.8% in FY2036, with individual income tax revenues rising from 8.6% to 9.1% of GDP over the FY2026-2036 period. 
Economic growth is one key determinant of the trajectory of revenues. The Administration projects that the economy will grow 3.0% per year, faster than the 1.8% rate projected by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or the 2.0% rate projected by the Federal Reserve. More recently, the International Monetary Fund warned that the war with Iran would likely reduce economic growth rates.
Tax administration is another determinant of revenue collections. Reductions of funding and staff at the Internal Revenue Service reduced resources for enforcement. CBO and other economic researchers have found a strong positive relationship between enforcement and revenue collections.
OMB projected that tariff revenue (shown in Figure 1 within “Other Taxes”) would rise from 0.6% of GDP in FY2025 to 1.4% of GDP in FY2027 and in later years. The Administration’s projections do not reflect refunds provided for tariffs that the Supreme Court found lacked legal basis. CBO’s revised projections indicate that the ruling’s effect on revenues would increase federal debt by $2.0 trillion over the coming decade. Tariffs were the largest federal revenue source in the 19th century, but declined in importance in the last century, especially as post-World War II international agreements lowered tariffs. 

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12690/IN12690.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12690.html
IN12689,Colombia’s 2026 Presidential Election,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T11:38:08Z,Active,Posts,Clare Ribando Seelke,"Colombia, South America, Latin America, Caribbean & Canada","On May 31, Colombia, a top U.S. security partner in Latin America, is scheduled to convene an election to replace President Gustavo Petro (2022-present), who is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the Petro government’s counterdrug and security policies. The 119th Congress has reduced foreign assistance to Colombia and placed additional conditions on that assistance. Some Members of Congress also have expressed concerns about political violence in Colombia since the June 2025 assassination of a presidential hopeful and threats against other candidates. 
The three main candidates are Iván Cepeda of Petro’s leftist Historic Pact (PH) and two conservative rivals—Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center (CD) and independent Abelardo De la Espriella. Members of Congress may examine these candidates’ platforms and assess their possible implications for relations with the United States. If no candidate captures more than 50% of the vote, a runoff election is scheduled for June 21; the winner is to take office on August 7. 
Domestic Context and Campaign
The legacy of outgoing President Petro, a polarizing figure whose popularity has risen since November, has influenced the elections. Supporters have praised Petro’s focus on reducing inequality through labor reform and historic minimum wage increases despite his government’s corruption scandals. The Petro administration’s deemphasis of coca eradication has coincided with record cocaine production. Also, the government’s “total peace” negotiations involving ceasefires with illegally armed groups may have bolstered the power of such groups and fueled violence. Increased violence could inhibit voting in some regions as armed groups seek to influence the election results.
The results of Colombia’s March 8 legislative elections illustrated a left-right division among voters regarding how best to address violence, corruption, and economic issues but also the continued relevance of traditional parties, including the Liberal and Conservative parties. PH captured the most Senate (25 of 103) and House of Representatives (43 of 183) seats, while CD garnered the second-largest number in both chambers (17 and 28, respectively). Four parties that aligned with the PH early in Petro’s term despite ideological differences—but later broke with PH—together won 69 House seats and 38 Senate seats. The next president likely will need to form cross-party alliances. 
Candidates
Colombia began its presidential contest with hundreds of candidates. After three interparty primaries were held concurrently with legislative elections, Paloma Valencia, winner of the center-right primary, emerged as a leading candidate, alongside Cepeda and De la Espriella—neither of whom participated in a primary.
/
Iván Cepeda is a left-wing PH senator, human rights activist, and “total peace” negotiator. Cepeda has pledged to combat corruption, prioritize peace and armed conflict victims’ rights, enact a progressive tax reform, and bolster rural development. Cepeda opposed U.S. “intervention” in Venezuela and is skeptical of militarized drug policies.
Cepeda selected Aida Quilcué, a former senator and Indigenous activist, as his running mate, reinforcing PH’s support for underrepresented groups.

/
Abelardo De la Espriella is a right-wing criminal defense lawyer who has represented controversial figures including Alex Saab, a U.S.-indicted money launderer for former Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro. De la Espriella, a political outsider who also holds U.S. and Italian citizenship, rejected support from political parties. He has proposed aggressive security policies similar to those of Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele and supports military strikes on drug trafficking targets in Colombia and aerial fumigation of coca crops.
His running mate, José Manuel Restrepo, is an economist and former minister of finance.

/
Paloma Valencia, a conservative CD senator, is a lawyer backed by former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010). Valencia has proposed a strong security plan to recapture territory from criminal groups and a counterdrug alliance with U.S. and European officials. She has pledged to streamline government and restart private investment in oil exploration and mining.
Valencia chose Juan Carlos Oviedo, a moderate economist who directed the national statistics agency, to join her ticket.


Other contenders include Sergio Fajardo, a former mayor of Medellin, and Claudia Lopez, a former mayor of Bogotá, both of whom are centrists.

Polls
Since January 2026, Cepeda has led in the polls but remained short of an absolute majority. A weighted average of recent polls suggests that Cepeda could narrowly lose to Valencia but defeat De la Espriella in a runoff (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Voter Intentions
/
Source: CRS, using data from a weighted average of polls as published by Colombia’s La Silla Vacia, https://www.lasillavacia.com/silla-nacional/ponderador-de-encuestas-cepeda-pierde-la-ventaja-en-segunda-vuelta/. 
Implications for U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress
U.S.-Colombian relations have been strained under the second Trump Administration amid the Administration’s differences with President Petro. Drug policy changes, U.S. foreign assistance cuts and tariffs, and Colombia’s decision to sign a cooperation plan with China on the Belt and Road Initiative have contributed to strained relations. In September 2025, President Trump determined that Colombia had failed to meet its counternarcotics commitments, the State Department revoked Petro’s visa, and the Department of the Treasury sanctioned Petro under counternarcotics authorities. Those sanctions remain in place despite a reportedly cordial February 2026 White House meeting.
Colombia’s next president may seek a positive relationship with the U.S. government, as the United States remains Colombia’s top economic partner and a source of security and humanitarian support. Iván Cepeda is regarded as less polarizing than President Petro and supports human rights programming and initiatives for Afro-Colombians and Indigenous peoples such as those funded in the FY2026 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-75). Nevertheless, his backing of Petro’s security policies could strain relations. Valencia and De la Espriella have vowed to join President Trump’s Americas Counter Cartel initiative. Valencia has proposed a modernized Plan Colombia bilateral security initiative. De la Espriella has endorsed security policies such as El Salvador’s “state of exception” policy, which has raised some human rights concerns in Congress. Cepeda could maintain Petro’s high corporate taxes and frequent regulatory changes, which have created uncertainty among investors, while his opponents reportedly could seek to attract U.S. businesses by rolling back investment restrictions and limiting regulations.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12689/IN12689.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12689.html
IN12688,DFC Shipping Reinsurance Facility: Iran Conflict and Strait of Hormuz,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T09:08:43Z,Active,Posts,"Shayerah I. Akhtar, Nick M. Brown",,"Background
In February 2026, U.S. and Israeli forces initiated military operations against Iran. Iran responded with retaliatory attacks and threats against commercial shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz, through which more than one-quarter of crude oil and petroleum maritime trade transited to global markets. Hostilities and related developments contributed to a near-stoppage of maritime energy and other commerce through the Strait. 
On March 3, 2026, President Trump ordered the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) “to provide, at a very reasonable price, political risk insurance and guarantees for the Financial Security of ALL Maritime Trade, especially Energy, traveling through the Gulf.” He also stated naval escorts could be provided for transiting vessels. 
DFC announced a reinsurance facility on March 6, pledging an unprecedented $20 billion—almost ten-fold larger than any active DFC commitment—to help alleviate the maritime commerce disruptions. DFC indicated further details would be forthcoming. It is unclear if DFC has provided any coverage yet. The facility’s potential consequences for DFC’s strategic focus, operations, and risk profile raise issues for possible congressional oversight.
DFC announcements indicate a $40 billion facility ($20 billion each from DFC and from private partners), focusing initially on “Hull & Machinery and Cargo.” DFC announced seven U.S. insurance partners, naming Chubb, a global property and casualty insurer, as the lead underwriter. Chubb is to “manage the facility, determine pricing and terms, assume risk, and issue policies” and “manage all claims.” DFC indicated a forthcoming application portal, meanwhile listing some key applicant information it would require to determine eligibility.
DFC Background
DFC is a federal agency that provides political risk insurance (PRI), direct loans, loan guarantees, and equity to promote private investment overseas to advance global development and U.S. foreign policy. DFC’s PRI program aims to cover risk of investment losses due to events such as political violence and expropriation, and includes reinsurance to increase underwriting capacity. DFC in April removed information from its application portal indicating a cap of $1 billion on PRI. 
DFC’s support is subject to statutory parameters, including to prioritize less-developed economies, manage risk, ensure development impact, screen for environmental and social effects, and complement private capital (“additionality”). In reauthorizing DFC in 2025 (P.L. 119-60, Division H, Title LXXXVII), Congress more than tripled the cap on DFC’s potential exposure to claims and other financial payouts (the maximum contingent liability, MCL) to $205 billion. Congress also, among other things, expanded DFC’s authorities to invest in some upper-middle-income and high-income economies (with high-income support limited to 10% of the total MCL, or $20.5 billion), while prohibiting DFC support in “countries of concern,” such as Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). 

Possible Issues and Options for Congress
Scale of Coverage. At end-2025, DFC’s portfolio exposure was roughly $42 billion (of which about $1 billion was PRI), leaving approximately $160 billion in available financing. The financing that may be needed to address Strait maritime commerce disruptions is unclear. Insurance needs may be as high as $352 billion; major private insurers have reportedly relaunched limited or more costly war risk cover for vessels following initial cancelations when the conflict erupted. Shippers also have been reluctant to put crews in harm’s way regardless of insurance availability. 
DFC could use the origin country, the destination country, the vessel flag, or the shipping entity domicile to classify support for Hormuz-transiting shipments. Most origin countries are high-income economies. DFC’s $20 billion backing, if deployed in full and largely to high-income economies, could preclude DFC from providing other support in high-income countries, given that the facility would comprise as much as 97.6% of DFC’s $20.5 billion high-income cap. The vessel flag, firm domicile, or destination may present additional issues: many of these countries also are high-income (e.g., Singapore) or restricted from DFC support (e.g., the PRC). Congress could 
engage in fact-finding to assess how DFC would determine the facility’s country income designations; 
examine whether the facility is in tension with DFC’s mandates (e.g., one Member has raised potential PRC gains from the facility);
assess how the facility may affect DFC’s support for its other priorities; and 
consider whether, and if so, how to modify DFC funding or authorities to support the facility or other congressional priorities, including seeking information on the utilized scale of the facility.  
Staffing. DFC’s workforce shrank by 25% in 2025, potentially straining its application review and monitoring capacity. CRS identified $75 million in active DFC reinsurance projects, a small share of DFC’s portfolio. Press releases indicate that DFC, Chubb, and the interagency may each be involved in due diligence for each vessel. Congress may assess: 
DFC’s specific role in the facility, and how DFC and its partners plan to coordinate to minimize potential duplication of efforts; 
to what extent DFC is equipped with staff and expertise to administer the facility; and 
whether any DFC workforce shortfalls would erode efforts to comply with statutory requirements (e.g., “countries of concerns” prohibition) and shift aspects of facility administration to the private sector at potentially higher costs.
Risk. Federal accounting practice subjects some PRI to federal credit rules. DFC may cover PRI claims with corporate reserves or borrowing from Treasury, and the government pledges “the full faith and credit of the United States of America” for all valid claims. Given the implications of DFC operations for taxpayer liability, Congress could oversee or mandate reporting from DFC and/or the Administration on 
how DFC will use evidence to assess risk for reinsured vessels;
the facility’s effect on DFC’s risk profile; and
applicability of the Anti-Deficiency Act if expected claims exceed appropriations.
Statutory Compliance. The planned rapid response nature of the reinsurance facility may raise questions about how DFC has tailored its application requirements. DFC applicants must generally seek private sector financing first and show it is inadequate. The reentry of some major private insurers into the maritime war risk insurance market, as noted above, could limit the additionality of DFC-backed support. DFC also may have to expedite its application and screening process, which can take longer than a year to reach Board approval, for support to be relevant in the conflict.
Members may conduct oversight or mandate DFC reporting on
any assessments about shortcomings in private sector PRI offerings and to what extent DFC support would be “additional”; 
estimates of reduced property risk to covered vessels, if any, due to planned coordination with U.S. Central Command and the Treasury; 
whether, and if so, how DFC may expedite consideration of applications, including processes to assess development impact and environmental and social impact; and
tensions, if any, between the President’s offer of “a very reasonable price” to shippers and DFC’s statutory requirement to “minimize cost” for taxpayers.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12688/IN12688.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12688.html
IF13218,Endangered Species Committee (“God Squad”) Exemption of Oil and Gas Activities in the Gulf of America,2026-05-06T04:00:00Z,2026-05-07T16:53:12Z,Active,Resources,"Anthony R. Marshak, Pervaze A. Sheikh, Laura B. Comay",,"Introduction
On March 31, 2026, the Endangered Species Committee (ESC; also known as the “God Squad”) voted to issue an exemption from Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) for oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities in the Gulf of America (GoA). In accordance with Sections 7(h) and 7(j) of the ESA, the ESC exempted these oil and gas activities from the ESA requirements known as Section 7 consultation after the Secretary of Defense—who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025—notified the Secretary of the Interior (the ESC chair) that an exemption was necessary for reasons of national security. 
This exemption was the first issued for national security reasons. To date, GoA oil and gas companies have abided by reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) and other measures to mitigate effects on ESA-listed species and critical habitat when carrying out activities, as required in a 2025 National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) biological opinion (BiOp) and 2018 and 2025 BiOps from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). 
In the request for an exemption, the Secretary of Defense stated that ongoing litigation related to endangered species threatens to halt oil and gas production in the region and that litigation diverts resources away from approving permits; limits agency discretion, leading to more restrictive operations; and creates instability and uncertainty that might discourage long-term development. Further, the Secretary asserted that if oil and gas exploration and development were halted, U.S. military operations and readiness would be disrupted, and U.S. adversaries such as Iran and Russia would benefit. In light of the Secretary’s determination under Section 7(j), the ESC granted the exemption. Several stakeholder groups have filed lawsuits regarding the ESC’s findings. 
Congress may be interested in how this exemption from Section 7 consultation could affect ESA-listed species (e.g., Rice’s whales, certain sea turtles) and critical habitat in the GoA, its potential implications for Gulf oil and gas operations, and any precedent the decision might set for other areas with ESA-listed species.
Section 7 Consultations and Exemptions
Section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to ensure that actions they undertake, authorize, or fund are not likely to jeopardize listed species under the ESA or adversely modify designated critical habitat of listed species. Section 7 requires federal agencies to consult with FWS and/or NMFS (jointly referred to as the Services) when their proposed actions may affect listed species or critical habitat. Section 7 consultation is the process used to evaluate the effects of agency actions on listed species and critical habitat and to consider alternatives to minimize those effects. If the action may adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, formal consultation ensues. Formal consultation generally concludes with the Services issuing a BiOp on the effects of the action. If the action is likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat, the Services are required to identify any RPAs the federal agency can take to avoid jeopardy. If the Services find no jeopardy or an RPA is identified, an incidental take statement (ITS) is included. An ITS states the amount of take of a listed species anticipated from the proposed action and exempts the action from prohibitions on take of listed species under Section 9 of the ESA.  
If the Services issue a jeopardy BiOp without identifying any RPAs, or if the federal agency determines that it cannot implement the action without violating the ESA (i.e., it does not want to use the RPA), the agency may apply for an exemption under Section 7(h). Under the process detailed in Sections 7(g)-(h), the agency (or the governor[s] of affected state[s]or affected license applicant[s]) may apply for an exemption after consultation is completed. Upon determining that a request for an exemption may be warranted, the Secretary of the Interior or Secretary of Commerce, as applicable to jurisdiction, passes the application to the ESC, composed of six specified federal officials and one individual from each affected state. After a process of deliberation and consideration of several factors associated with the action, the ESC votes on whether to grant an exemption. 
For an exemption to be granted, the ESC must find that there are no RPAs to the action, that the benefits of that action outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action, that the action is of regional or national significance, and that the federal agency or private applicant went through the process according to the rules and acted in good faith. 
If the exemption is given, reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures are to be implemented to minimize the effects of the action on listed species and critical habitat. Using this process, the ESC granted two exemptions (in 1979 and 1992). No other exemptions were granted until the March 2026 exemption for GoA oil and gas activities employing the authority of Section 7(j) of the ESA. Section 7(j) states that the ESC shall grant an exemption if the Secretary of Defense finds that the exemption is necessary for reasons of national security. The language of this section does not make clear whether the full process for granting an exemption under Section 7(g) and (h) needs to be followed in conjunction with such a determination. Granted exemptions for a proposed action are permanent unless certain conditions arise. The March 2026 action covers all current leases and new leases issued through 2029 in the area covered by the BiOps.
ESA Requirements for Oil and Gas Development in the GoA Prior to Exemption
NMFS and FWS have issued BiOps for oil and gas activities in the GoA as part of their consultations with the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE). BOEM and BSEE administer oil and gas activities pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In March 2020, NMFS issued a BiOp for BOEM’s and BSEE’s GoA oil and gas activities. Several environmental organizations filed a lawsuit arguing that NMFS did not adequately evaluate the potential for future GoA oil spills, and did not require sufficient safeguards for ESA-listed species from offshore drilling operations. A U.S. district court in Maryland vacated NMFS’s 2020 BiOp in August 2024, effective December 20, 2024 (later extended to May 21, 2025). Due to the wide range of oil and gas activities covered by the BiOp, industry stakeholders asserted that any gap between the vacatur and adoption of a new BiOp could “halt or seriously slow all operations in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico.” NMFS issued the BiOp in May 2025 and no gap occurred.
The NMFS 2025 BiOp covers the full range of BOEM’s and BSEE’s management and regulation of outer continental shelf oil and gas activities—from lease sales, through exploration and development of leases, to eventual decommissioning of oil and gas infrastructure when leases terminate—for GoA oil and gas leases issued within five years of the BiOp’s publication (approximately through 2029), and leases issued prior to the BiOp’s publication. The BiOp’s scope includes activities throughout the projected 40-year life of a given lease, as long as the lease was issued in the specified timeframe. In terms of geographic area, the BiOp covers the Western and Central GoA planning areas and the “small portion” of the Eastern GoA planning area that is not withdrawn from leasing.
In the 2025 BiOp, NMFS found that without precautionary measures, GoA oil and gas activities could jeopardize the future survival of endangered Rice’s whales. In a 2022 stock assessment, the most current for the species, NMFS estimated that 51 Rice’s whales remain. The BiOp includes measures for preventing vessel strikes on Rice’s whales, which experts identify as a significant threat to their long-term viability. Experts also identify the Deepwater Horizon oil spill as having contributed to the mortality of some Rice’s whales, among other factors. The BiOp also identified adverse impacts to some other ESA-listed species (e.g., sperm whales, certain sea turtles). A separate FWS 2018 BiOp for GoA oil and gas activities found that such activities were unlikely to jeopardize nesting sea turtles or other ESA-listed species under FWS’s jurisdiction (e.g., manatees) or to destroy or adversely affect their critical habitats. The FWS BiOp, which covered a similar set of activities, geography, and time range as the NMFS BiOp, also included conservation recommendations to minimize adverse impacts to these listed species. A 2025 FWS decision affirmed the conclusions of the 2018 BiOp. 
In its 2026 decision, the ESC granted “an exemption from the requirements of the [ESA]” for the agency actions that were analyzed in the 2025 NMFS BiOp and the 2018 and 2025 FWS BiOps. The ESC stated that with this exemption, BOEM and BSEE are not required to comply with the Section 7(a)(2) procedural requirements or substantive “jeopardy” and “adverse modification” mandates. Also, incidental take of listed species in carrying out the covered activities would not violate the ESA. The ESC noted that other protective measures that BOEM and BSEE mandated in the covered agency actions before the ESA consultation process would remain implemented.
Considerations for Congress
Congress may consider issues that might arise from the exemption, including but not limited to the following:
Congress may consider any precedents this exemption might set for other authorized activities with potential national security concerns and BiOps in place—for instance, whether a similar approach could be used to exempt activities from ESA consultation in other regions where oil and gas development is occurring; whether it could be applied to water conveyance operations where BiOps are issued and water supply is deemed a security concern; or whether national security exemptions in accordance with Executive Order 14276, “Restoring America’s Seafood Competitiveness,” might be applicable to the fishing industry’s interactions with ESA-listed species, and how any such exemptions might intersect with other conservation mandates. 
Congress could consider whether to define the scope and applicability of the term national security in the context of an exemption from the ESA’s Section 7(a)(2). 
Section 7(j) of the ESA does not specify ESC procedures when the Secretary of Defense finds that an exemption is necessary for national security reasons. Congress may consider whether to specify the process for granting an exemption for national security interests.
The Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) includes protections for marine mammals (e.g., Rice’s whales) during authorized oil and gas activities, including under a Letter of Authorization (LOA) for GoA geophysical survey activities. Congress may consider how the exemption might affect future LOAs and intersections between the ESA and MMPA. 
GoA oil and gas companies had been subject to ESA regulations and mitigation measures while producing oil and gas. Congress may consider to what extent the exemption might facilitate production compared to pre-exemption levels, and how it would affect listed species. 
The exemption of GoA oil and gas activities appears to apply to a broad scope of activities. Congress may consider whether to clarify the scope or number of activities that could be included in an exemption.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13218/IF13218.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13218.html
R48936,The Electoral College: Frequently Asked Questions,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-08T14:52:54Z,Active,Reports,R. Sam Garrett,,"Individual voters in the United States do not directly elect the President and the Vice President. Instead, their votes select intermediaries, known as electors, to cast votes for a presidential ticket on their behalf. Those electors make up the electoral college, which elects the President and the Vice President. Provisions in Article II and in the Twelfth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution establish the electoral college.
The frequently asked questions discussed in this report provide a resource for Members of Congress and congressional staff as they conduct oversight, consider legislation, and address constituent questions related to policy issues concerning the electoral college. The report does not contain legal analysis. 
Some Members of Congress have occasionally proposed constitutional amendments to abolish or alter the electoral college. As of this writing, such proposals have not substantially advanced beyond introduction in recent Congresses.
Throughout American history, one candidate has almost always won both the popular vote and the electoral college. On four occasions, the electoral college has produced a presidential winner inconsistent with the national popular vote. Currently, to win the presidency or vice presidency, a candidate must receive at least 270 of 538 electoral votes to achieve an electoral college majority. A contingent election would occur if no candidate won a majority in the electoral college. In such an instance, the House of Representatives would elect the President and the Senate would elect the Vice President.
This report will be updated in the event of substantial legislative activity concerning the electoral college.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48936/R48936.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48936.html
LSB11429,Artificial Intelligence and the Fourth Amendment: Two Emerging Legal Issues,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-07T12:53:04Z,Active,Posts,Peter G. Berris,,"Various law enforcement components at the federal, state, and local levels report using artificial intelligence (AI) for some functions. Legislatures at the state and federal level have considered a variety of proposals relevant to the intersection of law enforcement, crime, and AI. Legal commentary has focused on the potential impact of AI on criminal justice, including everything from the admissibility of AI evidence, to sentencing, to AI-powered robot police officers, to the Fourth Amendment.
Precise conceptualizations of AI vary, but the FBI has used the definition from the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act. That legislation defines AI to include, among other things, artificial systems “designed to think or act like a human,” or that “perform[] tasks under varying and unpredictable circumstances without significant human oversight,” or that “can learn from experience and improve performance when exposed to data sets.” Another federal statute defines AI as “a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations or decisions influencing real or virtual environments” and that uses human or machine inputs to perceive environments, abstract its perceptions, and thereby “formulate options for information or action.”
This Legal Sidebar focuses on the potential Fourth Amendment implications of AI in two contexts. The first pertains to law enforcement seeking to obtain data generated from consumer use of AI products such as chatbot conversation histories and related data. The second context involves law enforcement use of surveillance tools augmented with AI, with a particular focus on Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs). This Legal Sidebar begins with a brief overview of Fourth Amendment concepts relevant to both topics and concludes with considerations for Congress. For a list of additional CRS products covering other aspects of AI, see CRS Insight IN12458, Artificial Intelligence: CRS Products, by Laurie Harris and Rachael D. Roan (2025).
The Fourth Amendment and AI
The Fourth Amendment imposes limits on searches and seizures by the government. Courts have determined that a Fourth Amendment search occurs if “the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area” or “when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” With respect to the seizure of property, that “occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.” If a law enforcement activity qualifies as a search or seizure, then the Fourth Amendment requires that it must be reasonable, which ordinarily means that the search or seizure must be conducted pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause, with some exceptions.
Law Enforcement Access to Chatbot User Data
Consumer use of AI products generates data that may be of interest to law enforcement in criminal investigations. For example, investigators have sought or used chatbot conversation histories as evidence in cases involving a range of offenses, including arson, child exploitation, fraud, and vandalism. In an arson prosecution stemming from the Lachman Fire and the Palisades Fire, for instance, the government alleged in charging documents that the defendant had various exchanges with OpenAI’s ChatGPT, a generative AI program, on the topic of fire, including asking the program: “Are you at fault if a fire is [lit] because of your cigarettes.” 
In some cases, it appears that law enforcement has obtained chatbot user data by accessing a suspect’s phone or device. To illustrate, in one vandalism case, local law enforcement seized a suspect’s phone as evidence. According to law enforcement, the suspect provided a passcode and consent to search the device. Law enforcement obtained incriminating ChatGPT conversations where the suspect asked ChatGPT about the consequences of smashing windshields and otherwise damaging vehicles. (Federal courts have expounded on the various, potential legal considerations when law enforcement accesses a suspect’s device—topics beyond the scope of this product.) 
In other cases, however, it appears that law enforcement has sought chatbot user data from AI companies. In such scenarios, the extent to which users’ data such as chat histories are protected by the Fourth Amendment may hinge in large part on the limits of the third-party doctrine, which the Supreme Court has held to mean that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” The third-party doctrine reflects a judgment that a person “takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government.” In articulating this doctrine, the Supreme Court in 1976 concluded that a bank customer lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records stored with his bank by virtue of his being a customer there. Under a broad construction of the third-party doctrine in the modern era, a potentially vast amount of digital information would exist beyond the protections of the Fourth Amendment, because such information is often shared by customers with technology providers in the ordinary course of using a product.
In the 2018 opinion Carpenter v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized a limitation to the potentially expansive scope of the third-party doctrine. That case involved the warrantless search of historical cell-site location information (CSLI)—data that record the location of a cellular device when it connects to “a set of radio antennas called cell sites’” typically mounted on towers or structures and operated by private companies to provide network coverage. In Carpenter, law enforcement obtained a defendant’s CSLI—covering 127 days—from cellular providers through a court order issued pursuant to the Stored Communications Act (SCA). The Carpenter Court held that the CSLI was not exempt from Fourth Amendment protection pursuant to the third-party doctrine, even though the CSLI was shared by the defendant with cellular providers in the course of his cell phone use. The Court rejected the idea that the defendant’s sharing of CSLI with the providers was voluntary, observing that “[c]ell phone location information is not truly shared’ as one normally understands the term” given that carrying a cell phone is “indispensable to participation in modern society” and in light of the fact that “a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation.” In addition, the Court concluded that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI due to the revealing nature of the information at issue. This, the Court observed, amounted to “near perfect surveillance” because cell phones accompany their owners in nearly every physical space and because the CSLI is both accurate and retrospective. As the Court in Carpenter put it, CSLI can provide “an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them, his familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.’” Nevertheless, the Court described Carpenter as a “narrow” holding that did not abolish the third-party doctrine or predetermine its application to other forms of technological surveillance. 
It appears that federal courts have not yet had the occasion to determine whether a user maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in chatbot histories, or whether that expectation is forfeited by virtue of the third-party doctrine. A Supreme Court case argued in April 2026—discussed below—may shed additional light on the scope of Carpenter and on the types of technologies that are protected by the Fourth Amendment by virtue of their indispensability in modern society and the revealing nature of the data they generate. In practice, it appears that law enforcement may already be seeking warrants for some such information pursuant to a statutory scheme—namely, the SCA. 
The Stored Communications Act and Chatbot Data
Law enforcement access to chatbot user data implicates the Stored Communications Act (SCA). Congress enacted the SCA as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). Some legislative history suggests that Congress’s intent in doing so was to add supplemental protections from providers’ disclosure of stored wire and electronic communications beyond those potentially covered by the Fourth Amendment. For instance, the Senate Judiciary report accompanying the ECPA described the proliferation of electronic data storage and the risk that such data “may be subject to no constitutional privacy protection” because it “is subject to control by a third party computer operator.” In general terms, the SCA restricts when certain information may be disclosed by Electronic Communication Services or Remote Computing Services, which typically include entities such as “cell phone providers, email providers, or social media platforms” and cloud computing providers. Pursuant to a provision of the SCA codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2703, the government may compel such providers to share communications’ content and metadata if it obtains the requisite level of legal process, which ranges from a subpoena to a warrant, depending on the category of information sought. Analysis of the SCA and related considerations may be found in CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10801, Overview of Governmental Action Under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), by Jimmy Balser (2022).
Reverse Warrants for Chatbot Histories
Carpenter involved a law enforcement search for customer data pertaining to a known suspect. In other words, law enforcement had already identified the defendant as a possible suspect when it obtained a court order compelling certain wireless carriers to provide that person’s phone records. In the digital space, law enforcement sometimes works in the opposite direction—seeking customer data to identify an unknown suspect. Take, for example, a suspected arson where law enforcement knows the time and address of the fire, but has not been able to identify a suspect through traditional investigative means. There, law enforcement might seek a reverse keyword warrant to compel a technology provider to disclose account information for users who searched for the address of the suspected arson in the fifteen days preceding the fire. Similarly, if investigators know the time and location of a robbery, but lack other leads, they might request a geofence warrant to compel a technology provider to disclose information about smartphone users who were near the robbery scene around the time it occurred. 
Reverse warrants, like geofence and reverse keyword warrants, seek to identify a suspect by compelling technology providers to identify user accounts that match the criteria specified in the warrant. Some legal observers have argued that chatbot user data may provide another pool of user data from which law enforcement might seek to identify suspects in this manner. It appears that at least one reverse chatbot warrant may have already been obtained at the federal level. In September 2025, federal authorities obtained a warrant for chatbot user data in connection with a child exploitation investigation. According to the warrant affidavit, investigators had been unable to identify the suspect beyond an online username. The suspect had, however, told an undercover investigator online about several exchanges the suspect had with ChatGPT, unrelated to the crime being investigated. Those included “two unique, specific prompts” made to ChatGPT and “unique responses generated by ChatGPT.” For example, the suspect disclosed to the investigator that he had asked ChatGPT to speculate on “what would happen if sherlock holmes met q from star trek?” The suspect also provided ChatGPT’s response to the investigator. With the aim of identifying the suspect, federal prosecutors obtained a warrant specifying the suspect by reference to the ChatGPT prompt about Sherlock Holmes and Q, which it said was made “on about April 18, 2025.” The warrant also used ChatGPT’s responses to specify the user. The warrant further compelled the company OpenAI to disclose the user’s names, account credentials, session histories, IP addresses, and other identifying information for April 2025. 
At the time of this writing, it does not appear that federal courts have issued any binding decisions on reverse chatbot warrants specifically. Courts have diverged on the constitutionality of reverse warrants in other contexts. In April 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Chatrie v. United States, on the constitutionality of geofence warrants. Depending on how the Court resolves Chatrie, it may shed light on at least two legal issues relevant to reverse warrants for chatbot user data. The first is the same threshold question discussed above: whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the user data at issue. Although Chatrie focuses on Google Location History information rather than chatbot user data, the opinion could be relevant if it further clarifies Carpenter and the limits of the third-party doctrine. The second question that the Supreme Court might reach in Chatrie is whether a reverse warrant is legally sufficient for Fourth Amendment purposes. In 2024, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a geofence warrant was invalid for Fourth Amendment purposes because it “amounted to a general’ warrant prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” General warrants are those that leave too much discretion for executing officials to engage in “general, exploratory rummaging.” 
Law Enforcement Use of AI for Surveillance (e.g., Vehicle Information)
The potential for AI systems to be used for mass surveillance garnered widespread attention following a 2026 dispute between the federal government and Anthropic (an AI company). As another CRS product explains, that dispute reportedly centered in part on Anthropic seeking to limit its AI products from being used for mass domestic surveillance by the government. 
Depending on the context, surveillance can potentially involve a variety of law enforcement techniques ranging from wiretaps to the collection and analysis of bulk data. The precise legal issues implicated by the use of AI for surveillance will depend on the type of surveillance and the context of the use. 
So far, case law on AI and surveillance remains in its nascency, and that limited body of jurisprudence has sometimes focused on the possible Fourth Amendment ramifications of AI in the context of ALPRs. ALPRs are “camera systems that capture the license plate data of vehicles, along with related information.” Although the details vary, “information obtained from ALPR systems may be included in certain databases.” Law enforcement agencies employ ALPRs for purposes such as evidence gathering and identifying potential suspects, among others. 
At least some ALPRs reportedly employ AI for functions such as reading license plates or selecting the “best photo” to upload to a database. One private ALPR company states that law enforcement customers can use AI-powered search tools to automatically look for images of “vehicles with unique characteristics,” using search phrases like “white F-150 with a ladder in the back.” 
Thus far, federal courts have generally rejected Fourth Amendment challenges to law enforcement’s use of ALPRs. Some of those cases have focused on the underlying collection of ALPR data, typically concluding that there is no protected privacy interest in license plates displayed in plain view. Other cases focus on law enforcement access to ALPR databases, generally rejecting the contention that ALPR data should be subject to the same protections as the historical CSLI at issue in Carpenter.
Some courts have cautioned, however, that technologically-advanced ALPR systems could still violate the Fourth Amendment moving forward. One federal district court judge considered the potential impact of AI on ALPRs, writing:
[L]ower court acceptance of ALPR databases leaves serious doubt about the point, if any, at which governmental use of cameras crosses the line to an impermissible warrantless search and whether linking images to a larger network or enhancing them through the use of artificial intelligence or other emerging technologies leads to a different result. Such surveillance could become too intrusive and run afoul of Carpenter at some point. But when?
Other federal judges have offered similar sentiments, at least in passing. 
Although these courts have yet to identify a precise line where AI-powered ALPRs might run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, two potential areas of tension could “involve sustained tracking of a particular defendant through ALPRs, or an increase in the comprehensiveness of ALPR data.” For example, in a case rejecting a Fourth Amendment challenge to footage from a pole camera, a federal appellate court acknowledged that there could be additional Fourth Amendment concerns if pole-camera surveillance were used “over longer periods . . . [or] in combination with other tools—such as facial recognition, automated tracking or artificial intelligence—to build a far more comprehensive portrait of an individual’s life.” 
Courts have concluded that “comprehensive” technology-aided surveillance programs violated the Fourth Amendment in other contexts. In Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department, for instance, the en banc Fourth Circuit concluded that “Carpenter prohibited the warrantless use of aerial surveillance to record an enormous swath of Baltimore over 12 hours daily.” There, the court focused on the volume and detail of the data at issue, which it said provided exactly the type of “intimate window” into a “person’s associations and activities” that Carpenter counseled against.
Congressional Considerations
The two emerging issues described in this product are unlikely to be the only Fourth Amendment questions prompted by the widespread adoption of AI. If so, AI would join a long line of technological advancements like electronic eavesdropping, GPS tracking, thermal imaging, and wiretapping that, when adopted by law enforcement, have sometimes resulted in legal tension with constitutional privacy protections. Some federal judges have suggested that Congress could enact new privacy legislation in light of the potential civil liberties implications of developing technologies. Augmenting Fourth Amendment protections is a path Congress has taken in some contexts. The SCA, discussed above, is one example through which Congress sought to achieve “a fair balance between the privacy expectations of American citizens and the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies.” On the one hand, it protects information that in some situations would otherwise be unguarded by the Fourth Amendment due to the third-party doctrine. On the other hand, it creates a framework for law enforcement agencies to access that information when they obtain the requisite level of process. Beyond the digital realm, Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act, which “limits the ability of federal, state, and local officials to conduct certain searches and seizures implicating First Amendment activities.” Congress could also leave resolution of any Fourth Amendment issues posed by AI to the courts. 
Additional CRS Resources Relevant to the Fourth Amendment and Technology
CRS Report WPD00172, Search Me! Episode 1: Advances in DNA Investigations and the Fourth Amendment, by Jonathan M. Gaffney and Peter G. Berris (2026)
CRS Report R48852, Geofence and Keyword Searches: Reverse Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, by Peter G. Berris and Clay Wild (2026)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11393, The Fourth Amendment Meets the Fourth Estate: Law Enforcement Searches of Journalists, by Cassandra J. Barnum and Peter G. Berris (2026)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11274, Geofence Warrants and the Fourth Amendment, by Peter G. Berris and Clay Wild (2026)
CRS In Focus IF13068, Automated License Plate Readers: Background and Legal Issues, by Peter G. Berris, Kristin Finklea, and Dave S. Sidhu (2025)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11339, Advances in DNA Analysis: Fourth Amendment Implications, by Peter G. Berris (2025)
CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11165, Disrupting Botnets: An Overview of Seizure Warrants and Other Legal Tools, by Peter G. Berris (2024) 
CRS Report R48160, Law Enforcement and Technology: Use of Automated License Plate Readers, by Kristin Finklea (2024)
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11429/LSB11429.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11429.html
IN12687,Argentine Beef Import Quota Expansion,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T16:07:58Z,Active,Posts,"Benjamin Tsui, Christine Whitt",,"In February 2026, the average price cattle producers received for their cattle reached a record high. The price increase was in part due to the year-over-year decreases in U.S. cattle inventory, suspended cattle imports from Mexico due to New World Screwworm, and slower pace of U.S. cattle slaughter. The reduction in cattle inventory led to an increase in the retail price of beef across the United States. The U.S. beef cattle supply chain is made up of interconnected links. The supply chain comprises cattle producers that raise beef cattle, processors that slaughter the beef cattle to develop beef products, and entities that sell the beef products to U.S. consumers directly or through intermediaries. Typically, if the price the cattle producer receives for the cattle increases, the price for beef products that U.S. consumers purchase also would increase. This price dynamic may sometimes contribute to entities along the U.S. beef supply chain and U.S. consumers of beef products having different perspectives on policies affecting domestic production of cattle and U.S. beef prices, particularly in periods of rising cattle and U.S. retail beef prices. 
On February 6, 2026, President Trump issued a proclamation to address the high U.S. beef prices for American consumers by temporarily increasing the volume for the U.S. beef tariff-rate quota (TRQ) for imported Argentine beef. Under TRQs, a certain volume of imports enter in-quota and face lower or no duties. Imports that enter outside of the in-quota volume (i.e., out-of-quota) face higher duties. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to regulate foreign commerce and impose tariffs. Congress delegated authority to administer agricultural TRQs to the President, including for beef imports, under Section 404 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465, 19 U.S.C. §3601). Additionally, the President “may temporarily increase the quantity of imports” under the in-quota rate of an agricultural product TRQ if existing supplies are inadequate to “meet domestic demand at reasonable prices” because of “natural disaster, disease, or major national market disruption.” The February 2026 proclamation was issued a day after the United States and Argentina signed an Agreement on Reciprocal Trade and Investment. The Trump Administration had publicly proposed increasing Argentine imports since October 2025.
Several Members of Congress expressed concerns before and after the proclamation announcement. Some Members cited concerns related to Argentina’s inconsistent food safety and animal health standards. Other Members expressed concerns about potential destabilization for the U.S. cattle market. In the 119th Congress, the trade title of H.R. 7567, as passed by the House on April 30, 2026, would address President Trump’s February 2026 proclamation. The bill would express congressional concerns that the expanded quota is detrimental to U.S. cattle producers and could have a “ripple effect throughout the domestic economy affecting feed suppliers, equipment dealers, veterinarians, and other rural businesses.” H.R. 7567 would require the Secretary of Agriculture and U.S. Trade Representative to jointly submit a report, to specified congressional committees, detailing what effect a change in the TRQ or other duties for Argentine beef imports would have on U.S. beef and cattle markets. 
Some analysts argue that an increase in Argentine beef imports would have a negligible effect on the price of U.S. beef. Other analysts claim U.S. beef cattle producers may respond by slowing down the rebuilding of the U.S. cattle herd.
U.S. Beef Imports and Tariff-Rate Quotas
Due to limited domestic beef cattle production and high beef prices since 2020, foreign beef imports have increased to augment U.S. supply, and U.S. beef exports have decreased (Figure 1). According to USDA, most beef imports are lean beef trimmings (i.e., the lower quality pieces of meat that remain on the carcass after the marketable cuts, such as steaks and roast, have been removed), which are an input of U.S. ground beef.
Figure 1. U.S. Beef Production, Domestic Consumption, and Trade
/
Source: CRS using U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), “Production, Supply, and Distribution Online,” April 2026.
Argentina has an annual country-specific in-quota quantity of 20,000 metric tons (MT) that faces a lower duty of $44 per MT and a higher 26.4% duty on the product’s value when the in-quota threshold is reached. Argentine beef imports enter into the United States under the World Trade Organization TRQ established under the Uruguay Round Agreements. From 2018 to 2025, Argentine beef imports were on average less than 2% of total U.S. beef imports. In 2024 and 2025, there was an uptick of out-of-quota beef imports from Argentina and other countries (Figure 2) while domestic beef production continued to fall and domestic beef consumption continued to rise. 
The February 2026 presidential proclamation increased Argentina’s in-quota volume by an additional 80,000 MT in quarterly tranches of 20,000 MT through calendar year 2026. The additional quota for Argentina would account for less than 5% of total 2025 beef imports. The proclamation also restricts imported Argentine beef that is allowed under the additional quota to lean beef trimmings.  
Figure 2. U.S. Beef Imports
/
Source: CRS using U.S. Census Bureau Trade data via USDA, FAS, “Global Agricultural Trade System,” April, 2026.
Congressional Considerations
Congress may choose not to take action concerning the importation of beef or domestic supply. If Congress chooses to act, it may consider legislation that would address the President’s current and/or future trade actions. Congress may consider options that would restrict beef TRQs to protect the domestic cattle and beef industry from import competition or expand the TRQs in an effort to lower U.S. retail beef prices. 
Additionally, Congress may consider increasing or decreasing the type and/or amount of federal support or oversight that may affect a U.S. cattle producer’s decision on herd size. Congress may also consider policies that either increase or decrease domestic production of cattle and beef. Such policies may affect one or all of the stages of the U.S. beef supply chain. Policies that could affect U.S. cattle producers may include the increase or decrease of direct financial support to offset higher production costs. Congress may also consider examining competition in the U.S. beef supply chain.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12687/IN12687.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12687.html
IF13217,Federal Government and Anthropic: Considerations for AI Innovation and Competition,2026-05-05T04:00:00Z,2026-05-07T09:38:00Z,Active,Resources,"Laurie Harris, Clare Y. Cho","Artificial Intelligence, Telecommunications & Internet Policy, Competition Policy & Law, Technology & Innovation","On February 27, 2026, President Trump directed federal agencies to stop using technology developed by the U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) company Anthropic, and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth announced he was directing the Department of Defense (DOD) to designate Anthropic a “Supply-Chain Risk to National Security.” (DOD and the Secretary are now using “Department of War” and “Secretary of War,” respectively, as “secondary” designations per Executive Order 14347.) These actions followed a reported months-long dispute between DOD and Anthropic regarding certain uses of its AI technologies. The national security risk designation and use prohibitions may have implications for AI innovation and competition, including at Anthropic and other domestic AI companies. This In Focus provides information on the AI models under debate, actions taken by the U.S. government (USG), the potential implications of those actions, and considerations and questions for Congress.  
Frontier AI Models: Potential Capabilities and Limitations
Frontier AI models are the most advanced foundation models—general-purpose AI models pretrained on large datasets that can be used for many applications. Anthropic’s Claude model, one such frontier model, reportedly has been deployed across DOD and national security agencies for such applications as intelligence analysis, operational planning, and cyber operations. In June 2024, Anthropic stated it was the first AI company to deploy frontier models in classified USG networks. In July 2025, four U.S. AI companies entered into contracts with DOD to “accelerate [DOD] adoption of advanced AI capabilities to address critical national security challenges.” DOD awarded up to $200 million each to Anthropic, Google, OpenAI, and xAI. The Pentagon reportedly agreed to the use in classified systems of xAI’s Grok model, Google’s Gemini model, and six other tech companies’ AI models, as of May 1, 2026. 
While asserting a belief in “the existential importance of using AI to defend the United States and other democracies,” Anthropic claimed that, during contract negotiations with DOD, it requested two use exceptions for its Claude model. First, Anthropic stated that it “do[es] not believe that today’s frontier AI models are reliable enough to be used in fully autonomous weapons. Allowing current models to be used in this way would endanger America’s warfighters and civilians.” Second, Anthropic asserted that “mass domestic surveillance of Americans constitutes a violation of fundamental rights.” 
Anthropic’s requested use exceptions highlight a broader debate over frontier AI model capabilities and limitations. Though frontier AI models demonstrate powerful capabilities, as measured by publicly available benchmarks and assessments, some studies have described their potential limitations. A December 2024 Frontier AI Trends Report by the UK’s AI Security Institute reported that, in its evaluations of frontier AI systems across domains critical to national security and public safety, model safeguards are improving, but the institute found “vulnerabilities in every system [it] tested.” According to Stanford University’s 2025 AI Index Report, complex reasoning tasks remain a challenge, though AI model performance on “demanding benchmarks” continues to improve. 
Recent Federal Actions
On February 27, 2026, President Trump directed federal agencies to “IMMEDIATELY CEASE all use of Anthropic’s technology” and outlined a six-month “phase out period for Agencies like the Department of War who are using Anthropic’s products, at various levels.” On March 5, 2026, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei confirmed receipt of a letter from DOD designating Anthropic a supply chain risk to America’s national security, which reportedly went into immediate effect.
In response, federal agencies took actions to stop using Anthropic’s Claude models. For example, the General Services Administration (GSA) announced that it was removing Anthropic from USAi.gov and its multiple award schedule (i.e., long-term government-wide contracts with commercial firms). Other agencies such as the State Department and the Department of Health and Human Services reportedly ceased use of Claude. The Office of Personnel Management removed Claude from its list of AI use cases (updated March 4, 2026) and added xAI’s Grok and OpenAI’s Codex (Claude was listed on the prior list, dated January 30, 2026).
Potential Effect on Anthropic
As a private company, Anthropic provides limited public financial information. Some information suggests that federal agencies and government contractors no longer using Anthropic’s AI models might not have a significant financial effect on the company. The $200 million awarded by DOD and a $18,960 award from the Department of State in 2026 (the only government contract with Anthropic on usaspending.gov) are relatively small compared to its run-rate revenue (i.e., annual revenue estimate based on its current financial performance). On February 12, 2026, Anthropic stated its run-rate revenue had reached $14 billion, and on April 6, 2026, Anthropic announced it had surpassed $30 billion. In January 2026, Anthropic CEO Dario Amodei reportedly stated that about 80% of Anthropic’s business is with enterprise customers, which he viewed as a relatively predictable, stable source of income.
Other information suggests that federal agencies and government contractors no longer using Anthropic’s AI models might have a significant financial effect on the company. Anthropic has stated that the USG’s actions are “harming Anthropic irreparably.” Additionally, it is unclear what percentage of Anthropic’s enterprise customers are federal agencies and USG contractors. If Anthropic loses a significant share of its revenue or funding from investors, it might have difficulty continuing to develop its AI models, potentially affecting its ability to compete and innovate. 
The effect of the USG’s actions on Anthropic may partially depend on the response of its other clients and the scope of the prohibition, which is under dispute. On February 27, 2026, Secretary Hegseth stated, “Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic.” Anthropic responded that it does not believe this action is legal, asserting that “a supply chain risk designation under 10 U.S.C. §3252 can only extend to the use of Claude as part of [DOD] contracts—it cannot affect how contractors use Claude to serve other customers.” Anthropic filed federal lawsuits in two courts on March 9, 2026. One lawsuit claims that the government’s actions exceed its legal authority and violate the Administrative Procedure Act as well as Anthropic’s due process and First Amendment rights. The second lawsuit seeks review of the designation of Anthropic as a supply chain risk under a separate statute. In the first lawsuit, Microsoft, a company that “has established a close business relationship with Anthropic,” filed an amicus brief urging the court to temporarily block the implementation of this designation. On March 26, 2026, a federal judge ordered a preliminary injunction to temporarily block the implementation of this designation and halted the President’s directive ordering federal agencies to stop using Claude, and GSA restored Anthropic in USAi.gov and its multiple award schedule. In the second lawsuit, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied Anthropic’s request to stop DOD from labeling it as a security risk. 
One trade group reportedly raised concerns that the designation is being used in a procurement dispute and should instead be reserved for foreign adversaries. Some initial reporting indicated that a subset of defense contractors have stopped using Anthropic, while others are waiting to see how the conflict is resolved. On April 17, 2026, Anthropic executives met with White House officials, discussing “opportunities for collaboration” and “balance between advancing innovation and ensuring safety.”
Potential Implications for Innovation and Competition
The USG’s actions against Anthropic might have broader effects on AI markets and competition. For example, if the USG’s actions negatively impact Anthropic’s revenues such that it can no longer operate, that would reduce the number of companies offering frontier AI models and prevent other companies from creating AI products using Anthropic’s models. However, the USG’s actions also appear to have boosted public adoption of Claude, which became the most popular app on Apple’s chart of top free apps in the United States on February 28, 2026. Further, OpenAI’s decision to strike a deal with the Pentagon reportedly resulted in a “massive wave of public backlash” as users uninstalled ChatGPT.
The USG’s actions against Anthropic have also raised concerns about potential effects on innovation and U.S. competitiveness. Some trade groups reportedly raised concerns that designating an American technology company as a national security risk would “have a chilling effect on U.S. innovation.” A letter reportedly sent by former defense officials, academics, and tech policy leaders to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees asserted that “blacklisting an American company weakens U.S. competitiveness” and warned, “this is not a marketplace any serious entrepreneur or investor can build around.” Microsoft’s amicus brief in support of Anthropic asserts: “This is not the time to put at risk the very AI ecosystem that the Administration has helped to champion.”
Considerations for Congress
Federal policies and actions may influence competition between AI companies and potentially encourage or stifle innovation. Congress may wish to conduct oversight on the extent of DOD’s authority to declare Anthropic a supply chain risk to national security and how the designation may affect private-sector innovation. Congress may also consider legislation to clarify privacy and security considerations around the use of AI technologies for sensitive applications, such as public surveillance. Alternatively, Congress may wait for federal courts to determine the legal merits of the Trump Administration’s actions against Anthropic before considering a legislative response. In weighing these options, among others, Congress might consider a range of questions, including 
How do certain types of government actions affect revenue reliability for AI businesses? 
How might this dispute between Anthropic and the federal government influence future agreements between private companies and the federal government?
How difficult and costly is it for government agencies to switch from one AI foundation model to another? 
Anthropic developed AI models that underpinned many federal uses with a stated goal of “building reliably safe systems.” How might restricting the use of Anthropic’s models by the USG affect the reliability of AI-powered government services and decisionmaking, particularly for high-impact uses—those that have a legal, material, binding, or significant effect on rights or safety?
How might USG actions in response to a company’s efforts to maintain safety measures affect industry efforts to innovate in AI safety and security?
In light of what has been described as a global “AI race,” what might be the effects of USG actions against one AI company on the ability of, or incentives for, other U.S. AI companies to innovate and invest in building AI models? ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13217/IF13217.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13217.html
R48935,"Facial Recognition Technology: Definitions, Applications, and Policy Considerations for Congress",2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T14:38:04Z,Active,Reports,Dominique T. Greene-Sanders,,"Facial recognition technology (FRT) is a type of biometric technology designed to identify or verify an individual by analyzing unique and measurable facial features. FRT has received attention from policymakers and the public, in large part because of technical advances and use by both public and private sector entities. FRT usage has the potential to optimize performance, enhance security, and increase the speed of tasks that were once handled by humans (e.g., identity verification in airports). The use of FRT has raised issues regarding data privacy and disclosure of its use, as well as bias and accuracy—particularly across different demographic groups. 
There is no universally accepted definition of FRT, and disagreement persists among technology developers, policymakers, and academics regarding what the term includes when used in various contexts. Legislation and guidelines have offered differing definitions of FRT, ranging from narrow ones focused on verification and identification to broader interpretations that include emotion detection, age estimation, and facial characteristic classifications. Different definitions may affect which technologies are categorized as FRT.
FRT is employed across a wide range of sectors, including the military, law enforcement, financial services, public health, and education, as well as in activities such as employment decisions and immigration enforcement. FRT usage offers several potential benefits, such as increased security, efficiency, and convenience. Additionally, FRT usage raises concerns, for example, whether FRT systems are designed and deployed in ways that avoid or mitigate bias and are transparent and accurate—particularly across different demographic groups. FRT applications in three particular sectors—transportation and airport security, housing, and law enforcement—have garnered specific interest from the public, Congress, and industry, based on perceptions of the frequency of FRT’s use and its potential risks and benefits.
Some state and local governments have passed laws to prohibit or restrict FRT use, especially by law enforcement. As Congress debates the use of FRT across various sectors, it may consider an approach that balances support for innovation and the beneficial uses of FRT while minimizing potential risks. In particular, Congress may consider how FRT is defined in order to avoid inadvertent restriction of narrower identity verification uses, such as personal smartphone access. Considerations for Congress might also include whether existing mechanisms are sufficient for determining accountability regarding FRT use by federal agencies and others. Finally, Congress may also consider requirements for disclosure of FRT use and for testing and validation of FRT systems, potential ways to require FRT system evaluations for federal use, and mechanisms to incentivize FRT system evaluations for commercial use.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48935/R48935.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48935.html
R48934,Introduction to Tribal Forestry,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T16:23:03Z,Active,Reports,"Mariel J. Murray, Anne A. Riddle","Native American Lands & Resources, Federal Land Management","The United States and federally recognized Tribes (“Tribes”) have a unique relationship that affects federal policies regarding forestry on tribal lands. In particular, the United States has a federal trust responsibility, which is a legal obligation under which the United States, through treaties, acts of Congress, and court decisions, “has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust” toward Tribes and tribal citizens. This responsibility can include federal obligations to protect tribal trust assets, which are tribal trust lands, natural resources, trust funds, or other assets held by the federal government in trust for Tribes and tribal citizens. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) within the Department of the Interior (DOI) is the lead agency charged with managing tribal trust assets, including tribal forests. 
Forested tribal lands can be described in different ways. For consistency throughout this report, CRS primarily uses the term Indian forest land as defined by the National Indian Forest Resources Management Act (NIFRMA). NIFRMA defines the term Indian forest land as including tribal trust or restricted fee lands that are commercial and noncommercial timberland and woodland, and are “considered chiefly valuable for the production of forest products or to maintain watershed or other land values enhanced by a forest cover.” These include lands both within and outside of tribal reservation boundaries.
According to the most recent periodic assessment of tribal forests and forest management in the United States, as of 2019, there were 19.4 million acres of tribal forest. Tribal forest acres are highly concentrated within a few states, and with a few Tribes. For example, 5.4 million acres (28%) of tribal forests belong to a single Tribe, the Navajo Nation, Arizona, New Mexico & Utah. Accordingly, 8.4 million acres (43%) of tribal forests are located in Arizona and New Mexico, including Navajo forests and forests belonging to other Tribes. Overall, almost all tribal forest acreage (17.8 million acres, or 92%) is located in the western United States and Alaska. 
Congress has acknowledged the federal trust responsibility toward forest management on Indian forest lands, and federal law provides the overall framework. Congress continues to debate the appropriate management of these lands, including how to manage wildfire on these lands, and whether to fund tribal forestry activities on these lands, and if so at what level. Like other federal forests, it may be challenging for Congress to balance diverse interests—including economic, social, and cultural interests—concerning the management and use of these lands. Other federal authorities govern whether, and how, Tribes may manage their forest lands and associated programs, activities, and revenues. In this context, Congress may deliberate federal oversight of forestry on tribal lands and evaluate tribal self-determination considerations. In addition, Congress may debate the appropriate federal role in supporting forest management on lands associated with other Indigenous entities in the United States, such as Native Hawaiians and Alaska Native Corporations.
Another consideration is the degree to which Tribes may engage in the management (or co-management) of federal forests near tribal lands. This issue particularly concerns forests to which a Tribe has a historical tie, or forests that are geographically near tribal forest and therefore may share certain management issues or needs. During the 119th Congress, Congress has considered amending existing authorities, or establishing new authorities, to facilitate more federal-tribal co-management of forested federal lands.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48934/R48934.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48934.html
LSB11428,Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: The Adjudication of Petitions and the 240-Day Deadline,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T16:38:00Z,Active,Posts,Hannah-Alise Rogers,"Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), Vaccines & Immunization, Judicial Branch, Public Health Services & Special Populations, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)","The Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) was created by Congress via the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986. The VICP is a no-fault compensation program made up of two essential components. First, it allows individuals who suffer vaccine-related injuries or deaths to receive compensation by filing a petition for compensation with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (Court of Federal Claims) and serving the petition on the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Second, the statute provides a liability shield for vaccine manufacturers and administrators (i.e., individuals who administer vaccines), which generally prevents injured individuals from bringing lawsuits until the VICP process is exhausted. Congress directed the Office of Special Masters (OSM), which adjudicates petitions for compensation, to determine entitlement within 240 days of the filing of the petition. If a petition has not been adjudicated within that time frame, a petitioner may voluntarily dismiss it; this provision is known as the “240-day deadline.” Thus, a petitioner may exhaust the VICP remedy either by fully adjudicating a VICP petition, or by withdrawing the petition after the 240-day deadline.
Historically, some individuals who were not entitled to VICP compensation have subsequently sued vaccine manufacturers. In recent years, there has been concern that more petitioners will use the 240-day deadline to exit the program and instead pursue litigation against manufacturers, potentially circumventing the general purpose of the VICP statute. For example, in 2022, hundreds of petitioners filed complaints in federal court that were consolidated into a multidistrict litigation against Merck, the maker of the Gardasil vaccine (In re Gardasil Products Liability Litigation). Most, but not all, of those litigants first exhausted their VICP remedy. For the claimants who did not exhaust their VICP remedy, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Fourth Circuit) ruled in 2025 that timely participation in the VICP was necessary before a petitioner could join the multidistrict litigation. In recent years, a growing number of petitions have been dismissed by petitioners after the 240-day deadline, with at least one petitioner claiming that her attorney encouraged her to file a VICP petition only to then use the 240-day deadline to exit the program, even when she wanted to pursue compensation through VICP.  
This Legal Sidebar provides background on the VICP’s adjudication process, including the availability of attorney’s fees, explains the legislative history of the 240-day deadline, and analyzes the Fourth Circuit’s decision in the multidistrict Gardasil litigation. It concludes by exploring potential VICP statutory amendments Congress could consider, if it wished to make changes to the program.
The Adjudication of VICP Petitions 
Congress created the VICP to limit the liability of vaccine manufacturers and administrators and to provide a process through which individuals injured by certain routine vaccinations could receive compensation. The statute shields drug manufacturers and administrators from liability for a “vaccine-related injury or death,” which is defined as an injury or death associated with one or more vaccines listed on the Vaccine Injury Table (the Table). The VICP’s liability shield and the compensation that it provides are both tied to the Table, which currently includes sixteen types of vaccines. Congress included some of these vaccines to the Table when the program was created, while others were added by the HHS Secretary via rulemaking. The statute bars individuals injured by listed vaccines from filing civil claims in excess of $1,000 against a manufacturer or administrator for damages arising from such injuries until after a VICP petition has been filed and judgment entered through the program. The statute also limits the types of civil actions that can be brought against vaccine manufacturers and administrators even after the VICP process is exhausted.
Before a special master may determine whether a VICP petitioner is entitled to compensation, the petitioner must file a full set of medical records, which are then reviewed by representatives of the Secretary. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), a division of HHS, reviews the medical records to determine if the petitioner has met the medical criteria for compensation. The U.S. Department of Justice then files an official statement of the HHS Secretary’s position in the case (known as a “Rule 4 report”). Next, the special master reviews the Rule 4 report and schedules a preliminary status conference with the parties to discuss next steps in the case. 
After the Rule 4 report is filed, VICP cases typically proceed in two phases: entitlement and damages. First, the special master determines whether the petitioner is entitled to receive compensation for the alleged injuries. (If the government does not contest causation in its Rule 4 report, then entitlement is presumed and the case proceeds to damages.) Petitioners may demonstrate entitlement to compensation either by showing that they have suffered an injury listed on the Table within the specified onset period (in which case causation is presumed) or by preponderantly proving causation-in-fact for injuries not set forth on the Table via three factors, set out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in Althen v. Secretary of HHS. 
The Althen factors require the petitioner to set forth a plausible medical theory of causation, a logical sequence of cause and effect, and a proximate temporal relationship between receipt of the vaccine and onset of the injury. In general, the Althen factors are much less burdensome for petitioners to prove than civil tort litigation, which would require a petitioner to prove that the vaccine manufacturer was at fault for the alleged injury, in addition to medical causation. In this way, the VICP makes it easier for litigants to be compensated for injuries caused by vaccines.
If a petitioner is found to be entitled to compensation, the case next proceeds to the damages phase, wherein the special master determines the amount of compensation the petitioner is owed. All damages are awarded by order of the special master, and awards are made out of a trust fund, which is funded by an excise tax paid by manufacturers of the vaccines listed on the Table. In addition to damages, VICP petitioners who are represented by attorneys are generally entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, even if they are found to be ineligible for injury compensation.
VICP Attorney’s Fees and Costs
To streamline the process of determining the proper fees award, the special masters use a fee schedule, which contains hourly rates based on each individual attorney’s number of years of experience practicing law. OSM first developed schedules for attorney’s fees in 2015, and schedules were subsequently adopted by all special masters. In rare cases, a special master may decline to award attorney’s fees and costs, if the special master finds that the petition lacked a reasonable basis or was not brought in good faith. For example, in Stratton v. Secretary of HHS, the Chief Special Master determined that a petitioner’s attorney was not entitled to fees and costs because the case lacked a reasonable basis. 
Filed in 2020, the petition in Stratton alleged that the Gardasil vaccination caused the petitioner to develop postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS). The petitioner dismissed the petition at the 240-day deadline and thereafter joined the multidistrict litigation against Merck over Gardasil. Her attorney then requested more than $10,000 in fees and costs after the dismissal, and the government objected. As part of his analysis of whether the petitioner’s attorney was entitled to fees, the Chief Special Master noted that the petition made clear on its face that it was filed only as a formality so that the petitioner could later pursue a claim against Merck. The Chief Special Master also noted that the petition was filed just before the three-year statute of limitations would have run, and the petition stated that petitioner’s attorney had not yet reviewed the medical records for objective evidence to support the claim. 
The Federal Circuit has stated that in considering a motion for fees, the special master first should make a subjective inquiry into whether the petition was brought in good faith and then undertake an objective  evaluation of whether a reasonable basis existed for the claim. The Federal Circuit has directed that reasonable basis should be “more than a mere scintilla [of evidence] but less than a preponderance of proof.” Using this inquiry, the Chief Special Master in Stratton evaluated whether the petition demonstrated “fundamental substantiating elements” at the time it was filed, including whether the petitioner had received a covered vaccine and the medical records filed in support of her alleged diagnosis. 
In denying attorney’s fees, the Chief Special Master reasoned that “this matter is one of many initiated by the same [] attorney, who has initiated, then withdrawn, approximately 320 cases from the Program,” so that plaintiffs could sue the manufacturer individually or join the In re Gardasil litigation. Given the attorney’s experience in the program, the Chief Special Master noted that he may “have had some sense (based on both cases he personally litigated, as well as others),” that HPV claims alleging POTS “were highly unlikely to succeed” in the VICP. In addition, upon reviewing the medical records, the Chief Special Master found the record “wholly unsupportive” of petitioner’s claim that she developed POTS as a result of Gardasil, because she had been experiencing symptoms before she received the vaccine. The Chief Special Master concluded that all cases concerning the HPV vaccine that were withdrawn at the 240-day deadline to join the In re Gardasil case “are not automatically properly entitled to, or ineligible for, a fees award,” and that each fees request would have to be decided based on its specific facts.
Selected Legislative History of the VICP Statute 
Since it was first enacted in 1986, Congress has made several changes to the VICP statute, including changing the timeline for the adjudication of petitions. When the statute was originally enacted, Congress directed special masters to determine entitlement to compensation and any damages within 365 days of the petition’s filing. The initial version of the statute also did not contain a deadline allowing petitioners to dismiss their petitions if they were not adjudicated by a certain date. 
The legislative history of amendments made to the VICP in 1989 indicate that in the program’s initial years of operation, some lawmakers were concerned that the VICP was becoming too formal and adversarial in nature. A House Report that accompanied the 1989 amendments observes that Congress had wanted the program to be “as swift and uncomplicated as possible,” but several avenues for programmatic delay had emerged. The report explained that Congress sought to ensure more timely processing of claims by amending the statute to require that special masters adjudicate petitions and determine damages within 240 days. Along with this change, Congress also included the provision (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(g)) that allows the petitioner to dismiss a petition after the 240-day deadline lapses. 
In the years since the program’s creation, the timeline for adjudicating VICP petitions has stretched well beyond Congress’s desired 240-day timeline. A 2014 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study of VICP petitions found that petitions filed since 1999 took an average of five-and-a-half years to adjudicate, but that during this time, approximately 24% of VICP petitions were resolved in two years or less. GAO further noted the increased timeline could be attributed to the omnibus autism proceeding, which took place during the studied 15-year window, and the fact that the HHS Secretary added six new vaccines to the Table. GAO observed that OSM’s caseload significantly increased during this time, due to the influx of petitions alleging vaccines caused autism as well as the additional vaccines that were then covered by the program. GAO further found that the average time to adjudicate a non-autism VICP petition during the studied time frame was approximately three-and-a-half years. Finally, GAO noted that while a petitioner may dismiss the petition if it has not been resolved after 240 days, “petitioners rarely exercise this option.”
The Fourth Circuit’s Decision in In re: Gardasil Products Liability Litigation 
In 2025, the Fourth Circuit decided an appeal related to the VICP’s exhaustion requirement, wherein the court determined that timely participation in the VICP is required in order to file a subsequent tort suit, and that a trial court considering such a tort suit could not reconsider a special master’s determination that the VICP exhaustion requirement had not been satisfied. The case concerned three petitioners who had joined the multidistrict litigation against Merck regarding Gardasil, but who had not exhausted the VICP process because they had filed their VICP petitions after the statute of limitations had run. (Their petitions were dismissed by the special master for being untimely filed.) In the multidistrict litigation, Merck argued that the petitioners’ claims against the company should be dismissed because the petitioners failed to exhaust the VICP remedy and were thus barred from bringing a civil suit. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina agreed, and the petitioners appealed the ruling to the Fourth Circuit.
Before the Fourth Circuit, the petitioners argued that a trial court could consider whether a VICP petition was timely and that the special master’s timeliness determination had “no force in a tort suit,” which the plaintiffs characterized as a “de novo civil action.” The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the petitioners’ first argument, finding that the text of the VICP statute that speaks to the liability shield requires a petition to be filed “in accordance with” the statute, referencing the statute of limitations. Thus, the court reasoned that “the Act requires a claimant to file a timely Vaccine Act petition to later be able to bring a tort suit,” and that “[a]bsent a timeliness requirement,” the filing of a VICP petition would be “a mere technical prerequisite” to filing a civil suit. The court further held that the text of the VICP statute reveals that only the special master and the VICP reviewing courts (i.e., the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit) are eligible to make or review a timeliness determination. 
With regard to petitioner’s argument about the de novo nature of a tort action, the Fourth Circuit found that the petitioners “misread what it means for the tort suit to be de novo.’” The court held that the “de novo nature of the tort suit” meant only that factual and legal findings of special masters were inadmissible, not that the trial court in a tort suit could “wholly disregard” the VICP proceedings. The Fourth Circuit interpreted the VICP statute’s provision regarding the inadmissibility of evidence in “any state of a civil action” as applying only to the three stages of civil actions discussed earlier in the statute: liability, general damages, and punitive damages. As a result, the court said, the statute “doesn’t bar the [special master’s] findings of fact and conclusions of law . . . from being considered for other purposes, like determining whether a petition was timely filed.”
The effect of the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in In re Gardasil means that any petitioner who wants to join the multidistrict litigation against Merck, or any other petitioner who wishes to sue a vaccine manufacturer for injuries following vaccination, must first exhaust the VICP remedy. Moreover, once a special master determines that a VICP petition was untimely filed, that decision may only be appealed to the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit. The Fourth Circuit’s decision would preclude a trial court from reaching a different timeliness determination or finding that a petitioner had satisfied the VICP’s exhaustion requirement.
Considerations for Congress 
Some stakeholders have expressed concern that if petitioners use the 240-day deadline to opt out of the VICP before a determination of entitlement to then file civil suits, this could subvert the general purpose of the program. In response, Congress may consider that there are existing statutory mechanisms that could potentially discourage petitioners from opting out of the VICP if their petition is not adjudicated within 240 days. For example, special masters have recognized that while attorney compensation is not an absolute guarantee, the availability of compensation generally encourages petitioners to retain counsel in their cases, which can help expedite the filing of records and may lead to faster decisions by OSM. However, the VICP statute contains a provision limiting the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs to petitions that are filed in good faith and with a reasonable basis. As discussed in Stratton, special masters have found instances in which petitioners’ attorneys are not entitled to a fee award. 
OSM could discourage petitioners’ attorneys from using the 240-day deadline to exit the VICP early by denying attorney’s fees for petitioners who did not intend to pursue their VICP remedies. As was the case in Stratton, if petitioners make clear that they do not intend to pursue their VICP claim after 240 days, this could be a factor in a special master’s determination of reasonable basis. If OSM awards fewer fees and costs, it may help curb the influx of case filings. On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit’s In re Gardasil ruling means that even if a case is likely to be found to lack a reasonable basis, a petitioner must still pursue the VICP remedy before suing the vaccine manufacturer. 
If it wished, Congress could balance these and other considerations by making changes to the VICP statute. For example, Congress could consider amending the VICP statute to increase the number of special masters, which is currently capped at eight. Congress could also appropriate additional funding for DOJ and HRSA, both of which also play a role in the VICP process, to facilitate the adjudication of claims. With respect to the 240-day deadline to adjudicate petitions, Congress could amend the statute to give OSM more than 240 days to adjudicate petitions, or it could strike the 240-day deadline from the statute altogether. Eliminating the 240-day deadline may further encourage petitioners to fully adjudicate their VICP claims, which could result in fewer civil tort claims. 
If Congress is concerned that the 240-day deadline is being abused by petitioners or their attorneys, it could also amend the VICP statute to deny an attorney’s fees award when a petition is dismissed after 240 days, or to deny an attorney’s fees award absent a special showing from the petitioner. If Congress wished to alter the balance between encouraging the filing of petitions and not prompting frivolous claims, Congress could also amend the VICP’s statutory provisions related to attorney’s fees and costs, or it could give the HHS Secretary the authority to modify attorney fee award eligibility criteria via rulemaking. For example, statutory or regulatory clarifications could specify the conditions or factors that must be present in order for an attorney to receive a fee award.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11428/LSB11428.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11428.html
LSB11427,CDC’s Updated Childhood Vaccine Schedule: Litigation and Potential Implications for Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T16:07:57Z,Active,Posts,Hannah-Alise Rogers,"Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Vaccines & Immunization, Executive Branch, Judicial Branch, Public Health Services & Special Populations","In December 2025, President Trump issued an executive memorandum in which he instructed the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to “review best practices from peer, developed countries for core childhood vaccine recommendations,” to determine if updates to the childhood immunization schedule were warranted. The memorandum stated that “[p]eer, developed countries recommend fewer childhood vaccinations” than the United States, and it characterized the then-current schedule as “depart[ing] from [vaccine] policies in the majority of developed countries.” In January 2026, HHS released an assessment comparing vaccine recommendations in the United States with 20 peer nations, concluding that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), a division of HHS, should update the childhood vaccination schedule to recommend fewer vaccines for children. The assessment found that the United States “is a global outlier among developed nations in both the number of diseases addressed in its routine childhood vaccination schedule and the total number of recommended doses.” A few days later, CDC announced a new childhood vaccine schedule, which modified the recommendation types of six vaccines. While the previous schedule recommended these six vaccines for administration to all children, the new schedule recommends that they be received only by certain risk-based groups and/or based on an individual decision process between the child’s parent(s) or guardian(s) and their health care provider (a process known as “shared clinical decision-making” (SCDM)). 
In creating the new schedule, CDC did not consult with the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), the federal advisory committee that has made both childhood and adult vaccine recommendations to the HHS Secretary for more than 60 years. When the new schedule was announced in January 2026, the agency did not involve ACIP or explain why it had not followed CDC’s typical process of having ACIP vote to recommend any changes made to the childhood schedule. 
On February 17, 2026, the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), joined by several other stakeholder associations as well as a few individual plaintiffs, filed a lawsuit to challenge the new schedule as a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs argue that the new schedule was a “final agency action” that was arbitrary, capricious, and not in accordance with law. The case had initially been filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in late 2025 to challenge other CDC actions related to vaccines, and the plaintiffs subsequently amended their complaint in February 2026 to include a challenge to the new schedule. On March 16, 2026, the district court preliminarily stayed the implementation of the new schedule, along with several other CDC actions, in response to the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
This Legal Sidebar discusses the district court’s preliminary stay of the new vaccine schedule in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Kennedy and explores potential implications for the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP) if the new schedule were allowed to take effect. It concludes by offering considerations for the 119th Congress. 
Background 
Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices
CDC has annually published a recommended immunization schedule for both children and adults for many years. While this process is not subject to specific statutory provisions, it has evolved over the years to be led by ACIP. ACIP is a federal advisory committee, established by the U.S. Surgeon General in 1964, that develops recommendations for the use of vaccines in the United States. ACIP was created under a general authority in the Public Health Service Act that allows the HHS Secretary to appoint an advisory council “for the purpose of advising him in connection with any of his functions.” Although Congress did not create ACIP by statute, both federal and state laws refer to ACIP and its vaccine recommendations. For example, in the 21st Century Cures Act, Congress required ACIP to “consider the use of” any new, FDA-approved vaccines at the committee’s next, regularly scheduled meeting. If the committee decides not to make a recommendation for use of a new vaccine, it is required to update the HHS Secretary as to the status of the vaccine’s review. 
In addition to reviewing new vaccines, ACIP establishes and periodically reviews vaccines eligible for the Vaccines for Children Program. The committee also regularly reviews the pediatric vaccine schedule, which includes listing the appropriate dose and dosage interval for each vaccine, as well as any contraindications. ACIP’s recommendations inform CDC and the HHS Secretary’s decisionmaking about which vaccines are placed on the CDC-recommended schedule for children. 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
While some federal statutory frameworks mention ACIP directly, others instead refer to CDC’s vaccine recommendations, which have generally been based on ACIP’s recommendations. For example, Congress requires the HHS Secretary to add to the VICP vaccines that CDC “recommend[s] for routine administration” to children. Congress created the VICP in 1986 when it enacted the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. The VICP is a no-fault compensation program that allows individuals to file a petition for compensation against the HHS Secretary for a “vaccine-related injury or death,” which is defined as an injury or death related to a vaccine that is listed on the Vaccine Injury Table (the Table). Congress created VICP to limit the liability of vaccine manufacturers and administrators and to provide a process by which individuals injured by certain vaccines could receive compensation. The statute shields manufacturers and administrators from liability for vaccine-related injuries or deaths by generally barring individuals from filing civil claims in excess of $1,000 against a vaccine manufacturer or administrator for damages arising from such injuries or deaths until after a VICP petition has been filed and judgment entered through the program. The statute also limits the types of civil actions that can be brought against vaccine manufacturers and administrators even after the VICP process is exhausted. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) defends the HHS Secretary in the cases, and Congress created the Office of Special Masters (OSM), situated within the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, to adjudicate VICP petitions. 
The VICP’s liability shield and the compensation it provides are both tied to the Table, which currently includes sixteen vaccine types. Some of these vaccines were added by Congress when the program was initially created, and some were added by HHS later, after the CDC considered them to be “recommended for routine administration” to children. Thus, a newly approved vaccine can be added to the Table either by Congress via statute, or by the HHS Secretary via rulemaking. 
While the statute does not explicitly authorize the HHS Secretary to remove a vaccine from the Table, it empowers the Secretary to make two types of changes to the Table. First, the Secretary may initiate a rulemaking proceeding to make certain administrative revisions to the Table, including adding to or deleting from the list of injuries associated with particular vaccines and the onset periods for those injuries. Second, when CDC recommends a new vaccine “for routine administration to children,” the Secretary must promulgate a rule adding that vaccine to the Table within two years of the recommendation. In order for the Table change adding the new vaccine to be legally effective, however, Congress must enact an excise tax on the vaccine. The funds from the excise tax paid by vaccine manufacturers are placed into a trust fund from which VICP awards are made to entitled petitioners. In other words, when a new vaccine is “recommended for routine administration” by CDC, in order for that vaccine to be covered by the VICP, not only must the Secretary add the new vaccine to the Table via rulemaking, but Congress must also enact a tax on it.
The VICP statute does not define what it means for a vaccine to be “recommend[ed] for routine administration,” and a court has never interpreted this provision of the statute. CDC and ACIP also have not used consistent terminology in their vaccine recommendations, and HHS has not always been consistent with the types of vaccine recommendations that have led to inclusion on the Table. For example, the VICP already includes the meningococcal B vaccine, which CDC recommends only for SCDM, and HHS added the hepatitis A vaccine before it was universally recommended. (The hepatitis A vaccine was first recommended only for children in areas with high rates of the virus, but the recommendation was later updated.) Moreover, CDC appears to contrast routine recommendations with SCDM in guidance on its website, which was updated shortly after the new schedule was released in January 2026. The agency states, “Unlike routine, catch-up, and risk-based recommendations, [SCDM] vaccinations are individually based and informed by a decision process between the health care provider and the patient or parent/guardian” (emphasis added). The ACIP Handbook similarly refers to a “routine recommendation” as one that “appl[ies] to all persons in an age group.” In light of these examples, it is unclear whether all of the changed vaccine recommendations, were they not stayed, would be considered “recommended for routine administration” to children. 
American Academy of Pediatrics v. Kennedy 
In 2025, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, challenging several of CDC’s recent actions making changes to vaccine recommendations and to ACIP, including the HHS Secretary’s decision to remove all seventeen ACIP members and replace them with new members. The plaintiffs subsequently amended the complaint to challenge the January 2026 new childhood vaccine schedule. Plaintiffs contend that the agency’s actions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA. Plaintiffs also claim that the new ACIP members lack the relevant credentials to serve on the committee and render it unfairly balanced in violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. This Legal Sidebar focuses on plaintiffs’ challenge to the new childhood immunization schedule released by CDC in January 2026 and the court’s subsequent stay of that new schedule. 
In February 2026, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the court prohibit the new vaccine schedule from taking effect until the lawsuit is resolved. In support of the motion, plaintiffs argued that HHS “downgraded” six vaccine recommendations and made other substantive changes to the schedule without providing any “new data that calls into question the safety or efficacy of any of the downgraded immunizations.” In March 2026, the district court stayed the implementation of the new schedule, holding that it was a “final agency action” for purposes of the APA and that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim that the new schedule was arbitrary and capricious. 
The Supreme Court has held that an agency action is “final” for purposes of APA review when it represents the “consummation of the agency’s decision-making process” from which “legal consequences will flow.” The district court held that while CDC’s vaccine schedules are characterized as “recommendations,” legal consequences still flow from them and thus they are final agency actions. The court pointed to several federal laws that reference both ACIP and CDC’s vaccine schedules, including the Vaccines for Children Program statute. The court also observed that changing which vaccines are recommended for children could expose health care providers to civil liability, citing the HHS Secretary’s claim that vaccine administrators who do not follow the recommendations as listed on the new schedule would not be covered by the VICP’s liability shield. Finally, the court found that states also rely on the recommendations made by CDC, which sets “nationwide industry standards.” The court was also unpersuaded by the government’s argument that CDC’s vaccine schedules were not reviewable under the APA because they were “committed to the agency’s discretion by law,” finding that Congress requires CDC to “at least[] consider ACIP’s recommendations before adopting an immunization schedule.” The court pointed to several laws referencing ACIP’s role in reviewing and establishing the schedules, reasoning that “Congress’s mention of ACIP [in these laws] would be rendered pure surplusage if the CDC Director were empowered to act entirely apart from [them].” The court further observed that the government did not cite any case law in support of its point that vaccine recommendations were committed to agency discretion. 
The court further concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim because the CDC director “lacked authority to issue [the new schedule]” without ACIP’s involvement, given the statutory provisions that “directly contemplate ACIP as, at least, a meaningful participant in any changes to the CDC’s immunizations schedules.” When the CDC director issued the new schedule without “sufficiently consulting ACIP,” the court held that he “acted contrary to law.” The court further found that the new schedule was also arbitrary and capricious, “because it abandoned the agency’s longstanding practice of getting recommendations from ACIP before changing the immunization schedules without sufficient explanation.” The court said that HHS did not sufficiently explain why it “circumvented [the] decades-old practice” of receiving recommendations from ACIP, other than citing to the December 2025 executive memorandum. The court noted, however, that “Defendants cannot disregard the APA’s requirements simply because they are following the President’s orders.” 
The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient irreparable harm for which interim relief was appropriate. The court agreed with the plaintiffs that both the professional organization plaintiffs themselves, as well as their members individually, would suffer financial harm in the form of uncompensated work and diverted resources expended to address the new schedule. This includes increased time spent counseling patients and physicians regarding the schedule’s implementation. The court also held that the balancing of equities supported granting the stay. On April 29, 2026, the government appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. 
Potential Implications for the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
Amidst ongoing litigation challenging various CDC actions to alter the childhood vaccine schedules, public health organizations such as AAP have released their own childhood and adolescent vaccine schedules, which differ from the CDC’s guidelines. As the Massachusetts District Court noted in its stay of the new schedule, Secretary Kennedy has claimed that providers who diverge from CDC recommendations for vaccines “are not shielded from liability under the 1986 Vaccine Injury Act.” The HHS Secretary did not further explain this statement, and HHS has not taken any action to officially change the Table since releasing the new schedule. If the new schedule were to take effect, it is possible that the HHS Secretary could propose changes to the Table in accordance with it, which could include removing vaccines that are recommended for SCDM. If the Secretary were to undertake such an action, legal questions would likely arise, including what it means for a vaccine to be “recommended for routine administration” by the CDC, whether a vaccine recommended for SCDM is still “recommended for routine administration,” whether the HHS Secretary has the authority to remove a vaccine from the Table, and what that would mean for drug manufacturers who are still obligated to pay the excise tax. 
For example, the seasonal flu vaccine is recommended only for SCDM under the new schedule, so if the new schedule were to take effect, the HHS Secretary could undertake rulemaking to remove the flu vaccine from the Table. The Secretary might argue that such an action was warranted because the flu vaccine would no longer meet the criteria for being added to the Table, based on an interpretation of “recommended for routine administration” that excluded SCDM. If the flu vaccine were no longer listed on the Table, then it could not be covered by the VICP, because it would no longer meet the definition of a “vaccine-related injury or death.” In that scenario, a person allegedly injured by the flu vaccine would not qualify to seek VICP compensation and could sue the manufacturer directly. In addition, the injured person or the vaccine manufacturer being sued might challenge the Secretary’s authority to remove the vaccine from the Table. If such a case were to be brought challenging the Secretary’s authority to remove a vaccine from the Table, a court may have an opportunity to interpret what it means for a vaccine to be “recommended for routine administration” to children under the VICP statute. 
If a court were to determine that vaccines that are recommended for SCDM are not “recommended for routine administration,” legal questions might then arise about the HHS Secretary’s treatment of SCDM vaccines that are listed on the Table. It is unclear whether the HHS Secretary has unilateral authority to remove a vaccine from the Table altogether, as such authority is not explicitly laid out in the VICP statute. Even if the statute were interpreted to give the Secretary this authority, only Congress could amend the tax code to remove the excise tax on a vaccine. Thus, even if the Secretary has the authority to remove a SCDM vaccine from the Table, if Congress does not act, the manufacturer would potentially remain legally obligated to pay the tax. 
Considerations for Congress 
To the extent that Congress determines it is appropriate to do so, Congress could clarify the questions raised by the new schedule and related litigation. For example, Congress could specify which vaccines it wants the VICP to cover and how the liability shield should function for vaccines that CDC recommends for SCDM. Alternatively, Congress could consider clarifying what it means for a vaccine to be “recommended for routine administration,” by defining the term, further specifying which kinds of CDC vaccine recommendations are included within it, or by giving the HHS Secretary the authority to define the term via rulemaking. Congress could also amend the VICP statute to clarify what should happen in the event that a vaccine listed on the Table is no longer considered to be “recommended for routine administration.”
In addition to potential uncertainty regarding ACIP and a new CDC schedule’s effect on vaccines covered by the VICP, attorneys and other vaccine interest groups are urging HHS to make further changes to the VICP. For example, a group of attorneys recently sent a letter to Secretary Kennedy requesting that the Secretary immediately amend the Table to add a list of injuries that they claim are “associated with” certain Table vaccines. The authors argue that the VICP statute requires the Secretary to amend the Table to add injuries “associated with” certain vaccines, and that because there are studies demonstrating that particular injuries are associated with certain vaccines, the Secretary is legally obligated to add those injuries to the Table. The authors, all of whom represent VICP petitioners, have threatened to sue HHS if the Secretary does not exercise his authority under the statute to add additional injuries to the Table. Any changes that the Secretary makes to the Table would likely be considered “final agency actions” and would thus be reviewable under the APA.
In April 2026, HHS posted a Federal Register Notice announcing a renewal of ACIP’s charter through April 2028. When compared with the previous committee charter from 2025, the new charter omits language requiring members to have “expertise in the use of vaccines and other immunobiologic agents in clinical practice or preventive medicine, have expertise with clinical or laboratory vaccine research, or have expertise in assessment of vaccine efficacy and safety.” The new charter retains a statement that the committee should be “fairly balanced” in terms of the perspectives represented. It also contains broader categories of expertise, including individuals with knowledge of “medicine, vaccines, immunization practices, immunology, toxicology, pediatric neurodevelopment, epidemiology, data science, statistical analysis, health economics, recovery from serious vaccine injuries, or public health.” In the event that stakeholders such as AAP have concerns about the changes made to the ACIP charter, it is possible that these changes could be harder to challenge under the APA. For example, if AAP sought to challenge the changes made to the ACIP charter, the organization would need to articulate a concrete, particularized harm that stems directly from the agency’s actions in order to have standing. Congress could exert more control over the committee by statute, if it sought to do so. For example, Congress could authorize ACIP in statute and require committee members to have specific expertise, which would limit some of the HHS Secretary’s authority over the committee.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11427/LSB11427.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11427.html
IN12691,President’s FY2027 Budget Request in Historical Context: Outlays,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:25Z,Active,Posts,D. Andrew Austin,"Legislative & Budget Process, Executive Budget Process","On April 3, 2026, the Trump Administration submitted its FY2027 budget request to Congress. That budget proposes increases in defense spending, reductions in most nondefense discretionary spending, and seeks to maintain spending on border security and immigration enforcement, among other priorities. In February 2026, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) issued its budget and economic outlook and its current-law baseline projections. This Insight discusses the Administration’s fiscal proposals in the context of longer-term budgetary trends.
Outlays
Figure 1 shows federal outlays by Budget Enforcement Act (BEA; P.L. 101-508) categories since FY1962 and total receipts (dark blue line), both measured as shares of GDP. Annual appropriations acts fund and control discretionary outlays. Other laws fund mandatory outlays. 
Mandatory spending mostly supports social insurance, health, and retirement programs. Over time, mandatory spending’s share of federal outlays has grown, while discretionary spending’s share has declined. Some observers express concern that the growth of mandatory spending has left a shrinking portion of the federal budget controlled by Congress on an annual basis.
Rising deficits in the 1980s spurred Congress to constrain deficit levels through the 1985 Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. The 1990 BEA set statutory caps on discretionary budget authority (BA) and established pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) limits on mandatory spending and tax cuts. By FY1998, the federal government achieved its first budget surpluses in a generation, as caps on discretionary BA and PAYGO limits on mandatory outlays helped align spending and revenues. Strong economic growth, Social Security payroll taxes boosted by Baby Boomers—those born in the two decades after World War II—in their peak earnings years, and the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse all helped achieve four years of budget  surpluses. 
PAYGO and discretionary caps expired shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11 attacks). The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) reimposed caps on discretionary spending through FY2021. The Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 (P.L. 188-5) set new caps on discretionary spending for FY2024 and FY2025. Those caps lapsed, although sequestration of nonexempted mandatory programs was extended through 2033.
Figure 1. Federal Outlays by Budget Enforcement Act Category as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, FY1962-FY2031
Figure is interactive in HTML report version.
/
Source: CRS calculations based on OMB and Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data. Historical events shown in calendar years.
Notes: Revenue and outlay data are for fiscal years. Laws are shown in the calendar year when enacted. FY2026 values are estimated. Later years reflect Administration proposals and projections.
Mandatory Outlays
Figure 2 shows major components of mandatory outlays. Social Security, created in 1935 during the Great Depression to provide old-age retirement benefits, is now the largest federal program. A 1972 act raised Social Security benefits, tied them to a cost-of-living index, and created the Supplemental Security Income program. Financial concerns prompted a 1983 act limiting some benefits and raising employee and employer contribution rates. Baby Boom retirements increased Social Security outlays in the past decade and will continue to raise them in coming years. 
Figure 2. Mandatory Outlays by Category as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, FY1962-FY2031
Figure is interactive in HTML report version.
/
Source: CRS calculations based on OMB and BEA data.
Notes: Outlay data are for fiscal years. Acts are shown in the calendar year when enacted. FY2026 values are estimated. Later years reflect Administration proposals and projections.

In 1965, Medicare was established to provide health care to the elderly and Medicaid (included within Other Health in Figure 2) to provide health care to low-income individuals. As beneficiary populations and health care costs rose, so did federal health outlays. Major legislation in 1996 and 1997 limited certain income security and health care programs.
Many mandatory programs act as automatic stabilizers that mitigate macroeconomic fluctuations. When incomes drop during recessions, more households become eligible for social benefits, and tax collections fall. Other economic shocks—including the 1973-1974 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo; the 2007-2009 financial crisis, exemplified by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank, and the ensuing Great Recession; and the COVID-19 pandemic—led to robust federal fiscal responses.
Net interest costs as a share of GDP fell in the late 1990s as falling interest rates outpaced debt accumulation. In recent years, large COVID-19-era debt increases and rising interest rates combined to raise net interest costs to $1,039 billion in FY2026 (3.3% of GDP), rising to $2,146 billion by FY2036 (4.6% of GDP) according to CBO baseline projections.
Discretionary Outlays
Discretionary spending mostly supports federal agencies’ operations, including those of the Department of Defense. In recent years, however, reconciliation acts have included mandatory funding for operations of the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense.
Figure 3 shows discretionary defense and nondefense outlays measured as shares of GDP. After the 1968 Tet offensive and U.S. deescalation in Vietnam, defense spending fell sharply. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, defense outlays rose dramatically, reaching 6% of GDP in the mid-1980s. The Soviet Union’s 1991 dissolution yielded a “peace dividend” and falling defense outlays. The 9/11 attacks, lapsing of BEA budgetary limits, and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq all increased discretionary outlays in the Aughts. After elevated spending responding to the 2007-2009 Great Recession, the 2011 BCA , as noted above, reestablished caps on discretionary spending through FY2021, which were extended for FY2024 and FY2025.
Figure 3. Discretionary Defense and Nondefense Outlays as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product, FY1977-FY2031
Figure is interactive in HTML report version.
/
Source: CRS calculations based on OMB and BEA data.
Notes: Outlay data are for fiscal years. Acts are shown in the calendar year when enacted. FY2026 values are estimated. Later years reflect Administration proposals and projections.

FY2027 Administration Budget
The Administration’s FY2027 budget proposes increases in defense and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spending and a 10% reduction in nondefense discretionary spending, among other priorities. The Administration notes the use of reconciliation procedures to fund defense and DHS operations, each of which received extra mandatory funding of about 0.6% of GDP in the 2025 reconciliation act. 
The Administration asks for $1,115 billion in National Defense (budget function 050) in FY2027 discretionary funding. It also asks for $388 billion in mandatory funding, including $101 billion for Defense-wide Research, Development, Test and Evaluation and another $45 billion for Defense-wide Procurement. Before FY2025, mandatory funding was a small proportion of the national defense budget. For instance, such funding was $34 billion in FY2024. The request does not include costs of the war with Iran.
Requested FY2027 discretionary funding for International Affairs (budget function 150; $35 billion) is about 40% of its FY2024 level ($87 billion). FY2027 discretionary funding for Natural Resources and Environment (budget function 300; $35 billion) would be 55% of its FY2024 level ($65 billion). Discretionary funding for science, energy, transportation, and education would also decrease.
Requested FY2027 discretionary funding for Veterans benefits and services (budget function 700; $145 billion) would be about $10 billion (7%) above its FY2024 level ($135 billion). Requested mandatory funding ($338 billion) would be 77% above its FY2024 level ($191 billion).
Total mandatory spending, according to Administration projections, will be below pandemic-era levels but above prepandemic levels, largely due to rising Social Security, Medicare, and other health outlays, although other mandatory spending (see Figure 2) would decrease.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12691/IN12691.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12691.html
IG10096,U.S. Service Academy Nominations: Timelines,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:56:14Z,Active,Infographics,"R. Eric Petersen, Sarah J. Eckman","Service Academy Nominations, Service Academies","/


U.S. Service Academy Nominations and Appointments 
General Timelines for Congress, Academies, and Applicants 

Members of Congress are authorized by law to nominate candidates for appointment to four U.S. service academies: the U.S. Military Academy (USMA); U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA); and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy (USMMA). In the 18 months prior to the enrollment of new academy classes, congressional Member offices, the service academies, and applicants are involved in a series of events and actions to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities. This Infographic presents approximate timelines of when typical events and activities occur.

These timelines present generalized information, representing when these events and activities most frequently occur. Many applicants are high school students and apply during grade levels corresponding with “Junior Year” and “Senior Year.” Other applicants are not high school students, including some active duty and reserve military members seeking appointment, though the timelines remain relevant.

CLASS ENTERS ACADEMY 

PROSPECTIVE APPLICANTS/CANDIDATES 

House and Senate Member Offices 

Outreach for prospective nominees 

Host service academy events 

Publicize nomination deadlines 

Common deadlines for office nomination deadlines 

Selection panel consideration, applicant interviews 

Notify nominees 

Submit nominations to service academies 

Publicize appointees attending academies 

Service Academies 

Pre-Candidate Questionnaire opens* 

Rolling Application review 

Fill any remaining appointments 

Applicants 

Submit pre-applicant questionnaire. Take SAT, ACT, or CLT** 

Complete application requirements, submit application 
Accept or decline appointment 

Appointees begin academy

YEAR 1 YEAR 2 

DEC 31 Outgoing 

Members JAN 31 

Returning Members 

Senior Year 

Junior Year 

MAY 1 

JUL 1 

Typical Deadlines 

Outgoing Member offices submit nominations to academies 

DEC 31 

Returning Member offices submit nominations to academies 

JAN 31

Deadline for submission of applications to academies 

FEB 28 

Most congressionally nominated appointments are completed 

APR 15 

Applicants accept or decline appointment 

MAY 1 

Appointees begin academy 

JUL 1 


*Timing varies by academy. 
** All four academies accept SAT and ACT results. USMA, USNA, and USAFA accept CLT results. 

Information as of April 29, 2026. Prepared by R. Eric Petersen, Specialist in American National Government; 

Sarah J. Eckman, Analyst in American National Government; and Brion Long, Visual Information Specialist. 

—CRS 

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10096/IG10096.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10096.html
IF13216,Connecting Constituents with Federal Programs for Historic Preservation,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-09T05:53:58Z,Active,Resources,"Scott Vierick, Mark K. DeSantis",Federal Land Management,"Congress has established programs and provided grant funding to assist constituents—including individuals, organizations, and state, tribal, and local governments—with historic preservation efforts. This In Focus lists selected federal programs that may be used to further historic preservation goals such as building restoration, land acquisition, and education. 
The National Park Service (NPS) administers most federal historic preservation funding programs. Many federal grants are awarded to state, tribal, and local governments, which in turn may issue sub-awards to other entities. Interested applicants are encouraged to contact federal agencies, state agencies, or tribal agencies for information on eligibility, the application process, award cycles, and availability. Funding levels for the programs listed below vary and may be subject to appropriations. 
Since January 2025, President Trump has issued executive orders addressing the use of federal funds in various areas. Several of these orders—aspects of which are subject to litigation—direct relevant agencies to pause certain grant-related and other funding activities and may affect the resources discussed in this CRS In Focus. 
For more information about the federal role in historic preservation, see CRS Report R45800, The Federal Role in Historic Preservation: An Overview, by Mark K. DeSantis.
Historic Preservation Fund Grant Programs
The NPS’s Historic Preservation Fund (HPF) encompasses several different programs. Funding from the HPF is distributed through both formula-based apportionment grants and competitive grants.
Formula Grants
Each year, NPS distributes HPF formula grants to state historic preservation offices (SHPOs) and tribal historic preservation offices (THPOs). Within general parameters established by NPS, these offices have flexibility on how they distribute HPF funds. Grant seekers should contact their SHPOs or THPOs directly to learn more about available funding opportunities. NPS maintains a list of SHPOs, and the National Association of Tribal Historic Preservation Officers maintains a THPO directory.
Certified Local Governments
A certified local government is a city, town, or county government entity that has been certified by the NPS and a state SHPO as being committed to national historic preservation standards. By law, SHPOs must devote 10% of the HPF funding they receive as formula grants to certified local governments.
Competitive Grants
The NPS’s State, Tribal, Local, Plans and Grants Division manages several competitive grant programs funded through the HPF. Applicant eligibility varies depending on the program and may change over time. Interested applicants should reach out to the contacts listed on each program’s website for more information about eligibility. 
African American Civil Rights Grants
The African American Civil Rights grant program offers competitive grants in two categories: preservation and history. Preservation grants fund physical preservation activities or pre-preservation studies of sites connected to African American history. History grants fund historical research or interpretation projects at eligible sites. Grants must be used for properties that are in or are eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register) either individually or as part of a historic district. 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities Grants
The Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) grant program provides funds for the preservation and restoration of historic structures located on HBCU campuses. 
History of Equal Rights Grants
The History of Equal Rights grant program funds sites connected to efforts to secure equal rights for all Americans. The program supports preservation work and pre-preservation planning activities. Grants must be used for properties that are in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register either individually or as part of a historic district. 
Paul Bruhn Historic Revitalization Grants
The Paul Bruhn Historic Revitalization grant program provides preservation funds to rural communities. Applicants, also known as prime grantees, apply for funding, which they then distribute as grants to other organizations, known as subgrantees. Grants must be used for properties in rural areas that are in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register either individually or as part of a historic district. 
Save America’s Treasures Grants
The Save America’s Treasures grant program—co-administered with the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the Institute of Museum and Library Services—provides competitive grants in two categories: preservation and collections. Preservation grants may be used for conservation and preservation work on structures that are listed in the National Register as nationally significant, are part of historic districts designated as nationally significant, or are National Historic Landmarks. Collections grants may fund activities to conserve historically significant museum, archival, and archaeological collections. 
Semiquincentennial Grants
The Semiquincentennial grant program provides funds for preservation and pre-preservation activities at sites connected to the founding of the United States. Sites must be listed in the National Register to be eligible for grants. 
Tribal Heritage Grants
The Tribal Heritage grant program provides grants to federally recognized Indian Tribes for historic and cultural preservation, identification, and documentation projects. 
American Battlefield Protection Program
The American Battlefield Protection program, managed by NPS, provides funding for the preservation and interpretation of battlefields and associated sites. Funds are distributed through four competitive grant programs. Battlefield Land Acquisition Grants may be used to purchase or conserve parcels of battlefield land. Battlefield Restoration Grants may be used to undertake activities that restore park land to day-of-battle conditions. Battlefield Interpretation Grants may be used to fund projects that connect visitors to the story of the battlefield. Preservation Planning Grants may be used to fund a variety of activities, including but not limited to public programs, signage, planning studies, surveys, and historical documentation. For more information on these grants, see CRS In Focus IF11329, American Battlefield Protection Program, by Mark K. DeSantis. 
Other Historic Preservation Programs
National Maritime Heritage
NPS and the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration administer the National Maritime Heritage grant program. Grants may be used to preserve historic maritime properties including ships, archaeological sites, and waterfront structures. Grants can also be used to support the conservation of collections relating to maritime history and the teaching of traditional maritime skills. Funds are distributed to SHPOs and the National Trust for Historic Preservation, which can then conduct projects directly or distribute the funds to other organizations through subgrant programs that they create and administer. 
Japanese American Confinement Sites
The Japanese American Confinement Sites grant program provides grants to preserve, protect, restore, and educate the public on certain sites connected to the United States’ incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War II. 
Community Development Block Grants
The Community Development Block Grant program is managed by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. Grants are distributed to states and qualified localities, which have some flexibility on how they use the funds. Some historic preservation projects may qualify for funding provided that they meet other program goals such as improving the lives of low- and moderate-income individuals, revitalizing neighborhoods, or addressing immediate safety and health risks. More information can be found in CRS Report R43520, Community Development Block Grants and Related Programs: A Primer, by Joseph V. Jaroscak 
Historic Preservation Tax Incentives
The NPS and the Internal Revenue Service offer a tax credit to support the rehabilitation of historic structures. Property owners may apply for this credit. Both the NPS and the relevant SHPO must review the rehabilitation work to ensure that it complies with federal preservation standards. 
Disaster Recovery Grants
In the aftermath of some natural disasters, Congress has, at times, appropriated additional funding from the Historic Preservation Fund to assist impacted communities. Known as Disaster Recovery Grants or the Emergency Supplemental Historic Preservation Fund grant program, funds may be used for various recovery projects, including compliance activities, survey and inventory of historic resources in declared disaster areas, recovery and repair of historic properties damaged during the disaster, and other approved activities related to disaster recovery. Funding is at congressional discretion. 
Other Resources
CRS In Focus IF12687, Connecting Constituents with Federal Programs for Public Parks, by Scott Vierick and Eric P. Nardi 
CRS In Focus IF12561, Connecting Constituents with Federal Assistance for the Arts and Humanities, by Shannon S. Loane 
CRS has other products available related to grants work, many of which are listed on the Grants and Federal Assistance page of the CRS.gov website.
The Federal Assistance page on SAM.gov is the primary source of information on grants and other assistance programs. The listings include information on eligibility, how to apply, and matching requirements. Actual funding of specific grant programs depends on annual congressional budget appropriations.
Grants.gov provides grant seekers with information on competitive federal grant opportunities and how to apply for them.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13216/IF13216.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13216.html
IF13215,Office of Strategic Capital: Overview and Considerations,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-06T13:08:06Z,Active,Resources,Marcy E. Gallo,,"Technological advantage has long contributed to the dominance of the U.S. Armed Forces. Some analysts and policymakers also suggest that U.S. technological superiority—and, by extension, national security—is at risk due to a number of factors. They include a rapidly evolving global landscape for innovation and the increasing technological prowess of potential adversaries. As a result, the Department of Defense (DOD, which is “using a secondary Department of War designation” under Executive Order 14347) and Congress have taken a number of steps intended to improve government support for and management of defense-related innovation, including the establishment of new DOD organizations such as the Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) (10 U.S.C. §149). This In Focus provides an overview of OSC, including its mission, roles, responsibilities, programs, and funding. It also highlights selected issues for Congress pertaining to OSC transparency, accountability, and funding levels and whether to provide OSC with the authority to make equity investments.
Establishment and Mission of OSC
The mission of the OSC is to use the United States’ comparative advantage in private capital markets to attract and scale investments in technologies critical to national security. A press release announcing the establishment of OSC on December 1, 2022, stated that “critical technologies ... often require long-term financing to bridge the gap between the laboratory and full-scale production.” It quoted the then-Secretary of Defense as stating, “By working with the private capital markets and by partnering with our federal colleagues, OSC will address investment gaps and add a new tool to the Department’s investment toolbox.”
OSC Roles and Responsibilities
In 2023, Section 903 of P.L. 118-31, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024, codified and outlined the duties of OSC to include
developing, integrating, and implementing capital investment strategies proven in the commercial sector to shape and scale investment in critical technologies and assets;
identifying and prioritizing promising critical technologies and assets that require funding and have the potential to benefit DOD; and
making investments in such technologies and assets, such as supply chain technologies not always supported by traditional private capital.
In addition, the OSC director is statutorily charged with serving as the chair of the National Security Capital Forum established by the FY2025 NDAA (Section 1092 of P.L. 118-159). The duties of the National Security Capital Forum, as amended by the FY2026 NDAA (Section 876(c) of P.L. 119-60) are to
convene domestic and international institutional investors, innovators, and business representatives from across the private sector, relevant federal agencies and offices, and government and private entities of partner nations, among others; 
allow for the exchange of information between such persons and entities and DOD regarding potential transactions in order to integrate and coordinate efforts in support of U.S. national security interests; and
serve as a clearinghouse for vetting potential investment transactions.
OSC Capital Assistance Programs
P.L. 118-31 authorized the OSC director to carry out a pilot program to provide capital assistance—defined as loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance—to eligible entities (e.g., corporations, joint ventures). Capital assistance is to be used for the development of dual-use technologies that meet the needs of DOD and fall within one of the 34 covered technology categories defined in statute (e.g., advanced manufacturing, quantum sensing, and space launch). The authority for the pilot program expires on October 1, 2028, and is subject to the availability of appropriations.
When selecting among applications for capital assistance, the OSC director is required to consider the following criteria: (1) the extent to which an investment supports the national security or economic interests of the United States, (2) the likelihood that the capital assistance provided would hasten the anticipated outcome of the investment, and (3) the creditworthiness of an investment. 
OSC’s capital assistance pilot program includes both direct debt financing for companies and the financing of venture capital, private equity, and other investment funds. For example, on February 3, 2025, OSC closed the application window for its first direct loan product under its Credit Program—the equipment finance product. Specifically, OSC intends to provide loans between $10 million and $150 million to U.S.-based public and private companies for the construction, expansion, or modernization of commercial facilities and equipment in the United States. The commercial facilities and equipment eligible for loans though the equipment finance product must support, either directly or indirectly, a covered technology category. The total amount of funding available through the equipment finance product is $984 million. Per DOD’s FY2026 budget justification, OSC “received more than 200 loan applications, representing $8.9 billion in financing requests.” OSC has indicated that it is “developing additional financial instruments” under its Credit Program. 
In addition, OSC provides loans and loan guarantees to investment funds (e.g., venture capital funds) through its Critical Technologies Limited Partner (CTLP) Program and the Small Business Investment Company Critical Technology (SBICCT) Initiative. CTLP accepts applications on a rolling basis and provides loans to qualified investment fund managers (e.g., venture capitalists or private equity investors) who use federal funds to leverage additional private sector capital. These combined resources are then invested in companies operating within one of the covered technology categories. Similarly, the SBICCT Initiative is a joint effort between the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and OSC that takes advantage of SBA’s Small Business Investment Company Program as a means “to empower highly qualified [investment] fund managers to scale and catalyze investments” in small businesses developing critical technologies of importance to DOD.
Further, per DOD’s FY2026 budget justification, OSC’s Global Technology Scout Program leads international efforts to identify and leverage OSC capital assistance with co-investments from U.S. allies to advance critical technologies, support interoperability, and prevent adversarial capital investment.
OSC Appropriations
For FY2026, P.L. 119-75, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026, Division A, provided $97.8 million to the DOD Credit Program account for OSC’s capital assistance pilot program. Such funds are available until expended to subsidize up to $4.4 billion in loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance in accordance with Title 10, Section 149(e), of the U.S. Code. Per the explanatory statement associated with P.L. 119-75, OSC also received $2 million for FY2026 through the defense-wide research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) account. According to DOD’s FY2026 budget justification, OSC plans to use $21.3 million in FY2025 reconciliation funding for RDT&E activities in FY2026 (see Table 1).
Table 1 details additional funding provided to OSC as part of the FY2025 budget reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21).
Table 1. OSC Funding in FY2025 Budget Reconciliation Law (P.L. 119-21)
SectionAmount and Purpose
20004(d)$500 million to the DOD Credit Program account, available until September 30, 2029, to subsidize up to $100 billion in loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance for critical minerals and related industries and projects

20005(a)(1)
$25 million, available until September 30, 2029, for the OSC Global Technology Scout program

20005(a)(33)
$20 million, available until September 30, 2029, for the OSC workforce

20005(b)
$1 billion to the DOD Credit Program account, available until September 30, 2029, to subsidize up to $100 billion in loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance for covered technologies

Source: CRS analysis of P.L. 119-21.
Note: For a list of covered technologies, see 10 U.S.C. §149(h)(2).
Issues for Congress
As Congress considers the effectiveness, relevance, and role of OSC within the broader defense innovation ecosystem, it may consider the following selected issues, among others.  
A House version of the FY2026 NDAA (H.R. 3838) would have provided OSC with the authority to acquire equity positions in private sector companies. At hearings in February and March 2026, some Members of Congress questioned the rationale and potential implications of DOD equity investments. As Congress determines whether to provide OSC the authority to take equity positions in U.S. firms, it may consider the pros and cons of such a practice. Potential advantages include (1) strengthening national security and supply chain resilience through direct support for domestic companies in sectors where reliance on foreign suppliers—especially China—poses a strategic vulnerability, (2) attracting private investments that could bolster the competitiveness of U.S. firms, and (3) generating potential financial returns for the U.S. government and taxpayers if such companies are successful. Potential disadvantages include (1) the risk of politicization and undue influence over a firm’s decisionmaking; (2) market distortion, including concerns over preferential treatment toward companies in which the federal government has equity stakes; and (3) high financial risk for the U.S. government.
Some experts have recommended that DOD more clearly communicate its short- and long-term needs to industry, suggesting that a clear market demand signal would allow DOD to more effectively leverage and foster private sector innovation and research investments. In FY2024 and FY2025, OSC released strategies indicating its investment priorities. OSC has not released such a strategy for FY2026 as of May 1, 2026. DOD is required to submit an annual report to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees describing OSC’s activities under the capital assistance pilot program. Such information is not required to be publicly available. Congress may consider the pros and cons of additional reporting requirements, including an annual investment strategy; a public database of OSC loans, loan guarantees, and technical assistance; and transparency into OSC’s role in the National Security Capital Forum.
DOD’s FY2027 budget request includes $216 million in discretionary funding and $20 billion in mandatory funding for OSC’s capital assistance pilot program. As Congress determines the level of funding to provide OSC, it may consider what, if any, metrics OSC is collecting or should collect to track short- and long-term outcomes and success.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13215/IF13215.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13215.html
IF13214,Private Equity in Selected Industries: Policy Background,2026-05-04T04:00:00Z,2026-05-05T07:07:56Z,Active,Resources,Eva Su,,"Private equity (PE)—which falls within a broader set of investment products often called alternative investments, private capital, or private funds—is a pooled investment vehicle that generally raises money from accredited investors and invests primarily in private (non-publicly traded) companies. PE participation could provide benefits associated with capital formation, performance and productivity gains, distressed company resolution, and competition enhancement. Compared with public funds, PE typically involves less regulation and transparency, less investor access, lower liquidity, greater valuation challenges, and higher fees and expenses. 
Some Members of Congress and industry observers contend that PE’s profit-maximizing business model may appear incompatible with certain public interest-oriented industry sectors, especially those that receive tax advantages, grants, financial backstops, and other forms of benefits because their work is seen as building public good. Critics argue that PE practices amplify financial fragility and social harm without fully recognizing and pricing externalized risks. PE investment may lead to adverse effects on the long-term well-being of customers, employees, and communities. 
For policymakers, industry-specific discussions often are about understanding which stakeholder interests to prioritize, how PE funding operates in specific contexts, and what policy changes may help preserve benefits while mitigating risks. For more about PE operations and regulation, see CRS Report R47053, Private Equity and Capital Markets Policy, by Eva Su.  
PE Operational Focus and Features
Figure 1 illustrates a list of industries—including software (which has generated major risks to PE investors in 2026), health care, financial services, real estate, industrial services and products, and media—that attracted relatively large numbers of PE deals as of 2025. Although some public interest-oriented industries (e.g., child care and youth sports) are not the primary recipients of PE funding, PE’s influence on them has generated policy debates and legislative proposals.
Controversial Operational Features
Certain practices associated with, but not unique to, PE’s operating and financing models (which focus on value creation for investors), may attract policymakers’ attention: (1) leveraged buyout strategies that use borrowed money to invest and multiply risks and returns; (2) dividend recapitalization that enables PE investors to create new debt to fund their own payouts; (3) sale-and-leaseback arrangements that allow PE investors to sell high-cost fixed assets for cash while arranging a leaseback to the company for a fee; (4) roll-ups that consolidate multiple smaller companies into a larger entity, potentially leading to antitrust concerns in certain markets; (5) certain operational restructuring for efficiency that may lead to job cuts; and (6) certain risk transfers that allow PE firms to benefit from regulatory arbitrage, such as reduction of regulatory capital. While job cuts, dividend recapitalization, sale-and-leaseback arrangements, and roll-ups are common concerns for industries that are more labor-intensive and involve many operating branches (e.g., health care), risk transfer considerations are more commonly found in PE involvement with insurers.
Figure 1. Private Equity Deal Count by Industry  
/
Source: CRS using Bloomberg data.  
Notes: The chart includes industries with 500 or more deals in 2025. Bloomberg counts each fund’s investment in a company as an individual deal and captures many, but not all, private equity transactions. Bloomberg’s industry classifications may differ from general industry conventions.  
Industry-Specific Analysis
This section discusses some policy challenges in conducting industry-specific analysis as well as a summary of existing discussions on PE involvement and the potential benefits and risks to selected examples of industries. 
Policy Challenges
Terminology. Many entities or practices lack standardized terminology, leading to the inability to establish a common discussion. For example, in single family housing, the term institutional investor could refer to different entities, depending on whether the focus is on ownership scale, investment structure, or regulatory jurisdiction. As such, the entities captured under the term may vary across data sources.  
Data. Data availability and reliability may prevent policymakers from reaching definitive conclusions about PE’s involvement and impact. While some industries may have more data than others, in general, data availability about ownership structures and PE’s impact on specific industries is often limited.  
Research and consensus. In light of data limitations, empirical research on PE in selected industries remains underdeveloped. Even where such research exists, findings often do not converge on a clear policy direction. For example, authoritative research on PE in sectors such as child care and youth sports is scarce. In sectors with more developed literature, such as PE acquisition of hospitals, findings could be mixed (e.g., some studies suggest adverse effects on patients, while others find no significant changes).
Limitations of policy tools. Designing policy responses to PE activity is challenging due to variation across and within industries. As such, policy approaches may need to account for these differences. Policy efforts to mitigate perceived risks may require precision to avoid unintended consequences, including constraining capital access for businesses that rely on external funding. 
Examples of Potential Impact of PE Investments
Overall, PE’s impact is not uniform and may present both benefits and concerns across industries. As Table 1 illustrates, the selected industries differ in (1) the level of PE involvement (including the extent of PE investment and the activities that have attracted policy attention); (2) regulatory barriers (including industry-specific regulatory requirements that may affect the ease of PE acquisitions); and (3) potential benefits and risks. In general, the health care industry has a higher level of PE involvement than the other industries listed. While some industries do not have industry-specific regulatory restrictions on PE acquisitions, others, such as banking regulations, once blocked certain PE investments. Some Members have pursued both broad legislative proposals affecting PE generally and industry-specific proposals aimed at addressing perceived risks. Table 1. Examples of Private Equity in Selected Industry Sectors
Industry
PE Involvement 
Regulatory Barriers
Potential Benefits
Potential Risks

Health care
Heavy involvement
Medium
Operational efficiency, clinical integration and coordination, cost control, and expansion of access to certain care.
Higher costs, poorer quality of care and patient outcomes, lower physician and patient satisfaction, reduced staffing and access to care. 

Single family housing
Some involvement with regional factors 
Low
Capital provision for housing supply, standardized property management, provider of liquidity, and risk absorption through establishing a price floor during financial crisis. 
Increases in home prices and rents, ownership concentration in local markets, poorer tenant experience, and reduced purchase opportunities for individual homebuyers. 

Child care
Some involvement at large providers
Low
Enhance business operations and expand the availability of care, potentially reducing supply gaps.
Uneven expansion of child care availability toward higher income segments, and potential cost increases for families and wage reductions for workers.

Utilities
Some involvement with emerging activities
High
Capital injection and risk sharing for large, capital-intensive projects. Operational efficiency and project expertise. 
Adverse changes to utility price and reliability. National security considerations. 

Higher education
Some involvement  
Medium
Higher school enrollment and financial profits.
Lower education inputs, higher tuition, higher student debt, and lower graduation rates.

Insurance
Some involvement, particularly in life and annuities
High
Operational efficiency and asset management expertise. Potential lower costs and greater availability of life insurance and annuities. 
Risk exposure for participants and the lack of transparency. For PE-affiliated pension risk transfer, concerns exist regarding annuity investor education and investor choices.

Banking
Emerging involvement in  failed bank resolutions 
High
Restructure failed banks, support local economies, and save money for the FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund.
PE acquirers may manage risks differently than highly regulated banks, potentially shifting assets outside the banking system. 

Youth sports
Emerging activities with notable cases 
Low
Increased efficiency, scale, and operational strength in events organization and marketing. 
Reduced access to certain sports and sports programs. Adverse effects in youth development. loss of local character and fan experience. 

Source: CRS summary using white papers, media reports, and Bloomberg data. 
Note: Summary descriptions are illustrative and do not represent an exhaustive list of scenarios or potential benefits and risks.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13214/IF13214.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13214.html
R48932,The Senior Executive Service: Overview and Recent Developments,2026-05-01T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:54:00Z,Active,Reports,Maeve P. Carey,,"The Senior Executive Service (SES) was established in the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978 as a centralized personnel system of government managers. The vast majority of members of the SES are career appointees who generally comprise the highest levels of leadership within federal agencies, often reporting directly to the Senate-confirmed agency leadership. As a result of the SES’s position within the federal government, senior executives often play a large role in the implementation of federal programs and management of the civil service. According to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), as of April 2026, the SES had 6,647 members.
Congress created the SES to encourage productivity and efficiency in government administration and to establish sturdy and continuous leadership that would remain in place across presidential Administrations. Several aspects of the SES’s statutorily established organization, structure, and operations were meant to contribute to these outcomes. For example, the SES is primarily (around 85%-90%) career appointees who have protections against politically motivated removal. Certain aspects of the SES performance management system were established in law; for example, senior executives receive performance appraisals based on their own performance as well as their organization’s performance. The SES has a performance-based pay system that includes basic pay and potential eligibility for performance awards. The SES hiring process prioritizes applicants’ executive qualifications and includes a shared responsibility between agencies and OPM to ensure that the individuals selected for appointment are adequately qualified for membership in the SES and the position for which they may be hired. 
The Trump Administration has made several changes that have advanced a stronger view of presidential control over the SES. On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum entitled “Restoring Accountability for Career Senior Executives.” The memorandum instructed OPM and agency heads to take several actions to increase control and accountability over the SES. The memorandum required OPM to issue a new SES performance plan for senior executives that agencies were required to adopt, instructed agencies to reassign senior executives to ensure more optimal implementation of the President’s policy agenda, called for a larger role for noncareer senior executives in the hiring process and overall executive management within agencies, instructed agencies to ensure individuals involved in performance reviews are fully committed to the President’s vision for the SES, and required agencies to immediately “take all appropriate actions, up to and including removal” of senior executives whose “performance or continued occupancy of the position is inconsistent with either the principles reaffirmed in this Order or their duties to the Nation under section 3131 of Title 5, United States Code.”
OPM has taken several actions to implement the policies included in the President’s memorandum. For example, OPM directed agencies to redesignate certain types of positions so that they may be filled through noncareer (political) appointment instead of remaining reserved for career appointment; these positions include chief information officers and chief human capital officers. OPM created a new, standardized performance appraisal system that all agencies were required to adopt for senior executives beginning in October 2025. OPM also changed its regulations on performance appraisals to limit the number of senior executives who can receive high-level performance ratings and to remove language relating to diversity, equity, and inclusion from performance appraisals.
Congress could consider enacting legislation in response to the changes made during the Trump Administration, including by amending Title 5 of the U.S. Code. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48932/R48932.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48932.html
R48930,Government Shutdowns: Applying the Antideficiency Act to a Lapse in Appropriations,2026-05-01T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:53:54Z,Active,Reports,"Sean Stiff, Matthew D. Trout","Antideficiency Act, Federal Financial Management, Government Shutdown","Congress funds much of the federal government through a series of 12 regular, annual appropriations acts. A significant portion of that funding is for a single fiscal year, and most agencies thus rely on passage of new appropriations before the end of that fiscal year to have uninterrupted funding from one fiscal year to the next. If Congress does not pass the regular appropriations acts or a continuing resolution that generally continues funding at the prior year’s level, an agency reliant on annual appropriations faces a funding lapse. This lapse in appropriations has significant consequences for governmental operations.
Commonly called a “government shutdown,” the cessation of government functions and related furloughs of government employees that result from a lapse in appropriations are largely a function of a collection of statutes referred to as the Antideficiency Act. When the Act’s first provisions were enacted in 1870, it was Congress’s attempt to control government spending of appropriated funds to avoid the problem of coercive deficiencies—a situation where an agency obligates funds in excess of appropriated amounts or prematurely depletes an appropriation in a manner that pressures Congress to pass supplemental or “deficiency” appropriations. Over time, Congress has added to and amended the Antideficiency Act’s various prohibitions and exceptions, creating what is a significant fiscal control law.
Today, a combination of the Antideficiency Act’s core prohibitions and the related bar on voluntary services result in a suspension of many, but not all, government functions during a lapse in appropriations. During such a lapse, agencies apply the Act’s prohibitions and its exceptions to determine what functions may continue and what functions must cease until further appropriations are provided. Understanding government conduct during a lapse in appropriations thus requires an understanding of the Antideficiency Act and related appropriations laws.
The Antideficiency Act generally precludes government employees or officers from creating legal obligations to pay government funds “before an appropriation is made.” The Act further precludes individuals from volunteering their services to the government when the possibility of a future claim for payment exists. During a lapse in appropriations, these statutory prohibitions work in tandem to establish the general shutdown mandate, that is, the legal requirement to cease government functions and furlough employees. Some functions may be exempt from this general mandate and continue if other funds remain available despite the lapse in annual appropriations. Additional functions may be excepted from the mandate if authorized by law to continue in the absence of appropriations or if they satisfy the emergency exception to the Act. Various legislative proposals have been introduced in the 119th Congress that would address different facets of the Antideficiency Act and government shutdowns more broadly. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48930/R48930.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48930.html
LSB11426,The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause’s Ban on Executing the Intellectually Disabled,2026-05-01T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:54:01Z,Active,Posts,Dave S. Sidhu,,"In 2002, the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia ruled that the imposition of capital punishment on the intellectually disabled constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, leaving to the states the responsibility to determine who qualifies as intellectually disabled. (The Eighth Amendment binds both the federal as well as state and local governments by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.) In and after Atkins, the Court has provided some guideposts to the states in performing this constitutional inquiry. The Court has not, however, resolved whether and how states may consider a defendant’s scores from multiple Intellectual Quotient (IQ) tests. This term, in Hamm v. Smith, the Court may resolve the open question. 
This Sidebar discusses the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the Eighth Amendment and the imposition of capital punishment on the intellectually disabled. It sketches the Supreme Court’s specific decisions applying the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to the subject of executing the intellectually disabled. Against this backdrop, this Sidebar provides an overview of the Hamm case that remains pending before the Supreme Court. Finally, this Sidebar closes with considerations for Congress. 
The Categorical Ban on Imposing Capital Punishment on Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities
Atkins v. Virginia
In 2002, the Supreme Court determined in Atkins v. Virginia that subjecting prisoners with intellectual disabilities to capital punishment had become “truly unusual,” and that it was “fair to say” that a “national consensus” had developed against this policy. To wit, in 1989, only two states that otherwise permitted capital punishment and the federal government prohibited the execution of persons with intellectual disabilities. By contrast, in 2002, the Court observed, an additional sixteen states that otherwise allowed capital punishment had prohibited execution of persons with intellectual disabilities, and no states had reinstated the power. What mattered, the Court clarified, was “not so much the number” of states that had changed course, but instead the “consistency of the direction of change.” 
The Court checked the execution of individuals with disabilities against the purposes of punishment. Neither of the two generally recognized penological justifications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence—applies with full force to individuals with intellectual disabilities, the Court concluded. It found that retribution corresponds with, and reflects, the culpability of the defendant; however, impaired intellectual capacity reduced the defendant’s culpability and moral blameworthiness. The Court also pointed out that deterrence theory of punishment is premised on the ability of individuals to conform their conduct to bounds of the law, and diminished intellectual capacity reduces an individual’s ability to engage in self-control. As to murder in particular, the Court asserted that this crime involves premeditation and deliberation, but the Court suggested that the intellectually disabled are not as capable of engaging in “that sort of calculus.”
The Atkins Court left to the states the “task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” In the course of its opinion, the Court referred to definitions of “intellectual disability” from the medical community that centered on three criteria: (1) “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning”; (2) “significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety”; and (3) “[t]he onset must occur before age 18 years.” These criteria became relevant in subsequent cases in which the Court provided some guideposts on how states are to evaluate the criteria and continue to be relevant in Hamm, in which the Court is being asked to supplement these guideposts. 
Post-Atkins Supreme Court Cases
Schriro v. Smith (2005)
After Atkins, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered a pending federal habeas action in which a petitioner in Arizona argued he was intellectually disabled and therefore could not be executed. The Ninth Circuit suspended the proceedings, ordering the “Arizona courts to conduct a jury trial to resolve [the petitioner’s] . . . claim.” On appeal, the Supreme Court stressed that states—not federal courts—are to “adopt[] their own measures for adjudicating [such] claims.” The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, reasoning that “Arizona had not even had a chance to apply its chosen procedures when the Ninth Circuit pre-emptively imposed its jury trial condition.”
Panetti v. Quarterman (2007)
The Court in Panetti v. Quarterman clarified when a prisoner’s current mental state can bar their execution under Ford v. Wainwright—in which the Court in 1986 had held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the government from carrying out the death penalty on an individual who has a severe mental illness. Relying on the understanding that the execution of a prisoner who cannot comprehend the reasons for his punishment serves “no retributive purpose,” in Panetti, the Court concluded that the operative test was whether a prisoner can “reach a rational understanding of the reason for [his] execution.” The Court announced a standard that if a prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by mental illness that he cannot grasp the execution’s “meaning and purpose” or the “link between [his] crime and its punishment,” he cannot be executed. The Court also described the procedural requirements in such a case. Once a death row inmate has made a “preliminary showing that his current mental state would bar his execution,” due process entitles him to a hearing at which he may present “evidence and argument from the prisoner’s counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence” in support of his claim of incompetence and in rebuttal of any state-offered evidence.
Hall v. Florida (2014)
The Court in Hall v. Florida reviewed a Florida law establishing a mandatory bright-line cutoff under which an individual was not intellectually disabled if the individual possessed an IQ of above 70. The Florida Supreme Court had upheld the “70-point threshold” as constitutional.
The Supreme Court invalidated the law’s “rigid rule,” observing that “[i]ntellectual disability is a condition, not a number.” The majority found that, although IQ scores are helpful in determining mental capabilities, they are imprecise in nature. The Court referenced a corresponding consensus of mental health professionals that concluded that an IQ test score should be read not as a single fixed number, but as a range that accounts for a “standard error of measurement” or “SEM.” The Court explained that an SEM “means that an individual’s score is best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded score,” “within which one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies.” Accordingly, the Court determined that a state’s assessment of an IQ score must include consideration of the corresponding SEM. In addition, the Court added that “once the SEM applies and the individual’s IQ score is 75 or below the [intellectual disability] inquiry” should not bar “factors indicating whether the person had deficits in adaptive functioning.”
Moore v. Texas (2014 and 2019)
In two opinions stemming from the same underlying case, the Court reviewed and rejected intellectual disability standards adopted in Texas. In 1980, a Texas state court convicted a defendant for a murder committed during an attempted robbery and sentenced him to death. Following Atkins, in 2014, a Texas state habeas court found the defendant to be intellectually disabled and recommended that he be declared ineligible for the death penalty. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (CCA), however, denied relief. On appeal, in Moore v. Texas (Moore I), the Supreme Court rejected the standards used by this Texas court to evaluate whether a death row inmate was intellectually disabled, which created an “unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.” The defendant’s six credited IQ scores yielded an average of 70.66. The Court wrote that Hall instructs that an IQ score be adjusted for the SEM and that “[b]ecause the lower end of [the defendant’s] score range falls at or below 70, the CCA had to move on to consider [the defendant’s] adaptive functioning.”
Here, the Texas court erred in these two respects, the Court concluded. First, the Court majority concluded that the Texas court improperly narrowed the SEM when assessing the defendant’s IQ scores. Second, it found that the Texas court failed to properly analyze the defendant’s adaptive functioning. For example, the Court noted that the Texas decision emphasized the petitioner’s perceived adaptive strengths and his behavior in prison and discounted several traumatic experiences from the defendant’s past. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case. On remand, the Texas CCA again concluded that the defendant was not intellectually disabled for capital punishment purposes. 
The case returned to the Supreme Court. In a 2019 per curiam opinion, the Court again held that the standard used by Texas fell short of the requirements set forth in Hall. The Court criticized the Texas court for its reliance on the petitioner’s adaptive strengths in lieu of his adaptive deficits; its focus on the petitioner’s adaptive improvements made in prison; its tendency to consider the petitioner’s social behavior to be caused by emotional problems, instead of his general mental abilities; and its continued reliance on a lay opinion. In consideration of Moore I, the Court concluded the petitioner was a person with intellectual disability, reversing the lower court’s judgment and remanding the case.
Madison v. Alabama (2019)
In 2019, in Madison v. Alabama the Court explained that a prisoner challenging his execution on the ground of a mental disability cannot prevail merely because he cannot remember committing his crime. The Court found that the relevant temporal moment is not the prisoner’s memory vis-à-vis the commission of the offense, but rather the prisoner’s appreciation for the nature of the pending execution. The Court made clear that, under its decision in Panetti, a prisoner’s claim hinges on whether he has a rational understanding of the reason for his execution. A person’s memory loss or dementia, the Court added, could relate to the latter inquiry: “persons suffering from dementia could satisfy the Panetti standard.” The Court returned the case to state court to reevaluate the prisoner. In doing so, the court stated that general loss of memory, alone, does not bar execution.
Hamm v. Smith
Background
Joseph Clifton Smith was tried and convicted of first-degree murder, a capital offense in Alabama. Following the guilt phase of his trial, Smith was sentenced to death. Smith raised an Atkins claim—that he was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for capital punishment—that the Alabama state courts rejected. Smith turned to federal court, seeking habeas relief on the ground that his sentence violated Atkins. The federal district court held an evidentiary hearing on his Atkins claim. At the hearing, Smith presented five IQ scores relevant to whether he suffered from “significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning”—75, 74, 72, 78, and 74. The court heard expert testimony, presented by Smith and by Alabama, on these scores as they relate to Smith’s intellectual functioning. The court then moved on to weigh Smith’s adaptive functioning, and heard information from experts on Smith’s communication skills, literacy, vocabulary, and ability to adhere to rules, among other things. Finally, the court probed whether these two prongs—concerning intellectual functioning and adaptive functioning—were present during Smith’s developmental period. 
Based on this information, the district court concluded that Smith was intellectually disabled. As relevant here, the district court observed that Smith had IQ “scores as low as 72, which according to testimony could mean his IQ is actually as low as 69 if you take into account the standard error of measurement.” The district court did not credit the testimony of Alabama’s expert as “strong enough” to throw out the lowest score “as an outlier” or to disregard the standard error of measurement. In view of all the evidence, the district court found that Smith satisfied each of the prongs to show he was intellectually disabled.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court complied with Supreme Court precedent in deciding that “when an offender’s lowest IQ score, adjusted for the test’s standard error of measurement, is equal to or less than 70, a court must move on and consider evidence of the offender’s adaptive deficits.” Alabama asked the Supreme Court to review the decision. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review, vacated the Eleventh Circuit opinion, and instructed the Eleventh Circuit to clarify on remand whether its affirmance was based: (1) solely on “the fact that the lower end of the standard-error range for Smith’s lowest IQ score is 69” or on (2) a “holistic approach to multiple IQ scores that considers the relevant evidence, including as appropriate any relevant expert testimony.” The circuit court responded that it had employed the latter basis, explaining it had acknowledged that “additional evidence”—beyond a single IQ score—“may be required to determine whether Smith has significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.” According to the Eleventh Circuit, the district court followed suit, investigating expert testimony on the IQ scores and Smith’s intellectual functioning more generally. 
The Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, John Hamm, filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. The Justices granted certiorari to address “Whether and how courts may consider the cumulative effect of multiple IQ scores in assessing an Atkins claim.”
The Parties’ Arguments
Alabama contends that reversal is appropriate because “Smith never proved that his five scores together imply an IQ of 70.” Alabama further argues that the lower courts “fixated” on Smith’s lowest IQ score, treating it as dispositive. Alabama claimed that “holistic’ rhetoric was just window dressing” and that, “If all that matters is whether Smith’s IQ could’ be 69, then the presence of multiple scores is legally meaningless.” Alabama further argued that the lower courts looked at each score individually rather than collectively, as the latter “prevents intellectual functioning from being reduced to a single numerical score.’” 
The United States has participated in the case as amicus in support of Alabama. In its brief, the United States argues that Smith has not met his burden of proving that he is intellectually disabled and urges the Court to reject a “one-low-score rule, where so long as a prisoner obtains one IQ test at the margins, he proves deficient intellectual functioning for purposes of Atkins.”
For his part, Smith agreed with the parties that “the existence of multiple IQ scores does not mean that IQ score alone can become dispositive of intellectual functioning if the range of those scores, taking into account the SEM, reaches 70 or below.” Smith also agreed that intellectual functioning should be determined in a “holistic” fashion. Smith, however, claimed that the district court did not focus on any score or scores overall, but considered other non-IQ evidence indicative of intellectual functioning.
The Supreme Court held oral argument in this case on December 10, 2025. The Court may issue a ruling in the case by the end of June or early July.
Considerations for Congress
Congress has a long-standing and ongoing interest in legislation involving the death penalty. For example, the current Congress has proposed legislation that would introduce new federal capital offenses (see, e.g., H.R. 7702, 119th Cong.) and that would add aggravating factors that courts may consider in deciding whether a death sentence should be imposed (see, e.g., H.R. 4697, 119th Cong.). Because Hamm turns on an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, Congress’s options to address the scope and meaning of Atkins and its progeny may be more limited. If it chose to, it could restrict the use of capital punishment beyond what is required under the Eighth Amendment (as interpreted by courts), for example by providing enhanced limitations on the application of federal capital punishment for particular IQ scores. Congress may also leave resolution of these issues to the courts.  ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11426/LSB11426.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11426.html
IF13213,Veterans Affairs Life Insurance (VALife),2026-05-01T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:52:57Z,Active,Resources,T. Lynn Sears,Veterans Disability Compensation & Pensions,"The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers several life insurance programs. Two of these programs, the now-closed Service-Disabled Veterans’ Insurance (S-DVI) program and the recently launched Veterans Affairs Life Insurance (VALife) program, provide life insurance for certain veterans with service-connected disabilities.
The Johnny Isakson and David P. Roe, M.D. Veterans Health Care and Benefits Improvement Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-315) required VA to establish a new VA life insurance program for veterans with service-connected disabilities (VALife) and close the existing S-DVI program to new applicants. VALife was designed to meet the needs of veterans who had previously been unable to qualify for life insurance with VA. VALife launched on January 1, 2023. Existing S-DVI policyholders are able to keep their S-DVI coverage or apply for VALife. 
This In Focus provides a brief description of VALife, compares VALife’s features with plans under S-DVI, provides metrics on the uptake of VALife, and provides resources on VALife and S-DVI.
VALife
Plan Features
VALife provides guaranteed acceptance, whole life insurance coverage to eligible veterans with service-connected disabilities. Guaranteed acceptance means that if the eligibility requirements for VALife are met, VAwould automatically approve the application without the need to prove good health. Whole life means policyholders can keep their coverage for the rest of their lives. Policies may be selected for up to $40,000 in coverage and build cash value starting two years after application approval (two-year waiting period).
Eligibility
Generally, a veteran is eligible for VALife if he or she is
age 80 or younger and has a VA disability rating (no time limit) or
age 81 or older and
applied for VA disability compensation for a service-connected disability before turning 81 years old, and
received a rating for that same disability after turning 81 years old, and
applied for VALife within two years of getting notification of the disability rating.
Premiums
Premiums depend on the policyholder’s insurance age and the amount of coverage. The policyholder’s premium rate will not increase as long as the VALife policy is kept. 
Premiums may be paid monthly or annually. Monthly premium payments are the only option if paying by deduction from the policyholder’s VA disability compensation, military retirement pay, or pre-authorized checking. If paying through e-billing (pay.gov), payments may be monthly or annually. There is a discount of 2.5% for paying premiums annually.
Two-Year Waiting Period
VALife includes a two-year waiting period for new policy holders to receive full life insurance coverage. Full life insurance coverage starts after the two-year waiting period, during which time premiums must be paid.  If the policyholder dies during the two-year waiting period, beneficiaries receive the total amount of paid-in premiums, plus interest. If the policyholder dies after the two-year waiting period, the beneficiaries will receive the full coverage amount of the policy. The two-year waiting period replaces the need for medical underwriting and S-DVI’s good health requirement.
Options for Existing S-DVI Policyholders
Existing S-DVI policyholders are able to keep their S-DVI coverage or apply for VALife. The ability to keep S-DVI coverage during the VALife two-year waiting period depends on when the application for VALife was submitted.
Existing S-DVI policyholders who applied for VALife by December 31, 2025, are able to keep their S-DVI during the two-year waiting period for VALife benefits, and must pay premiums for both policies. After the two-year waiting period, S-DVI coverage terminates and the policyholder receives any cash value the S-DVI policy had at that time.
Existing S-DVI policyholders who apply for VALife on or after January 1, 2026, will have their S-DVI policies end the day their VALife applications are approved and will not have full coverage during the two-year VALife waiting period.
Selected Differences in S-DVI and VALife Policies
At the time S-DVI closed to new applicants, it offered a choice of nine different policies, including term, ordinary life, modified life, paid-up life, and endowment plans. VALife offers one whole life policy. 
VALife increases the maximum coverage available to all policyholders to $40,000. Under S-DVI, the maximum was $10,000 in basic coverage; policyholders with total disability could apply for a premium waiver for basic coverage, which would also enable them to pay for up to an additional $30,000 in supplemental coverage. VALife does not offer premium waivers.
Table 1 compares differences in selected provisions of S-DVI and VALife. 
Table 1. Selected Differences in S-DVI and VALife Policies
Provision
S-DVI
VALife

Eligibility
Released from active service on or after April 25, 1951, and
Released under other than dishonorable condition, and
Had a service-connected disability rating, and
Applied by December 31, 2022, or within two years of receiving a new disability rating, whichever came first.
Age 80 or younger with a disability rating, or
Age 81 or older and applied for VA disability compensation for a service-connected disability before turning 81, received a rating for that same disability after turning 81 years old, and applied for VALife within two years of receiving notification of the disability rating.

Good health requirement
Yes
No

Two-year waiting period
No
Yes

Multiple plan options
Yes (including a term policy option)
No, whole life only

Cash value
Yes (except term policy)
Yes, after two years

Paid up plan option
Yes (certain options)
No

Loans
Yes (except term policy)
No

Maximum coverage
$10,000 ($40,000 with total disability waiver)
$40,000

Premium waiver and supplemental coverage
Yes (for total disability)
No

Source: CRS summary of VA policies.
For S-DVI policyholders considering whether they should switch to VALife, VA suggests that they consider the following when deciding which coverage is best for them:
How much coverage do you need? VALife provides up to $40,000 in coverage, while S-DVI offers $10,000 in basic coverage.
How much are your premiums for S-DVI versus VALife?
Do your S-DVI premiums increase over time (term insurance)? VALife premiums never increase beyond the premium rate at which you enroll.
Do you have waiver of premiums on your S-DVI policy? VALife does not offer waiver of premiums.
Is your S-DVI policy paid-up? VALife does not offer paid-up insurance.
Do you want to have the option to borrow against your policy? For S-DVI policyholders who have a permanent plan or reduced paid-up policy, you can take a loan against your policy, while VALife does not offer loans.
Enrollment in VALife
Between VALife’s launch and September 30, 2024, VA processed over 65,000 applications and issued over 52,000 policies. As of September 30, 2024, it provided over $1.5 billion of whole life insurance coverage. During FY2024, VALife had 45,700 policies in force, with an average face amount of $31,818. During FY2023, 24,543 policies were in force, with an average face amount of $31,938.
Resources
CRS Report R44837, Benefits for Service-Disabled Veterans
VA, VA Life Insurance Programs Booklet
VA, Veterans Affairs Life Insurance (VALife)
VA, Service-Disabled Veterans Life Insurance (S-DVI)
VA, Veterans Affairs Life Insurance (VALife) Frequently Asked Questions",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13213/IF13213.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13213.html
R48929,"Overview of FY2027 Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS)",2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:52:55Z,Active,Reports,Nathan James,"Commerce, Justice, Science Appropriations","This report describes actions to provide FY2027 appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. The annual CJS appropriations act provides funding for the U.S. Department of Commerce, which includes bureaus and offices such as the Census Bureau, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology; the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), which includes agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Prisons, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Offices of the U.S. Attorneys; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the National Science Foundation; and several related agencies such as the Legal Services Corporation and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
On January 23, 2026, the Commerce, Justice, Science; Energy and Water Development; and Interior and Environment Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-74) was signed into law by President Trump. The act provided a total of $82.619 billion for CJS departments and agencies, which included $11.132 billion for the Department of Commerce; $37.079 billion for the Department of Justice; $33.196 billion for the science agencies; and $1.212 billion for the related agencies.
The Administration requests a total of $75.159 billion for CJS for FY2027, which is $7.460 billion (-9.0%) less than the FY2026 regular appropriation. The Administration’s request for CJS includes $9.748 billion for the Department of Commerce, which is $1.385 (-12.4%) less than the FY2026 regular appropriation; $41.887 billion for the Department of Justice, which is $4.807 billion (+13.0%) more than the FY2026 regular appropriation; $22.800 billion for the science agencies, which is $10.396 billion (-31.3%) less than the FY2026 regular appropriation; and $725 million for the related agencies, which is $487 million (-40.2%) less than the FY2026 regular appropriation.

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48929/R48929.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48929.html
R48928,Restoring the Great Salt Lake Ecosystem,2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:52:57Z,Active,Reports,"Charles V. Stern, Anna E. Normand, Laura Gatz, Eric P. Nardi, Pervaze A. Sheikh",,"The Great Salt Lake—located in Utah—is the largest saline lake in the United States. The Great Salt Lake supports wetland habitat for shorebirds, migratory birds, and waterfowl. The lake also supports several economically important activities for the region, including tourism, recreation, the brine shrimp (Artemia sp.) industry, and mineral extraction. Over the past two decades, water levels in the lake have decreased, largely due to less water flowing into the lake, drought, and increasing temperatures. In October 2022, water levels in the lake were measured at record lows. In the past three years, water levels have risen, but they are still at levels considered harmful for the ecosystem. 
Concern over sustained low water levels in the Great Salt Lake is shared by stakeholders and some Members of Congress due to the economic, environmental, and associated health impacts of low water levels, among other concerns. Decreasing water levels and increased salinity can adversely affect the lake’s ecosystem, disrupting fish and wildlife populations and exposing dry lake bed to the air. In some areas, exposed lakebed contains toxic sediments. Winds and dust storms can aerosolize soils and transport toxins to areas inhabited by humans, potentially leading to health issues. 
The State of Utah is spearheading efforts to increase water flows to the Great Salt Lake and restore the ecosystem in and around the lake. The state established the Office of the Great Salt Lake Commissioner in 2023 and tasked the commissioner to create a plan for restoring the lake. In 2024, the commissioner released The Great Salt Lake Strategic Plan, which aims to restore the lake while balancing ecological, economic, and societal interests. The state government also implemented regulations that aim to maintain water flows into the lake and several measures to address water conservation that aim to help the lake retain or receive more water. 
One federal government initiative by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and some national-level programs address ecosystem restoration and water levels in the Great Salt Lake. In 2025, Reclamation provided $50 million to Utah to fund voluntary water transactions, water conservation, and ecosystem restoration to benefit the lake. The Trump Administration requested $1.0 billion for the Department of the Interior (DOI) for FY2027 to lead a comprehensive federal restoration program. The governor of Utah also requested funds from the Administration to restore the lake, and the Utah state legislature passed a resolution asking for federal involvement in lake restoration. 
Congress may consider several issues to address the restoration of the Great Salt Lake, including (1) whether to appropriate funding for science and monitoring to inform lake restoration, (2) whether to support state efforts to increase water flows to the lake, (3) monitoring and evaluating air quality and public health concerns caused by exposed lakebed, and (4) whether to authorize and appropriate funds for a federal or joint federal-state lake restoration initiative. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48928/R48928.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48928.html
R48927,Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) FY2027 Budget Request: In Brief,2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:52:56Z,Active,Reports,Alyse N. Minter,Housing Budget & Appropriations,This report provides a brief overview of the President’s FY2027 budget request for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). It also identifies relevant Administration budget documents and CRS reports.,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48927/R48927.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48927.html
R48917,S.Con.Res. 33: The FY2026 Budget Resolution,2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:53:28Z,Active,Reports,"Drew C. Aherne, Megan S. Lynch",,"In April 2026, the House and Senate adopted S.Con.Res. 33, a budget resolution for FY2026. The budget resolution generally represents an agreement between the House and Senate on a budgetary plan for the upcoming fiscal year. Certain budgetary levels established in the budget resolution are enforceable through points of order during floor consideration of subsequent budgetary legislation in the House and Senate. A budget resolution may also trigger the budget reconciliation process, which allows Congress to develop and consider certain budgetary legislation that can then be considered in the Senate using expedited procedures. In order for a budget resolution to have force and effect, both chambers must adopt an identical version of the same concurrent resolution. Because it is a concurrent resolution, it does not need to be signed by the President to have force and effect in Congress. 
S.Con.Res. 33 establishes aggregate budgetary levels related to total revenues, spending, the deficit, and the public debt for FY2026-FY2035. It also includes several other provisions, most of which relate to the congressional budget process. These include reserve fund provisions and other provisions related to budget procedure in the House and Senate.
For Congress to use the reconciliation process, it must first adopt a budget resolution that includes reconciliation directives. Title II of S.Con.Res. 33 includes reconciliation directives to two House committees and two Senate committees, instructing each committee to develop and submit legislation within their jurisdictions increasing the deficit by no more than $70 billion over FY2026-FY2035 (for a potential total deficit increase of no more than $140 billion in each chamber) by May 15, 2026. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48917/R48917.4.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48917.html
LSB11425,"Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision Interpreting the Limited Partner Exception to Self-Employment Taxes",2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T15:08:06Z,Active,Posts,Milan N. Ball,"Business & Corporate Tax, Individual Tax, Jurisprudence, Medicare, Self-Employment Contributions Act (SECA) Taxes, Social Security, Pass-Through Businesses","On January 16, 2026, in Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P. v. Commissioner, a divided three-judge panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) rejected the Tax Court’s interpretation of the limited partner exception to self-employment taxes. Under Internal Revenue Code (IRC) § 1402(a)(13), taxpayers who are “limited partners” can qualify to exclude their distributive share of partnership income (or loss) from self-employment income. The term “limited partner” for purposes of the limited partner exception is not defined in the IRC. As a result, there are multiple cases discussing the application of self-employment taxes to partners that turn on the meaning of limited partner. 
In Sirius Solutions, the Fifth Circuit majority interpreted limited partner for purposes of the limited partner exception to mean “a partner in a limited partnership that has limited liability” and rejected the Tax Court’s functional analysis and “passive investor” interpretation. The Fifth Circuit vacated the Tax Court’s ruling and sent the case back to the Tax Court for “further proceedings consistent” with its limited liability interpretation. As a consequence, state-law limited partners who have limited liability under state law and are acting in a partner capacity might not be subject to federal self-employment taxes even when they actively participate in limited partnership business. 
On April 1, 2026, the government petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a rehearing en banc in Sirius Solutions. Challenges to the Tax Court’s functional analysis and limited partner interpretation are pending before the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Second Circuits. 
Past attempts by the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to restrict eligibility for the limited partner exception have been unsuccessful.
This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of how self-employment taxes and Social Security benefits apply to limited partners, summarizes the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sirius Solutions, and discusses considerations for Congress.
Self-Employment Taxes and Social Security Benefits
In general, self-employed individuals must pay Social Security taxes and Medicare taxes funding Medicare Part A or Hospital Insurance (collectively, Self-Employed Contributions Act [SECA] taxes). These self-employment taxes are determined using an individual’s “self-employment income,” which is defined in IRC § 1402(b) as “net earnings from self-employment.” The Social Security tax rate is 12.4% on self-employment income up to an annual limit adjusted by average wage growth ($184,500 in 2026). The Medicare tax rate is 2.9% on all self-employment income. A 0.9% additional Medicare tax applies to self-employment income above thresholds that vary based on filing status (i.e., $250,000 for joint returns; $125,000 for married filing separately; and $200,000 for others). As part of the Social Security Amendments of 1977 (P.L. 95-216), Congress amended IRC § 1402(a) to exclude a limited partner’s partnership share of income or loss from Social Security and Medicare taxes, subject to exceptions. In the same section of the Social Security Amendments of 1977, Congress amended Section 211 of the Social Security Act to exclude a limited partner’s partnership share of income or loss from net earnings from self-employment for Social Security purposes.
IRC § 1402 contains special rules applicable to partners in a partnership when calculating their self-employment tax liability. Under IRC § 1402(a), net earnings from self-employment expressly includes a partner’s “distributive share (whether or not distributed) of income or loss described in section 702(a)(8) from any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a member.” IRC § 1402(a)(13) expressly excludes a limited partner’s distributive share from net earnings from self-employment. Specifically, IRC § 1402(a)(13) provides an exclusion for 
the distributive share of any item of income or loss of a limited partner, as such, other than guaranteed payments described in section 707(c) to that partner for services actually rendered to or on behalf of the partnership to the extent that those payments are established to be in the nature of remuneration for those services. 
“Guaranteed payments,” as described in IRC § 707(c), are “payments to a partner for services or the use of capital” that are paid without regard to partnership income. Because of the guaranteed payment for services carveout in IRC § 1402(a)(13), a limited partner can have self-employment income subject to self-employment taxes when a limited partner receives a guaranteed payment for services rendered to the partnership and that payment is in the nature of remuneration for services. 
Additionally, the amount of Social Security benefits an individual receives depends, in part, on an individual’s net earnings from self-employment. Parallel to IRC § 1402(a)(13), under Section 211(a)(12) of the Social Security Act, net earnings from self-employment are similarly excluded from a limited partner’s distributive share.
Pursuant to these sections, when a limited partner’s distributive share of partnership income is not subject to SECA taxes, that income typically does not count toward Social Security benefits. 
Sirius Solutions
Case History
Before the Fifth Circuit’s 2-1 decision in Sirius Solutions, in multiple cases, the Tax Court employed a functional analysis to determine when a limited partner under state law was a limited partner under IRC § 1402(a)(13). In 2023, in Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner, the Tax Court determined that Congress intended the limited partner exception to apply to state-law limited partners who were “passive investors” and held that a functional analysis test should be used to decide whether the limited partner exception applied. In 2024, when the matter in Sirius Solutions was before the Tax Court, the Tax Court explained that stare decisis principles obligated it to follow its limited partner interpretation in Soroban. In response, Sirius Solutions requested, and the Tax Court granted, a decision for the government, so that Sirius Solutions could challenge the Tax Court’s holding in Soroban in the Fifth Circuit.  
Facts
Sirius Solutions, L.L.L.P., a limited liability limited partnership formed in Delaware and based in Texas, operated a business consulting firm. In the 2014-2016 tax years, the firm was owned by several individual limited partners and one general partner—a limited liability company (LLC). The LLC general partner’s interest in the limited partnership was less than 1%. On the firm’s 2014, 2015, and 2016 tax returns, the firm allocated all of its ordinary business income to its limited partners. The firm “reported ordinary business income of $5,829,402 in 2014, $7,242,984 in 2015, and –$490,291 in 2016.” Pursuant to the limited partner exception in IRC § 1402(a)(13), the firm “did not report any net earnings from self-employment to any of the individual partners.” The IRS audited the firm’s returns and adjusted the firm’s net earnings from self-employment—an increase of $5,915,918 for 2014; an increase of $7,372,756 for 2015; and a decrease of $490,291 for 2016. 
Opinion
Applying the Supreme Court’s framework in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo to determine the meaning of a statute, the 2-1 majority held that the “single, best meaning” of limited partner in IRC § 1402(a)(13) was “a partner in a limited partnership that has limited liability.” The majority began its analysis by studying contemporaneous dictionary definitions, then looked to the IRS’s long-standing definition in partnership return instructions, and the Social Security Administration’s (SSA’s) long-standing rule defining limited partner for the purpose of Section 211(a)(12) of the Social Security Act. After reviewing multiple dictionaries, the majority announced that “limited liability” was the “touchstone” of a “limited partner” at the time of the exception’s enactment. 
The majority observed that the definition of limited partner used by the IRS in its partnership return instructions remained consistent for more than 40 years. It explained that the 1978 partnership return instructions defined a limited partner as “one whose potential personal liability for partnership debts is limited to the amount of money or other property that the partner contributed or is required to contribute to the partnership” and did not refer to a “passive investor.” Quoting Loper Bright, the majority considered this particular contemporaneous and consistent agency interpretation “especially useful’ in determining the meaning of the phrase limited partner.’” In the majority’s view, the IRS’s partnership return instructions definition was even more useful because it provided information “to the public” in an effort to “help taxpayers comply with the law.”
Similarly, the majority found support for its statutory interpretation in the SSA’s long-standing rule defining limited partner for the purpose of Section 211(a)(12) of the Social Security Act. The majority explained that the SSA’s interpretation should be given “due respect” in interpreting limited partner under IRC § 1402(a)(13) because “[b]oth Social Security taxes and benefits depend on an individual’s net earnings from self-employment.” The 1980 SSA rule provided that a person is a “limited partner’ if [the person’s] financial liability for the obligations of the partnership is limited to the amount of [the person’s] financial investment in the partnership.” In the majority’s view, the SSA rule confirmed that limited liability was “the touchstone” of the term limited partner at the time of the exception’s enactment.
The majority acknowledged and discounted the latter part of the SSA’s long-standing rule, which provides that limited partners generally “will not have to perform services.” It reasoned that the latter part of the rule did not mean a limited partner was prohibited from, “or generally d[id] not[,] perform services for the partnership.” The prevailing opinion determined that the latter part of the SSA rule did not change the focus of the limited partner definition from the limited liability component. The majority also concluded that the latter part of the SSA rule did not support a definition of limited partner that only applied to passive investors. 
Next, the 2-1 majority addressed the Tax Court’s, the IRS’s, and the dissent’s counterarguments. The majority reasoned that interpreting the limited partner exception to apply only to “passive investors” was “wrong” because the interpretation was undermined by IRC § 1402(a)(13)’s guaranteed payment clause, Congress had shown its ability to write laws addressing “passive” activities, and the interpretation required a functional analysis that produced taxpayer uncertainty. The majority responded to arguments that a limited liability interpretation conflicted with federal tax principles—“[f]ederal law, not state law, controls the interpretation of federal tax statutes”; “[f]ederal tax law is concerned with economic reality, not labels”; and “federal tax law should be uniform nationwide.” The majority explained that it had to look to state law to determine whether the state-controlled preconditions to the federal definition of limited partner were met. The majority expressed that it looked beyond state labels because it looked to the “substantive interests’ that state law creates”—whether a taxpayer had “the rights and duties associated with a limited partnership or whether that individual ha[d] limited liability.” The prevailing view determined that there was “no serious risk” to federal law uniformity as differences in state law did not equate to “disuniformity” and most states had adopted uniform limited partnership acts.
An analysis of the Tax Court’s textual argument in Soroban that the limited partner exception in IRC § 1402(a)(13) only applies to a subset of limited partners is included in the majority’s opinion. In Soroban, the Tax Court decided that Congress’s addition of “as such’ . . . made clear that the limited partner exception applies only to a limited partner who is functioning as a limited partner.” From there, the Tax Court looked to IRC § 1402(a)(13)’s legislative history and “confirmed [its] conclusion” that “Congress enacted section 1402(a)(13) to exclude earnings from a mere investment” and intended the provision “to apply to partners that are passive investors.” The 2-1 majority in Sirius Solutions did not reach the same conclusion because it did not construe “as such” to “restrict or narrow the class of limited partners, []or . . . upset the term’s ordinary meaning.” To the majority, “as such” was added to “clarif[y]” how dual status partners are taxed. It explained “[a]t the time the statute was enacted, just as today, an individual could serve as both a limited partner and a general partner” and limited partners could have “multiple functions or capacities.” As follows, the majority determined that when a taxpayer is “functioning as a limited partner, [the] taxpayer’s distributive share of partnership income (or loss) is excluded from net earnings from self-employment,” “[b]ut when functioning as a general partner, [the taxpayer’s] distributive share is included in net earnings from self-employment.” 
In the majority’s view, the history of limited partnership law and the legislative history of IRC § 1402(a)(13) did not strengthen the government’s case. The majority found that state laws on limited partnerships were in “constant flux” and the “only clear rule derivable from that ever-changing patchwork [wa]s . . . a limited partner had limited liability.” It was not enough that the “Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 [(RULPA)] set some . . . limits on the ability of limited partners to participate in the control of [a] limited partnership,” as that did not “change the core of what it mean[t] to be a limited partner.” The majority was reluctant to “probe the legislative history,” but did examine House Ways and Means Committee Report 95-702, which was, in the majority’s view, the “best evidence” supporting the government’s position that the limited partner exception in IRC § 1402(a)(13) only applied to passive investors. The majority discussed the language in the House report that revealed the committee’s “concern[] about situations in which certain business organizations solicit investments in limited partnerships as a means for an investor to become insured for social security benefits.” The majority also acknowledged the House report’s explanation that “the exclusion from coverage would not extend to guaranteed payments (as described in section 707(c) of the Internal Revenue Code), such as salary and professional fees, received for services actually performed by the limited partner for the partnership.” Despite its review of the House report, the majority dismissed the government’s legislative history argument because the legislative history “sa[id] nothing about how Congress sought to fix the perceived issue.” The majority determined that the “plain text of the statute d[id] not yield that result” and “[n]either d[id] the House Report.”
Considerations for Congress
Some tax commentators have expressed opinions that the majority’s focus on “limited liability” discounted the history of uniform limited partnership laws and how those laws initially took into account a limited partner’s partnership activities to determine whether a limited partner retained limited liability and the history of entity classifications. For example, some tax commentators have observed that over time, uniform laws changed from prohibiting limited partners from participating in partnership business to permitting limited partners to participate in more partnership activities without losing liability protection. It is unclear whether U.S. Courts of Appeals outside the Fifth Circuit might be receptive to contentions that at the time of IRC § 1402(a)(13)’s enactment state-law limited partners were generally not entitled to limited liability unless they “refrain[ed]” from partnership business. 
In the past, Treasury and the IRS have attempted to restrict eligibility for the limited partner exception. In 1997, Treasury issued a proposed regulation defining limited partner for purposes of IRC § 1402(a)(13). Soon after, Congress enacted the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34), which provided, “No temporary or final regulation with respect to the definition of a limited partner under section 1402(a)(13) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 may be issued or made effective before July 1, 1998.” A “Sense of Senate resolution” might offer some insight on the reasons for the moratorium: “the proposed regulations address and raise significant policy issues and the proposed definition of a limited partner may have a substantial impact on the tax liability of certain individuals and may also affect individuals’ entitlement to social security benefits.” Therefore, the Sense of Senate Resolution concluded that Treasury and the IRS should withdraw the proposed regulation and “Congress . . . should determine the tax law governing self-employment income for limited partner.”
Because this case turns on a statutory term, Congress could consider passing legislation clarifying the scope of the limited partnership exception to provide a consistent limited partner definition for purposes of IRC § 1402(a)(13). For example, to prevent active state-law limited partners with limited liability from circumventing SECA taxes, Congress may adopt statutory text like IRC § 1402(a)(10) or the 1997 proposed regulation. Alternatively, Congress could adopt language that clarifies that limited liability is all that is required to be a limited partner under IRC § 1402(a)(13). Congress may also consider clarifying the extent to which partners and members of other state-law entities, such as limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies, are eligible for the limited partner exception. Congress could also leave this matter for resolution in the courts.    
In the government’s Sirius Solutions petition for rehearing en banc, the government contends that “heavy losses in tax revenues” would stem from the Fifth Circuit’s 2-1 decision and those losses threaten “critical funding for Social Security and Medicare.” The government asserts, “[t]he IRS estimates that revenue at stake exceeds $500 million, just in pending matters.” The government claims that these revenue losses are “expected to grow, as the majority’s approach encourages more businesses to organize as limited partnerships and use distributive shares to compensate workers who already qualify for benefits.” To the extent that Congress seeks to address the government’s claims concerning Social Security and Medicare Part A funding, Congress could consider raising the earnings base for Social Security taxes and the additional 0.9% Medicare tax and increasing Social Security and Medicare tax rates. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11425/LSB11425.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11425.html
LSB11424,Department of Justice Eases Control of Medical Marijuana,2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T10:45:53Z,Active,Posts,Joanna R. Lampe,"Controlled Substances Act (CSA), Department of Justice (DOJ), Drug Control, Marijuana","On April 23, 2026, the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued a final order easing some controls of medical marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Specifically, the order provides that marijuana and its derivatives are now controlled in Schedule III under the CSA to the extent they are “included in [a Food & Drug Administration (FDA)]-approved drug product or are subject to a state-issued license to manufacture, distribute, and/or dispense marijuana or products containing marijuana for medical purposes.” This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of the rescheduling order, then discusses the legal implications of the order and selected considerations for Congress related to marijuana regulation.
Background on Cannabis Regulation
Cannabis and its derivatives generally fall within one of two categories under federal law: marijuana or hemp. Unless an exception applies, the CSA classifies the cannabis plant and its derivatives as marijuana (some provisions of the statute use an alternative spelling, “marihuana”). The CSA definition of marijuana excludes (1) products that meet the legal definition of hemp and (2) the mature stalks of the cannabis plant; the sterilized seeds of the plant; and fibers, oils, and other products made from the stalks and seeds. Marijuana is a controlled substance under the CSA.
Currently applicable federal law defines hemp as the cannabis plant or any part of that plant with a concentration of no more than 0.3% of the psychoactive cannabinoid delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). In November 2025, Congress enacted legislation changing the definition of hemp so that, among other things, it is defined based on total THC concentration rather than just the concentration of delta-9 THC. The new definition is scheduled to take effect in November 2026. Other CRS products discuss the legal and policy implications of that change. The non-psychoactive compound cannabidiol (CBD) falls within the legal definition of hemp. Hemp, including CBD, is not a controlled substance under the CSA.
The CSA establishes a unified legal framework to regulate certain drugs and other substances that are deemed to pose a risk of abuse and dependence. Substances become subject to the CSA through placement in one of five lists, known as Schedules I through V. The CSA grants the Attorney General (AG) the authority to schedule controlled substances via administrative rulemaking. The ordinary scheduling process proceeds via formal rulemaking and requires the AG to consider eight statutory factors related to the effects and public health risks of the substance. The CSA also authorizes temporary scheduling by the AG, via expedited procedures and with more limited factfinding, when “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to the public safety.” In addition, the CSA allows the AG to schedule a substance “[i]f control is required by United States obligations under international [drug control] treaties” to which the United States is a party. Such treaty-based scheduling may be conducted “without regard to the findings required . . . and without regard to the procedures prescribed” for regular administrative scheduling. The AG generally delegates CSA scheduling authority to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) but also retains the authority to make scheduling decisions.
As an alternative to administrative scheduling, Congress can enact legislation to schedule, reschedule, or deschedule controlled substances. Congress is not required to comply with CSA procedures or factfinding requirements when it schedules substances via legislation.
Congress placed marijuana in Schedule I in 1970 when the CSA was enacted and also separately controlled THC in Schedule I. Several prescription drugs that are derived from cannabis or use cannabinoids as active ingredients have been rescheduled to Schedule II or III or descheduled.
A lower CSA schedule number carries greater restrictions, with controlled substances in Schedule I subject to the most stringent controls. Schedule I controlled substances have no currently accepted medical use in the United States under federal law. It is illegal to produce, dispense, or possess such substances except in the context of federally approved scientific studies, subject to CSA regulatory requirements designed to prevent abuse and diversion. DEA is required to set annual production quotas for Schedule I controlled substances manufactured for use in approved research. 
Controlled substances in Schedules II-V have accepted medical uses and may be used for medical purposes, subject to CSA regulations designed to prevent abuse and diversion. Unauthorized activities involving controlled substances, including recreational use, are federal crimes that may give rise to large fines and significant jail time. In addition to the general schedule-based framework under the CSA, some provisions of the CSA apply specifically to marijuana. For instance, 21 U.S.C. § 841 imposes mandatory minimum prison sentences for persons convicted of criminal CSA violations involving set quantities of specific controlled substances, including marijuana. In addition, 21 U.S.C. § 823 imposes special registration requirements for those who manufacture marijuana for research purposes.
In contrast to the stringent federal control of marijuana, in recent decades nearly all the states have changed their laws to permit the use of marijuana or other cannabis products for medical purposes. Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have removed certain state criminal prohibitions on recreational marijuana use by adults. As the Supreme Court has recognized, states cannot fully legalize marijuana because the states cannot change federal law, and the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause dictates that federal law takes precedence over conflicting state laws. So long as marijuana is a controlled substance under the CSA, all unauthorized activities involving marijuana are federal crimes anywhere in the United States, including in states that have purported to legalize marijuana. CRS uses the phrase “state-legal activities” to refer to activities that are permitted under state law but may violate federal law.
Congress has granted the states some leeway to allow the distribution and use of medical marijuana. In each budget cycle since FY2015, Congress has passed an appropriations rider barring DOJ from using taxpayer funds to prevent states from “implementing their own laws that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.” Courts have interpreted the appropriations rider to prohibit federal prosecution of state-legal activities involving medical marijuana, but it poses no bar to federal prosecution of activities involving recreational marijuana. The rider does not remove criminal liability; it merely limits enforcement of the CSA while the rider remains in effect. While official DOJ policy has varied somewhat across administrations, recent presidential administrations have not prioritized prosecution of state-legal activities involving medical or recreational marijuana.
Even absent criminal prosecution or conviction, individuals and organizations engaged in marijuana-related activities in violation of the CSA—including participants in the state-legal marijuana industry who violate federal law—may face collateral consequences arising from the federal control of marijuana. As one example, to the extent marijuana is controlled in Schedule I or II, Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code renders marijuana businesses ineligible for certain federal tax deductions. In addition, cannabis and its derivatives, including products classified as either marijuana or hemp, may be subject to other federal and state laws. One key example is the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), which regulates consumer products such as food, pharmaceutical drugs, and dietary supplements.
April 2026 Rescheduling Order
On April 23, 2026, DOJ issued a final order signed by Acting AG Todd Blanche moving some medical marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III under the CSA. The April 2026 order is not the first executive activity related to the status of marijuana under the CSA. In May 2024, DOJ issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to move marijuana to Schedule III. That NPRM was issued pursuant to DEA’s regular scheduling authority and would have applied to marijuana generally. As of the date of this Legal Sidebar, the NPRM had not been finalized. At the same time DOJ issued the final order rescheduling medical marijuana, it also announced that it was withdrawing a previous notice of hearing on the NPRM and would hold a new administrative hearing beginning June 29, 2026, related to full rescheduling of marijuana from Schedule I to Schedule III.
The April 2026 final order applies more narrowly than the NPRM would but takes effect immediately without the need to complete formal administrative rulemaking. The rescheduling order applies to
(i) those FDA-approved drug products that contain 9-THC falling within the CSA’s definition of marijuana, specifically FDA-approved drug products containing 9-THC derived from the plant Cannabis sativa L., other than the mature stalks and seeds; and (ii) marijuana subject to a state medical marijuana license.
Unlike the May 2024 NPRM, DOJ issued the April 2026 order pursuant to its authority to schedule substances as required under two international treaties, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 (Single Convention) and the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971, which respectively require signatories to impose controls on cannabis (and certain cannabis derivatives) and delta-9 THC. The rescheduling order begins by reviewing the United States’ obligations under those treaties, including but not limited to restricting handling of covered drugs “exclusively to medical and scientific purposes”; imposing production quotas for covered drugs; requiring manufacturers, importers, and exporters of covered drugs to be licensed; requiring prescriptions for medical use of covered drugs; and prohibiting possession of covered drugs “except under legal authority.” The final order also notes that the Single Convention imposes some requirements specific to marijuana, including but not limited to requiring signatory governments to purchase “all harvested crops of marijuana and monopolize the wholesale trade in harvested marijuana.”
The rescheduling order briefly surveys state marijuana regulatory schemes. It then discusses a 2024 opinion of the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel that determined that “if marijuana is listed in schedule III, most of the Single Convention’s obligations noted above will continue to be met by CSA statutory authorities and associated regulations” and “the controls available under schedule III are also sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances with respect to 9-THC.” The key requirement of the Single Convention that would not be satisfied by Schedule III status is the requirement of a permit to import or export covered drugs. Accordingly, the order provides that “DEA must simultaneously amend the regulations to require a permit to import or export” FDA-approved marijuana products or marijuana subject to state-issued licenses. The requirement to purchase all harvested marijuana is to be implemented via a “nominal price purchase-and-resale mechanism,” which is similar to procedures that apply to marijuana grown for research purposes.
The final order emphasizes that treaty-based scheduling is to be conducted without regard to the procedures and factfinding required for regular administrative scheduling. Nonetheless, the final order reviews an August 29, 2023, letter from the Secretary of Health and Human Services providing a scientific and medical analysis of marijuana that recommended placing marijuana in Schedule III before DOJ issued the May 2024 NPRM. In the April 2026 final order, the Acting AG states,
because I believe there are several legally viable scheduling options that would satisfy the United States’ obligations under the Single Convention based on OLC’s 2024 opinion . . . , I exercise my discretion in determining the most appropriate schedule by choosing the option that most closely aligns to HHS’s findings and best positions the United States to carry out its obligations under the Single Convention.
The final order states that it applies only to covered medical marijuana and is “maintaining unlicensed bulk marijuana in schedule I” and “does not apply to synthetically derived THC,” such as delta-10 THC. It further states that it “does not affect the status of hemp,” nor does it “reschedul[e] any drug product containing marijuana or THC that previously has been rescheduled out of schedule I (e.g., Marinol and Syndros),” or “impact the status of any previously scheduled synthetic cannabinoids.” Thus, it appears that the rescheduling of FDA-approved marijuana products is intended to apply prospectively to products that FDA may approve in the future.
The final order summarizes Schedule III regulatory requirements that are to apply to FDA-approved marijuana products. These include but are not limited to requirements for entities handling those products (other than end users) to register with DEA, ensure that such drugs are dispensed only pursuant to a valid prescription, maintain certain records and make certain reports to DEA, and comply with CSA regulations related to security, labeling, and packaging.
With respect to entities holding state medical marijuana licenses, the final order states that the Acting AG 
has determined that incorporating state licensing systems into the federal registration framework represents the most effective and efficient means of achieving the CSA’s objectives with respect to medical marijuana while promoting the medical benefits of marijuana and causing the least disruption for patients and existing state systems.
Accordingly, the final order amends applicable CSA regulations to “establish a new registration pathway for state-licensed medical marijuana entities seeking federal DEA registration as manufacturers, distributors, and/or dispensers.” Among other things, the new process provides for expedited review of registration applications from applicants holding state medical marijuana licenses. In particular, the final order directs the DEA Administrator “to process applications submitted within 60 days of publication within six months” and provides that “early applicants may lawfully operate under their state-issued licenses during the pendency of review.”
With respect to end users of state-legal medical marijuana, the final order provides that “[s]tate-authorized medical marijuana certifications or similar documents are sufficient to permit the dispensing of medical marijuana to users, provided they include the user’s name and address, are dated and signed on the day of issuance, and identify the issuing practitioner.”
With respect to marijuana researchers, the final order clarifies that “researchers who obtain marijuana or marijuana-derived products from a state licensee for use in scientific research shall incur no civil or criminal liability under the Controlled Substances Act solely by reason of having obtained such products from a state-licensed source” and shall not face adverse action against their registration.
Finally, the final order notes that “as a consequence of this rule, holders of state medical marijuana licenses will no longer be subject to the deduction disallowance imposed by Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code,” and states that the DEA Administrator “encourages the Secretary of the Treasury to consider providing retrospective relief from Section 280E liability for taxable years in which a state licensee operated under a state medical marijuana license.” The Department of the Treasury has announced that it plans to do so.
Legal Implications of Final Order
The April 2026 rescheduling order does not immediately bring the state-legal marijuana industry into compliance with federal law, but it appears to make it possible for some entities handling medical marijuana to come into compliance with the CSA. A key difference between Schedule I and Schedule III is that substances in Schedule III have an accepted medical use and may lawfully be used for medical purposes, while substances in Schedule I cannot. By moving FDA-approved marijuana and state-licensed medical marijuana to Schedule III, the rescheduling order opens the possibility that manufacturers, distributors, dispensers, and end users of covered marijuana products may be able to comply with the CSA. All entities that handle covered marijuana products, other than end users, will need to register with DEA in order to do so lawfully. The order directs DEA to establish expedited procedures to register holders of state medical marijuana licenses and to approve early applications within six months.
Once registered with DEA, entities handling medical marijuana will be required to comply with applicable regulatory requirements. As outlined above, entities handling FDA-approved marijuana products must to comply with general CSA Schedule III regulatory requirements, while it appears state license holders generally have to comply with state regulatory requirements.
Under the CSA, a controlled substance that is a prescription drug may only be dispensed via a valid prescription. Generally, pharmaceutical controlled substances in Schedule III are prescription drugs, but marijuana is not. Under current medical practice, state-legal medical marijuana is not dispensed by prescription but instead based on a certification from a medical provider. The rescheduling order provides that such certifications are sufficient to permit dispensing of medical marijuana to users as long as the certifications satisfy certain requirements. Thus, the order appears to authorize end users to possess marijuana for medical use without a CSA-compliant prescription.
With respect to participants in the state-legal marijuana industry other than end users, the final order may make it possible for them to comply with the CSA, but may not bring them into full compliance with federal law. Under the FD&C Act, pharmaceutical drugs must be approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and it is unlawful to introduce an unapproved drug into interstate commerce. Although, as noted above, FDA has approved some drugs derived from or related to cannabis, marijuana itself is not an FDA-approved drug.
With respect to research, CSA registration requirements for Schedule III controlled substances are generally less stringent than the requirements for Schedule I controlled substances. The Medical Marijuana and Cannabidiol Research Expansion Act, enacted in 2022, created specialized procedures for DEA approval of marijuana research and manufacture of marijuana for research purposes. Substance-specific registration requirements continue to apply to marijuana following rescheduling, which might limit the impact of rescheduling on marijuana research. However, the final order appears to seek to facilitate marijuana research by allowing researchers to use state-legal marijuana rather than relying on existing DEA-registered sources.
Rescheduling medical marijuana does not directly alter the medical marijuana appropriations rider, but may render it redundant for state-legal medical marijuana businesses that register with DEA. To the extent those businesses now comply with the CSA, they do not need the rider to shield them from prosecution.
With respect to the manufacture, distribution, and possession of recreational marijuana, even if marijuana were completely moved to Schedule III, such activities would remain illegal under federal law and potentially subject to federal prosecution regardless of their status under state law. Some criminal penalties for CSA violations depend on the schedule in which a substance is classified. To the extent marijuana is moved to Schedule III, applicable penalties for some offenses would be reduced. However, CSA penalties that apply to marijuana specifically, such as the quantity-based mandatory minimum sentences discussed above, would not change as a result of rescheduling. The CSA does not require DEA to set annual production quotas for Schedule III controlled substances, but the final order states that DEA will continue to apply quota requirements to marijuana as required by the Single Convention.
The prohibition on business deductions in Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code applies to any trade or business that “consists of trafficking in controlled substances (within the meaning of schedule I and II of the Controlled Substances Act) which is prohibited by Federal law or the law of any State in which such trade or business is conducted.” Because the provision applies only to activities involving substances in Schedule I or II, to the extent marijuana is moved from Schedule I to Schedule III, marijuana businesses can deduct business expenses on federal tax filings. Other collateral legal consequences may continue to attach to marijuana-related activities to the extent they violate the CSA or other federal laws.
Considerations for Congress
As noted, either Congress or the executive branch has the authority to change the status of marijuana under the CSA. With the issuance of the final order, DOJ has rescheduled marijuana in part and expressed the intent to reschedule the substance completely in the future. If Congress seeks to change the legal status of marijuana, it has broad authority to do so before or after DOJ makes any final scheduling decision. Several proposals in the 118th and 119th Congresses would remove marijuana from control under the CSA or move the substance to a less restrictive schedule. If Congress moved marijuana to Schedule III by legislation, it could simultaneously consider whether to change any of the legal consequences of Schedule III status mentioned above. Congress could also legislate to move marijuana to another CSA schedule, which would subject it to controls more or less stringent than those that apply to Schedule III controlled substances. In addition, Congress might consider whether rescheduling marijuana in whole or in part necessitates amendments to other applicable legal frameworks, such as the FD&C Act.
While most recent proposals would relax federal regulation of marijuana, Congress could also seek to impose more stringent controls. One proposal in the 119th Congress would amend Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code to specifically deny tax deductions for any trade or business that “consists of trafficking in . . . marijuana.” A proposal in the 118th Congress would have withheld certain federal funds from states in which the purchase or public possession of marijuana for recreational purposes is lawful. A proposal in the 117th Congress would have prohibited the use of benefits under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant at any store that offers marijuana for sale. Other proposals in the 117th Congress sought to address the issues of workplace impairment or driving under the influence of marijuana and other substances.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11424/LSB11424.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11424.html
IN12686,The 2/37ths Limitation on Itemized Deductions,2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:53:32Z,Active,Posts,Nicholas E. Buffie,"Itemized Deductions, Individual Tax, Tax Reform","In July 2025, as part of the FY2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21), Congress enacted a new limitation on itemized tax deductions for high-income taxpayers. This Insight describes itemized tax deductions, explains how the new limitation works, and analyzes the limitation’s effects.
Itemized Deductions: Background and Distributional Impact
When Americans file their income tax returns, they may use deductions to exempt certain amounts of income from taxation. For example, a taxpayer with $100,000 of income who claims deductions totaling $20,000 will have a taxable income of $80,000.
There are four broad types of deductions: (1) above-the-line deductions; (2) the standard deduction; (3) itemized deductions; and (4) “other” deductions. Above-the-line deductions and “other” deductions may be claimed by all taxpayers, though taxpayers must claim either the standard deduction or itemized deductions. The standard deduction allows taxpayers to reduce their taxable incomes by certain amounts—$16,100 for single filers, $24,150 for head-of-household filers, and $32,200 for married couples in 2026 (amounts are adjusted annually for inflation). Itemized deductions are claimed for certain expenses paid by the taxpayer. As shown in Table 1, three particular expenses—charitable contributions, mortgage interest, and state and local tax (SALT) payments—constitute about three-quarters of all itemized deduction amounts.
Table 1. Taxpayer Use of Itemized Deductions, Tax Year 2023 (Filing Year 2024)
Taxpayer Incomes
Share with Itemized Deductions
Average Itemized Deductions
Share of All Itemized Deductions Claimed




Charitable Contributions Deduction
Mortgage Interest Deduction
State and Local Tax Deduction
All Other Itemized Deductions

Below $50,000
2%
$32,262
11%
21%
15%
54%

$50,000 to $100,000
9%
$28,852
16%
29%
23%
31%

$100,000 to $500,000
21%
$37,717
23%
34%
24%
19%

$500,000 to $1 Million
52%
$64,654
35%
27%
15%
23%

$1 Million to $5 Million
66%
$142,579
50%
11%
7%
33%

$5 Million or More
83%
$1,361,925
68%
1%
1%
31%

All Tax Returns
9%
$45,732
31%
25%
18%
27%

Source: IRS Statistics of Income Tables 1.2, 1.4, and 2.1, accessed April 20, 2026, at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income. 
Notes: The income concept used to rank taxpayers by income is adjusted gross income, or AGI. Average itemized deductions are per taxpayer claiming itemized deductions. Shares of all itemized deductions claimed may not sum to 100% for some income groups due to rounding. 
Itemized deductions disproportionately benefit high-income taxpayers for two reasons: (1) most low- and middle-income taxpayers claim the standard deduction because they do not have high itemizable expenses; and (2) high-income taxpayers are taxed at higher marginal rates than other taxpayers, so they can reduce their tax payments more for each dollar deducted. The Tax Policy Center estimates that 43% of the tax savings from itemized deductions accrue to the top 1% of the income distribution, and 87% accrue to the top 20%.
The 2/37ths Limitation
The FY2025 reconciliation law enacted a new “2/37ths” limitation on itemized deductions. Under this limitation, which takes effect in 2026, taxpayers’ total itemized deductions are reduced by 2/37ths of the lesser of
the total value of all itemized deductions claimed; or
the amount by which the sum of taxable income and all itemized deductions exceeds the income threshold at which the top 37% marginal tax bracket begins.
For 2026, the 37% bracket begins at $640,600 of taxable income for unmarried individuals and $768,700 for married couples filing a joint return.
This limitation effectively works such that
taxpayers with combined taxable income and itemized deductions below the top bracket are not affected;
taxpayers with taxable income below the top bracket, but with combined taxable income and itemized deductions above the bracket, have their itemized deductions reduced by 2/37ths of (Taxable Income + Itemized Deductions – Top Bracket Income Threshold); and
taxpayers with taxable incomes above the threshold for the top bracket have their itemized deductions reduced by 2/37ths.
For example, a married couple with $1 million of taxable income and $100,000 of itemized deductions—therefore fitting criterion #3 above—would have their itemized deductions reduced by 2/37ths of $100,000, or $5,405. With a marginal tax rate of 37%, the couple would pay an additional $2,000 of income taxes.
The effect of this limitation is that taxpayers in the top bracket (37%) now receive the same benefits from itemized deductions as taxpayers in the second-highest bracket (35%). For taxpayers in the second-highest bracket, itemized deductions reduce tax payments by 35% × (Amount Deducted). For taxpayers in the top bracket, itemized deductions reduce tax payments by 37% × (35/37) × (Amount Deducted), which simplifies to 35% × (Amount Deducted). 
The 2/37ths limitation is imposed after limitations to specific itemized deductions have already been applied. The most important application of this rule is to the SALT deduction.
Interaction with the SALT Cap
Prior to the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA; P.L. 115-97) in 2017, taxpayers were eligible for an unlimited SALT deduction. The TCJA capped the deduction at $10,000 per tax return from 2018 to 2025. The FY2025 reconciliation law then raised the cap to $40,000 for 2025, set it to grow 1% annually through 2029, and then permanently reverted the cap to $10,000 beginning in 2030.
For 2026, the SALT cap is $40,400. Taxpayers in the top 37% bracket have their SALT deduction reduced by 2/37ths, effectively limiting it to $38,216. As a result, the maximum SALT savings per tax return is $14,140.
The SALT deduction was used by 98.8% of taxpayers claiming itemized deductions in 2023. Table 2 shows that among those claiming the SALT deduction, high-income taxpayers were disproportionately impacted by the $10,000 cap. The 2/37ths limitation partially blunts the impact of raising the cap, but the increase will still lead to concentrated benefits, particularly among those with annual incomes above $500,000.
Table 2. The SALT Deduction and SALT Cap in 2023, by Income Level

Tax Returns with SALT Deduction
Amount per Return Claiming SALT
SALT Dollars Above the Cap per Dollar Deducted



Average SALT Deduction Amount
Average Additional SALT Above the Cap


Below $50,000
1,630,212
$5,016
$1,124
$0.22

$50,000 to $100,000
3,585,124
$6,784
$1,271
$0.19

$100,000 to $500,000
8,248,386
$9,009
$8,113
$0.90

$500,000 to $1 Million
921,762
$9,722
$39,233
$4.04

$1 Million to $5 Million
476,745
$9,738
$109,455
$11.24

$5 Million or More
66,053
$9,704
$743,676
$76.64

All Tax Returns
14,928,282
$8,109
$14,119
$1.74

Source: IRS Statistics of Income Table 2.1, accessed April 20, 2026, at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income.
Note: The income concept used to rank taxpayers by income is adjusted gross income, or AGI.
Impacts of the Limitation
The 2/37ths limitation will affect government revenues and the distribution of national after-tax income.
CRS estimates that the 2/37ths limitation will generate $255 billion in federal revenue over 10 years based on analysis using the Policy Simulation Library’s (PSL’s) Tax-Calculator. Projected annual revenue attributable to the limitation starts at $21.5 billion in FY2026 and rises to $30.7 billion by FY2035. These projections are not official revenue estimates for “scoring” purposes or congressional budgetary rules; the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) is Congress’s official revenue estimator, and the estimates presented here may differ from those produced by the JCT. 
The revenues generated by the limitation are expected to come predominantly from the top 1% of the income distribution. Table 3 shows the projected impacts of the limitation on taxpayers of different income levels for the 2026 tax year. The PSL’s model indicates that no taxpayers in the bottom 95% of the income distribution will be affected, but roughly half (49.3%) of those in the top 1% will pay higher taxes. Table 3 indicates that 50.7% of taxpayers in the top 1% will not be affected, 26.3% will switch from claiming itemized deductions to using the standard deduction, and 23.1% will continue claiming itemized deductions. The average projected tax increase (including those not affected by the limitation) is $0 for the bottom 95% of the income distribution, $21.50 for those between the 95th and 99th percentiles, and $11,067 for the top 1%. For the top 1%, the projected tax increase is equivalent to 0.43% of the group’s adjusted gross income, which is expected to average $2.6 million in 2026.
Table 3. Distributional Impacts of the 2/37ths Limitation on Itemized Deductions, 2026
Income Distribution Percentiles
Average Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)
Share Itemizing
Share Affected by 2/37ths Limitation
Average Tax Increase



Without 2/37ths Limitation
With 2/37ths Limitation

Dollars
Percent of AGI

Bottom 95%
$58,339
6.1%
6.1%
0.0%
$0
0.00%

95th-99th Percentiles
$402,247
59.7%
59.7%
1.6%
$22
0.01%

Top 1%
$2,565,053
57.9%
31.6%
49.3%
$11,067
0.43%

Source: CRS estimates and calculations using the Policy Simulation Library’s Tax-Calculator, accessed April 27, 2026.
Notes: Estimates include both tax filers and nonfilers for the 2026 tax year. Individuals and couples with negative incomes are included in the analysis but are counted as having $0 incomes. The average tax increase for the 95th-99th percentiles is $21.50, or approximately 0.0053% of AGI.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12686/IN12686.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12686.html
IG10095,"Medicare Payment for Rural or Geographically Isolated Hospitals, 2026",2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T10:45:51Z,Active,Infographics,Marco A. Villagrana,Medicare,"/
Medicare Payment for Rural or Geographically Isolated Hospitals
Traditional Medicare pays most acute-care hospitals under the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS). Some IPPS hospitals receive payment adjustments, which may help address the potential financial distress associated with rural, geographically isolated, and low-volume hospitals. These Medicare payment designations are Sole Community Hospitals (SCHs), Medicare-Dependent Hospitals (MDHs), and Low-Volume Hospitals (LVHs). Other similar acute-care hospitals—Critical Access Hospitals (CAHs)—are paid based on reasonable cost, not under IPPS. 2026
Medicare Hospital Payment
IPPS Inpatient Prospective Payment System
A predetermined, fixed, per discharge payment for inpatient services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries, subject to adjustments.
All IPPS Hospital Designations 
SCH, MDH, LVH
Duplicated; designations not mutually exclusive
Hospital Designation Locations
Eligibility Criteria
Adjusted payment 
No. of hospitals
Sole Community Hospital (SCH)
Meets ONE of the following FOUR criteria:
	> 35 miles from another IPPS hospital
	Rural and 25-35 miles from another hospital and
	Is the exclusive hospital provider in the area, or
	< 50 beds, meets exclusive hospital provider criterion but for patient transfers to other hospitals for specialized care
	Rural and 15-15 miles from another hospital(s) that is inaccessible due to topography or severe weather conditions
		Rural and  45-minute drive to nearest other hospital (due to distance, speed limits, and weather conditions)
The > of the following:
Hospital-specific rate applicable reference years1 FY - Fiscal Year 423 14%*
Medicare-Dependent Hospital (MDH)

Meets ALL of the following criteria:
	Rural 
	 100 beds
	Not an SCH
	 60% are Medicare patients
MDH is a temporary program that will expire January 1, 2027, if Congress does not extend or make it permanent.
162 5%*
Low-Volume Hospital (LVH)
Meets ALL of the following criteria: 
	> 15 miles from another IPPS hospital
	< 3,800 annual total discharges
LVH eligibility criteria will change effective January 1, 2027, if Congress does not extend the current criteria. Continuous linear adjustment
Annual patient discharges $ = IPPS + (IPPS x Applicable %) 572 19%*
Critical Access Hospital (CAH)
Meets ALL of the following criteria: 
	Rural
	 25 inpatient beds
	24/7 emergency services
	Annual average length of stay of  96 hours
	> 35-mile drive from another IPPS hospital or CAH, or
	> 15-mile drive in mountainous terrain, or
		Designated as a “necessary provider” before January 1, 2006 101% CAH’s reasonable costs 1,378 %
CAHs are not paid by Medicare under IPPS.
1Hospital-specific rate (HSR): A per discharge payment based on a hospital’s average operating costs for furnishing inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. In contrast, IPPS is a per discharge payment based on the national average operating cost of furnishing inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. Both HSR and IPPS use costs from statutorily defined reference years, trended forward.
Designations: Mutually exclusive Not mutually exclusive   *Total number of IPPS hospitals: 3,155 (Excludes Maryland hospitals because they are exempt from IPPS.)      
Sources: CRS analysis of relevant statute, regulations, and Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services “FY2026 Impact File,” www.cms.gov/medicare/payment/prospective-payment-systems/acute-inpatient-pps/fy-2026-ipps-final-rule-home-page; and Health Resources and Services Administration, Data Warehouse, Data Explorer “Health Care Facilities (CMS)” data, https://data.hrsa.gov/data/data-explorer, accessed March 25, 2026. 
Information as of April 30, 2026. Prepared by Marco Villagrana, Analyst in Health Care Financing; Joe Angert, Research Assistant; Mari Lee, Visual Information Specialist; and Molly Cox, Geospatial Information Systems Analyst.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10095/IG10095.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10095.html
IF13212,U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: FY2027 Appropriations,2026-04-30T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T17:38:02Z,Active,Resources,"Anna E. Normand, Nicole T. Carter",,"Congress generally funds and provides related policy direction to the civil works activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in annual Energy and Water Development appropriations acts and their accompanying documents. USACE primarily plans and constructs authorized water resource projects and operates and maintains USACE-managed infrastructure and navigation improvements. Many of these activities are managed by staff at 39 of USACE’s district offices. USACE uses most of its appropriations on specific studies and projects authorized by Congress, which are often cost shared with nonfederal sponsors.
President Trump released the FY2027 budget request on April 3, 2026. The request includes $6.66 billion for USACE, which is $3.77 billion less in nominal dollars than the roughly $10.44 billion provided for FY2026 (see Figure 1). The Administration also proposed different accounts compared with FY2026, including a District Salaries and Expenses (S&E) account. The S&E Account would fund the salaries of USACE district and field office employees, plus other operational costs, separately from direct study and project costs, which would be funded in traditional study and project accounts (e.g., the Construction account).  
Figure 1. Annual USACE Budget Requests and Appropriations, FY2020-FY2026, and FY2027 Request
/
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on appropriations acts and USACE budget requests.
Notes: Does not reflect supplemental funds, redirection of prior-year appropriations, rescissions, or reprogramming. The lines show inflation-adjusted FY2019-FY2025 amounts in FY2025 dollars using FY2027 Budget of the U.S. Government, Historical Tables, Table 10.1. 
FY2027 Request: Selected Topics
Proposed District Salaries and Expenses Account
In the FY2027 request the Administration proposes altering budgeting of USACE district S&E. In previous budget requests and appropriations acts, study and project accounts (Investigations, Construction, Operation and Maintenance [O&M], and Mississippi River and Tributaries accounts) composed the majority of the funding (see Figure 2), with district S&E included within those accounts. In contrast, the FY2027 request includes such funding in the new District S&E account. An example of budgeting under the proposed structure is the request for the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, LA, which is split between $5 million in the O&M account and $15 million in the District S&E account, for a total of $20 million for the project.
Figure 2. USACE FY2020-FY2026 Annual Appropriations and FY2027 Budget Request, Percentage of Total Funds by Account
/
Source: CRS, using appropriations laws and the FY2027 Budget Request.
Notes: WIFIP = Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Program; ASA = Assistant Secretary of the Army; Regulatory = Regulatory Program; FCCE = Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies; FUSRAP = Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program; MR&T = Mississippi River and Tributaries; O&M = operation and maintenance; S&E = Salaries and Expenses; Req. = request. Does not reflect supplemental funds or redirection of prior-year appropriations, rescissions, or reprogramming. Although the FY2027 request proposes to fund certain expenses directly from trust funds accounts, this figure shows that funding distributed among the Construction, O&M, and MR&T accounts. For the FY2027 request, figure shows amounts using both the traditional account structure (FY27 Req Trad; i.e., the study and project accounts include district S&E), and the proposed District S&E account (FY27 Req New).    
The amount for the proposed District S&E account is $2.43 billion, making up 36% of the total FY2027 request. Figure 2 shows the percentage of total funds by account of the FY2027 request, comparing the traditional account structure (i.e., the study and project accounts including district S&E) against the FY2027 request, which breaks out the proposed District S&E account separately. 
Funding Proposed for USACE Activities
The amount and proportion of appropriations to provide for various USACE activity types is a perennial consideration for Congress. The FY2027 request of $2.06 billion for navigation (exclusive of district S&E) represents 30% of the total USACE request. Under navigation, $1.37 billion would come from the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund (HMTF) for eligible coastal and inland harbor-O&M-related USACE expenses (including $13 million for eligible O&M-dredging-related construction). The FY2027 request includes $244 million for navigation construction, with $135 million for inland and intracoastal waterway construction, of which $33 million is funded by the Inland Waterways Trust Fund (IWTF). The FY2027 request also proposes creating new USACE accounts for activities funded by the HMTF and IWTF, as has been requested (but not enacted) in prior Administration budgets. 
Under the proposed account structure, the FY2027 request for flood risk reduction is $931 million (exclusive of district S&E). Of that amount, $915 million is for inland flood risk reduction, including $647 million for project construction, such as $420 million for dam safety work at Prado, CA (plus an additional $55 million for the dam project in the District S&E account). The remainder is for coastal storm damage reduction. The request proposes funding two new studies, one for inland flood damage reduction and the other for coastal storm damage reduction. For USACE’s aquatic ecosystem restoration efforts, the budget request under the proposed account structure includes $410 million (exclusive of district S&E), of which $296 million is for Everglades restoration (plus $150 million under the District S&E account for the Everglades). 
Selected Issues for Congress
Transparency of Study and Project Information 
The FY2027 budget request notes that a central feature of the request is a new District S&E account as part of a “District Salary Transparency initiative.” USACE states that the proposed account is a policy change to emphasize delivery, transparency, and accountability, and that “this new approach will realign incentives to focus on building infrastructure on time and within budget.” Congress may consider how the proposed district S&E accounting would alter project delivery and agency accountability, and whether to fund the S&E separately as proposed. 
Congress may also seek from the Administration further information on study and project details for its deliberations on appropriations and conducting oversight. The FY2027 budget request generally delivered less project information in the budget request relative to prior budget justifications. Previous requests typically provided a description of project work, past funding allocations, and estimated funding required for completion for each requested study and construction project. The FY2027 budget justifications only included the study or project name and the amount of funding requested in the account, while noting the associated funding proposed for district S&E. 
Expending Study and Project Appropriations
During the lapse in appropriations for FY2026, in October 2025 Russell Vought, Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), indicated that USACE would be “immediately pausing over $11 billion in lower-priority projects & considering them for cancellation.” In response, some Members have expressed concern about the status of USACE study and project appropriations, generally and for specific projects. For example, in January 2026, some Members requested OMB and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works (ASACW) to release funds for the Brandon Road Interbasin Project, IL. USACE released funding to award a contract for the project in April 2026. 
At a February 24, 2026, hearing, the ASACW stated that there were $45 billion in appropriated, unexpended funds for USACE activities, and that USACE needed to “be better at executing the funding” and that a portion of these funds are “stranded.” The ASACW indicated that Congress could reexamine whether to apply these appropriations “somewhere else more efficiently or appropriately.” To do so, Congress may wish to pursue additional information on which studies and projects have funds that remain unexpended. Congress also may consider whether to direct USACE to expend such funding (S. 4248, for example, would direct this funding for a subset of nonstructural flood risk reduction projects), or direct USACE to reallocate those funds to other study and project priorities in FY2027. 
Funding for Certain Activities Not in the Request 
The FY2027 request does not propose funds for environmental infrastructure assistance (see CRS In Focus IF11184, Army Corps of Engineers: Environmental Infrastructure (EI) Assistance), the Corps Water Infrastructure Financing Program (see CRS Insight IN12021, Corps Water Infrastructure Financing Program (CWIFP)), and a number of items in the Investigations account related to data collection and water science. The request included funding for one of the continuing authorities programs (CAPs)—Section 204 for beneficial uses of dredged materials—while not funding other CAPs (for more information on CAPs, see CRS In Focus IF12635, Continuing Authorities Programs (CAPs) of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). Congress may consider whether, and if so at what level, to fund these activities not included in the request, in addition to whether to support the activities included in the request. For example, Congress may consider what EI assistance authorities, if any, to fund based on requests from Members (i.e., congressional project funding/congressionally directed spending). ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13212/IF13212.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13212.html
R48925,The Food and Drug Administration’s Food Traceability Rule: Overview and Issues for Congress,2026-04-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T15:23:02Z,Active,Reports,Laura Pineda-Bermudez,Food Safety,"Foodborne illness outbreaks and subsequent recalls have garnered broad public attention to the safety of the U.S. food supply. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA; P.L. 111-353), enacted in 2011, aimed to improve food safety, among other objectives. In Section 204 of FSMA, Congress directed FDA to improve the tracking and tracing of food through the supply chain by establishing additional recordkeeping requirements for facilities handling certain foods frequently associated with foodborne illness outbreaks. The additional recordkeeping requirements were intended to enable more efficient removal of products from the market in the case of an outbreak leading to a recall. FDA has established these recordkeeping requirements in the Food Traceability Rule, as described below.
Prior to FSMA, some entities that handled, manufactured, packed, transported, or distributed food were required to keep records to trace food one step forward and one step back in the supply chain. Notably, farms and restaurants were not required to keep such records. Through FSMA, §204, Congress directed FDA to conduct pilot projects, collect and assess data, establish a list of high-risk foods, and issue regulation establishing additional recordkeeping requirements for foods on the high-risk list. Congress directed the agency to require certain records from entities that “manufacture, process, pack, or hold” foods on the list, including some previously exempt food establishments. FDA was to ensure the requirements were science-based and proportionate to risks associated with the food; that the public health benefits would outweigh the compliance costs; and that the burden on subject entities would be minimized whenever possible. 
FDA has implemented many of the Section 204 requirements. Some implementation has occurred after the deadlines set by Congress. On September 23, 2020, FDA published the proposed rule, “Requirements for Additional Traceability Records for Certain Foods” (the “Food Traceability Rule”), and requested comments on the rule and its accompanying list of high-risk foods (the “Food Traceability List”). FDA published the final Food Traceability Rule, as well as the Food Traceability List, on November 21, 2022. The Food Traceability List includes some fresh-cut produce, some soft cheeses, shell eggs, nut butters, and some seafood. The Food Traceability Rule requires facilities that perform certain activities with these products to keep specific records to facilitate faster identification of the source of a foodborne illness outbreak. Enforcement of the rule spans across the supply chain: from harvest to transformation or processing, through distributors of the food product, to the final product sold at a restaurant or grocery store. Subject entities handling a food on the Food Traceability List are to maintain specific records for certain points in the item’s supply chain. In addition, subject entities are to provide FDA with specific information within 24 hours of a request—or within a reasonable time to which FDA has agreed—to help FDA during an outbreak or other public health threat. FDA estimated that the final rule would cover more than 323,000 domestic businesses operating more than 484,100 establishments and set the initial compliance date for January 20, 2026.
In January 2024, the Government Accountability Office recommended that FDA finalize and document an implementation plan for the Food Traceability Rule to meet the 2026 compliance date. In September 2024, a stakeholder roundtable report published by the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the FDA indicated that industry stakeholders may not be aware of or prepared to be in compliance with the rule by January 2026. In March 2025, FDA announced its intention to extend the compliance date by 30 months and, in August 2025, published a notice of proposed rulemaking to provide additional time to covered entities to coordinate across the supply chain to fully implement the rule. In the FY2026 Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act (P.L. 119-37, Division B), Congress further directed that “no funds appropriated by this act may be used to administer or enforce the [Food Traceability Rule] ... prior to July 20, 2028.” Congress directed FDA to provide guidance and engage with stakeholders and to report on its implementation plan and the status of its product tracing system.
Congress has provided direction to FDA on its implementation of FSMA and may use oversight mechanisms to continue to evaluate whether FDA activities to implement Section 204 are accomplishing the law’s intended goals. Congress may also consider whether or not additional legislation may be necessary to direct FDA’s actions and rule enforcement. Such legislation may include directing FDA to conduct additional pilot projects or tabletop exercises, to finalize an implementation plan, and to exempt certain entities from being subject to the rule. Congress may also consider whether further action is needed to achieve the goal of improving food safety through increased food traceability. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48925/R48925.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48925.html
R48923,First Responder Network (FirstNet) Authority: Reauthorization and Selected Issues,2026-04-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T16:07:58Z,Active,Reports,"Colby Leigh Pechtol, Amanda H. Peskin",,"In the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96)—in response to communications issues experienced during the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and other disasters—Congress created the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet Authority). The FirstNet Authority is an independent authority within the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), under the U.S. Department of Commerce. P.L. 112-96 tasked the FirstNet Authority with establishing a nationwide public safety broadband network (FirstNet Network) dedicated to and customized for public safety use. The act provided $7 billion in electromagnetic spectrum auction proceeds to fund the FirstNet Authority and FirstNet Network; allocated 20 megahertz of spectrum for public safety use; directed the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to grant a renewable 10-year spectrum license to the FirstNet Authority (which was granted in 2012 and renewed in 2023); authorized the FirstNet Authority to enter into a public-private partnership to develop, deploy, and operate the FirstNet Network; and directed that the FirstNet Network be permanently self-sustaining. The statutory authorization of the FirstNet Authority expires in February 2027.
In March 2017, the FirstNet Authority awarded a 25-year contract to AT&T to build and maintain the FirstNet Network. P.L. 112-96 required that states be given the choice to opt in to the FirstNet Network or opt out and build a separate statewide network that would be interoperable with the FirstNet Network. By January 2018, all states, territories, and the District of Columbia had opted in, meaning AT&T would be deploying the FirstNet Network in each jurisdiction. In March 2018, the FirstNet Authority announced that AT&T had begun deploying the FirstNet Network, including the core network and cell sites, in each state. By December 2023, the FirstNet Authority validated that the initial five-year build-out was complete. In February 2024, the FirstNet Authority (with AT&T) announced plans to reinvest up to $8 billion over the next 10 years to expand and evolve the FirstNet Network. As of October 2025, the FirstNet Authority and AT&T reported that over 30,000 public safety agencies and organizations use the FirstNet Network, including several federal agencies.
In the 119th Congress, both the House and Senate have held hearings on FirstNet. The hearings centered on assessing progress of the FirstNet Network and other policy issues, including clarification of the FirstNet Authority’s and NTIA’s management responsibilities, interoperability with other networks, recent audit findings, and expiration of the authorizing statute. 
A key issue for Congress is reauthorization of the FirstNet Authority. Other concerns may include organizational and structural issues within the FirstNet Authority and between the FirstNet Authority and NTIA; oversight of the FirstNet Authority and FirstNet Network; market competition; and interoperability with other networks, including Next Generation 911. Legislation relating to the FirstNet Authority has been introduced in the 119th Congress. For example, H.R. 1519 would provide statutory authority for the Office of Public Safety Communications (within NTIA) to support efforts related to public safety communications, including managing and auditing the FirstNet Authority. H.R. 7386 would extend the FirstNet Authority’s statutory authorization through 2037 and take measures to increase transparency and accountability.
Options for Congress could include removing or extending the FirstNet Authority’s sunset provision, set forth in P.L. 112-96. Removing the sunset provision would authorize the FirstNet Authority to operate permanently and could help to avoid uncertainty around the future of the FirstNet Network and services. On the other hand, retaining the reauthorization provision could allow Congress to periodically assess the progress and performance of the FirstNet Network and address policy issues of interest to Congress. Congress could extend the FirstNet Authority’s authorization, for example, to align with the expiration of the current AT&T contract or impose certain conditions—such as changing the FirstNet Authority’s organizational structure, requiring interoperability between FirstNet and other networks, or encouraging more carriers within the FirstNet Network. Congress could also opt not to reauthorize the FirstNet Authority, which could raise questions regarding the fate of the spectrum license, management of the FirstNet Network, and oversight of the contract with AT&T. 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48923/R48923.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48923.html
LSB11423,Trump v. Barbara: Supreme Court Considers Birthright Citizenship,2026-04-29T04:00:00Z,2026-04-30T15:01:35Z,Active,Posts,Hannah Solomon-Strauss,"Executive Branch, Civil Rights & Liberties, Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), The Supreme Court of the United States, Immigration, Permanent Immigration","On April 1, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Trump v. Barbara. The question before the Court was whether Executive Order 14160 (E.O. 14160, or the E.O.), “Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship,” is constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause and authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a), a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that codifies the Citizenship Clause. This Legal Sidebar provides a brief overview of the arguments made by the parties in this litigation and a summary of the oral argument. For further information on E.O. 14160 and earlier stages of the litigation, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11414, Birthright Citizenship: Litigation Status Update, by Hannah Solomon-Strauss and Juria L. Jones (2026). 
The Citizenship Clause and Executive Order 14160
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reads, “All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The clause has been interpreted only sparingly by the Supreme Court since the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1868. In those cases, the Court has interpreted the clause to mean that every child born in the United States is a citizen at birth, regardless of their parents’ alienage.  
On January 20, 2025, President Trump signed E.O. 14160. The E.O. seeks to interpret “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in the Citizenship Clause to limit who may be considered a U.S. citizen from birth. 
The E.O. states: “It is the policy of the United States that no department or agency of the United States government shall issue documents recognizing United States citizenship, or accept documents issued by State, local, or other governments or authorities purporting to recognize United States citizenship, to persons” whom the executive branch believes are not granted citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment solely by being born in the United States. 
The E.O. outlines two categories of persons that, in the view of the executive branch, are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and therefore are excluded from the Fourteenth Amendment’s grant of birthright citizenship: (1) a child whose mother was not lawfully present in the United States, and whose father was not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, at the moment the child was born; and (2) a child whose mother was lawfully but temporarily in the United States, and whose father was not a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, at the moment the child was born. The E.O. asserts that children born in the United States to parents in either of these categories are not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. The E.O. directs the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Commissioner of Social Security to “take all appropriate measures to ensure that the regulations and policies of their respective departments and agencies are consistent with this order.”  
Trump v. Barbara at the Supreme Court
The question before the Court in Trump v. Barbara is whether the E.O. is constitutional—because the Citizenship Clause permits such a definition of birthright citizenship—and whether it is authorized by the INA, in which Congress codified the Citizenship Clause. During oral argument held on April 1, 2026, several key themes emerged from the Justices’ questions. 
Case Law and Precedent
Both plaintiffs and the executive branch argued that one of the Supreme Court’s prior cases on the Citizenship Clause supported their arguments, and that the Court should follow that precedent to rule in their favor. 
This prior case, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, is about the citizenship of a man born in the United States to parents who had emigrated from China. Wong Kim Ark’s parents came to the United States and lived in San Francisco for more than twenty years, during which time Wong Kim Ark was born. At the time, the Chinese Exclusion Act barred Wong Kim Ark’s parents from becoming citizens. They lived lawfully in the United States, but were ineligible to naturalize: they were, as the Court explains, “subjects of the Emperor of China.” In 1890, they returned to China. Several years later, Wong Kim Ark visited his parents in China and, on his return to the United States, was barred at the border. He argued he was a birthright citizen because he was born on U.S. soil even though his parents were not U.S. citizens. As a citizen, he argued, he could not be excluded from the country. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Citizenship Clause meant Wong Kim Ark was a birthright citizen notwithstanding that his parents were not citizens, and were ineligible to become citizens, when he was born. 
The plaintiffs argue that Wong Kim Ark controls Barbara, and that the earlier case holds that the Citizenship Clause grants birthright citizenship to every child born on U.S. soil not subject to rare exceptions. In fact, before the Supreme Court agreed to hear this case, plaintiffs argued the Court should decline to do so, because “it has already answered the constitutional question” that Barbara poses, in Wong Kim Ark. At oral argument, the plaintiffs continued to press their case that Barbara is resolved by consulting Wong Kim Ark’s holding.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the Trump Administration in defense of the E.O., agreed that Wong Kim Ark controls Barbara, but disagreed with plaintiffs’ reading of the precedent. The executive branch argued the fact that Wong Kim Ark’s parents were lawfully in San Francisco for twenty years—during which time Wong Kim Ark was born—indicates they were “domiciled” in the United States even though they could not naturalize, and that this mattered to the 1898 decision. The government argued that the Court’s repetition of, and focus on, “domicile” in Wong Kim Ark suggests this was central to the Court’s reasoning. Accordingly, the Trump Administration argued, the Court in Barbara should apply this “domicile” analysis to the Citizenship Clause. In response to a question from Justice Sotomayor, the Solicitor General said the executive branch was not asking the Supreme Court to overrule Wong Kim Ark, but instead to understand “domicile” as central to both cases and decide Barbara accordingly.
Domicile
The Solicitor General’s opening remarks staked out a position that the Citizenship Clause was intended to give birthright citizenship to those newly freed from slavery with the end of the Civil War along with those persons’ descendants. He argued that the Clause was never intended to grant citizenship to “the children of temporary visitors or illegal aliens” because, “unlike the newly freed slaves, those visitors lack direct and immediate allegiance to the United States. For aliens, lawful domicile is the status that creates the requisite allegiance, and the text of the clause presupposes domicile.” The executive branch pointed to Wong Kim Ark as evidence that the Supreme Court’s precedent also requires a consideration of domicile, because, in that case, the Court repeated the term many times through the opinion. 
Plaintiffs disagreed with the Administration’s argument that “domicile” was central to the Wong Kim Ark analysis. Instead, plaintiffs argued that the repetition of “domicile” in the 1898 case was merely a recitation of stipulated facts—because no one disagreed that Wong’s parents were domiciled in the United States—and the holding of the case did not hinge on this fact. Rather than turn on this uncontested, background fact of the case, plaintiffs say, Wong Kim Ark squarely held that the Citizenship Clause grants birthright citizenship to every child born on U.S. soil not subject to rare exceptions. Plaintiffs’ argument noted that the Fourteenth Amendment uses the word “jurisdiction,” not “domicile” or, as the executive branch sometimes offered interchangeably, “allegiance.”  
The executive branch’s arguments about domicile were at times met with questions from the Justices, who wondered how domicile is determined. In response to a question from Justice Thomas, the Solicitor General explained that the Fourteenth Amendment intended to give birthright citizenship to those newly freed from slavery: “the main object of the Citizenship Clause is to overrule Dred Scott and establish the citizenship of the freed slaves.” Justice Barrett noted, however, that people brought to the United States through the slave trade may not have had an intent to stay—that is, they may not be lawfully domiciled under the government’s test for birthright citizenship, even though the Trump Administration argued this population was the intended target of the Citizenship Clause. Justice Gorsuch also had an extended colloquy with the Solicitor General about whose domicile was relevant for determining birthright citizenship: the mother, father, or even the child’s. The Justice noted that the language of the Citizenship Clause suggests a focus on the child’s place of birth—“all persons born or naturalized in the United States”—whereas the Solicitor General’s arguments in defense of the E.O. appeared focused on the parents’ allegiance.
Status of Native Americans
Whether enrolled members of Indian tribes are birthright citizens under the Citizenship Clause is a question that dates to the codification of the clause itself. Legislative history indicates that Congress considered this question at length during the debates over the Citizenship Clause, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was passed just before the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court addressed this question in Elk v. Wilkins, concluding that “Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of, and owing immediate allegiance to, one of the Indian tribes ... are no more born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ within [the Citizenship Clause] than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government.... ” In this case, the Supreme Court reasoned by analogy: since children born to diplomats serving in the United States were not birthright citizens—because they were subject to a foreign power—neither were children born owing allegiance to Indian tribes, because they, too, were subjects of a different sovereign. (Congress changed this by legislation; since 1924, enrolled members of Indian tribes have been birthright citizens.) 
The question in Barbara is how, and whether, the Court’s prior analysis of this question bears on the interpretation of the E.O. 
The executive branch argued in its briefs before the Supreme Court that Elk was a case in its favor because “children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to their several tribes” are not citizens at birth under the Fourteenth Amendment and, simultaneously, “Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United States are subject to its authority.” This means that, before Congress changed this by statute, children born to Indian tribes were born on U.S. soil but were not birthright citizens. They were not, as the Court reasoned in Elk, “completely subject to [the United States’] political jurisdiction and owing [it] direct and immediate allegiance.” In the context of E.O. 14160, the Trump Administration argued this analysis authorized restricting birthright citizenship only to children born to parents with analogously “direct and immediate allegiance.” 
By contrast, the plaintiffs have a different explanation for Elk, arguing that the exceptions to the Citizenship Clause are a “closed set of exceptions to an otherwise universal rule.” Only those “cloaked with a fiction of extraterritoriality because they are subject to another sovereign’s jurisdiction even when they’re in the United States” are excluded from the Citizenship Clause’s grant of birthright citizenship, according to plaintiffs. This “closed set” includes children born to diplomats, children born to invading armies or aboard warships, and—for a time—children born to Indian tribes. 
Bright-Line Rules
Both parties agreed that before the E.O., the status quo in the United States has been a bright-line rule: children born on U.S. soil, and not subject to rare exceptions, are birthright citizens. At oral argument, the Justices pushed both advocates to articulate what the legal standard might look like if the E.O. were to take effect, and how birthright citizenship might be determined if not an administrable bright-line rule.
Some of these questions were prompted by the executive branch’s theory of the case, which relies on “domicile” having a subjective intent element. That is, the Trump Administration’s argument turns in part on a person’s mindset. Justice Barrett asked the Solicitor General squarely, “How would it work? How would you adjudicate these cases? You’re not going to know at the time of birth for some people whether they have the intent to stay or not—including U.S. citizens, by the way.” The Solicitor General responded that the E.O. turns on “an objectively verifiable thing, which is immigration status” and would not require an examination of subjective intent to remain in the United States. 
Justice Jackson, referring back to Justice Barrett’s questions, asked, “How does this work? Are you suggesting that when a baby is born, people have to ... present documents? Is this happening in the delivery room?” In response, the Solicitor General explained that the Social Security Administration (SSA) has promulgated guidance about how it will enforce the E.O. if it is permitted to take effect, and parents may contest—“after the fact”—the SSA’s determination if they believe it has wrongly determined their child is not a birthright citizen. 
Additionally, the Solicitor General noted that the E.O., by its terms, applies only prospectively: that is, only to children born after the E.O. takes effect.
Crafting the Court’s Holding
The plaintiffs asked the Court to “reaffirm its decision in Wong Kim Ark.” Likewise, the Trump Administration agreed that the holding of Wong Kim Ark would control this case. In addition to agreeing on the centrality of Wong Kim Ark, both parties agreed the Court should address the core merits issue in this case—the constitutionality of the E.O. 
Justice Gorsuch asked, “at the end of the day, then, this is a straight-up constitutional ruling you want from this Court?” to which the Solicitor General responded affirmatively, in part because the executive branch’s theory of the case rests on the assertion that “the statute and the Constitution mean the same thing.” 
Justice Kavanaugh noted that the Court sometimes opts to apply a rule of constitutional avoidance—that is, to decide cases on statutory grounds and to avoid constitutional holdings where possible—and asked plaintiffs whether that was one route to resolve this case. Plaintiffs responded, “it would be prudent to go ahead and reaffirm” Wong Kim Ark, but, “of course, we’re happy to take a win on any ground.” 
A decision is expected by the end of the Court’s term. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11423/LSB11423.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11423.html
IN12685,The General Business Credit,2026-04-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T14:52:57Z,Active,Posts,"Donald J. Marples, Nicholas E. Buffie","Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT), Business & Corporate Tax, Energy Tax Credits","The general business tax credit represents the sum of 41 separate business credits specified in Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 38(b). Each of these component credits is computed separately under its own IRC section, and then all of the credits are added together. For corporations, the most significant of these general business credits in terms of revenue cost is the credit for research and experimentation (IRC §41), followed by the low-income housing credit (IRC §42). Many of the credits relate to energy.  
Credits not included in the general business credit include personal credits in IRC §§22-26 that are unrelated to business, the foreign tax credit (IRC §27), certain credits (IRC §30) relating to alternative fuel vehicles, and the credit for prior year alternative minimum tax liability (IRC §53). 
The general business credit is a nonrefundable credit that is subject to a limitation based on the business’s tax liability. Any credit that exceeds this limit may generally be carried back one year (or three years for IRC §6417 applicable credits, or five years for the IRC §45I marginal well production credit) and carried forward 20 years. Several components of the credits, known as “specified credits” (IRC §196), that remain unused at the end of the carryforward period may be deducted in the following year.
The general business credit for a tax year is the sum of
the general business credit carryforwards to the year;
the current year business credit (that is, the total of the component credits for the tax year); and
the business credit carrybacks to the tax year.

Taxable Liability Limitation
The general business credit is subject to a limitation based on tax liability that varies for corporate and noncorporate taxpayers. Tax liability is calculated after nonrefundable, non-general business credits. The limit is calculated using three amounts. Net income tax is the sum of the taxpayer’s regular tax liability and any alternative minimum tax (AMT) liability, reduced by specified nonrefundable credits. Net regular tax liability is the taxpayer’s regular tax liability reduced by the specified nonrefundable credits. Tentative minimum tax is the amount calculated for purposes of the AMT.
For corporations, the general business credit cannot exceed net income tax minus 25% of net regular tax liability above $25,000. (For purposes of the tax liability limit, a corporation’s tentative minimum tax is treated as zero. However, the AMT for corporations is included in the corporation’s net income tax.)
For noncorporate taxpayers, the general business credit may not exceed net income tax less (1) the taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax liability, or (2) if greater, 25% of net regular tax liability above $25,000. 
For pass-through businesses, the $25,000 ceiling for net regular tax liability must be apportioned between married individuals filing separately; among estates, trusts, and their beneficiaries; and among component members of a controlled group of corporations. Banks and other financial institutions, regulated investment companies (RICs), and real estate investment trusts (REITs) may use a limited ratable share of the $25,000 net tax liability limit.
For several component credits of the general business credit, known as specified credits, a taxpayer’s tentative minimum tax liability is deemed to be zero. Consequently, these credits are potentially deductible in full against AMT liability. The tax liability limitation is also modified to allow the empowerment zone employment credit component of the general business credit to offset up to 25% of a taxpayer’s AMT liability.
Ordering Rules for the General Business Credit
Carryforwards of the general business credit are used first (starting with the earliest carryforwards), followed by the current year business credit, and then by any credits carried back to the tax year. Earned tax credits that are later repealed continue to be eligible for carryforwards. If the tax liability limit is exceeded for the tax year, the component credits of the carryforward, current year business credit, or carryback are used in the order the component credits are listed in IRC §38(b).
Elective Payment Election and Credit Transfers
Applicable entities may treat current applicable credits as direct tax payments against federal income taxes, thereby making the credits refundable. These include certain clean energy tax credits that were either enacted or modified in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-169). Applicable entities include tax-exempt organizations, state or political subdivisions, Indian tribal governments, Alaska Native Corporations, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and rural electric cooperative corporations. 
A taxpayer that is not an applicable entity may elect to transfer (sell) eligible credits for cash. Eligible credits are the applicable credits, excepting the IRC §45W qualified commercial vehicle credit. However, if the business that generates the credit carries it forward or backward, the business is barred from selling that carried-forward or carried-back amount. For the buyer, there are no restrictions on carrying forward or carrying backward any unused amounts of purchased credits.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12685/IN12685.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12685.html
IF13211,Fossil Fuel Tax Benefits,2026-04-29T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T14:52:57Z,Active,Resources,"Nicholas E. Buffie, Donald J. Marples",Energy Tax Policy,"In recent years, lawmakers have expressed interest in federal subsidies for the domestic fossil fuel industry. This In Focus provides high-level descriptions of fossil fuel income tax benefits and their costs, including tax benefits that discourage greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and other fossil fuel tax benefits. More detailed descriptions of all relevant provisions are in CRS Report R46865, Energy Tax Provisions: Overview and Budgetary Cost.
Introduction
Tax benefits—credits, deductions, and other ways of lowering a company’s or individual’s tax bill—are the primary type of subsidy used by fossil fuel producers. A 2023 study from the Energy Information Administration found that tax benefits constituted 85% of all federal subsidies for fossil fuel interests from FY2016 to FY2022.
Estimates from the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) suggest that the largest fossil fuel tax benefits total about $19.1 billion over FY2025-FY2029, an average of $3.8 billion per year. Not included in that total are some provisions that are described as having de minimis costs (i.e., less than $250 million over five years) or that do not have JCT estimates. Each provision is described below with JCT estimates when available. Also, companies with fossil fuel operations at times invest in geothermal, offshore wind, and other energy sources that may qualify for renewable energy tax credits. Those credits are not discussed below.
Fossil Fuel Tax Benefits Designed to Reduce Pollution and GHG Emissions
Credit for carbon oxide sequestration—$9.2 billion over FY2025-FY2029
Taxpayers may claim the carbon oxide sequestration credit for captured carbon dioxide and monoxide amounts. For taxpayers meeting prevailing wage and apprenticeship (PWA) requirements, the credit amounts are $180 per metric ton that is captured using Direct Air Capture (DAC) technologies and $85 per ton captured using non-DAC technologies. Captured carbon oxides must be geologically sequestered or reused by the taxpayer. Credit amounts will be adjusted for inflation starting in 2027 and are reduced if the taxpayer receives financing from tax-exempt bonds or does not meet the PWA requirements. This credit may be used by fossil-fuel-powered electricity facilities, but it may also be claimed by owners of industrial facilities and DAC facilities. The cost of the credit is $9.2 billion over five years, an average of $1.8 billion per year, though some of the benefit accrues to owners of industrial facilities or DAC facilities rather than to fossil fuel companies.
Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) credit—de minimis costs
A tax credit equal to 15% of qualified domestic enhanced oil recovery (EOR) costs is available when oil prices are below a certain threshold ($28 per barrel in 1991 dollars) that rises with inflation each year. Injecting carbon dioxide into the ground, where it is to be geologically sequestered, counts as a qualifying domestic EOR cost.
Expensing of tertiary injectants—de minimis costs
Certain tertiary injectant costs, including the operating and recycling costs associated with below-ground carbon dioxide sequestration, may be deducted immediately (i.e., expensed) rather than over the useful life of the asset. Costs for recoverable hydrocarbon injectants are not included.
Amortization of air pollution control facilities—de minimis costs
Certain air pollution control facilities used in connection with coal-fired power plants are given five- or seven-year amortization periods, allowing quicker upfront deductions for the facilities than would be allowed under normal tax law. The amortizable basis of a qualifying facility may be reduced by 20% in certain circumstances.
Fossil Fuel Tax Benefits Not Based on Pollution or GHG Emissions
Percentage depletion for oil and gas companies—$3.4 billion over FY2025-FY2029
Certain independent oil and gas producers may claim percentage depletion rather than cost depletion. The former allowance is 15% of gross income from the property, not to exceed 100% of taxable income from the property and 65% of all taxable income. Oil and gas producers may claim percentage depletion on up to 1,000 barrels of average daily production, or an equivalent amount of natural gas.
Exceptions for publicly traded partnerships with qualified income derived from energy-related activities—$3.2 billion over FY2025-FY2029
Publicly traded partnerships are treated as corporations for tax purposes. An exception occurs if 90% or more of a partnership’s gross income comes from certain sources, including the exploration, development, mining, refining, production, transportation, and marketing of fossil fuels or other energy sources. The total cost of this provision is $4.4 billion; CRS calculations remove $1.2 billion for other energy sources, leaving $3.2 billion for fossil fuels.
Expensing of exploration and development costs for oil and gas companies—$2.3 billion over FY2025-FY2029
The costs associated with identifying and preparing natural resources for extraction may be expensed.
Tax credit for metallurgical coal—$709 million over FY2025-FY2029
The Advanced Manufacturing Production Credit, as enacted by P.L. 117-169, subsidizes the domestic production of certain inverters, battery components, solar and wind energy components, and critical minerals. The FY2025 reconciliation law added “metallurgical coal which is suitable for use in the production of steel” to the list of qualifying critical minerals. Qualifying metallurgical coal can be imported or produced domestically and is eligible for a credit equal to 2.5% of production costs through 2029.
Amortization of geological and geophysical expenditures associated with oil and gas exploration—$300 million over FY2025-FY2029
Geological and geophysical (G&G) costs are associated with determining the location and potential size of a natural resource or mineral deposit. These costs would generally be viewed as intangible assets, which are typically amortized over 15 years. Most producers may amortize G&G expenditures over two years, and major integrated oil companies may amortize over seven years. 
The total cost of the five provisions above is $9.9 billion, an average of $2.0 billion per year. Provisions with de minimis costs or no estimates by the JCT are described below.
Credit for producing oil and gas from marginal wells—de minimis costs
A tax credit is available for producing oil or gas from marginal wells when oil and gas prices are below certain thresholds. The credit for natural gas is unavailable most years, and the credit for crude oil has never been available, as oil prices have never fallen below the relevant threshold.
Seven-year MACRS for Alaska natural gas pipelines—de minimis costs
Since 2014, a Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery System (MACRS) period of seven years has been provided for certain large natural gas pipelines in Alaska. MACRS and other forms of accelerated depreciation allow businesses to deduct costs more quickly than they would under normal tax rules. (Natural gas pipelines, like other types of business property, became eligible for expensing starting in 2025.)
Fossil fuel capital gains tax treatment—estimate not provided by the JCT
Certain sales of coal under royalty contracts qualify for taxation as capital gains rather than as ordinary income.
Safe harbor from arbitrage rules for prepaid natural gas—estimate not provided by the JCT
This provision allows tax-exempt bonds to be used to finance prepaid natural gas contracts without applying otherwise applicable arbitrage rules.
Seven-year MACRS for natural gas gathering lines—estimate not provided by the JCT
Natural gas gathering lines have a seven-year MACRS period, which is shorter than their projected useful life.
Passive loss rules for working interests in oil and gas property—estimate not provided by the JCT
Deductions from passive trade or business activities, to the extent they exceed income from all such passive activities, generally may not be deducted against other income. Working interests in oil or gas property are exempt from these rules and may be deducted against other income.
Scale and Impact on Global Warming
Based on projections from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the JCT, fossil fuel tax benefits (including those meant to lower emissions) will equal 0.07% of federal spending and 0.05% of revenues over FY2025-FY2029.
The Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center (TPC) concludes that the effects of fossil fuel tax benefits on global warming are “likely minor,” noting that “any increase in domestic production they induce mostly displaces imports rather than raising domestic fuel consumption.” The TPC also cites a study from the National Academy of Sciences, which finds that such tax benefits likely reduce GHG emissions because they encourage displacement of coal by natural gas. (Coal has roughly twice the GHG emissions of natural gas.)
JCT Estimates vs. Other Estimates
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has found that annual fossil fuel subsidies amount to $7.4 trillion worldwide and more than $1.1 trillion in the United States. The latter figure is three orders of magnitude greater than the total reported by the JCT. The discrepancy largely reflects the IMF’s decision to include both explicit and implicit subsidies in its reported totals. Explicit subsidies are tax breaks or spending programs benefiting fossil fuel companies or users. Implicit subsidies represent forgone revenues from lawmakers’ decision to not levy a carbon tax or other fee that would account for the social costs of pollution. For the United States, virtually all the subsidies are implicit: The IMF reports that in 2024, fossil fuels were given $1.1 trillion of implicit subsidies and $18.2 billion ($0.0182 trillion) of explicit subsidies across all levels of government (federal, state, and local). This lower amount of explicit subsidies is closer to the JCT’s estimates.
During the Biden Administration, the Department of the Treasury produced higher estimates than the JCT for specific fossil fuel tax benefits. For example, the JCT estimates that percentage depletion for oil and gas companies reduces five-year revenues by $3.4 billion, whereas the Biden Treasury reported that it reduces revenues by $6.9 billion.
Two methodological differences explain much of the discrepancies between the two sets of estimates. First, the JCT estimates the costs of fossil fuel tax benefits under current law, whereas the Biden Treasury estimated the savings from repealing such benefits alongside other reforms. For example, the Biden Administration proposed raising the corporate tax rate from 21% to 28%, which would have made deductions from taxable income more costly. Second, the JCT assumes that if a given tax benefit is eliminated, taxpayers will claim the next-largest benefit available, whereas the Treasury assumes that taxpayers are prevented from claiming other benefits. The JCT and Treasury estimates also differ in more minor ways, such as their treatment of passive loss rules, inclusion of negative tax expenditures, baseline projections for economic growth, and methods of rounding low-cost provisions. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13211/IF13211.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13211.html
IF13210,The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA): Issues for the 119th Congress,2026-04-29T04:00:00Z,2026-04-30T10:53:31Z,Active,Resources,Anthony R. Marshak,,"The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, as amended (MSA; 16 U.S.C. §1801 et seq.), is the primary law authorizing the conservation and management of U.S. federal marine fisheries (i.e., those occurring in waters up to 200 nautical miles beyond state or territorial waters). First enacted in April 1976 (P.L. 94-265), MSA governs both commercial and recreational fisheries, in addition to nontarget fishery species (e.g., ecosystem component species). Among its provisions, MSA established eight Regional Fishery Management Councils (FMCs), which develop fishery management plans and/or fishery ecosystem plans. These plans are jointly implemented with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) following their approval by the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary).
Since its enactment, Congress has extensively amended MSA’s provisions twice; first in 1996 (P.L. 104-297) and again in 2006 (P.L. 109-479). Although the act’s authorization of appropriations expired at the end of FY2013, MSA requirements remain in effect and Congress has continued to appropriate funds for NMFS and partners to administer the act. Proposals to extensively amend MSA in the past several Congresses include bills such as the Sustaining America’s Fisheries for the Future Act of 2025 (H.R. 3718 in the 119th Congress; similar legislation in the 117th [H.R. 4690] and 118th [H.R. 8862] Congresses) and the Strengthening Fishing Communities and Increasing Flexibility in Fisheries Management Act (H.R. 59 in the 117th Congress and H.R. 200 in the 115th Congress).
Fisheries Policy Challenges and Considerations
During the first decade after MSA’s passage, fisheries policy focused primarily on controlling and replacing foreign (i.e., non-U.S.) fishing off the United States and on developing U.S. fisheries in the newly declared 200-nautical-mile Fishery Conservation Zone. Subsequently, U.S. fisheries management priorities have shifted to include sustaining fishery populations and responding to overfishing. One ongoing policy challenge for decisionmakers is the balance between conservation and utilization of fish populations. Despite MSA provisions seeking to prevent fishery stocks from becoming overfished and requiring the rebuilding of overfished stocks, questions remain regarding the timing and implementation of management actions. Further, some stakeholders continue to raise concerns about stocks that remain overfished, the quality of data used to assess the status of certain stocks (e.g., some call for increased inclusion of state-based survey data in NMFS stock assessments), and other topics. In accounting for different management objectives, relevant factors include allocating fishery resources among users; developing and supporting management bodies; and investing in fisheries management and research. 
Additional considerations in the 119th Congress may include accounting for impacts of environmental drivers on fisheries and fishing communities; addressing bycatch (i.e., nontarget catch) and its effects on managed species; and accounting for marine ecosystems and their components (e.g., forage fish) in management actions. Fisheries legislation introduced in recent Congresses has focused on these and other types of issues. Congress also may continue to show interest in and provide oversight of federal and interstate fisheries management activities. For example, in April 2025, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 14276, “Restoring American Seafood Competitiveness,” which required multiple federal actions with respect to U.S. fisheries science and management and the seafood trade. In June 2025, the House Subcommittee on Water, Wildlife and Fisheries held a hearing during which Members discussed the E.O., MSA, and other related issues.
Legislation in the 119th Congress
Among its actions, the 119th Congress passed the Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-74, Division A) in January 2026. The explanatory statement and reports accompanying the law included directives to NMFS with respect to particular federal fisheries (e.g., South Atlantic reef fishes), fishery surveys, and other MSA-related activities. In the 119th Congress, Members have introduced legislation focused on elements pertaining to fisheries and their management under MSA. Issues include refinements to fishery disaster assistance, fisheries science as carried out primarily by NMFS, and the fisheries management process, such as increased focus on marine ecosystem considerations. A proposed resolution (H.Con.Res. 85) also would recognize the 50th anniversary of MSA and the act’s impact on U.S. fisheries management. Bills seeking to amend MSA are summarized below (most have had few actions since introduction). Some bills were introduced in the 118th Congress with similar language. Some other 118th Congress proposals that sought to amend MSA may be of interest in the 119th Congress.
Bills Seeking to Amend Fishery Disaster Assistance
Members of Congress have remained interested in refining federal fishery disaster assistance since enactment of the Fishery Resource Disasters Improvement Act (P.L. 117-328, Division S, Title II), and more recently the Fishery Improvement to Streamline untimely regulatory Hurdles post Emergency Situation Act (FISHES Act; P.L. 118-229), which both amended provisions in Section 312(a) of MSA governing fishery disaster assistance. Related bills introduced in the 119th Congress include H.R. 4800, the Fisheries Modernization Act of 2025, which would amend MSA to make certain freshwater crawfish fisheries eligible for fishery disaster assistance, and H.R. 6150, the Protect American Fisheries Act of 2025, which would amend MSA to include an economic cause as an eligible reason for assistance. In the 119th Congress, some Members also have sought other forms of financial assistance for fishing communities, such as proposed expansions of U.S. Department of Agriculture loans and grants to include fishers and seafood producers as eligible recipients (e.g., S. 4236, American Seafood Competitiveness Act of 2026) and directing NOAA and the National Academy of Public Administration to investigate the feasibility of a fishery disaster insurance program for seafood harvesters (S.Rept. 119-44 accompanying P.L. 119-74).
Bills Seeking to Amend Fisheries Science Mandates
In the 119th Congress, some Members of Congress have proposed amending provisions in MSA that intersect with fisheries science, including with respect to data used to inform recreational fisheries, and bycatch reduction and mitigation efforts. H.R. 5699, the Fisheries Data Modernization and Accuracy Act of 2025, would require NOAA to reform the NMFS Marine Recreational Information Program (MRIP) and require NMFS to establish a standing committee with the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine to discuss recreational fisheries data collection and management. Among its contents, the bill also would allow for a given state, with approval of NOAA, to collect recreational fishing catch and effort data in state and federal waters for federally managed species, and require NOAA to develop and implement a plan to use those data in place of those collected via MRIP. The bill also would direct NOAA to establish a competitive program for independent entities to conduct fishery-independent surveys on behalf of NMFS. Further, the bill would amend MSA to include a definition of the term stock assessment, require NMFS to publish a plan for its stock assessments, and stipulate additional requirements regarding FMC procedures and meetings. Among its contents, S. 3923, the Weather Research and Forecasting Innovation Reauthorization Act of 2026, similarly would amend MSA to require NMFS to publish its planned stock assessments and surveys for an upcoming fiscal year.
H.R. 6939, the Bycatch Reduction and Research Act of 2026, and S. 3579, they Bycatch Reduction and Research Act of 2025, seek to address data and research gaps in Alaskan fisheries and to prioritize technologies in support of research, bycatch reduction, and marine habitat conservation. Among their contents, the bills would reconstitute the Alaska Salmon Research Task Force to form a “Bycatch Reduction and Research Task Force,” and serve as a review body for related NMFS research and reports. The task force would provide recommendations for future NMFS work related to bycatch in Alaskan fisheries. The bills additionally would direct NMFS to carry out ecosystem analyses on the effects of trawl gears on Alaskan marine habitats (including use of electronic monitoring and reporting, cooperative research, and other approaches to reduce bycatch and marine habitat disturbances in Alaskan fishing practices) and enter into public-private partnerships (e.g., with states, nonprofit organizations, or Tribes) to conduct research on Alaska-origin salmon. Further, the bills would amend MSA to include a “Bycatch Mitigation and Habitat Protection Assistance Fund,” administered by the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation, to provide funding to fishers and commercial vessel owners and operators to purchase or modify fishing gear, equipment, and technologies to reduce or mitigate bycatch and impacts to habitats from trawling.
Bills Seeking to Amend Fisheries Management
Members of Congress have introduced legislation in the 119th Congress that would amend MSA to address interactions among certain species and managing for their effects on particular fisheries. Among its contents, H.R. 3714, the Forage Fish Conservation Act of 2025, would direct the Secretary, with advice from FMCs, to issue a definition of forage fish and amend MSA to include such definition; and would include specific directives regarding the management of forage fish. Among their contents, H.R. 207 as passed the House and S. 2314 as reported, the Supporting the Health of Aquatic systems through Research Knowledge and Enhanced Dialogue Act of 2025 (SHARKED Act of 2025), would amend MSA to include projects related to addressing shark depredation as a priority area for cooperative research funding. Relatedly, H.R. 3831, the Florida Safe Seas Act of 2025, would amend MSA to prohibit the feeding of sharks in federal waters off the state of Florida. Some Members have noted that the bill’s intent also is to mitigate shark depredation off Florida. In addition, some Members of Congress have introduced legislation that would account for shifting distributions of fishery species in management. Among its contents, S. 3658, the Supporting Healthy Interstate Fisheries in Transition Act (SHIFT Act), would amend MSA with directives to NMFS and FMCs for managing fishery species with shifting distributions, including novel fisheries resulting from these shifts.
Additional bills in the 119th Congress have focused on amending MSA as related to specific aspects of U.S. fisheries and their management. H.R. 2375/S. 1152, the Rhode Island Fishermen’s Fairness Act, would amend MSA to include representatives from Rhode Island on the Mid-Atlantic FMC. S. 3923 also would amend MSA to require the Secretary to include in annual reports to Congress on the status of U.S. fisheries information about the adequacy of data available for assessing particular fishery stocks and information to identify priority assessments and surveys for addressing uncertainty in stock assessments, among other priorities for species management. Further, among its contents, H.R. 3718 would amend MSA with respect to providing assistance to U.S. working waterfronts; administering limited access privilege programs; and accounting for climate-related distribution shifts. The bill also would refine FMC requirements and representation (e.g., adding tribal representatives to the North Pacific FMC); address science and technologies to inform fisheries management, including for sharks; and amend provisions related to essential fish habitat, bycatch, and rebuilding of fishery populations, among other factors.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13210/IF13210.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13210.html
R48931,Sports Reform in the United States: College Athletics and the Olympic Sports Pipeline,2026-04-28T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:53:42Z,Active,Reports,Ben Wilhelm,,"In the United States, the last decade has seen substantial disruption of both college and Olympic sports. The two systems are closely integrated because college athletic programs function as an essential part of America’s Olympic sports pipeline by providing opportunities for elite training and competition to top athletes. College sports, in particular, are in the process of a substantial transformation brought on by the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA’s) 2021 decision—under pressure from courts, state legislatures, and other stakeholders—to pause enforcement of its rules that barred student-athletes from making money by signing agreements with third parties allowing for the use of their personal name, image, and likeness (NIL). Following that decision, the NCAA, member institutions, and current and former players settled a lawsuit challenging those rules. In their place, the parties have agreed to a system that allows most NIL payments as well as revenue sharing with players from their institutions.
These changes have the potential to significantly alter the American collegiate and Olympic sports landscapes. Collegiate athletic departments have a long history of offering major spectator sports such as football and basketball, which can generate enough revenue to support themselves, as well as a variety of Olympic sports, which generally do not. Cost considerations aside, collegiate support is vitally important for Olympic sports, as intercollegiate competition through colleges and universities is the primary training ground for athletes working to break through into elite, international competition. Additionally, because colleges and universities fund Olympic sports training, there is substantially less pressure on the federal government to provide dedicated funding for elite sports, which is how most other countries fund their Olympic programs. 
In the face of this legal and financial uncertainty for intercollegiate and Olympic sports, many stakeholders believe that Congress may be uniquely positioned to address some of the key issues related to college sports in a way that both provides certainty for organizations including the NCAA and locks in rights and protections for athletes. This report examines these issues, what legislative options Congress might have if it chooses to act, and what proposals are currently under consideration.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48931/R48931.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48931.html
R48921,Paid Sick Leave in the United States,2026-04-28T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T10:45:51Z,Active,Reports,Sarah A. Donovan,"Wages & Benefits, Employer-Provided Leave Benefits","Paid sick leave is generally a compensated, excused absence from work for the purposes of medical recovery, treatment, or examination. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 80% of private sector workers had access to paid sick leave in March 2025, but the availability of leave was not uniform across occupations and industries. 
While federal law generally does not entitle private sector employees to paid sick leave, 18 states (including the District of Columbia) have laws that require private sector employers to provide paid sick leave to their employees and 3 additional states require employers to provide paid leave that can be used for any purpose. Some employers who are not covered by state leave mandates elect to include paid sick leave as part of their compensation packages, or provide it as part of collective bargaining agreements with employees. 
Congress has considered a range of proposals to expand workers’ access to paid sick leave, including by mandating employer-provided paid sick leave or by allowing employees to be compensated for overtime hours in paid leave in lieu of overtime pay (“comp time”). Proponents of federal policies to increase access to paid sick leave often cite its potential to improve worker well-being, workplace productivity, and public health. While recognizing possible gains, some observers have cautioned that federal leave policies should account for employers’ costs or allow employers to tailor leave policies to the specific needs of their workplaces. 
This report provides an overview of employees’ access to paid sick leave in the United States, discusses state laws that create an entitlement to such leave and research on the impacts of these mandates, and describes recent federal proposals to increase access to paid sick leave.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48921/R48921.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48921.html
IN12684,Changes to CDC Vaccine Recommendations in 2025 and 2026,2026-04-28T04:00:00Z,2026-04-30T09:23:14Z,Active,Posts,"Kavya Sekar, Alexandria K. Mickler",,"Since U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (hereinafter, HHS Secretary) was sworn in on February 13, 2025, HHS has changed several long-standing federal vaccine recommendations. In addition, HHS has issued recommendations for vaccines newly licensed (i.e., approved) by the Food and Drug Administration. This CRS Insight summarizes vaccine recommendation changes to date and related developments. 
For over 60 years prior to 2025, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)—a committee of scientific and health experts in immunization—made vaccine recommendations to HHS, particularly the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). For each vaccine recommendation, ACIP typically reviewed scientific evidence, developed a new or updated recommendation, and then voted on the recommendation. ACIP’s recommendation was subsequently reviewed by the CDC Director, who decided whether to adopt it as an official HHS/CDC recommendation. 
ACIP also voted annually, typically in the fall, to update the following year’s childhood/adolescent and adult immunization schedules. These consolidated schedules list CDC’s recommendations for vaccines routinely offered to patients, presented in a format to aid clinical practice. Many federal and state laws reference ACIP’s recommendations and CDC’s immunization schedules. 
In 2025 and 2026, HHS changed several aspects of policy and practice related to ACIP and CDC vaccine recommendations. On June 9, 2025, the HHS Secretary removed all 17 then-sitting ACIP committee members and subsequently appointed new members. At the June, September, and December meetings, the reconstituted committee voted on several vaccine recommendations, which CDC/HHS subsequently adopted. HHS also changed multiple vaccine recommendations without consulting ACIP, including for the entire childhood immunization schedule in January 2026. The changes made after June 11, 2025, are currently stayed by a district court order, meaning that they presently have no effect and the agency cannot implement them (as discussed further below).
HHS Vaccine Recommendation Changes in 2025 and 2026
The following changes in federal vaccine recommendations include both changes in ACIP recommendations that were officially adopted as CDC/HHS recommendations and CDC/HHS changes made without ACIP consultation. The following does not summarize changes to travel vaccine recommendations.
April 15-16, 2025 (ACIP Meeting) 
ACIP recommended that the meningitis vaccine, MenACWY, may be used when both MenACWY and MenB vaccines are indicated at the same visit. 
ACIP recommended that adults 50-59 years of age who are at increased risk of severe RSV disease receive a single dose of RSV vaccine. 
May 27, 2025
The HHS Secretary posted on X that CDC would stop recommending COVID-19 vaccines for children and pregnant women. 
CDC’s webpages subsequently reflected changes to COVID-19 vaccine recommendations, which changed from all children to a “shared clinical-decision making” recommendation (SCDM), where patients and providers discuss the benefits and risks of vaccination to determine whether to vaccinate; for pregnant women, the recommendation changed to “no guidance/not applicable.”
June 25-26, 2025 (ACIP Meeting) 
ACIP recommended one dose of a new RSV immunization, clesrovimab, for infants eight months of age or less born during or entering their first RSV season who are not protected by maternal vaccination. ACIP did not issue a preferential recommendation for either of the approved RSV immunizations for this population (i.e., clesrovimab and nirsevimab).
ACIP reaffirmed its recommendations for routine annual influenza (flu) vaccination for all persons aged six months and older who do not have contraindications for the 2025-2026 season. 
ACIP recommended to discontinue use of flu vaccines that contain thimerosal.
September 18-19, 2025 (ACIP Meeting)
ACIP changed COVID-19 vaccine recommendations for adults and children from universal to SCDM. 
ACIP recommended against the use of measles, mumps, rubella and varicella (MMRV) vaccines. Children were recommended to receive separate varicella vaccine and MMR vaccines. Prior to this change, the MMRV vaccine was preferentially recommended over separate vaccinations in certain situations. 
December 4-5, 2025 (ACIP Meeting) 
ACIP changed the Hepatitis B recommendation for infants, including newborns, from universal to SCDM. ACIP also recommended evaluating the need for subsequent Hepatitis B doses in children based on antibody testing results. 
January 5, 2026
CDC announced a new 2026 childhood immunization schedule that included six changes reflecting vaccine recommendations developed by federal health officials and two prior ACIP-recommended changes (see COVID-19 changes under “May 27, 2025” and Hepatitis B changes under “December 4-5, 2025 (ACIP Meeting)” and Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Comparison of 2025 and 2026 Childhood Immunization Schedules
/
Source: Figure developed by CRS. The “Prev. CDC/ACIP Recommendation” column is from CDC, Recommended Child and Adolescent Immunization Schedule for Ages 18 Years and Younger, 2025. The “2026 CDC Recommendation” column is from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Childhood Immunization Schedule by Recommended Group, 2026.
Notes: *Changed by ACIP in 2025 and reaffirmed in the January 2026 schedule.
**CDC previously categorized the recommendation to receive one-dose of RSV immunization as a recommendation for “All Children” and specified that this recommendation is for infants (<7 months) unprotected by maternal vaccination. The CDC also recommended a second dose for “certain high-risk groups or populations.” The 2026 change maintains both recommendations but recategorizes the first recommendation of “All Children” as a recommendation for “Certain High-Risk Groups or Populations.”
Current Status of Vaccine Recommendations
In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Kennedy, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a stay on March 16, 2026, postponing the effective date of the revised 2026 childhood immunization schedule, the appointments of 13 ACIP members appointed by the HHS Secretary beginning in June 2025, and all committee votes after June 11, 2025.
The stay stops the CDC from implementing changed vaccine recommendations after June 11, 2025, mostly reverting the childhood and adult immunization schedules to the 2025 versions (except for the April 2025 CDC/ACIP recommendations that remain in effect). The now-stayed ACIP members’ votes included a June 2025 vote to recommend a new RSV immunization, clesrovimab, for infants (as discussed above), which was not on the 2025 CDC immunization schedule. It is unclear whether a CDC/ACIP recommendation for clesrovimab remains, which could affect health care coverage of that immunization under federal law. The CDC/ACIP recommendation for the other RSV immunization for infants, nirsevimab, remains in effect.
Although the stay affected several 2025 and 2026 CDC vaccine recommendations, HHS may continue to change or issue new vaccine recommendations without violating the court’s order. On April 6, 2026, CDC published a Federal Register notice to renew a revised version of ACIP’s charter, which outlines ACIP’s objectives, scope of activities, and duties. The revised charter expands the potential scope of expertise for committee membership, modifies the committee’s objectives to focus more on vaccine safety considerations, and may signal that HHS/CDC intends to appoint new ACIP members. A newly formed committee could then vote on additional vaccine recommendations. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12684/IN12684.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12684.html
IG10094,Constitutional Equal Protection Analysis,2026-04-28T04:00:00Z,2026-04-29T10:23:03Z,Active,Infographics,April J. Anderson,"Fifth Amendment, Equal Protection, Jurisprudence, Civil Rights & Liberties","/
Constitutional Equal Protection Analysis
""No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."" - U.S. CONST. amend. XIV S 1 
OBLIGATION 
Equal protection obligations apply to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment. 
RESTRICTION 
Equal protection restricts the ways the government can classify similarly situated individuals. 
JUSTIFICATION 
The justification required (called the level of scrutiny) depends on the type of classification. 
Is a statute, regulation, or other government action singling someone out for a burden or a benefit? 
YES What is the basis for the different treatment? 
NO 
The government can make some distinctions, for example reporting race and sex in census data, without equal protection review. 
Kind of classification Race, Color, National Origin, Alienage, or Ancestry* 
National origin, alienage, and ancestry are only sometimes included in this group. 
Level of scrutiny Strict Scrutiny 
Narrowly tailored to serve A compelling government interest 
(Often, the claimed government interest is to remedy past discrimination) 
This level of review is stringent and very difficult for the government to satisfy. 
Sex, Gender, Nonmarital Children 
The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether this category includes sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Intermediate Scrutiny 
M Substantially related to, An important government objective 
This level of review is easier for the government to meet than strict scrutiny but requires more careful assessment than rational basis review. 
Other Reasons 
Examples include classifications based on income, disability, or veteran status. 
Rational Basis Review 
M Reasonably related to A legitimate government interest 
This standard is relatively easy to satisfy. 
Activities Violating Equal Protection 
Examples: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard coll., 600 U.S. 81 (2023) 
Holding, among other things, that university racial admissions preferences were not narrowly tailored to serve an interest in promoting diversity. 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
 State's sex-based age limits for beer sales were not substantially related to a government interest in 
traffic safety. 
City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
City’s ban on group homes for people with disabilities failed rational basis review because it was based on prejudice against disability. 
*The Court has been more deferential to federal (as opposed to state) classifications based on alienage, typically reviewing challenges under a less stringent, rational basis standard. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). Using ancestry sometimes, but not always, triggers strict scrutiny. Native American identity is a race or ancestry category subject to strict scrutiny, but tribal membership can be a political category subject to rational basis review. Morton v. Mancari, 417 US. 535, 552 (1974). 
Information as of April 28, 2026. Prepared by April Anderson, Legislative Attorney, and Mari Lee, Visual Information Specialist. For more information, see CRS lnFocus IF 12391, Equal Protection: Strict Scrutiny of Racial Classifications (2023). 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/PDF/IG10094/IG10094.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IG/HTML/IG10094.html
R48926,Enforcement of Federal Pollution Control Laws,2026-04-27T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T11:45:43Z,Active,Reports,"Cassandra J. Barnum, Kate R. Bowers, Andrew S. Coghlan",,"Congress has enacted an array of statutes designed to protect the environment and human health from the impacts of pollution. These laws allow the government, and sometimes private parties, to pursue enforcement actions against those who violate statutory requirements or prohibitions. Whether and how the statutes are enforced informs how well they achieve Congress’s legislative goals. Federal pollution control statutes generally require regulated entities to apply for, obtain, and abide by permits to conduct certain activities involving potential discharges of pollutants to the environment. These laws also typically have robust recordkeeping and reporting requirements, which facilitate government oversight. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) monitors compliance pursuant to its civil inspection and criminal investigation authorities.
EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) typically conduct enforcement actions on behalf of the federal government. Many statutes also authorize “citizen suits”—lawsuits by nonfederal actors seeking injunctive relief or penalties with respect to alleged violations. Enforcement actions generally fall into one of three broad categories: administrative enforcement, civil judicial enforcement, and criminal enforcement.
Administrative enforcement refers to actions taken by EPA outside the court system. Such actions can include orders to take corrective action, withdrawal of permits, and imposition of penalties up to certain amounts. These actions require various degrees of process; some corrective action orders can be issued based on an agency determination that a violation has occurred, while permit withdrawals or money penalties typically follow a hearing where the accused has an opportunity to submit evidence to a neutral adjudicator. Administrative enforcement actions are subject to judicial review, allowing courts to determine whether agencies have acted within the scope of their statutory and constitutional authority. Exercising that power of review, the Supreme Court recently held that administrative hearings may violate the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, though the effect of that ruling on EPA’s administrative enforcement actions remains unsettled. 
Civil judicial enforcement refers to lawsuits against alleged violators filed in federal court by the federal government or by nonfederal actors, including state and local governments, private citizens, and advocacy groups. Plaintiffs must prove violations by a preponderance of the evidence, and consequences can include both monetary penalties and injunctive relief (often involving cleanup of polluted sites or actions to assure prospective compliance). Settlements of civil judicial actions can be private, out-of-court agreements or can be formalized in a consent decree enforceable by a court. Civil judicial enforcement cases initiated by nonfederal actors implicate an additional suite of legal considerations that arise under Article III of the Constitution, which limits federal court jurisdiction to cases or controversies. Unlike the federal government, citizen suit plaintiffs must demonstrate their “standing” to bring suit by showing that they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the alleged violation and redressable by available remedies.
Criminal prosecution is generally reserved for violations committed with a particular degree of intent, or mens rea. Various environmental statutes criminalize violations committed negligently, knowingly, or willfully. Environmental laws prohibiting “knowing violation” of a permit or regulatory requirement have led courts to consider whether defendants must be aware only of their actions or also that their actions violate such requirements. The answer sometimes depends on the subject matter of the law; courts have found that certain “public welfare offenses” involving hazardous devices or substances can require a reduced showing of knowledge without offending due process, but courts have disagreed about whether the various environmental laws fall within this category. Corporations may be liable for environmental crimes based on the actions of their employees, and certain “responsible corporate officers” may be prosecuted for actions taken by subordinates. Applicable criminal penalties include jail time, criminal fines, and special conditions of probation.
The executive branch enjoys broad discretion in its enforcement of environmental laws, subject to certain constitutional constraints. Various policies govern EPA’s and DOJ’s exercise of that enforcement discretion, many of which vary widely across presidential administrations. Supplemental environmental projects, in which a judicial settlement involves a commitment to undertake a project benefiting the environment, have been a particular source of controversy in recent years. To alter the terms of environmental enforcement, Congress may amend underlying statutes to redefine violations, change who may enforce a statute, or change the penalties and remedies that may be imposed for statutory violations. Congress also may use its appropriations power to increase or decrease funding for enforcement activities or conduct oversight on changing enforcement policies and priorities across administrations.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48926/R48926.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48926.html
R48922,Comparison of House- and Senate-Passed Versions of H.R. 6644,2026-04-27T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T12:24:31Z,Active,Reports,"Henry G. Watson, Katie Jones, Maggie McCarty, Andrew P. Scott, Darryl E. Getter",,"Each chamber of Congress has considered and approved a multifaceted housing bill in the 119th Congress: 
On August 1, 2025, the Senate Banking Committee reported the Renewing Opportunity in the American Dream (ROAD) to Housing Act of 2025 (S. 2651). On October 9, 2025, a version of that bill passed the Senate as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (S. 2296). 
On January 15, 2026, the House Financial Services Committee reported a separate housing bill, the Housing for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 6644). A revised version was passed by the House on February 9, 2026. 
On March 12, 2026, the Senate passed a substitute amendment to H.R. 6644 under the short title of the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act. The Senate’s amended version included several provisions from the ROAD to Housing Act of 2025. 
This report compares the latter two bills: the House-passed Housing for the 21st Century Act (H.R. 6644 as passed by the House) and the Senate-passed 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act (H.R. 6644 as amended in the Senate). 
The House-passed Housing for the 21st Century Act and the Senate-passed 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act address similar housing policy topics, with some substantive differences. Several sections in the House bill have no corresponding section in the Senate bill. There are also several sections in the Senate bill that have no corresponding section in the House bill. Other sections correspond between the House and Senate bills, addressing the same topic. In some sections, the texts of the two bills are identical or have only technical changes; in other sections, they have substantive differences.
The tables in this report provide a side-by-side comparison of the House bill and the Senate bill, ordered according to the following major topics: Housing Finance and Homeownership, Manufactured and Modular Housing, State and Local Land Use, Environmental Review, Community Planning and Development Program Reforms, Rental Housing Assistance Program Reforms, Other Program Reforms, New Housing and Community Development Grants, Studies and Oversight, Banking and Offsets, Institutional Investors, and Central Bank Digital Currencies.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48922/R48922.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48922.html
R48918,The 2026 Farm Bill (H.R. 7567): Comparison with Current Law,2026-04-27T04:00:00Z,2026-04-30T11:08:51Z,Active,Reports,"Lisa S. Benson, Randy Alison Aussenberg, Eleni G. Bickell, Kelsi Bracmort, Jim Monke, Zachary T. Neuhofer, Anne A. Riddle, Stephanie Rosch, Megan Stubbs, Benjamin Tsui, Christine Whitt, Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Gene Falk, Laura Gatz, Alicyn R. Gitlin, Jason O. Heflin, Kristen Hite, Heather McPherron, Alexandria K. Mickler, Laura Pineda-Bermudez, Karen M. Sutter, Erin H. Ward, Jerry H. Yen","Agriculture Budget & Appropriations, Farm Bill","Congress has established federal policy related to the food and agriculture sectors through periodic farm bills since the 1930s. The farm bill is an omnibus, multiyear law and is the primary piece of legislation that governs an array of agricultural and food programs. The most recent farm bill, the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (2018 farm bill; P.L. 115-334), expired in 2023. It was extended three times, for a year at a time. The latest law to extend the farm bill passed in November 2025 and extended the 2018 farm bill through FY2026 and crop year 2026 (P.L. 119-37, Division E, §5002). 
The Farm, Food, and National Security Act of 2026 (H.R. 7567) would add, amend, and reauthorize some of the programs in the 2018 farm bill. H.R. 7567 was introduced on February 13, 2026. The House Committee on Agriculture considered the bill and ordered it reported favorably, as amended, to the House on March 5, 2026, by a vote of 34-17. This report provides a summary of each title included in H.R. 7567, as amended and ordered reported. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) relied on House Rules Committee Print 119-22, which reflects the introduced version of H.R. 7567 with the House Committee on Agriculture’s adopted amendments. Following the summary of each of the 12 titles included in H.R. 7567, this report includes tables describing each provision in the bill and provides a direct comparison of these provisions to current law. 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a score of H.R. 7567, as introduced, on February 20, 2026, ahead of the House Committee on Agriculture markup. The score indicates that the bill would be budget neutral for mandatory (direct) spending over an 11-year budget window (FY2026-FY2036). In the shorter term, it is expected to increase mandatory spending by $162 million over the first six years (FY2026-FY2031). 
Across Titles I through XII, H.R. 7567 would reauthorize and amend food and agricultural policies in a wide variety of ways, including the following examples. Title 1 of H.R. 7567 would suspend non-expiring farm bill commodity support provisions from the 1930s and 1940s through crop year 2031. Under Title II of H.R. 7567, the Conservation Reserve Program would be reauthorized at its current level of 27 million acres through FY2031. Title III of the bill would move the responsibilities of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) under the Food for Peace Act (P.L. 83-480), as amended, to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), including administration of Food for Peace Title II Grants. Title IV of the bill would generally extend the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and other related nutrition programs through September 30, 2031, and it would include new policies such as authority for states to outsource SNAP certification operations, discretionary funding for local food purchases for food banks and other entities, and the expansion of SNAP food purchases eligible for nutrition incentives. Title V of H.R. 7567 would increase the maximum loan amounts for individual farmers and ranchers who borrow from USDA. Under Title VI of H.R. 7567, USDA would expand the prioritization of funding for certain rural development programs to include projects that address substance abuse and behavioral, maternal, and mental health services.
Title VII of the bill would amend extension and research funding for 1890 land-grant institutions—historically Black colleges and universities designated as land-grant institutions under the Second Morrill Act of 1890—by increasing minimum funding levels for research and extension activities relative to other land-grant institutions and by requiring state governors to annually certify their ability to meet matching fund requirements. Title VIII of the bill addresses a variety of issues related to forestry research, assistance to nonfederal forest owners, and management of federal forestlands, including by amending existing programs and introducing new authorities. Title IX of the bill would reauthorize most of the 2018 farm bill energy title programs and make modifications to selected programs. Title X of H.R. 7567 would reauthorize and amend existing programs and create a new program that supports specialty crops, organic agriculture, local and regional food systems, hemp production, and pesticide regulation. Title XI of the bill would modify the definition of veteran farmers and ranchers used in the Federal Crop Insurance Program and increase premium subsidies available for these individuals, among other program changes. Title XII of H.R. 7567 would require USDA to evaluate the Cattle Fever Tick Eradication Program and to submit a report on USDA support for livestock and poultry operations during animal disease outbreaks to the agriculture committees of jurisdiction.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48918/R48918.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48918.html
IN12683,The FY2027 Mandatory Spending Sequester,2026-04-27T04:00:00Z,2026-04-28T12:24:17Z,Active,Posts,Drew C. Aherne,,"On April 3, 2026, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) submitted its report on the FY2027 mandatory sequester to Congress. On the same day, President Trump issued a sequestration order directing agencies to implement the reductions estimated in OMB’s report.
OMB estimates that a total of $1.54 trillion in mandatory budgetary resources across 260 individual accounts will be subject to reductions under the FY2027 mandatory sequester. This includes $35.32 billion in mandatory budgetary resources in the defense category, $1.37 trillion for Medicare and certain other health programs, and $139.14 billion for other nondefense accounts.
Current law requires OMB to determine required reductions for FY2027 by applying the following sequestration percentages to nonexempt accounts in each category: 
8.3% for defense; 
2% for Medicare and certain other health programs; and 
5.7% for other nondefense accounts. 
Applying these percentages for FY2027, OMB estimates reductions totaling $38.24 billion—including reductions of $2.93 billion in the defense category, $27.37 billion for Medicare and certain other health programs, and $7.93 billion to other nondefense accounts. 
Most reductions under the FY2027 mandatory sequester will begin on October 1, 2026. For Medicare, reductions will begin on April 1, 2027.
Table 1. FY2027 Estimated Sequestrable Resources and Reductions by Category
(in billions of dollars)
Spending Category
Percentage Reduction
Estimated Sequestrable Resources
Estimated Reduction

Defense
8.3%
$35.320
$2.932

Medicare and certain other health programs
2.0%
$1,368.659
$27.373

Other nondefense
5.7%
$139.140
$7.931

Total
—
$1,543.119
$38.236

Source: OMB, OMB Report to the Congress on the BBEDCA 251A Sequestration for Fiscal Year 2027, April 3, 2026, p. 4. 
The Appendix of OMB’s report details estimated reductions required for each nonexempt budget account. These reductions are required to be applied equally to all programs, projects, and activities within affected accounts. 
In his letter accompanying the report, OMB Director Russell T. Vought states that budgetary resources provided in P.L. 119-21—the 2025 reconciliation law—will be “largely unaffected” by the sequester. 
Defense
OMB estimates that $35.32 billion in budgetary resources across 15 individual accounts in the defense category will be subject to a uniform reduction of 8.3% under the FY2027 mandatory sequester. Most budgetary resources subject to sequestration in the defense category are estimated to come from the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) Concurrent Receipt Accrual Payments to the Military Retirement Fund account ($34.41 billion), but also included are budgetary resources from 10 other DOD accounts, two Department of Health and Human Services accounts, and two Department of Labor accounts. 
Under current law, unobligated balances of budget authority carried over from prior fiscal years in the defense category are subject to reductions under the mandatory sequester. For FY2027, OMB estimates that a total of $317 million in such budgetary resources across seven accounts will be subject to the 8.3% uniform reduction.
Medicare and Certain Other Health Programs
Reductions to Medicare and certain other health programs under the mandatory sequester are capped at 2%. OMB estimates that a total of $1.37 trillion in budgetary resources will be subject to 2% reductions under the FY2027 mandatory sequester. 
Medicare spending subject to the 2% limit—estimated to be $1.368 trillion in FY2027—consists mostly of benefit payments under Parts A-D of the program. The remaining budgetary resources in this category come from other health programs for which reductions are limited to 2% under current law. This includes an estimated $1.05 billion for community and migrant health centers and $50 million for Indian Health Services.
Other Nondefense
OMB estimates that $139.14 billion in budgetary resources across 239 individual accounts in the nondefense category will be subject to a uniform reduction of 5.7% under the FY2027 mandatory sequester. Estimated reductions in this category include accounts across 44 individual departments and agencies, including the legislative and judicial branches.
Administrative expenses incurred by the federal government are subject to the uniform percentage reductions for the defense or nondefense categories regardless of any exemption or special rule that otherwise applies to the account or program for which the administrative expenses were incurred. OMB estimates that $4.51 billion in such administrative expenses across 48 accounts in the nondefense category will be subject to the uniform 5.7% reduction for FY2027. 
Student Loans
A special sequestration rule applies to certain student loans made under the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan program. Under this rule, sequestration is applied by increasing origination fees for such loans originated during the period the sequestration order is in effect by the same uniform percentage applied to the nondefense category. 
For FY2027, OMB estimates that increasing these student loan fees by 5.7% will yield savings of $51 million in the direct student loan program. 
What is the Mandatory Sequester?
Since FY2013, OMB has been required to calculate, and the President to order, annual across-the-board reductions (“sequestration”) to certain mandatory spending accounts and programs. This process—often referred to as either the “Joint Committee,” “BBEDCA 251A,” or “mandatory” sequester—requires annual reductions at a uniform percentage of budgetary resources available to certain mandatory spending programs or accounts in the defense and nondefense categories. Reductions in the nondefense category include reductions to Medicare and certain other health programs, which are capped at 2% annually under current law. 
OMB and the President carry out the mandatory sequester pursuant to several provisions of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA), as amended. Many mandatory programs and activities—comprising around three-quarters of total mandatory spending—are exempt from sequestration. In addition, general and special sequestration rules define how the mandatory sequester is applied to certain accounts, programs, or categories of mandatory spending.
OMB is required to submit a report to Congress determining reductions under the mandatory sequester on the date of submission of the President’s budget. These reports are required to estimate 
total budgetary resources in each category subject to reductions under the sequester;
the percentage reduction to be applied to nonexempt accounts in each category; and
estimated reductions for each individual nonexempt account. 
The President is then required to issue a sequestration order directing agencies to implement the reductions set forth in OMB’s report.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12683/IN12683.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12683.html
IF13208,Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Non-Detained Docket (NDD),2026-04-24T04:00:00Z,2026-04-28T15:38:05Z,Active,Resources,"William A. Kandel, Audrey Singer",,"Background
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA, Title 8 of the U.S. Code) authorizes and sometimes requires the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain aliens (foreign nationals) who are subject to removal from the United States. This authority allows DHS to detain aliens who pose a threat to public safety, ensures that such individuals appear at immigration removal hearings, and permits DHS to remove an individual more effectively after an order of removal has been issued. Detained aliens represent what is known as the detained docket. However, DHS has broad discretion to release from custody those aliens who are not subject to mandatory detention or do not pose a threat or flight risk. These individuals represent the non-detained docket (NDD).
Supervision of aliens on the detained and the non-detained dockets is the responsibility of Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) within DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). ERO may arrest any alien who is believed to have violated U.S. immigration laws and remove any alien who has received a final removal order. The INA generally requires detention for applicants for admission who are removable, aliens removable on specified criminal and terrorist-related grounds, and those with final removal orders.
The INA also grants DHS discretion to either detain or release from custody all other aliens in pending removal proceedings. After ICE arrests an alien not subject to mandatory detention, an immigration officer makes an initial custody determination and may make further determinations during the course of formal removal proceedings, based on standards and criteria promulgated by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). 
Aliens may be detained in an ICE facility or released on bond or conditional parole; these individuals become part of the NDD. In any case, aliens must attend all subsequent proceedings before an immigration judge (IJ) within DOJ’s Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Detained aliens may request a review of the custody determination during a bond hearing before an IJ, unless they are subject to detention without bond by federal law.
ICE’s detention capacity limits the number of detainees that can be held at any given time. ICE currently oversees detainees in over 200 ICE-owned, private, state, and local facilities that house from fewer than 5 aliens to more than 2,000. ICE data indicate that 66,978 individuals were detained as of April 9, 2026. Between FY1996 and FY2025, the average annual total of detained individuals ranged from about 9,000 to 60,000. Currently, ICE possesses detention bedspace capacity for roughly 70,000 individuals and has considered plans to expand this capacity to over 90,000 in FY2026. 
In contrast, the NDD refers to aliens who are subject to removal but are not detained. The docket includes individuals at any stage in the removal process. Individuals on the NDD remain under ICE supervision to help ensure that they regularly check in, comply with release conditions, attend court hearings, and comply with removal if so ordered. 
The NDD Population
Generally, the NDD population consists of aliens that 
have been released at ICE’s discretion following an initial or subsequent custody determination (as discussed previously); 
are currently incarcerated in federal, state, and local facilities while serving sentences for criminal offenses; 
have final removal orders but were granted temporary  protection through withholding of removal or the Convention Against Torture (CAT);
have final removal orders and are in the process of being repatriated; 
have final removal orders but cannot be repatriated because their origin countries do not cooperate with the United States; 
have final removal orders but absconded into the United States as fugitives; and 
unbeknownst to ICE, have voluntarily departed the United States or died and remain on the NDD erroneously. 
ICE’s most recently reported NDD population size of 7.3 million reflects its count of non-detained aliens as of February 26, 2026 (Figure 1). All such individuals have been processed by ICE, including an estimated 1.6 million with final orders of removal. The NDD count relies on a cumulative list of removable aliens that is continuously updated; thus, it excludes those with a confirmed departure or death. Some aliens have been on the NDD for decades; others have been placed on it more recently. A fraction of NDD individuals are enrolled in ICE’s Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program, which involves more intensive supervision than other NDD individuals who, in addition to attending all court hearings, typically must check in once a year with ICE. Currently, 180,000 individuals are on ATD.
NDD Trends
The NDD has more than tripled since FY2016 (Figure 1). Recent NDD growth reflects high numbers of encounters (apprehensions) of aliens by the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP), part of DHS’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP). From FY2016 through FY2020, annual USBP encounters at the Southwest border averaged about 470,000, and the NDD grew during that period from 2.2 million to 3.3 million unauthorized aliens. From FY2021 through FY2024, average annual encounters more than quadrupled to 1.9 million, boosting the NDD from 3.7 million to 7.7 million individuals. Since FY2025 (as of March 2026), USBP encounters have declined substantially. Increased ICE enforcement actions and removals that have prompted unauthorized aliens to self-deport have also reduced the NDD. Reportedly, about 72,000 aliens as of March 2026 have used a CBP incentive-based program to facilitate their voluntary departure and many others have left of their own accord.
Figure 1. Estimated NDD Population, FY2016-FY2026*
/
Source: FY2016: DHS OIG-17-51; FY2017-FY2019: ICE ERO Annual Report, FY2019; FY2020-FY2023: ICE Annual Report, FY2023; FY2024: ICE Annual Report, FY2024; FY2025-FY2026: ICE Office of Legislative Affairs.
Note: FY2026* figure as of February 26, 2026.
How the NDD Fluctuates
The NDD increases with alien apprehensions and arrests and decreases when aliens are removed from the United States, or granted immigration relief (e.g., asylum) following immigration court proceedings. When border encounters are high, immigration officers may use their discretion to supervise individuals on the NDD instead of in limited detention space. In addition, ICE cannot remove aliens with final removal orders if their countries of citizenship restrict returns of their nationals; this lengthens the time they remain on the NDD. Geopolitical events, war and civil conflict, and noncooperation by countries on issuing travel documents or accepting their nationals can limit the ability of the United States to remove individuals.
The NDD decreases when ICE removes aliens from the United States, when removable individuals depart the United States by choice, or when ICE re-detains aliens if, for example, they violate their terms of release. The NDD also decreases if the alien dies. The NDD fluctuates due to the net effects of these combined circumstances.
Policy Developments
A January 2025 Executive Order (EO), Securing Our Borders, (Section 5) directed DHS to “take all appropriate actions to detain, to the fullest extent permitted by law, aliens apprehended for violations of immigration law until their successful removal from the United States.” In accordance with the EO, in February 2025 ICE issued a policy directive to ERO officers to consider for detention various groups of aliens in two broad categories. 
The first group includes aliens previously released by CBP who have not yet filed for asylum, including (1) paroled arriving aliens; (2) aliens issued a CBP “Notice to Report” (NTR); and (3) aliens processed for “Parole + ATD” or “Parole with Conditions.” These three processes were previously developed by CBP during record-high levels of Southwest border apprehensions during the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to reduce detainee time in custody to lessen the risk of transmission of the virus, CBP released certain aliens from custody. Instead of receiving a charging document to appear in immigration court, these aliens were issued either an NTR (requiring them to report to an ICE office within 60 days) or “Parole + ATD.”    
The second group consists of the non-detained generally. Officers are instructed to “carefully review for removal all cases reporting on the non-detained docket” when such aliens report to an ERO Field Office for a check-in. This group includes aliens granted withholding of removal and CAT protection. Also targeted are aliens previously released due to “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” following the Supreme Court’s 2001 case, Zadvydas v. Davis, which generally limits detention to a maximum of six months after a removal order is final. These aliens may be subject to third country removal (not their country of origin, citizenship, or last habitual residence). 
ICE’s ability to effectuate removals and thereby reduce the NDD depends on diplomatic relations with countries whose nationals comprise large portions of the NDD. For example, until recently, the United States had no diplomatic relations with Venezuela, hindering the removal and repatriation of potentially hundreds of thousands of Venezuelan nationals. Similar circumstances exist with other prominent migrant-sending countries such as Cuba, Vietnam, Nicaragua, and China. The Trump Administration has been negotiating with many third countries to accept deported aliens who cannot return to their home countries.
Considerations for Congress
More generally, issues for Congress may include  
ICE’s ability to monitor and ultimately remove the NDD population given its considerable size;
NDD individuals who had previously been granted protection being subject to third country removal and potential violation of due process rights; 
NDD individuals in removal proceedings or with final removal orders who may pose threats to public safety;
the growing number of aliens with final removal orders who remain on the NDD; 
efficacy and cost tradeoffs of the ATD program compared to conventional detention facilities; 
how ICE enforcement priorities affect the NDD;
how U.S. diplomatic relationships with other countries affect the NDD; and
the portion of the NDD with no criminal background recently detained, or at risk of being detained and removed, given ICE’s substantial funding increase from P.L. 119-21. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13208/IF13208.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13208.html
R48933,"Electricity Distribution Transformers: Supply, Tariffs, and Policy Options",2026-04-23T04:00:00Z,2026-05-02T05:54:01Z,Active,Reports,Martin C. Offutt,,"Supply of electricity distribution transformers essential to the electric power grid has been strained in the last few years, with implications for post-disaster recovery and plans for grid expansion. Distribution transformers are located near the service connection with residences and commercial buildings or on industrial sites. The price of transformers has increased sharply since 2020, with data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics reporting the prices of both distribution transformers and large power transformers to have risen roughly 40% from 2020 to 2024 (inflation-adjusted). Coupled with the rise in prices is an increase in the time needed for suppliers to fulfill orders for distribution transformers. According to a February 2024 report by the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR), orders are reportedly taking two years to be fulfilled, a fourfold increase compared to pre-2022. 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) identified 34 original equipment manufacturers in the U.S. market for distribution transformers as of April 2024. They also estimated that 1.5 million units were shipped in 2021. An industry report from 2024 estimated it would take three to five years before sufficient new manufacturing capacity might become operational and alleviate supply issues. NLR estimates roughly half of distribution transformers are over 33 years old and nearing the end of their useful life. The U.S. electric power grid transmission expands at roughly 1% per year, and in 2023, roughly one-third of grid investments went toward distribution infrastructure, implying a need for additional distribution transformers. 
The United States imports 25% to 30% of distribution transformers chiefly from Taiwan, Canada, and Mexico. Some domestic transformers are made using imported components such as the electrical core that facilitates the crucial voltage transformation, of which between half and three-quarters are imported for incorporation into assembled domestic transformers. Those cores that are instead made domestically obtain 95% of their steel from one domestic supplier. Importation is possible, but imported electrical “steel articles” are subject to 50% tariffs as of August 15, 2025. There are some flexibilities in the supply picture. Manufacturers could choose to increase their production of electrical steel for cores, if willing to reduce their output of other products. Current federal programs provide incentives for expanding production capacity, and several manufacturers have announced they will be utilizing these incentives—competitively awarded tax credits (Internal Revenue Code Section 48C [IRC §48C]).
Other recent domestic programs or actions include rebates for purchase of a replacement distribution transformer and a 2022 presidential determination which found that distribution transformers and grid components are “critical technology items” essential to the national defense. Bills currently in Congress, S. 448 and H.R. 4128, would expand the scope of a tax credit, Internal Revenue Code Section 45X (IRC §45X), to apply to the production costs of distribution transformers. In 2022, rural electric cooperatives and other organizations signed a letter to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees requesting $1 billion to address the “supply chain crisis.”
Congress may choose to constrict, maintain, or expand statutes affecting supply of distribution transformers. Policy options include the following:
Expanding the scope of the IRC §45X credit, a manufacturer credit of 10% the cost of producing certain electrical equipment, to include distribution transformers (S. 448 and H.R. 4128).
Modifying the Qualifying Advanced Energy Project Credit (IRC §48C) to reserve a certain dollar amount exclusively for distribution transformers, bypassing the competitive requirement.
Creating a virtual reserve by authorizing and funding the federal government to purchase distribution transformers up to a predetermined level (quota). If market activity does not reach the quota over a defined period of time, the government would purchase the difference as the buyer-of-last-resort.
Using Title III of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-774) to address manufacturing capacity.
Continuing to fund research and development for new, improved transformers and periodically assessing their technological readiness and adjusting the deployment incentives.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48933/R48933.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48933.html
R48916,Retailer Inventory and Pricing Behavior During Supply Chain Disruptions,2026-04-23T04:00:00Z,2026-04-25T13:37:57Z,Active,Reports,"Michael Alan Havlin, Clare Y. Cho",,"Recent supply chain disruptions have contributed to price increases for certain consumer goods, such as vehicles, groceries, apparel, and consumer electronics. Congress has expressed interest in various types of retailers that sell these consumer goods, particularly after their profits and prices have increased following supply chain disruptions.
Retailers provide services to producers and consumers and charge a price for their services. One of their main services is inventory management. That is, retailers acquire, hold, and maintain goods that are for sale to consumers. A retailer’s inventory management can affect its pricing behavior, particularly during supply chain disruptions. For example, if supply chain disruptions prevent a retailer from acquiring new inventory, the retailer might choose to increase prices to potentially increase its profits, avoid selling out of a product, or both. The price of a retail service is typically the markup charged on the product—the difference between the amount a retailer pays the supplier and the amount the retailer charges the consumer. The size of a markup may vary with time, retailer type, and a variety of competitive and contextual factors. 
Retailer behavior can affect how supply chain disruptions transmit down to the consumer. Retailers’ responses to such events may vary by the type of retailer, type of disruption, and a variety of contextual factors, such as inventory levels, competition, retail pricing strategies, and information access. Because of these factors, changes in markups and consumer prices are not uniformly driven by supplier price changes. Retailers might increase, decrease, or maintain their markups following changes in supplier pricing. During the Great Recession, vehicle dealerships paid higher prices to manufacturers that faced tightening financial constraints but did not pass those higher costs on to consumers. In contrast, during the COVID-19 pandemic, vehicle dealerships increased markups while experiencing record low vehicle inventories. As another example, grocery stores increased markups for meats during certain agricultural supply chain disruptions. Changes in tariffs in 2025 contributed to changes in import volumes and prices paid by retailers, both of which might affect retailer behavior. How a retailer responds to a supply chain disruption can affect both its profitability and consumer prices.
A retailer typically makes pricing and inventory decisions in response to market forces, such as consumer demand for its products, competitive pressure from other retailers, and the diversity of its upstream supplier network. Statute can affect retailers’ pricing behaviors within certain contexts. For example, Section 102 of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. §4512) prohibits hoarding of materials that the President has designated as scarce for the purpose of selling those goods at an elevated price.
No federal laws or regulations explicitly prohibit price gouging, a term often used to describe price increases perceived to be excessive, typically in response to sudden changes in supply or demand (e.g., caused by a supply chain disruption). Price gouging bills introduced by Members of the 119th Congress and state price gouging laws often have focused on supply chain disruptions or other market shocks. Congress might consider using its oversight authority to ask federal agencies to take actions to enforce existing laws that can affect pricing during supply chain disruptions. Congress might consider addressing price gouging through legislation. If Members of Congress choose to introduce additional legislation related to price gouging, considerations may include the circumstances in which a price increase might be considered excessive, whether to prohibit a specific price increase in statute or direct a federal agency to promulgate regulations to define the terms excessive or price gouging, and whether to prohibit price gouging in specific contexts or for certain goods. 
Congress also might consider legislation addressing supply chain resiliency. One option that Congress might consider is to direct research to identify industries to build supply chain resiliency and support domestic production of certain goods. The House and Senate passed their respective versions of a Promoting Resilient Supply Chains Act of 2025 (H.R. 2444; S. 257), which would direct the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Analysis to lead and establish an intergovernmental working group to develop plans and analyses to increase U.S. supply chain resiliency for industries and goods critical to U.S. economic or national security.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48916/R48916.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48916.html
R48915,"Preemption and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act)",2026-04-23T04:00:00Z,2026-04-24T11:09:05Z,Active,Reports,"Wen W. Shen, Dorothy C. Kafka","Federal Preemption, Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)","First enacted in 1938, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), as amended, empowers the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to regulate various products affecting public health, including food, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and tobacco products. By FDA’s estimate, the products it oversees in 2025 were valued at $4.1 trillion and accounted for about 21 cents of every dollar spent by U.S. consumers. In general, the FD&C Act prohibits the distribution of a covered product in interstate commerce that is “adulterated” or “misbranded,” and defines, for each product type, the circumstances and standards under which that product is “adulterated” or “misbranded.” Additional statutory or regulatory provisions often further refine the specific federal requirements that apply to specific subsets or components of a product type. Some subsets of drugs, devices, and tobacco products, for instance, must be reviewed by FDA before they can be lawfully marketed, while food and cosmetic products (with the exception of certain ingredients) generally are not subject to premarket review.  
States have historically regulated many products covered by the FD&C Act based on their general police power to provide for the public health and safety of their residents. State regulation of such products might include statutes specific to certain products, along with more general consumer protection and products liability laws. State consumer protection and products liability laws provide mechanisms by which consumers allegedly injured by a relevant product may challenge the product’s promotion, manufacture, design, and/or warning, on the grounds that the defendant manufacturers should have taken a different course of action with respect to those activities—some of which may be regulated by the FD&C Act and its implementing regulations.
Under the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, federal law supersedes (preempts) conflicting state law and can do so expressly—through explicit preemption provisions specifying the scope of preempted state law—or impliedly—where a state law is displaced because it conflicts with federal law or because federal law so thoroughly occupies the regulatory field as to leave no room for state activity. Over the FD&C Act’s nearly 90-year history, Congress has amended the law to include provisions that expressly preempt certain state laws that address areas specifically regulated by the FD&C Act, such as state laws imposing requirements on the safety and efficacy of medical devices, labeling requirements for food and cosmetic products, and requirements on certain standards for tobacco products. In other instances, Congress has not spoken specifically to preemption, as is the case for FD&C Act provisions governing prescription drugs. 
Courts—including the Supreme Court—have frequently considered the preemptive scope of the FD&C Act on state statutes and causes of action—an inquiry the Court has sometimes described as focused on discerning the intent of Congress. In practice, courts often look to the text, structure, and contextual background of the relevant FD&C Act provisions to determine their preemptive scope. This report provides an overview of the courts’ FD&C Act preemption jurisprudence, focusing on the following FDA-regulated products: food products, prescription drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and tobacco products. Generally speaking, these cases illustrate that while the FD&C Act’s enforcement scheme impliedly preempts a particular type of state fraud claim (i.e., one alleging that an applicant made misrepresentations to FDA during a premarket review process), context-specific analyses are usually required to assess whether other state laws or claims are preempted. In these analyses, courts typically undertake a case-specific, often granular, comparative analysis of what an applicable federal law requires or permits and whether and to what extent the relevant state requirements conflict with federal requirements. The courts’ nuanced approach often results in the preservation of at least some state claims or requirements—a result that arguably reflects the courts’ recognition of states’ long-standing, concurrent role in the regulation of these products. State requirements are most likely to survive preemption where Congress is silent on the interaction of federal and state law, but courts have sometimes understood the FD&C Act’s express preemption provisions as leaving room for certain state requirements. At the same time, courts may be more likely to construe relevant FD&C Act provisions to have broader preemptive effect on certain aspects of product regulation that are not historically regulated by states. These considerations may inform Congress’s decision on whether to modify existing express preemption provisions, add additional express preemption provisions, and consider the appropriate degree of specificity of any such provisions.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48915/R48915.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48915.html
IN12682,Kings and Queens Addressing Joint Meetings of Congress,2026-04-23T04:00:00Z,2026-04-25T13:52:50Z,Active,Posts,Jacob R. Straus,,"On April 1, 2026, Speaker of the House of Representatives Mike Johnson, Senate Majority Leader John Thune, Senate Minority Leader Charles Schumer, and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries jointly invited King Charles III of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to address a joint meeting of Congress. King Charles’s address is scheduled to occur on April 28, 2026. King Charles would be the 11th king or queen to address a joint meeting of Congress. 
Invitation Process
When a foreign leader formally visits the United States, he or she is sometimes invited to address a joint meeting of Congress. The decision to invite a foreign leader to address Congress has historically been made by the congressional leadership, often in consultation and conjunction with the executive branch. No formal procedure on when or how to issue invitations is codified in law or in House or Senate rules. Not all foreign leaders who visit the United States are invited to address Congress. For more information on foreign leaders who have addressed Congress, see CRS In Focus IF10211, Foreign Leaders Addressing Congress, by Jacob R. Straus.
Past Kings and Queens Who Have Addressed a Joint Meeting of Congress
To date, 10 individuals holding the title of king or queen have addressed a joint meeting of Congress. The first address by a king or queen occurred on December 18, 1874, when King Kalakaua, from the Kingdom of Hawaii, addressed Congress. The most recent, prior to King Charles III’s scheduled address, occurred when King Abdullah II Bin Al Hussein, of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, addressed a joint meeting of Congress on March 7, 2007. Table 1 lists the monarchs that have addressed a joint meeting of Congress.
Table 1. Addresses by Kings and Queens to a Joint Meeting of Congress
Date
Monarch
Country

December 18, 1874
King Kalakauaa
Kingdom of Hawaii

April 3, 1952
Queen Juliana
Kingdom of the Netherlands

May 12, 1959
King Baudouin
Kingdom of Belgium

April 28, 1960
King Mahendra
Kingdom of Nepal

June 29, 1960
King Bhumibol Adulyadej
Kingdom of Thailand

June 2, 1976
King Juan Carlos I
Kingdom of Spain

April 21, 1982
Queen Beatrix
Kingdom of the Netherlands

May 16, 1991
Queen Elizabeth II
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

July 26, 1994
King Hussein Ib
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

March 7, 2007
King Abdullah II Bin Al Hussein
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

Source: Historian of the House of Representatives, “Joint Meeting & Joint Session Addresses Before Congress by Foreign Leaders & Dignitaries,” http://history.house.gov/Institution/Foreign-Leaders/Joint-Sessions. 
Notes: 
King Kalakaua was unable to deliver his speech “because of a severe cold and hoarseness.” The speech was “read by former Representative Elisha Hunt Allen, then serving as Chancellor and Chief Justice of the Hawaiian Islands” on King Kalakaua’s behalf. See U.S. Congress, “Joint Sessions and Meetings, Address to the Senate or the House, and Inaugurations,” fn. 13, https://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/joint_sessions.pdf.
The address by King Hussein I was a joint address with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. See “Joint Meeting of the House and Senate to Hear Addresses by His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and His Excellency Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel,” Congressional Record, vol. 140, part 12 (July 26, 1994), pp. 17891-17895, https://www.congress.gov/103/crecb/1994/07/26/GPO-CRECB-1994-pt12-9-1.pdf.  
Most joint meetings of Congress to hear addresses by foreign leaders, including kings and queens, have been held in the Hall of the House. For example, Figure 1 shows King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand addressing a joint meeting of Congress on June 29, 1960.
Figure 1. King Bhumibol Adulyadej of Thailand Addressing a Joint Meeting of Congress
/
Source: Library of Congress, “Bhumibol Adulyadej, King of Thailand speaking before a joint session of the United States Congress, Washington, D.C.,” Marion S. Trikosko, June 29, 1960, https://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2023631222. 
For more information on foreign leaders addressing Congress, see CRS In Focus IF10211, Foreign Leaders Addressing Congress, by Jacob R. Straus. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12682/IN12682.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12682.html
IF13209,"Work Requirements: Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Rental Assistance, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)",2026-04-23T04:00:00Z,2026-05-01T10:30:49Z,Active,Resources,"Gene Falk, Randy Alison Aussenberg, Evelyne P. Baumrucker, Patrick A. Landers, Maggie McCarty","Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Work Requirements for Social Welfare Programs, Medicaid, Medicaid & Work Requirements, Rental Assistance","Meeting health care and financial needs while preserving incentives to work is a central tension in policies related to low-income assistance. Policies to promote work vary across Medicaid, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), housing assistance, and cash aid from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. The policies differ based on the program history; the nature and design of the particular program; whether or not it has dedicated funding for employment services, education, and training; and other factors. 
Medicaid
The FY2025 budget reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21) established a “community engagement requirement” whereby specified adults—those who are nonpregnant, nondisabled, and aged 19 through 64—in the 50 states and the District of Columbia must complete a minimum of 80 hours of qualifying activities (i.e., work, participation in a work program or community service, or enrollment in an education program) as a condition of Medicaid eligibility and continued coverage. Medicaid has no dedicated employment and training dollars (or associated work program), and thus nonemployed individuals subject to these requirements need to participate in other programs (e.g., Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act programs) to have hours in a work program counted toward the 80 hours.
SNAP
SNAP has several work-related requirements. Its strictest requirement is a time limit applying to nondisabled adults aged 18 to 64 either without dependents or whose youngest child is age 14 or older. Such participants are limited to receiving SNAP for 3 months in a 36-month period if they do not work or participate in a work program at least 80 hours per month. SNAP has dedicated Employment and Training (E&T) funding for states to design and implement programs. States may impose an E&T participation requirement for certain SNAP recipients. 
Rental Assistance
Among federal rental assistance programs, public housing is the only one with a federal community engagement requirement. CRS estimates that more than 80% of those in public housing were exempt from the requirement in 2023 because they were working, due to their age or disability status, or because they were receiving a welfare benefit and were in compliance with those program requirements.  Also, some communities participate in a waiver program under which they can adopt local work requirement policies applicable to their rental assistance programs. On March 2, 2026, HUD published in the Federal Register a proposed rule that would allow a broader set of program administrators to develop their own work requirement and time limit policies—within broad federal guidelines—applicable to rental assistance program participants. The President’s FY2027 budget request proposed permitting the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development to require adoption of such policies.
TANF
TANF is a block grant to the states. Most work-related requirements apply to states rather than individual recipients. States must meet numerical work participation standards with respect to needy families receiving cash assistance funded by the block grant. States that fail to meet these standards are at risk of a penalty that reduces the state’s block grant. States determine the requirements that apply to individual recipients and are generally free to determine what is required and the sanction for an individual’s failure to comply. States may meet the numerical work participation standards by reducing the number of families receiving assistance, having adult assistance recipients in unsubsidized employment, or providing employment services, education, and training to nonemployed assistance recipients. In general, states have met TANF standards through caseload reduction and by continuing assistance for employed parents by utilizing earnings disregards and earnings supplement programs. TANF funds may be used to provide employment and training services.
Table 1 summarizes the work-related requirements across the four major assistance programs.
Additional Resources
CRS Report R48755, Work Requirements: Comparison of Medicaid and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) After P.L. 119-21.
CRS Report R48827, Work Requirements: The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) Work Standard and How States Met It. Table 1. Summary of Work and Work-Related Requirements in Medicaid, SNAP, Rental Assistance, and TANF
Element
Medicaid
SNAP
Rental Assistance
TANF

Type of benefit
Financing for primary and acute medical services as well as long-term services and supports.
Benefits redeemable for food.
Below-market rent either through a rental voucher or a subsidized apartment.
Cash (work requirements apply to ongoing cash assistance recipients, though TANF may be used for other benefits and services).

Type of requirement
“Community engagement requirement” that applies to certain applicants and enrollees.
Requirements that apply to nonexempt SNAP recipients.
Requirements that apply to nonexempt individuals in the public housing program.
A numerical performance measure that applies to state governments, not individual recipients. States decide what requirements apply to individuals.

Population subject to the requirement (with exceptions specified by statute)
Certain nonpregnant, nondisabled adults aged 19 through 64 eligible or enrolled under the ACA Medicaid expansion or a comparable waiver who have no dependent children or their youngest child is aged 14 or older.
General work requirements apply to nondisabled adults aged 16 to 59. A time limit for those not working or in a work program applies to nondisabled adults aged 18 to 64 who have no dependent children or their youngest child is age 14 or older.
Nonelderly, nondisabled, nonworking adult public housing residents.
TANF assistance recipients who are either adults (age 18 or older) or are minor heads of households. Single parents with a child under age 1 may be disregarded when determining whether a state met its standard. 

Main requirements
Nonexempt individuals must work, participate in a work program, be enrolled at least half time in an education program, or volunteer for a combined total of at least 80 hours per month.
Nonexempt individuals must register for work (general work requirement).
Participants subject to the time limit may receive SNAP for 3 months in a 36-month period unless they are working or in a work program for 80 hours per month.
States may require participation in E&T programs for other recipients.
Generally, nonelderly, nondisabled, nonworking adult public housing residents must complete eight hours per month of economic self-sufficiency or community service activities. Recipients of other welfare program benefits who are in compliance with those program requirements are also exempt.
States may meet numerical participation standards through reducing the number of families receiving assistance, assisting employed parents and caretakers, or engaging nonemployed recipients in activities. Minimum hours of either work or being engaged in activities vary by family type.

Funded employment services
No
Yes
No
Yes

Sanction for noncompliance
Individuals denied eligibility or disenrolled.
Loss of SNAP benefits for noncomplying individuals and sometimes, at state option, the household.
Nonrenewal of a public housing lease, which could result in eviction.
States are required to sanction those who refuse to work, but it is the states that determine the sanctions.

Source: CRS summary of relevant statutes and regulations, March 17, 2026.    
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13209/IF13209.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13209.html
R48914,Cryptocurrency Mining and the Electricity Sector,2026-04-22T04:00:00Z,2026-04-24T12:53:53Z,Active,Reports,Corrie E. Clark,"Electricity, Energy Policy","The popularity of cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, and their underlying blockchain technology presents both challenges and opportunities for the electricity sector. Cryptocurrency is a type of digital asset that is sometimes referred to as virtual currency. Cryptocurrency mining (“cryptomining”) is the process of validating transactions on a digital ledger and adding transactions to the ledger’s permanent record. For providing the computing power for the validations, miners are awarded some amount of cryptocurrency in return, making it a potentially lucrative endeavor. 
As investment in Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies has increased, the electricity demand to support cryptocurrency mining activities has also increased. The increased electricity demand—when localized—can exceed the available generation capacity. If a utility invests in a new power plant or in infrastructure upgrades to meet the increased demand, the utility might raise rates to recover the cost of those capital investments. In instances where a utility may be able to accommodate the increased electricity demand, increased sales might lead a utility to reduce rates. 
Not all cryptocurrencies require energy-intensive mining operations. Some cryptocurrencies, such as Ether, can operate under algorithms that require less electricity. In addition, blockchain technologies could present opportunities for the electricity sector by facilitating power and financial transactions on a smart grid. Some see an opportunity to leverage cryptocurrency mining facilities as a way to manage growth in electricity demand and to moderate wholesale power prices during times of peak demand or low generator availability.
Some U.S. state governments are developing various policies in response to growth in electricity demand from cryptocurrency mining activities. Some states have considered or imposed limits on cryptomining development. Other states have offered reduced electricity rates, tax incentives, or opportunities to participate in electric load reduction programs to attract and retain miners. 
There are potential options that could be adopted by the federal government to address electricity consumption and affordability concerns. These options include better quantifying and tracking the size of proposed and existing cryptocurrency mining operations, incentivizing the development and operation of power plants to increase electricity generation, and improving the energy efficiency of cryptocurrency mining facilities through the consideration of the adoption of technologies and processes that promote energy delivery optimization. Approaches to improve energy efficiency could include funding research and development of technologies for cooling, technologies for waste heat optimization, and algorithms for use in consensus mechanisms or for other computational purposes. Some of these options could have implications beyond cryptocurrency miners, potentially affecting data center facilities broadly. Other policy options to facilitate the communication of information between the federal government and electricity sector stakeholders could respond to concerns regarding electricity security associated with cryptocurrency mining facilities. 
In the 119th Congress, there are several bills that could address cryptocurrency mining and electricity sector issues. The Clean Cloud Act of 2025 (S. 1475 and H.R. 6179) and the Data Center Transparency Act (H.R. 6984) address data collection content and frequency for cryptocurrency mining facilities and data centers. The Preventing Rate Inflation in Consumer Energy (PRICE) Act (H.R. 6983) would address concerns about electricity generation by requiring data centers of a certain size to generate all of the electricity that the facility consumes. Accompanying the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 (S. 2342), the report by the Select Committee on Intelligence, S.Rept. 119-51, in describing concerns with certain cryptocurrency mining operations, would direct the intelligence community to work together with law enforcement partners to shut down those operations that pose a threat to national security. Other bills related to addressing electricity security issues would expand the Department of Energy’s authorities; these include the Energy Emergency Leadership Act (H.R. 7258) and the Energy Threat Analysis Center Act of 2026 (H.R. 7305). 
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48914/R48914.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48914.html
R48913,Corporate Taxation: The Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate,2026-04-21T04:00:00Z,2026-04-23T15:23:00Z,Active,Reports,Jane G. Gravelle,,"Economists have long recognized that there are behavioral responses to the corporate tax, and that these responses have implications for the efficiency of the economy and the burden of the tax, as well as how much revenue a tax increase might raise. This report examines the research surrounding the revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate and explores implications for federal tax policy.
The notion that a corporate tax cut could raise revenues (and thus “pay for itself”) was part of the debate in 2017, when the corporate tax rate was subsequently cut from 35% to 21%. A decade earlier, this issue played a much more prominent role during the corporate tax debate in 2007. Several studies appeared in 2006 and 2007 that estimated a revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate of around 30%, although one study estimated a higher rate of 56% for a large, less-open economy such as the United States. These studies used a panel of countries to determine corporate revenues as a percentage of GDP as a function of the statutory tax rate. 
This report examines two issues with these studies. The first is the incompatibility of the studies’ results with theoretical constraints on how low the revenue-maximizing tax rate can be. Because the pretax rate of return falls when the capital stock increases, the corporate tax base is relatively insensitive to tax reductions that increase investment. Under the most generous assumptions, theory suggests the revenue-maximizing tax rate is probably no less than 70%. Effects arising from avoidance and evasion of taxes by corporations are too small to account for a revenue-maximizing rate below the tax rates in effect before the 2017 corporate rate cut (from 35% to 21%). 
The second issue is an econometric one. For panel studies comparing trends, including fixed country and time effects is necessary to produce unbiased estimates. When CRS reestimated two of the most prominent studies with these fixed effects included, the results were generally statistically insignificant effects. In cases where estimates were marginally significant, the coefficients indicated no revenue-maximizing tax rate.
A subsequent study addressed another issue with the econometric studies from 2006 and 2007: that the base may be changing at the same time as the tax rate. When controlling for the direction (although not the size), that study found a revenue-maximizing tax rate of 61% in general and a rate around 100% for a large, less-open country. 
A related set of literature estimated the elasticity of the corporate tax base with respect to the net-of-tax rate (1-t) (where t is the tax rate). This estimate can be used to calculate the implied revenue-maximizing tax rate. These studies used two different methods. The first approach also used a panel. The second examined the degree of clumping of observations below the kinks in the rate structure (where the statutory tax rate increased). The results of these studies largely indicated relatively high revenue-maximizing tax rates.
The implications of theory, of correcting the earlier studies for lack of fixed effects, of accounting for simultaneous base changes, and of the literature on the tax base elasticity are that the revenue-maximizing corporate tax rate is high, and that increases in the corporate tax rate would likely raise close to the static revenue estimate.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48913/R48913.5.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48913.html
IF13207,Prediction Markets Legislation in the 119th Congress,2026-04-21T04:00:00Z,2026-04-23T11:07:52Z,Active,Resources,"Karl E. Schneider, Alexander H. Pepper",,"Prediction markets are exchange platforms that specialize in offering event contracts (i.e., contracts that allow parties to trade on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of specific events). Prediction markets have rapidly expanded in recent years, facilitated by judicial decisions and changes in regulatory posture, with significant growth in the subject matter of available contracts, including geopolitical events, elections, and sports. The expansion into sports since early 2025 has led to conflict and litigation between prediction markets and state regulators overseeing traditional sports gambling. Certain well-timed trades related to government action have also sparked concern that government officials or others with access to material nonpublic information may use that information for private gain through prediction market trading. Some prediction markets, such as Kalshi, are exchanges registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Others, such as Polymarket’s international exchange, are not domiciled in the United States and claim to block U.S. users.
Congress has taken an interest in prediction markets. This In Focus summarizes some of the most pertinent federal law applicable to prediction markets as well as legislation introduced in the 119th Congress that would amend existing law to restrict trading of event contracts involving certain subject matter and regulate trading in prediction markets by certain officials. Within each heading, bills are listed by date of introduction.
Prohibitions Based on Subject Matter
Under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), exchanges registered with the CFTC may self-certify that certain event contracts comply with the Act and CFTC regulations and list them without prior CFTC approval. Section 5c(c)(5)(C) of the CEA—often called the “Special Rule”—gives the CFTC authority, however, to determine that event contracts are contrary to the public interest if they involve activity that is unlawful under federal or state law, terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or other similar activity. If the CFTC makes such a determination, the event contracts cannot be listed or made available for clearing or trading on CFTC-regulated exchanges. Although the CFTC has prohibited by regulation the listing of contracts within the enumerated categories, it has administered the Special Rule using a two-step process in which it evaluates whether a specific event contract (1) falls within those categories and, (2) if so, is contrary to the public interest. Accordingly, while the CFTC’s regulations by their terms include a per se ban of contracts falling within the enumerated categories, agency practice appears to reflect a less categorical approach that also incorporates public interest considerations into regulatory decisions. In addition, under current leadership, the CFTC has not yet utilized the Special Rule to review event contracts that exchanges have self-certified as compliant. 
Several bills introduced in the 119th Congress would augment or alter the CEA to directly prohibit specific categories of event contracts.
H.R. 7477 would add a new provision to the CEA to define a “casino-style game” and a “sporting event or athletic competition” and to directly prohibit CFTC-regulated exchanges from facilitating contracts based on either category of events. 
H.R. 7840 would replace the existing provisions concerning event contracts in Section 5c with a per se prohibition of event contracts that relate to activity that is unlawful under federal or state law; terrorism; assassination; war; gaming; U.S. elections; conduct by any level, branch, instrumentality, or personnel of local, state, or federal government; and other similar activities identified by the CFTC. The bill includes a broad definition of “gaming” that would encompass sports but would create an exemption permitting gaming-related event contracts in a state if the state expressly permits it.
S. 4035/H.R. 7942 would add language to Section 5c directly prohibiting CFTC-registered exchanges from listing event contracts related to terrorism, assassination, war, or any similar activity, as well as contracts that relate to an individual’s death or could be construed as correlated closely to an individual’s death.
S. 4115/H.R. 7955 would prohibit any person from placing, accepting, or facilitating “wagers” regarding particular categories of events, including terrorism, assassination, and war. An additional prohibited category would consist of events where the “primary underlying characteristic” is not “financial, commercial, or economic” and the event is (1) an action undertaken by a government, intergovernmental organization, or government official; (2) an event for which the outcome is under the complete control of any person; or (3) an event for which the outcome is known by any person in advance. The term “wager” is defined, with insurance-related exceptions. The bill would amend several criminal and financial statutes related to illegal gambling to enforce the prohibitions. By directly prohibiting individuals from placing wagers on the specified categories of events, the bill might extend to individuals who place such wagers on offshore exchanges. The bill also would add language to Section 5c of the CEA prohibiting CFTC-registered exchanges from offering contracts involving the same categories of events.
S. 4160 would add language to Section 5c defining a “casino-style game” and a “sporting event or athletic competition,” directly prohibiting CFTC-registered exchanges from listing event contracts related to those categories of events, and stating that nothing in the CEA preempts state laws that regulate or prohibit contracts involving those categories. This bill differs from H.R. 7477 in the location of the added text and the inclusion of the savings clauses regarding preemption.
H.R. 8123/S. 4226 would add language to Section 5c directly prohibiting CFTC-registered exchanges from listing event contracts involving any political election or contest; action taken by the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States; sporting event or contest; or military action taken by the United States or foreign countries. An exception would permit contracts related to actions taken by the federal branches if such contracts are used for hedging or mitigating commercial risk, as determined by the CFTC. The bill would also require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study on certain aspects of prediction markets and would provide the “sense of Congress” on the original intent of the CEA, preemption, and future CFTC enforcement.
Ethics in Government Concerns 
The Ethics in Government Act (EIGA) and the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act require financial disclosures from certain federal officials and employees and affirm the application of insider trading laws and regulations to those individuals. The degree to which such provisions cover event contracts is uncertain. In recent years, some Members of Congress have proposed reforms that would prohibit the purchase, sale, or ownership of certain financial instruments by Members of Congress and other specified congressional officers and employees. Several bills introduced in the 119th Congress would provide disclosure obligations or prohibitions for certain federal officials or employees specific to event contracts.
H.R. 7004 would prohibit elected officials of the federal government, employees of the House and Senate, political appointees, and executive employees from purchasing, selling, or exchanging “prediction market contracts” related to government policy, government action, or a political outcome if they possess relevant material nonpublic information (MNPI) or may reasonably obtain such information in the course of performing official duties.
S. 4017 would add language to Section 5c of the CEA prohibiting the President, Vice President, and Members of Congress from trading event contracts. It would also prohibit senior executive branch officials from trading in event contracts related to any matters in which the official personally and substantially participates as a government officer or employee. These prohibitions would be enforced by the Attorney General via civil action, with a nonexclusive, per violation civil penalty of $10,000 or the profit from the offending transaction, whichever is greater. Foreign boards of trade would be required to report quarterly to the CFTC on any transactions violating the prohibitions, subject to revocation of the registration of the foreign board. The CFTC would be required to issue a general rule on insider trading in event contracts. The bill would also amend the EIGA to require certain executive and legislative branch elected officials and employees to disclose transactions in event contracts (including transactions by a spouse or dependent child).
H.R. 8076 would add new provisions to the EIGA that would prohibit Members of Congress (as well as their spouses, dependents, and fiduciary representatives), employees and officers of Congress, the President and Vice President, political appointees, GS-15 executive branch staff and equivalents, and judicial officers and employees from trading on prediction market contracts dependent on a “specific political event.” The term “specific political event” is not defined and is to be interpreted by the supervising ethics office. 
S. 4188 would add a new provision to the EIGA that would make it unlawful for the President, Vice President, Members of Congress, House and Senate employees, political appointees, and employees of executive or independent regulatory agencies to use MNPI derived from their position or gained from the performance of their official responsibilities as a means for profiting from a prediction market transaction. Violators would be subject to a fine of the greater of $500 or double the profit of the transaction. Supervising ethics offices would administer penalties, establish implementing procedures and forms, and, in conjunction with the CFTC, issue appropriate rules and guidelines. The bill would also require the covered individuals to submit a report to their supervising ethics office within thirty days concerning any event contract transactions exceeding $250, including specific information on the event contract. 
Other Approaches
S. 4060 would create a new regulatory framework for prediction markets under the Attorney General and the states. The bill would prohibit event contracts that (1) are susceptible to manipulation or fraudulent activities; (2) relate to war, military action, or death; (3) violate state or federal law; or (4) relate to other matters that are contrary to the public interest as determined by the Attorney General. Prediction markets would not be able to operate in a state unless the state authorized a state wagering program approved by the Attorney General that incorporates state regulatory oversight, prohibitions on certain types of sports-related contracts, market integrity standards, consumer protection standards, and advertising restrictions. Prediction markets could not accept wagers from or advertise to individuals under 21 years of age. The bill would also establish a national self-exclusion list and require the Attorney General to implement prohibitions on fraud and manipulation in prediction markets.
H.R. 8148 would state that Sections 4(c) and 6(c) of the CEA apply to illegal trading practices related to “prediction market contracts.” Section 6(c) includes prohibitions on fraud and manipulation. It is unclear if the bill intends to reference Section 4(c), concerning certain public interest exceptions in futures trading or Section 4c, which includes prohibitions on the misuse of nonpublic government information.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13207/IF13207.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13207.html
LSB11422,Parental Rights and Student Gender Transitions at School: Legal Developments,2026-04-20T04:00:00Z,2026-04-22T11:38:16Z,Active,Posts,"Jared P. Cole, Whitney K. Novak","First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Jurisprudence, Privacy, School & Campus Safety, Civil Rights & Liberties, Due Process Clause, Family Education Rights & Privacy Act (FERPA)","How public schools should treat transgender students has generated substantial debate, raising legal questions in contexts such as bathroom access, athletics participation, and pronoun usage. One particular area of legal disagreement concerns whether public schools must notify parents when a minor student seeks to transition their gender at school. This question may involve various considerations, including the rights of parents to control the upbringing of their children and freely exercise their religious beliefs, how those rights should apply in the public-school context, and potentially countervailing considerations about a student’s autonomy, privacy, and the risk of parental abuse. 
States and school districts have different rules regarding whether parents must be notified when students experience gender dysphoria and/or pursue gender transition. For instance, some states have passed laws requiring schools to affirmatively disclose to parents when a minor requests a change in pronouns used to identify the student. By contrast, a number of public schools in other states have implemented policies prohibiting disclosure of a student’s gender identity to parents without the student’s consent. Some parents have sued school districts that have implemented these latter policies, arguing that denying parents access to critical information about their children violates their constitutional rights. A recent Supreme Court decision on the matter, issued pursuant to its “emergency docket,” will likely inform how courts examine these questions going forward. 
In Mirabelli v. Bonta, the Supreme Court partially reinstated a district court’s injunction against California’s policies that prohibit public schools from informing parents about their children’s gender transition at school absent the child’s consent. In a per curiam decision, the Court concluded that the parents were likely to succeed on the merits of their constitutional claims and that denial of those constitutional rights during the litigation process would cause irreparable harm. 
In addition to the constitutional claims addressed in the Mirabelli decision, an existing federal statute imposes requirements on schools regarding the disclosure of student records. The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) requires covered schools to allow parents to access their children’s records unless an exception applies. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) enforces FERPA. ED determined in early 2026 that California’s Department of Education (CDE) is out of compliance with FERPA because of its policies shielding information about a student’s gender identity from parents.
This Sidebar explores these recent legal developments, beginning with a brief background on the legal principles that the Supreme Court applied in Mirabelli, the procedural history of the case, and a discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision. The Sidebar then turns to FERPA, examining its overlapping relevance and the implications for parents, students, and schools that Congress may consider if it chooses to legislate further in this context.
Mirabelli: Relevant Constitutional Provisions and Precedent
The Court’s per curiam decision in Mirabelli relied on precedent interpreting two constitutional provisions: the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One subclass of parent plaintiffs who challenged the California policies claimed that because they had religious objections to gender transitioning, they were entitled to exemptions from the policies under the Free Exercise Clause. A subclass of plaintiffs also challenged California’s policies as violating their substantive due process right to control the education and upbringing of their children.
Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids the government from “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion. According to the Supreme Court, government action implicates the Free Exercise Clause when it penalizes religious practice or coerces someone—either directly or indirectly—into acting contrary to their religious beliefs. Some burdens on religious exercise may nevertheless be constitutionally permitted. For one thing, the government is “generally free to place incidental burdens on religious exercise” so long as its policy that does so is neutral and generally applicable. If a government policy is neither neutral nor generally applicable, modern Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence instructs courts to apply strict scrutiny, meaning the government must prove its action “advances compelling interests and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.” 
In its 2025 decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, the Court articulated an exception to these general Free Exercise Clause principles, holding that regardless of whether a policy is neutral or generally applicable, strict scrutiny applies when a government action substantially interferes with the religious development of a child or poses “a very real threat of undermining” the religious beliefs a parent wishes to instill in their child. In Mahmoud, parents of public-school children brought a Free Exercise Clause challenge against a school board’s implementation of curriculum that featured “LGBTQ+-inclusive” books and a policy disallowing opt-outs from that curriculum. The Court, applying strict scrutiny, concluded that the use of the books in classroom instruction, without the option to opt-out, substantially interfered with the religious development of the children, and that the school district was unable to demonstrate that its policy of not allowing opt-outs from the curriculum was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.
Due Process Clause
Two Supreme Court cases from the 1920s recognized a parent’s due process right to control their child’s education. In Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in 1923, the Court reversed the conviction of a parochial school teacher who had violated a state law by instructing students in the German language. The Court ruled that the law impeded “the power of parents to control the education” of their children in violation of the Due Process Clause. Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court examined an Oregon state law requiring children between 8 and 16 to attend public schools. The Court similarly ruled that the law interfered with parents’ right “to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control,” including by choosing to send those children to private schools.
The Court subsequently applied these principles in the mental health context in 1979. In Parham v. J.R., the Court considered a due process challenge to Georgia’s civil commitment procedures that allowed parents to commit minors to state mental hospitals without an adversarial hearing. The Court upheld the procedures, reasoning that parents “retain a substantial, if not dominant, role” in such decisions, that the “traditional presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their child should apply,” and that parents have “plenary authority” to seek such treatment. Given the nature of a child’s rights, the Court did acknowledge that parental discretion is not absolute and that inquiry by a “neutral factfinder,” such as a staff physician, should be required to determine whether admission requirements were satisfied. However, the Court rejected requiring a “formalized . . . hearing” due to the potential “significant intrusion in the parent-child relationship” and concluded that Georgia’s “neutral and detached” process for voluntary commitments satisfied due process requirements.
Mirabelli: Procedural History 
In Mirabelli v. Bonta, parents and teachers challenged California policies that prohibit public schools from informing parents about their children’s gender transition at school absent the child’s consent. At issue was a CDE guidance document addressing the responsibilities of the state’s public schools regarding transgender students. The document contended that transgender students have a right, rooted in state and federal law, to keep their transgender status private. Thus, according to the document, “[w]ith rare exceptions, schools are required to respect the limitations that a student places on the disclosure of their transgender status, including not sharing that information with the student’s parents.”  
Parents and teachers brought distinctive challenges against California’s policies in federal district court. The court ruled that parents have a right to access information about their child’s gender based on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court also ruled that teachers have a right to provide accurate information to parents under both the Free Speech Clause and, to the extent the teacher can demonstrate a burden on his or her religious exercise, under the Free Exercise Clause. The court issued a permanent injunction barring California from enforcing or implementing any state law that requires or permits any employee to either mislead a parent about their child’s gender identity or to use pronouns or names that do not match their child’s legal name if a parent objects. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed that injunction pending appeal, concluding in part that the state had shown that the district court’s decision likely was in error.
Mirabelli: Supreme Court Decision
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s stay as to the parents while litigation continues, ruling that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their free exercise and due process claims and that denial of those constitutional rights during the litigation process would cause irreparable harm. As to the Free Exercise Clause claim, the Court held that California’s policies were likely to trigger strict scrutiny because they substantially interfered with the “right of parents to guide the religious development of their children” under the principles set forth in Mahmoud v. Taylor. The Court stated that the intrusion on the parents’ free exercise rights—the “unconsented facilitation of a child’s gender transition”—was even greater than the burden at issue in Mahmoud. The Court also reasoned that the policies would likely not survive strict scrutiny because California’s proffered compelling interest in student safety and privacy “cut out the primary protectors of the children’s best interests: their parents.” The policies would also likely fail the narrow tailoring requirement, according to the Court, because they could have included religious exemptions while at the same time continuing to preclude gender-identity disclosure to parents who engage in abuse. 
The Court also ruled that the parents were likely to succeed on their due process claim. The Court cited its prior decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, and Parham v. J.R. and explained that according to “long-established precedent,” it is parents, rather than the state, who are entrusted with authority for raising and educating children. Further, the Court emphasized that this right includes being involved in decisions concerning a child’s mental health. In the Court’s view, California’s policies conceal from parents that their child displays evidence of gender dysphoria and “facilitate a degree of gender transitioning during school hours.” This, the Court concluded, likely violated a parent’s constitutional right to control the raising and education of their own child.
Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kagan, joined by Justice Jackson, wrote a dissenting opinion (Justice Sotomayor did not join the dissent but indicated she would have denied the request to stay the injunction). Justice Kagan’s dissent criticized the majority opinion for granting relief through its emergency docket without more developed briefing. In Justice Kagan’s view, the majority did so “by means of a terse, tonally dismissive ruling designed to conclusively resolve the dispute,” which (in her view) would be treated as a merits judgment in the courts below. Moreover, Justice Kagan observed that the parental right recognized in the majority opinion was rooted in the doctrine of substantive due process, of which the Justices in the majority had previously been skeptical. Most recently, in its 2022 decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Court overruled its prior decisions that had determined the Constitution confers a right to abortion based in substantive due process. Justice Alito’s majority opinion in Dobbs described substantive due process as “a treacherous field,” while Justice Thomas’s concurrence said the doctrine lacked any constitutional basis. Justice Kagan also expressed concern with the majority’s willingness to extend its recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, suggesting that the “ink on that decision is barely dry, and courts have just begun to consider its meaning and reach,” and therefore it was premature to grant relief without more developed analysis on the Free Exercise Clause issue.
Concurring Opinion
Justice Barrett, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Kavanaugh, responded to the dissent in a concurring opinion. Citing Meyer, Pierce, and Parham, Justice Barrett wrote that the substantive due process doctrine has long recognized a parent’s right to raise their child and participate in significant mental health decisions for them. According to the concurrence, the plaintiffs were likely to succeed under a “straightforward application” of these cases because California “quite obviously excludes parents from highly important decisions about their child’s mental health.” As to the majority’s application of parental rights cases after Dobbs, the concurrence asserted that Dobbs simply determined that the substantive due process doctrine does not protect the right to an abortion, not that the doctrine itself or other rights it protects are suspect. Responding to the dissent’s criticism that the majority’s grant of relief reflects an “impatience’ to reach the merits,’” the concurrence said the majority’s opinion simply indicates the “risk of irreparable harm to the parents.” The concurrence explained that the parents would not be entitled to interim relief absent the serious harm of a possible years-long exclusion from participating in decisions about their children’s mental health. Justice Barrett also suggested that in analyzing the Free Exercise Clause claim, the Ninth Circuit “significantly misunderstood Mahmoud v. Taylor,” and therefore “general course correction will allow the case to progress efficiently.”
FERPA: Applicability and Recent ED Action
Beyond the constitutional claims raised in Mirabelli, a related federal statute addresses parental access to student records. FERPA, which applies to educational institutions that receive financial assistance from ED, regulates how covered schools handle student education records. Among other things, as a condition of receiving funding from ED, FERPA requires schools to allow parents to “inspect and review” their children’s education records unless an exception applies. Schools must provide access within 45 days of a request.
On March 28, 2025, ED issued a Dear Colleague Letter (DCL) to state and local education agencies (SEAs and LEAs), informing them of their obligations under FERPA and identifying “priority concerns.” According to the DCL, many LEAs (with approval from, or under the direction of, SEAs) might have policies that conflict with FERPA’s requirements regarding parental inspection and review of student records. For example, the DCL observed, some schools create “gender plans” for students but claim those plans are not “education records” that parents may access under FERPA, as they are not part of an “official student record.” According to the DCL, FERPA allows for no such distinction. With certain statutory exceptions, the DCL stated that all information related to a student and maintained by an educational institution is an education record which parents have a right to inspect and review. 
On January 28, 2026, ED announced that, following an investigation, it had found CDE out of compliance with FERPA “for policies that pressure school officials to conceal information about students’ gender identity.’” ED’s announcement described CDE as maintaining “gender support plans” that were kept in separate filing systems in order to hide the records from parents. According to ED, “CDE’s guidance asserts that such plans are not part of a student’s record accessible to parents, which directly violates parent’s rights under FERPA to inspect all education records related to their minor children.” The announcement indicated that ED had offered CDE the opportunity to voluntarily resolve the matter by taking certain actions. On February 11, 2026, CDE issued an update to schools in the state, explaining that student support plans with information on a student’s gender identity are subject to parental access and review consistent with FERPA. It is unclear at this point whether the announcement resolves the issue for ED. The agency has also made a similar determination as to the policies of several school districts in Kansas regarding parental notification in cases of gender transitions.
Congressional Considerations
Congress may consider its options for addressing parental access to student records and information in light of the Supreme Court ruling in Mirabelli and ED’s recent actions related to FERPA. Subject to constitutional constraints, Congress has discretion to amend FERPA and alter the obligations that follow from that statute and accompanying regulations. Congress could amend FERPA’s provisions concerning parental access to records, including by defining with more specificity what records must be made available, altering the time limit within which access must be granted, or directing ED to promulgate new regulations consistent with congressional directions. Congress could also spell out additional parental rights regarding access to information at school. Alternatively, Congress could consider establishing certain rights of children or limiting parental access to student records, although it may be constrained by the constitutional boundaries reflected in Mirabelli.
In addition, FERPA currently does not contain a private right of action authorizing suits against recipient schools for violations of the law. Instead, the statute is primarily enforced administratively by ED against recipient schools. In cases of noncompliance, ED is authorized to withhold payments or terminate eligibility to receive funding. Congress could amend the statute to explicitly authorize private lawsuits, including establishing appropriate remedies for violations of the law. For instance, a bill introduced in the 119th Congress would create a private right of action and authorize courts to issue declaratory relief, injunctions, and award attorney’s fees where violations are found. That said, Congress’s ability to authorize private enforcement of FERPA may be limited in part by the Constitution’s Article III standing requirements, including the requirement that a plaintiff suffer a concrete injury-in-fact. The Supreme Court has ruled that Article III “requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory violation,” and that “courts should assess whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a close relationship’ to a harm traditionally’ recognized” by American courts. Certain tangible harms, such as physical or monetary harm, easily qualify as concrete injuries, but intangible harms may require more searching deliberations as to whether the harm is sufficiently similar to traditionally recognized harms like intrusion upon seclusion, forced disclosure of private information, reputational harms, or harms specified by the Constitution. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11422/LSB11422.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11422.html
LSB11421,ESA “God Squad” Exemption for Gulf Oil and Gas Activities: Background and Current Litigation,2026-04-20T04:00:00Z,2026-04-23T12:08:02Z,Active,Posts,"Cassandra J. Barnum, Erin H. Ward","Energy Policy, Environmental Review & Policy, Oil, Fossil Energy, Judicial Branch, Endangered Species Act (ESA) Policy & Programs","On March 31, 2026, the Endangered Species Committee—colloquially referred to as the “God Squad” because of its power to determine the fate of species—voted to grant an exemption from Endangered Species Act (ESA; 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544) agency consultation requirements for oil and gas leasing activity in the Gulf of Mexico. This was the first time such an exemption had been granted in more than 30 years, when the Committee last convened in 1992, and the first exemption ever sought or granted for reasons of national security. This Legal Sidebar describes the ESA framework for consultation and exemption therefrom, as well as the ensuing litigation surrounding threats to endangered species, such as the Rice’s whale, from Gulf oil and gas development.
Exemptions from ESA Section 7
Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies to use their authorities to conserve threatened and endangered species (i.e., listed species) and to limit harmful effects on listed species or their critical habitat. To ensure such effects are considered and mitigated, the statute prescribes a consultation process—referred to as Section 7 consultation—through which the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and/or National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (together, the Services) assess the effects of federal agencies’ proposed actions and identify ways to mitigate those effects. This process may result in the agency changing its proposed action, or deciding not to proceed with the action. In some rare cases, the agency may seek to move forward with an action that would otherwise violate Section 7. For such cases, the statute provides an exemption process, which was added to the statute in 1978 after the listing of the snail darter halted construction on the Tellico Dam Project. 
Section 7 Consultation
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires federal agencies to ensure their actions do not jeopardize the continued existence of listed species or adversely modify or destroy critical habitat designated for listed species. This requirement applies to actions carried out, authorized, or funded by federal agencies. Federal agencies fulfill this requirement “in consultation with and with the assistance of” the Services. In general, FWS administers the act for terrestrial and freshwater species, and NMFS administers the act for marine species. Federal agencies consult with one or both of the Services, depending on the listed species and critical habitat found in the area affected by the action. If a proposed action may adversely affect listed species or critical habitat, the federal agency generally is required to initiate a formal consultation process to assess the effects of the action. Once a federal agency initiates formal consultation, Section 7(d) prohibits the federal agency or any permittee or license applicant from making “any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources” to the action that might preclude pursuing alternatives. 
The formal consultation process culminates in the Services issuing a biological opinion (BiOp). In a BiOp, the Services determine whether the action is likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat. If so, the Services are required to identify any reasonable and prudent alternatives (RPAs) that the federal agency can take to avoid jeopardy. The Services’ regulations define RPAs as actions that are consistent with the proposed action’s purpose, can be undertaken within the scope of the federal agency’s authority, are “economically and technologically feasible,” and would avoid jeopardizing listed species or adversely modifying critical habitat. If the Services either find no jeopardy or identify an RPA, they issue the BiOp with an incidental take statement (ITS) that prescribes terms and conditions for mitigating the effects of the action on listed species. In that case, the federal agency may proceed with the proposed action or RPA, as applicable, and so long as the federal agency complies with the terms and conditions of the ITS, any incidental take of the species in the course of carrying out the action does not violate the act. 
If the Services issue a jeopardy BiOp without identifying any RPAs, or the federal agency otherwise determines that it cannot proceed with the action without violating Section 7(a)(2) (e.g., if the federal agency does not want to use the RPAs), the agency may apply for an exemption under Section 7(h). If granted, an exemption allows the federal agency to proceed without violating Section 7(a)(2) and allows the agency to take listed species as needed to carry out the action without violating the act. For more information on the Section 7 consultation process, see CRS Report R46867, Endangered Species Act (ESA) Section 7 Consultation and Infrastructure Projects, by Erin H. Ward and Pervaze A. Sheikh (2021).
Endangered Species Committee and the Section 7 Exemption Process
The Section 7 exemption process is administered by the Endangered Species Committee. Section 7(e) establishes the Committee and directs its composition and general operation. The act provides that the Committee is to be composed of at least seven members: the Secretaries of Agriculture, the Army, and the Interior; the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors; the Administrators of the Environmental Protection Agency and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; and an individual from each state affected by the action, to be appointed by the President. The Services determine which state, or states, are affected by the action. If no states are affected by a particular action, the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce, as applicable, submits a list of individuals with relevant expertise to the President to select an appointee for the committee. 
The Secretary of the Interior chairs the Committee. Five members constitute a quorum, and a meeting may be called by the chair or any five members. All Committee meetings and records related to an application for an exemption must “be open to the public.” The act provides the Committee with an array of authorities to gather information for purposes of making exemption decisions, including issuing subpoenas, holding hearings, taking testimony, and receiving evidence. The Committee members may assign representatives to carry out various Committee tasks, but only members can vote. 
Section 7(g) governs the process for applying for an exemption. The federal agency, the governor of a state where the action would occur, or an applicant for a permit or license may apply for an exemption for a particular agency action if the Services determine, through the consultation process, that the action would violate Section 7(a)(2). The exemption applicant submits a written application to the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce, as applicable, that includes information related to the proposed action, the associated consultation process, and alternatives to the action, as prescribed in regulations. Upon receipt, the relevant Secretary notifies governors of affected states and publishes notice of the application in the Federal Register. The Secretary also “promptly transmit[s]” the application to the Secretary of State to determine if granting the exemption and carrying out the action as proposed would violate an international treaty obligation or other international obligation of the United States. Within 20 days, the Secretary must determine whether the exemption applicant meets three criteria: (1) carried out consultation responsibilities in good faith with a “reasonable and responsible effort” to consider RPAs, (2) conducted any required biological assessments, and (3) refrained from making irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources in violation of Section 7(d). 
If the exemption applicant meets the three criteria, the act directs the Secretary to hold a hearing on the application, in consultation with the Committee, and prepare a report. The report addresses four topics: (1) the availability of RPAs and the benefits of those RPAs as compared to the proposed action, (2) the proposed action’s regional or national significance and whether it is in the public interest, (3) reasonable mitigation measures for the Committee to consider, and (4) compliance with Section 7(d)’s restrictions. The Secretary submits the report to the Committee. 
The Secretary of State also reviews the application and the hearing materials to determine whether granting the exemption would be consistent with the United States’ treaty or other international obligations. If the Secretary of State certifies, after reviewing the application and the hearing, that granting the exemption and carrying out the action would violate an international obligation of the United States, the Committee is prohibited from considering the exemption. 
The Committee makes the final determination on whether to exempt a particular agency action from the requirements of Section 7(a)(2). The Committee makes its determination based on the record of the agency action, the Secretary’s report, the hearing held by the Secretary, and any other testimony or evidence gathered. The statute directs the Committee to grant the exemption if four criteria are met, which parallel the information provided in the report: (1) there are no RPAs; (2) the benefits of the action clearly outweigh the benefits of RPAs, “consistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat,” and the action is in the public interest; (3) “the action is of regional or national significance”; and (4) neither the federal agency nor any permit or license applicant violated Section 7(d)’s restrictions. The Committee must also establish “reasonable mitigation and enhancement measures . . . as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the agency action upon the endangered species, threatened species, or critical habitat concerned.” The Committee must agree to an exemption with at least five votes, and the voting must be in person. If granted, the statute directs the Committee to issue an order that grants the exemption and specifies the required mitigation and enhancement measures for the exemption applicant to carry out. 
Separately, the act directs that “the Committee shall grant an exemption for any agency action if the Secretary of Defense finds that such exemption is necessary for reasons of national security.” The statute does not define “reasons of national security,” or specify any format or content for the Secretary of Defense’s “finding.” 
Section 7(n) authorizes judicial review of any exemption decision by the Committee in the U.S. Court of Appeals, either in the circuit where the action is to be or is being carried out or, if it is outside any circuit, in the District of Columbia Circuit. For more information on the exemption process and previous exemption applications, see CRS Report R40787, Endangered Species Act (ESA): The Exemption Process, by Pervaze A. Sheikh (2017).
Gulf Oil and Gas Leasing Consultation and NMFS Biological Opinion
In May 2025, NMFS issued a BiOp titled “Biological Opinion on the Federally Regulated Oil and Gas Program Activities in the Gulf of America,” the culmination of a lengthy Section 7 consultation process with two agencies within the Department of the Interior—the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE)—that oversee oil and gas leasing activity on the outer continental shelf. The 2025 BiOp replaced a previous opinion that had been successfully challenged in court by environmental NGOs and vacated upon a determination that NMFS had underestimated risks to species, among other things. 
In the new BiOp, NMFS considered potential impacts of various Gulf oil and gas development activities on potentially impacted listed species and their critical habitat. The 2025 BiOp concluded that “the proposed action is likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Rice’s whale” due to “the risk of injurious and lethal vessel strike interaction.” The BiOp identified an RPA centered on developing a technological approach to minimizing vessel strikes of Rice’s whales. The BiOp also included an ITS authorizing incidental take of various species in carrying out the RPA. 
A coalition of environmental groups—largely the same plaintiffs who had successfully challenged the prior BiOp—sued NMFS in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland over the 2025 BiOp, alleging among other things that it underestimated risks to listed species and seeking to have the BiOp vacated. The State of Louisiana and industry groups sued NMFS in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging among other things that the 2025 BiOp overestimated risks to species and requesting the BiOp be remanded to the agency for revision (but not vacated). The court in the Louisiana case granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, and remanded the 2025 BiOp to NMFS for revision without vacatur. It is unclear what impact that remand will have on the case in the District of Maryland.
The National Security Exemption
On March 13, 2026, the Secretary of Defense, who is using “Secretary of War” as a “secondary title” under Executive Order 14347 dated September 5, 2025, sent a letter to the Secretary of the Interior stating that national security required that the oil and gas activities considered in the 2025 BiOp be exempted from ESA requirements and requesting to convene the Endangered Species Committee. The letter and attached findings expressed concern over litigation surrounding the 2025 BiOp and the potential that the BiOp would be vacated. The Secretary noted that judicial vacatur of the opinion and associated ITS would disrupt oil and gas exploration and development and jeopardize safety of critical infrastructure. The findings emphasized the import of domestic production for economic stability and geopolitical strength, while also noting that certain military bases obtain fuel directly from Gulf oil refineries.
On March 16, 2026, the Office of the Secretary of the Interior published a notice in the Federal Register that the Endangered Species Committee would meet on March 31 regarding an ESA exemption under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h). 
Preliminary Litigation
On March 18, 2026, the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking to block the meeting from occurring. The complaint alleged that the decision to convene the Committee must be set aside under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as contrary to various procedural and substantive ESA requirements. Procedural allegations included, among others, that any exemption application must be summarized in a Federal Register notice and that the published notice did not do so, and that the proposed format—a closed-door meeting streamed over the internet—violated the ESA requirement that the meeting be “open to the public.” Substantively, CBD argued, among other things, that the ESA allows for an exemption only after a determination by NMFS or FWS that the Gulf oil and gas activities violated Section 7(a)(2) based on a finding of jeopardy and lack of RPAs, and that no such determination had been made. CBD requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the meeting from taking place.
The government responded that emergency injunctive relief was improper for a number of reasons. To issue a TRO, a court must find among other things that the requester is likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The government argued this was not the case because the meeting announcement was not a “final agency action” subject to judicial review under the APA, and because CBD had filed suit in the wrong venue and lacked standing to sue. 
The court denied CBD’s TRO motion, finding that the court likely lacked subject matter jurisdiction over CBD’s claims. The court did not elaborate on this conclusion, but cited cases addressing district court versus appellate court jurisdiction over particular claims, as well as the judicial review provision for Endangered Species Committee decisions. The court further held that the meeting announcement likely did not constitute a final agency action, and concluded CBD had not met its burden to demonstrate likely success on the merits of its claims. 
Endangered Species Committee Meeting and Decision
Members of the Endangered Species Committee convened as scheduled on March 31, 2026. Committee members gave prepared statements, and the meeting was live-streamed. Various members emphasized the import of domestic energy sources; that ESA litigation was impairing oil and gas development in the Gulf; and that disruptions to Gulf oil and gas operations degraded military readiness. Members generally expressed the view that the Committee was without discretion to deny the exemption in light of the Secretary of Defense’s findings, and voted unanimously to grant it. A Federal Register notice published on April 3, 2026, announced that the BOEM and BSEE Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Program, including “the oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities, as well as the avoidance or minimization measures” described in the 2025 BiOp, would be exempt from ESA requirements and take prohibitions. The notice further stated that the Committee was not required to specify mitigation and enhancement measures under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(l)(1) because that requirement applied only where the Committee received an exemption “application,” which did not occur in connection with the national security exemption; nonetheless, the notice stated that mitigation measures specified in the Secretary of Defense’s findings would satisfy this requirement in any case. Finally, the notice expressed the Committee’s understanding that, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n), judicial review of its decision would be available only in the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.
Subsequent Litigation and Likely Legal Issues
CBD filed an amended complaint alleging further APA violations immediately after the Endangered Species Committee meeting (but prior to publication of the Federal Register notice announcing the exemption). The alleged APA violations are that (1) the Committee met in the absence of an exemption application and without threshold findings that there were no potential mitigations or RPAs to the proposed agency action, contrary to ESA requirements; (2) the Committee conducted the meeting in violation of the ESA’s public notice and information access requirements; and (3) the Secretary of Defense’s national security findings lacked a rational basis. CBD also seeks a writ of mandamus requiring the Committee to publicize records related to the decision. 
Another coalition of environmental groups filed a lawsuit on April 2, 2026, also in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. These plaintiffs claim that the exemption was contrary to law under the APA because (1) the Committee can only consider an exemption after the expert agency has found the proposed action will jeopardize a species and there are no RPAs, such that an irreconcilable conflict exists; (2) an exemption may only be granted after thorough consideration of an application pursuant to statutory procedures, including required mitigation measures; and (3) an exemption can only be granted for an “agency action,” not a set of unspecified or speculative activities. The plaintiffs also claim that the Secretary of Defense’s finding that an exemption was necessary for national security was arbitrary and capricious and should be set aside under the APA because it was speculative and failed to consider available evidence.
As these cases proceed, the parties will likely file additional briefs in support of their positions. The government’s response to the TRO motion in the CBD case may serve as a preview of the government’s substantive response to the complaints. If so, the federal defendants may argue that when the Secretary of Defense makes a national security finding under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j), the Committee must grant an exemption under § 1536(h) and the “procedural provisions that apply to applications for exemptions, such as the submission itself, the hearing on the application, and the report of the Secretary of the Interior or Commerce on the application,” do not apply. The federal defendants may also renew their arguments with respect to venue that the cases can only be litigated in the U.S. Courts of Appeals under 16 U.S.C. § 1536(n). (The TRO opposition brief, unlike the notice of exemption in the Federal Register, did not take a position on which federal circuit(s) would be appropriate venues.)
Meanwhile, the federal and industry defendants in the District of Maryland 2025 BiOp litigation have argued that the case should be dismissed as moot in light of the exemption. The court is likely to receive briefing on that issue in the coming months.
Considerations for Congress
The ESA exemption process has rarely been used in the nearly 50 years since it was added to the ESA. Before March 31, the last time the Committee convened was in 1992. Most federal agency actions do not require formal consultations, and BiOps generally result in either nonjeopardy findings or RPAs. In either case, so long as the federal agency agrees that any identified RPA is viable, it may move forward with the action. As such, federal agencies have rarely had reason to pursue an exemption. The March 31 decision marks the first time an exemption has been approved due to national security reasons. As a result, there is no judicial precedent about how the national security exemption should work in practice. The ongoing litigation may change that if the court reaches a decision on the merits. 
With respect to the March 31 exemption specifically, Congress may choose to pass legislation to rescind or affirm the decision or to otherwise alter how the ESA requirements apply to oil and gas activities in the Gulf. More broadly, in light of the recent use of the exemption, Congress may consider whether to revisit the exemption provisions to determine whether they align with current congressional intent. With respect to the national security provision in particular, Congress may consider whether the discretion afforded the Secretary of Defense is consistent with national security goals or whether to specify procedural or substantive requirements for use of the provision, for example by defining “reasons of national security” or delineating the basis or form of the Secretary’s “find[ings].” Congress may also seek to clarify points of contention at issue in the ongoing litigation, such as whether the public must be allowed in-person access to Committee votes or whether federal agencies must follow the application process in Section 7(g) when the national security provision is invoked. 
Alternatively, Congress could specify that no additional process is required or otherwise streamline the use of the national security provision. Congress may also choose to glean further insight from the litigation into how a court might interpret these provisions before determining whether to pursue any legislative actions. Congress also could opt not to act legislatively. Either way, Congress could consider conducting oversight to determine which other actions may be considered for Section 7 exemptions, whether for national security reasons or otherwise. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11421/LSB11421.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11421.html
LSB11420,Congressional Court Watcher: Circuit Splits from March 2026,2026-04-20T04:00:00Z,2026-04-21T11:09:01Z,Active,Posts,"Michael John Garcia, Alexander H. Pepper",,"The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the thirteen “circuits” issue thousands of precedential decisions each year. Because relatively few of these decisions are ultimately reviewed by the Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals are often the last word on consequential legal questions. The federal appellate courts sometimes reach different conclusions on the same issue of federal law, causing a “split” among the circuits that leads to the nonuniform application of federal law among similarly situated litigants.
This Legal Sidebar discusses circuit splits that emerged or widened following decisions from March 2026 on matters relevant to Congress. The Sidebar does not address every circuit split that developed or widened during this period. Selected cases typically involve judicial disagreement over the interpretation or validity of federal statutes and regulations, or constitutional issues relevant to Congress’s lawmaking and oversight functions. The Sidebar includes only cases where an appellate court’s controlling opinion recognizes a split among the circuits on a key legal issue resolved in the opinion. This Sidebar refers to each U.S. Court of Appeals by its number or descriptor (e.g., “D.C. Circuit” for “U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit”).
Some cases identified in this Sidebar, or the legal questions they address, are examined in other CRS general distribution products. Members of Congress and congressional staff may click here to subscribe to the CRS Legal Update and receive regular notifications of new products and upcoming seminars by CRS attorneys.
Civil Rights: The Eleventh Circuit held that qualified immunity depends on whether a defendant’s conduct violates clearly established law; qualified immunity, the court held, is not affected by uncertainty over whether the defendant can be held personally liable for that conduct. Defendant school administrators allegedly failed to implement a settlement agreement between a former employee and their school district because of racial animus. The Eleventh Circuit held that the defendants’ alleged conduct violated clearly established law, reasoning that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and circuit precedent make clear that third parties may not impair contractual rights because of race. The defendants contended that they were nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because whether government officials can be held personally liable under Section 1981 is uncertain. The court held that any such uncertainty was irrelevant, with the question being whether a defendant’s conduct was unlawful, not whether a plaintiff can successfully haul them into court. The Eleventh Circuit rejected a Fifth Circuit finding that qualified immunity should be conferred where there had been uncertainty about the individual liability of public employees at the time of the conduct under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The Eleventh Circuit concurred with a Tenth Circuit conclusion regarding the same FMLA question and a Seventh Circuit opinion addressing uncertainty over personal liability in a different context (Foster v. King). 
Civil Rights: A divided Eleventh Circuit panel generally upheld a lower court’s ruling that Florida’s Medicaid health care program violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in serving children who were institutionalized or likely to be institutionalized due to “medically complex” conditions, requiring, for example, equipment for communication, mobility, breathing, or eating. Among other things, the majority agreed with the lower court that Florida’s Medicaid system unjustifiably risked institutionalizing these children in contravention of the ADA’s mandate—reflected in ADA regulations and the Supreme Court’s Olmstead decision—that persons with disabilities be placed in the most integrated setting possible. In so doing, the majority agreed with the Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, which have held that those at risk of institutionalization (but not yet institutionalized) may bring Olmstead claims, but split with the Fifth Circuit, which has held that risk alone does not give rise to a concrete claim under Title II (United States v. Florida).
Criminal Law & Procedure: A divided Second Circuit held that time credits earned under a provision of the First Step Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4), could not be used to reduce the petitioner’s period of supervised release. Section 3632(d)(4) permits qualifying prisoners to earn time credits for their participation in certain activities, including recidivism reduction programming. The majority held that time credits could be used for the early start of prelease custody or supervised release, but could not reduce the period of supervised release. The majority split from the Ninth Circuit, which has held that an inmate may use earned time credits to reduce his term of supervise release (Rivera-Perez v. Stover).
Criminal Law & Procedure: A divided Fourth Circuit panel held that a defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in files stored in a private Google Drive account and that law enforcement’s warrantless opening of those files was an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even where Google had flagged the files as likely to contain illegal material. A Google algorithm identified through hash value matching that the defendant’s files matched known child sexual abuse material. A Google reviewer opened some of the files and submitted a report to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which reviewed the same opened files and forwarded the report to law enforcement. Without a warrant, a detective opened several new files and then obtained a search warrant for the Google account. The panel majority held that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his Google Drive account and in the files stored there. It rejected the government’s arguments that Google’s privacy policy extinguished any reasonable privacy expectation, declining to follow an Eleventh Circuit opinion regarding inspection warnings by FedEx. The Fourth Circuit panel majority also held that the hash-matching of the files was not sufficient to trigger an exception to the warrant requirement under the private search doctrine, which generally provides that a search by a private party does not implicate the Fourth Amendment even if the results are provided to the government. In so interpreting the private search doctrine in the hash-matching context, the panel majority aligned with the Second and Ninth Circuits and against the Fifth and Sixth Circuits. The Fourth Circuit panel majority held that the detective exceeded the bounds of the earlier private searches and violated the Fourth Amendment when she opened files that private actors had flagged through hash-matching but not opened. The panel majority nevertheless affirmed the defendant’s conviction because later discovered evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search, and the remaining panel member concurred in the result (United States v. Lowers).
Criminal Law & Procedure: The Sixth Circuit held that the federal criminal offense of coercion and enticement of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), requires knowledge of the victim’s minor status. The defendant pleaded guilty to failure to register as a sex offender in violation of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). For sentencing purposes, the district court had classified the defendant as a Tier II sex offender under SORNA because it found that her underlying state law offense for lewd and lascivious battery was “comparable to or more severe than” Section 2422(b), a Tier-II offense. The Tenth Circuit determined that the state offense was not comparable primarily because, unlike the strict liability state offense, Section 2422(b) requires knowledge of the victim’s minor status. In interpreting Section 2422(b) to require such knowledge, the Sixth Circuit joined the Seventh and Ninth Circuits while disagreeing with the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. The Sixth Circuit relied on the plain text of the statute, holding that the adverb “knowingly” applied to not only the series of transitive verbs that follow that term in the statute, but also the grammatical object of that conduct, an “individual who has not attained the age of 18 years.” The court rejected the contrary circuits’ reliance on a comparison to an adjacent federal child sex trafficking statute that courts have uniformly interpreted not to require knowledge of age, explaining that the trafficking statute is structured differently. The court also reasoned that minor status can distinguish criminal behavior from innocent conduct in the enticement context, unlike in trafficking, bolstering a presumption in favor of a scienter requirement. The panel remanded for resentencing, in part because of the tier misclassification (United States v. Buddi).
Criminal Law & Procedure: The Ninth Circuit affirmed the application of a sentencing enhancement for firearms trafficking to a defendant who sold firearms to undercover agents. The enhancement in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines requires that a defendant knew or had reason to believe that their conduct would transfer a firearm to an individual who intended to use the firearm unlawfully or who could not lawfully possess a firearm. (The enhancement was amended in 2023, but the current version and prior version at issue in the case contain similar language.) The Ninth Circuit held that, based on a plain text reading, the enhancement does not require that the transferee was in fact an unlawful possessor or intended to use the firearm unlawfully; the attachment applies, the court explained, if the defendant had a reasonable belief of such. In adopting this interpretation, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits and rejected a contrary Tenth Circuit decision. The Ninth Circuit also rejected the defendant’s reliance on out-of-circuit interpretations of a related criminal statute involving knowledge or reasonable belief of a recipient’s status as a felon. The court deemed unpersuasive the Fourth and Fifth Circuits’ conclusory interpretations requiring actual felon status (United States v. Ferrari).
Criminal Law & Procedure: In an amended opinion, a divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed a district court’s order that accumulated deposits made by friends and family of a federal inmate be applied to the inmate’s restitution obligations under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA). A provision of the MVRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(n), generally requires a covered criminal who “receives substantial resources from any source, including inheritance, settlement, or other judgment, during a period of incarceration . . . to apply the value of such resources to any restitution or fine still owed.” The Ninth Circuit majority held that Section 3664(n)’s reference to “any source” indicated that the MVRA applied to substantial aggregated sums accrued in an inmate’s trust account from periodic deposits by multiple sources. The majority disagreed with the First and Fifth Circuits, among other courts, which have interpreted the MVRA’s reference to an “inheritance, settlement, or other judgment” to indicate that the statute was intended to apply in more limited fashion to sudden financial windfalls (United States v. Myers).
Criminal Law & Procedure: The Eleventh Circuit held that district courts may not permit federal inmate habeas corpus petitioners pursuing a second or successive petition to add new claims beyond those screened by a court of appeals. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, second or successive petitions must be certified by the appropriate court of appeals to rely on either (1) newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense at issue or (2) a newly announced constitutional interpretation made retroactively applicable. The Eleventh Circuit had granted this petitioner leave to challenge one of the counts on which he was convicted. At the district court, he moved to amend his petition to challenge several other counts. The district court refused, and the Eleventh Circuit agreed that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. The circuit panel held that expanding the scope of the petition to additional counts would require a new application to the court of appeals. In so deciding, the Eleventh Circuit noted a “potential circuit split” given decisions by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. Those circuits permitted district courts to consider motions to amend Section 2255 petitions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The Eleventh Circuit rejected this approach, to the extent that it permits petitioners to add claims that have not been screened by the court of appeals. The court remanded for resentencing on other grounds (United States v. Ragland).
Immigration: A divided Eighth Circuit panel held that an alien taken into immigration custody after having unlawfully entered the country years earlier could be detained without bond during the pendency of removal proceedings. In many cases, an alien may be released from custody on bond or on his or her own recognizance during the pendency of removal proceedings. Except in narrow circumstances, however, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) directs that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained [during removal proceedings]” (italics added). Federal statute provides that an alien “present in the United States who has not been admitted” shall be treated as an “applicant for admission,” but does not define an alien “seeking admission.” The Eighth Circuit majority joined the Fifth Circuit in holding that “applicant for admission” and an “alien seeking admission” are synonymous terms, meaning that aliens, such as the petitioner, who are present in the United States but not lawfully admitted are subject to the mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A). In so doing, the majority rejected the petitioner’s argument and the position of the Seventh Circuit that the two terms were not coextensive, and that an “alien seeking admission” under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) includes only those aliens not lawfully admitted who are encountered at the border, and not those found unlawfully present within the United States (Avila v. Bondi).
International Law: A divided Fourth Circuit panel affirmed a jury’s verdict in favor of Iraqi citizens who brought claims under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) against a U.S. contractor that provided interrogation services at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq, where the plaintiffs were detained. The ATS grants federal district courts “original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States,” and the jury found the contractor liable on two claims: (1) conspiracy to commit torture and (2) conspiracy to commit cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment. In upholding the verdict, the panel majority identified several issues regarding the application of the ATS on which it disagreed with other circuits. First, it held that the claims under the ATS were not impermissibly extraterritorial because detention centers in Iraq at the time of the plaintiffs’ detention were within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush, concerning detentions at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba, the panel majority held that the United States had “complete jurisdiction and control over Abu Ghraib” at the relevant time. The panel majority declined to follow the Fifth Circuit, which distinguished Iraq from Guantanamo Bay because of the temporary nature of the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Second, the panel majority held that the ATS permits the imposition of liability on corporations. While the Supreme Court has held that courts must look to norms of international law to assess what conduct is subject to liability under the ATS, appellate courts have adopted different views as to whether these norms control the question of corporate liability. The Fourth Circuit panel majority rejected the approach of the Second and Ninth Circuits, which look to whether international law recognizes the liability of corporations, and instead adopted that of the D.C. Circuit, which does not rely on international norms and instead focuses on the purposes of the ATS. In concluding that corporate liability may exist under the ATS, the Fourth Circuit panel majority also relied on concurring opinions considering the matter in the Supreme Court’s decision in Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe. Finally, the panel majority held that the combatant exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act does not preempt claims under the ATS, declining to follow a portion of a D.C. Circuit opinion that the panel majority characterized as “arguably dicta” (Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc.).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11420/LSB11420.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11420.html
IN12681,Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Response to a Raw Dairy Toxic E. coli Outbreak,2026-04-20T04:00:00Z,2026-04-21T15:53:11Z,Active,Posts,Laura Pineda-Bermudez,,"Introduction
On March 15, 2026, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS’s) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and certain state public health officials announced an investigation into a multistate outbreak of toxic E. coli O157:H7 infections linked to raw (unpasteurized) cheese and milk sold by RAW FARM, LLC (Raw Farm). The investigation confirmed nine E. coli cases in three states between September 2025 and February 2026, with the majority of illnesses occurring in children under five.
On April 2, 2026, after initially refusing, Raw Farm voluntarily recalled certain raw cheddar cheese products and stated it “disputes being the cause of this outbreak.” Raw Farm, the largest raw milk farm in the country, reported that this recall impacted approximately $1.5 million of its product. The farm was identified by CDC and FDA as the likely source of a similar 2024 E. coli outbreak. According to CDC, children under five, adults 65 and older, and people with compromised immune systems are at a higher risk of becoming ill with a toxic E. coli infection, which can cause serious health conditions. Raw dairy products, compared with pasteurized products, generally are associated with a higher risk of foodborne illness, including E. coli infection.
Food Recalls
Foods may be recalled from the market for various reasons, including labeling errors, possible microbial contamination, or the presence of health hazards that could result in serious impacts or death. If a potentially unsafe food is identified during a foodborne illness investigation, the food producer may recall it voluntarily. Voluntary recalls may be initiated at any time by the producer or at FDA’s request (under certain conditions). If the producer does not voluntarily recall the product (a rare occurrence), FDA has statutory authority to order a recall when deemed necessary to protect public health. Congress gave FDA mandatory recall authority for foods (excluding infant formula) in the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA; P.L. 111-353), enacted in 2011, if certain conditions are met (see textbox). FDA has used its FSMA mandatory recall authority once, in 2018—in dietary supplements, considered food in this context (21 U.S.C. §321(ff)), containing contaminated kratom.
FSMA Mandatory Recall Authority—Selected Provisions
(21 U.S.C. §350l) 
If the HHS Secretary determines that there is a reasonable probability that a food (except infant formula) is adulterated or misbranded and exposure to the food will cause serious adverse health consequences or death, “the Secretary shall provide the responsible party with an opportunity to” perform a voluntary food recall (21 U.S.C. §350l(a)).
“If the responsible party refuses to or does not voluntarily cease distribution or recall” the food within the time frame and manner set by the Secretary, FDA may order the party to immediately cease distribution and give notice and sufficient information to any other entities within the supply chain that may be holding, processing, or distributing the food (21 U.S.C. §350l(b)).
After the mandatory recall order is issued, an informal hearing is required as soon as possible, but no later than two days after the order, for the Secretary to provide mandatory recall instructions and allow the responsible party to make a case for why the food should not be recalled (21 U.S.C. §350l(c)).
After the hearing, if necessary, the Secretary shall continue the mandatory recall order and provide further instruction (e.g., specify time frame, require periodic updates) (21 U.S.C. §350l(d)(1)). If the Secretary determines that adequate grounds for continuing the recall do not exist, the Secretary is to vacate or modify the order (21 U.S.C. §350l(d)(2)).
The Secretary is to ensure public notification of the mandatory recall, including a press release, alerts, and public notices, as appropriate. The notification is to include the food name, a description of the risk associated with the food, and “information for consumers about similar articles of food” not part of the recall (21 U.S.C. §350l(g)(1)).
The Secretary is to coordinate communications via an “incident command operation” within HHS that is to be active “not later than 24 hours” from the start of the order and ensure clear communication within and from HHS with other agencies, organizations, and the public (providing a single point of contact for public inquiries) (21 U.S.C. §350l(j)).
The Secretary shall work in coordination with federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, as appropriate (21 U.S.C. §350l(f) and §(j)(2)(D)).
The Secretary is to end the order when deemed appropriate (21 U.S.C. §350l(j)(2)(E)).
FDA must submit an annual report to Congress under FSMA (21 U.S.C. §350l-1) on its use of mandatory recall authority. FDA has separate mandatory recall authority for infant formula under the Infant Formula Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-359).
Foodborne Illness Outbreak Investigations
Many federal and state agencies collaborate to regulate food safety and monitor for foodborne illness outbreaks. Foodborne illness outbreak investigations are not linear—multiple investigation activities can occur simultaneously across agencies. Various factors may impact the success of outbreak investigations, including illness onset time, food shelf-life, patient memory, and genetic relatedness of the pathogen that caused the illness. Investigative activities may include patient interviews, testing of suspected food products (e.g., in stores, patient homes, or production facilities), and inspections and testing of food facilities along the supply chain. The absence of a positive pathogen result in product testing does not necessarily mean the food is not associated with an outbreak. Likewise, a positive result does not necessarily mean there is food safety noncompliance but may highlight inherent risks in food production. All information gathered during investigations may inform next steps for regulatory and public health officials, actions of impacted food producers or retailers, and preventive practices for producers and consumers.
Considerations for Congress 
Some House Members of the Congressional Food Safety Caucus urged FDA and Raw Farm to remove the outbreak-linked products from the market and indicated openness to strengthening FDA’s mandatory recall authority, if needed. Policy issues of potential interest to Congress include timelines for voluntary recall compliance, the sufficiency of FDA’s recall procedures, and oversight of FDA’s use of mandatory recall authority.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12681/IN12681.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12681.html
IF13206,Judiciary Budget Request for FY2027,2026-04-20T04:00:00Z,2026-04-22T11:08:48Z,Active,Resources,Barry J. McMillion,,"Overview
The federal judiciary’s FY2027 budget request was made public by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts on March 25, 2026. The request seeks $9.7 billion in discretionary funding (an increase of 4.9% over the FY2026 enacted level), as well as $826.5 million in mandatory appropriations for judicial salaries and judicial retirement funds.
The judiciary also uses non-appropriated funds to offset its appropriations requirement. The majority of these non-appropriated funds are derived from the collection of fees, primarily court filing fees. The judiciary’s annual appropriations request reflects the net needs of the judiciary after the use of non-appropriated funds.
Congress typically includes appropriations for the judiciary in the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations bill.
Table 1 presents the FY2026 discretionary enacted level and the FY2027 discretionary request for each account that is part of the judiciary’s budget request.
Individual Accounts
Supreme Court
The total FY2027 discretionary request for the Supreme Court, $225.1 million, is contained in two accounts: (1) Salaries and Expenses ($207.0 million) and (2) Care of the Building and Grounds ($18.1 million). The total represents a 29.0% increase over the FY2026 enacted level (which includes supplemental funding enacted in P.L. 119-37). The FY2026 enacted amount reported in Table 1 does not include additional supplemental funding of $30 million included in H.R. 7147, which has not been enacted as of this writing.
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
This court, consisting of 12 judges, exercises jurisdiction over certain lower court rulings on patents and trademarks, international trade, and federal claims cases. The FY2027 discretionary budget request is $38.7 million, an increase of 5.4% over the FY2026 enacted level.
U.S. Court of International Trade
This court has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States, its agencies, and its officers, and certain civil actions brought by the United States arising out of import transactions and the administration and enforcement of federal customs and international trade laws. The FY2027 discretionary request of $22.9 million is an increase of 2.2% over the FY2026 enacted level.
Table 1. FY2026 Discretionary Appropriations and FY2027 Discretionary Appropriations Request
(in millions of dollars)
Account
FY2026 Enacted
FY2027 Request

Supreme Court (total)
$174.5
$225.1

Salaries and Expenses
$163.1
$207.0

Buildings and Grounds
$11.4
$18.1

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
$36.7
$38.7

Court of International Trade
$22.4
$22.9

Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Other Judicial Services (total)
$8,816.3
$9,202.0

Salaries and Expenses
$6,127.1
$6,439.0

Defender Services
$1,766.0
$1,792.8

Court Security
$892.0
$920.9

Fees of Jurors and Commissioners
$19.1
$37.1

Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund
$12.1
$12.1

Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts
$107.0
$113.8

Federal Judicial Center
$35.1
$35.6

Sentencing Commission
$22.7
$23.7

TOTAL 
$9,214.7
$9,661.8

Sources: H.R. 7148, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2026 (P.L. 119-75); Fiscal Year 2027 Congressional Budget Summary (prepared by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, March 2026).
Notes: Columns may not sum due to rounding. The FY2026 amount reported for Supreme Court Salaries and Expenses includes supplemental funding enacted for FY2026 ($28 million; P.L. 119-37) but does not include additional supplemental funding of $30 million included in H.R. 7147, which has not been enacted as of this writing.
Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Other Judicial Services
This account, which is the largest included in the judiciary’s budget request, provides funding for 12 U.S. courts of appeals and 94 district courts located in the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories. The account is further divided to represent costs associated with judicial salaries and expenses, defender services, court security, the fees paid to jurors and commissioners, and the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund. The FY2027 discretionary budget request of $9.2 billion is an increase of 4.4% over the FY2026 enacted level.
Salaries and Expenses
The FY2027 discretionary request for this account is $6.4 billion, an increase of 5.1% over the FY2026 enacted level. 
Defender Services
This account funds the operations of the federal public defender and community defender organizations, and compensation, reimbursements, and expenses of private practice panel attorneys appointed by federal courts to serve as defense counsel for indigent individuals. The FY2027 request is $1.8 billion, an increase of 1.5% over the FY2026 enacted level.
Court Security
This account provides for protective services, security systems, and equipment needs in courthouses and other federal facilities to ensure the safety of judicial officers, employees, and visitors. Under this account, the majority of funding for court security is transferred to the U.S. Marshals Service to pay for court security officers under the Judicial Facility Security Program. The FY2027 request is $920.9 million, an increase of 3.2% over the FY2026 enacted level.
Fees of Jurors and Commissioners
This account funds the fees and allowances provided to grand and petit jurors, and compensation for jury and land commissioners. The FY2027 request is $37.1 million, an increase of 94.2% over the FY2026 enacted level.
Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program funds a federal no-fault program that protects the availability of vaccines in the nation by diverting a substantial number of claims from the tort arena. The FY2027 request is $12.1 million, approximately the same amount as the FY2026 enacted level.
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO)
The AO provides a wide range of administrative, management, program, and information technology services to the U.S. courts. It also provides support to the Judicial Conference of the United States, and implements conference policies and applicable federal statutes and regulations. The FY2027 request for AO is $113.8 million, an increase of 6.4% over the FY2026 enacted level.
Federal Judicial Center
As the judiciary’s research and education entity, the Federal Judicial Center undertakes research and evaluation of judicial operations for the Judicial Conference committees and the courts. In addition, the center provides judges, court staff, and others with orientation, continuing education, and training. The center’s FY2027 request is $35.6 million, an increase of 1.4% over the FY2026 enacted level.
United States Sentencing Commission
The commission promulgates sentencing policies, practices, and guidelines for the federal criminal justice system. The FY2027 request is $23.7 million, an increase of 4.4% over the FY2026 enacted level.
Mandatory Funding
Mandatory funding in the judiciary budget includes required funding for the salaries and benefits of Article I and Article III judges. Mandatory appropriations also provide funding for judicial retirement accounts. Table 2 presents the FY2026 assumed appropriations level for each account and the judiciary’s FY2027 request.
Table 2. FY2026 Mandatory Appropriations and FY2027 Mandatory Budget Request
(in millions of dollars)
Account
FY2026 Enacted
FY2027 Request

Supreme Court
$3.3
$3.3

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
$3.7
$3.8

Court of International Trade
$2.5
$2.6

Courts of Appeals, District Courts, and Other Judicial Services
$534.7
$542.9

Judicial Retirement Funds
$309.4
$274.0

TOTAL
$853.6
$826.5

Source: Fiscal Year 2027 Congressional Budget Summary (prepared by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, March 2026).
Note: Columns may not sum due to rounding.
Relevant Items Not Funded by Judiciary Appropriations
Three specialized courts are funded with other appropriations—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and the U.S. Tax Court. 
Additionally, the federal judiciary’s courthouse construction and capital security projects are funded from the General Services Administration’s budget.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13206/IF13206.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13206.html
R48911,Social Security Administration (SSA) Staffing Levels by State or Area: Data Brief,2026-04-17T04:00:00Z,2026-04-18T05:08:24Z,Active,Reports,William R. Morton,,"The Social Security Administration (SSA) is an independent agency in the executive branch headed by the commissioner of Social Security. It is responsible for administering Social Security and Supplemental Security Income, which are the nation’s primary income support programs for older adults and individuals with disabilities. SSA is also responsible for supporting the administration of a number of non-SSA programs and activities, such as portions of Medicare. In FY2025, SSA employed about 52,000 federal workers and funded about 13,700 state disability determination services (DDS) employees to carry out its programs and other administrative responsibilities. The agency operates about 1,500 offices across the country and around the world. SSA is headquartered in Woodlawn, MD, outside of Baltimore.
This report provides data on SSA’s staffing levels (including state DDS staffing levels) by state or area.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48911/R48911.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48911.html
R48912,Child Welfare Funding in the President’s FY2027 Budget: In Brief,2026-04-16T04:00:00Z,2026-04-23T12:07:59Z,Active,Reports,Emilie Stoltzfus,"Child Welfare, Labor, HHS & Education Appropriations","The President’s FY2027 budget requests $11.619 billion in federal child welfare spending under the child welfare authorities included in Title IV-E (Payments for Foster Care, Prevention, and Permanency) and Title IV-B (Child and Family Services) of the Social Security Act (SSA), the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), Adoption Opportunities, and the Victims of Child Abuse Act (VCAA). Comparable funding is expected to be $11.662 billion for FY2026, and was $11.319 billion for FY2025. Federal child welfare programs are generally administered by the Children’s Bureau, an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Administration for Children and Families (ACF). The three competitive grant programs included in the VCAA, however, are administered by the Office of Justice Programs, within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).
The FY2027 budget documents do not include any proposals to amend federal child welfare program law, and funding requested for mandatory programs is provided based on current law only. At the same time, a message from the ACF Assistant Secretary, which is included in the agency’s budget justifications, states that the budget “advances the Administration’s commitment to child welfare through the implementation of the Fostering the Future for American Children and Families Executive Order.” It also notes that ACF will continue to lead its “A Home for Every Child Initiative.” The budget request explicitly provides that Title IV-E funding will support several activities that are aligned with the Fostering the Future executive order. These include promoting modernization of child welfare information systems; expanded use of “technological solutions,” such as predictive analytics and artificial intelligence; clearer state child welfare performance metrics and evaluation and related public data; and more easily accessed supports and services for youth transitioning from foster care to adulthood. In addition, it seeks a general provision in the annual appropriations act to permit any unused funds provided for Adoption and Legal Guardianship Incentive Payments to be redirected to support a “Fostering the Future Fund demonstration project” to offer support intended to enable youth to successfully transition to adulthood outside the foster care system.
Funding obligated or requested for Title IV-E foster care and for Title IV-E adoption or guardianship assistance (i.e., permanency assistance) has represented between 86% and 89% of total annual regular child welfare funding in each year since FY2019. However, Title IV-E foster care has represented a declining share of that total, falling from 54% of total funding in FY2019 to an expected 44% in FY2027. At the same time, the share for Title IV-E permanency assistance has risen from 33% in FY2019 to an expected 42% for FY2027. The principal cause of these opposing trends appears to be an expected continued decline in the number of children receiving Title IV-E foster care maintenance payments alongside an expected continued increase in the number receiving permanency assistance. Multiple factors are likely to impact these caseload changes.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48912/R48912.3.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48912.html
R48910,Trump Accounts: Overview and Policy Considerations,2026-04-16T04:00:00Z,2026-04-18T05:08:52Z,Active,Reports,Brendan McDermott,"Poverty Reduction Tax Policy, Individual Tax, Savings & Investment Tax Policy, Tax Reform","Trump Accounts are a new form of traditional individual retirement account (IRA) that the 2025 reconciliation law (P.L. 119-21) created for the benefit of children. Savers will be able to contribute to Trump Accounts starting on July 4, 2026.
Traditional IRAs are typically tax-advantaged accounts for individuals who have income from work to save for retirement. Trump Accounts differ from other traditional IRAs in that they have special rules, described below, that apply prior to the start of the year in which a beneficiary reaches the age of 18 (i.e., during the account’s growth period). 
Contributions to Trump Accounts are allowed from several sources. Anyone can contribute to a child’s Trump Account, although individual contributions during the growth period are not tax-deductible for either the contributor or the beneficiary. Employers can contribute up to $2,500 (adjusted for inflation after 2027) tax-free to the Trump Accounts of employees or their dependents (amount is per employee, per year). Tax-free contributions are also allowed from state or local governments and from 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations, provided the state, locality, or organization contributes an equal amount to the account of each child in a qualified group of either (1) all children, (2) all children in a certain geographic area, or (3) all children born in one or more calendar years. 
Contributions during the growth period are generally subject to an annual combined limit of $5,000 in 2026 (adjusted for inflation after 2027), which is lower than the traditional IRA limit ($7,500 in 2026). Contributions during the growth period are not limited to the beneficiary’s taxable compensation (as is the case for other traditional IRAs), making saving viable for children with little or no income of their own. During the growth period, beneficiaries cannot deduct contributions from their taxable income, whether those contributions are made by themselves or by others. Any income earned within the account (e.g., investment earnings) will not be taxed until withdrawal, similar to other traditional IRAs. 
During the growth period, savings in Trump Accounts must be invested in a diversified index fund of U.S. stocks and must minimize fees and expenses. After the growth period ends, contributions and investments follow the same rules as for other traditional IRAs.
Distributions are not allowed during the growth period, except to roll the funds into an ABLE account for disabled individuals. After the growth period ends, distributions follow the same rules as for other traditional IRAs. The amount of the distribution allocable to post-tax contributions from individuals (the beneficiary, parents, etc.) is exempt from tax. Pretax contributions—including from employers, charities, and the government—are taxable at the time of withdrawal as ordinary income. Investment returns on any contribution are subject to tax. Distributions before the beneficiary reaches age 59½ may be subject to an additional 10% tax, unless an exception applies, following traditional IRA rules. Exceptions include withdrawals for higher education expenses, for the purchase or construction of a first home (up to $10,000), for birth or adoption expenses (up to $5,000 per child), for emergency personal expenses (up to $1,000 per year), for certain medical expenses, and for certain other uses.
The 2025 reconciliation law also created a new one-time refundable tax credit of $1,000 for each qualifying child, which the U.S. Treasury is to contribute directly to the child’s Trump Account once an authorized individual has opened an account on behalf of the child. To be eligible for the one-time tax credit, the child must be a U.S. citizen born between January 1, 2025, and December 31, 2028.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48910/R48910.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48910.html
IF13205,The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS): FY2027 Budget Request,2026-04-16T04:00:00Z,2026-04-17T13:23:35Z,Active,Resources,Anna E. Normand,,"Background
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI), provides scientific information to support the management of water, energy, mineral, ecosystem, and land resources and to mitigate risks from natural hazards. The USGS also collects long-term data to understand and report on the Earth’s geologic and ecosystem processes, using satellite imagery, mapping, and ground-based instruments. The USGS is not a regulatory agency and does not manage federal lands.
Congress created the USGS in 1879 in the USGS Organic Act (43 U.S.C. §31). The USGS Organic Act defined the initial scope of the USGS:
[The Director of the USGS] shall have the direction of the United States Geological Survey, and the classification of the public lands and examination of the geological structure, mineral resources, and products of the national domain.
Since then, Congress has expanded the USGS’s statutory authority to “such examinations outside the national domain where determined by the Secretary [of the Interior] to be in the national interest.” Under this authority and additional congressional direction, the USGS now also conducts activities related to water resources, ecosystems, and natural hazards that span the globe. The USGS performs scientific activities under interdisciplinary mission areas, and each mission area has its own budget line. The USGS also has budget lines for Science Support (administrative activities and information) and Facilities. Congress typically provides discretionary appropriations for the USGS under its Surveys, Investigations, and Research account in annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations acts.
FY2027 Budget Request 
President Trump’s FY2027 budget request for the USGS is $892.7 million. The request is $527.8 million less (-37%) than the FY2026 enacted annual appropriation of $1.420 billion provided by Division C of P.L. 119-74 (Figure 1). 
The USGS budget request “emphasizes science supporting energy and mineral independence and security, including the mapping of the distribution of domestic critical minerals.” The request would eliminate the Ecosystems Mission Area to focus on those energy and mineral priorities. The previous FY2026 budget request also proposed eliminating the mission area, but P.L. 119-74 funded it. Similar to the previous request, the FY2027 budget request proposes a new mission area—Geology, Energy, and Minerals Mission Area—encompassing activities of the current Energy and Minerals Mission Area, plus geologic data management and mapping as well as offshore energy and minerals activities. P.L. 119-74 funded these activities under the existing mission area and program structure.
Figure 1. USGS Enacted Annual Appropriations, FY2018-FY2026, and FY2027 Budget Request
(in millions)
/
Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on enacted appropriations laws and the President’s FY2027 budget request. 
Notes: Amounts exclude supplemental funding. The yellow line shows inflation-adjusted amounts in FY2025 dollars using FY2027 Budget of the U.S. Government, Historical Tables, Table 10.1. FY2026 and FY2027 figures are not adjusted.   
Mission Area and Budget Line Funding
The following sections further describe the FY2027 budget request in comparison to FY2026 enacted annual appropriations and the corresponding explanatory statement. 
Ecosystems Mission Area. The FY2027 USGS budget request would eliminate the Ecosystems Mission Area, which was funded at $294.7 million for FY2026. This mission area conducts biological and ecological science to inform natural resource management decisions through its six programs and cooperative research units. Science activities conducted under the Ecosystems Mission Area include research related to invasive species, wildlife management, ecosystem restoration, climate change, and environmental contaminants, among other focuses. The budget request states that the proposed elimination “will allow the bureau to focus on higher priority activities, including achieving energy and minerals dominance.” The budget request would continue funding the agency’s invasive carp work through the National Water Quality Program in the Water Resources Mission Area. 
Geology, Energy, and Minerals Mission Area. The budget request proposes creation of a new mission area—Geology, Energy, and Minerals Mission Area—in the USGS. Under the current Energy and Minerals Mission Area, the USGS conducts scientific research and assessments for energy and minerals and analyzes and forecasts critical mineral supply chains. The request states that the proposed funding of $142.5 million for the Geology, Energy, and Minerals Mission Area would support several executive orders, including Executive Orders 14154 and 14241, “Unleashing American Energy” and “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production,” respectively. Under the reorganized mission area, Energy Resources Program funding would increase from $35.9 million for FY2026 to $38.0 million for FY2027, and Mineral Resources Program funding would increase from $68.7 million to $78.9 million. 
Natural Hazards Mission Area. The Natural Hazards Mission Area would decrease in funding from $200.1 million for FY2026 to $136.5 million for FY2027 (-32%). All of the mission area’s programs would see reductions.  The Earthquake Hazards Program accounts for $32.3 million of the decrease, mostly by reducing ShakeAlert Earthquake Early Warning funding by $25.2 million. The Coastal and Marine Hazards and Resources Program would decrease in funding from $41.0 million for FY2026 to $25.2 million for FY2027; $2.5 million of the reduction would result from transferring marine minerals and deep-sea gas-hydrates research activities to the Geology, Energy, and Minerals Mission Area. 
Water Resources Mission Area. The budget requests $227.1 million for the Water Resources Mission Area, a reduction from its FY2026 funding of $288.8 million (-21%). All of the mission area’s programs would decrease in funding; however, the budget request would increase funding for certain activities within the Groundwater and Streamflow Information Program. Proposed increased funding for cooperative matching funds ($4.0 million increase) and federal priority streamgages ($1.7 million increase) would support sustaining and expanding the streamgage network. For observing network and data system operations, increased funding of $6.8 million would support using artificial intelligence to improve efficiency. The budget request also would discontinue the Water Resources Research Act Program. 
Core Science Systems Mission Area. Funding for the Core Science Systems Mission Area would decrease from $276.1 million for FY2026 to $156.7 million for FY2027 (-43%). Transferring geologic mapping and geological and geophysical data preservation to the new Geology, Energy, and Minerals Mission Area accounts for $45.0 million of the proposed decrease. The mission area’s remaining programs would all decrease in funding compared to FY2026 enacted amounts, including a reduction of $39.9 million for the National Geospatial Program. Instead of continued development of Landsat Next, the budget request would support a ground system for operations of a single satellite (referred to as LandIS-1) to be launched in the early 2030s and preparatory work with NASA for a “phased transition to a commercial solution of the Landsat program.” 
Science Support and Facilities. Funding for Science Support would increase from $73.7 million for FY2026 to $80.0 million for FY2027 (9%) to support science coordination and services and information technology efficiencies. Funding for Facilities would decrease from $180.1 million for FY2026 to $149.9 million for FY2027 (-17%). Some of the proposed budget changes are associated with decommissioning Ecosystems Mission Area facilities. 
Congressionally Directed Spending
For FY2022 through FY2024 and for FY2026, explanatory statements accompanying appropriations acts included Member-requested funding (e.g., earmarks) for geographically specific activities. The House Appropriations Committee refers to such funding requests as Community Project Funding (CPF), whereas the Senate Appropriations Committee designates this funding as Congressionally Directed Spending (CDS). The explanatory statement accompanying P.L. 119-74 included three congressionally directed spending items for the USGS, totaling $2.3 million, under “Special Initiatives.” For FY2027, the Senate Appropriations Committee again allowed Members to request CDS items for the USGS’s account, whereas the House Appropriations Committee did not allow CPF requests for the account. 
Issues for Congress
Congress may examine how the FY2027 budget request, which proposes decreasing USGS’s funding by 37% compared with FY2026 enacted annual appropriations, would shape the focus of the agency’s scientific activities. Similar to the FY2026 request, the Administration stated that much of its proposed reductions would allow the USGS to focus on higher-priority activities, which in FY2027 relate to “the energy emergency, restoring U.S. mineral dominance, and safeguarding life and property.” For FY2026, P.L. 119-74 provided $528.8 million more (37%) in appropriations than the budget request of $891.6 million. An issue for Congress is whether to increase, decrease, or maintain funding for various USGS activities in light of Trump Administration science priorities, congressional goals for the agency, and other considerations. 
Similar to FY2026, President Trump’s FY2027 budget request also proposes restructuring the USGS. As previously stated, the request would eliminate the Ecosystems Mission Area. In addition, the budget request proposes creating a new Geology, Energy, and Minerals Mission Area to support the USGS’s mapping initiatives and the Administration’s energy and minerals agenda. Some stakeholders have supported funding these activities under the USGS’s current structure, as did Congress when it passed P.L. 119-74. Congress may consider the focus and scope of the USGS’s activities and mission areas in FY2027 appropriations legislation and accompanying congressional direction. Outside of the appropriations process, Congress also may consider what, if any, statutory authorities to repeal, amend, or enact to shape USGS activities. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13205/IF13205.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13205.html
IF13204,China’s 15th Five-Year Plan: S&T and Economic Priorities,2026-04-16T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T10:38:30Z,Active,Resources,Karen M. Sutter,"East Asia, Science & Technology, Trade & International Finance, International Financial Markets","On March 12, 2026, the legislature of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) approved China’s 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (FYP) (2025-2030) and the Outline of Long-Term Goals to 2035. The plan received previous input and approval from the Communist Party of China’s apex institution—the Central Committee. The 15th FYP is a high-level national document that sets policy priorities and approaches—particularly in economics and science and technology (S&T)—for the next five years. This framework informs other PRC economic, industrial, S&T, and foreign trade and investment policies; and it guides PRC government and corporate strategies and activities at the national, local, and global level. The FYP reflects PRC leaders’ emphasis on establishing China’s global economic and S&T leadership and independence. The industries, projects, and technologies featured in the plan reflect co-developed PRC civilian and military priorities that are to receive preferential financial and policy support. See CRS In Focus IF11684, China’s 14th Five-Year Plan: A First Look; and CRS In Focus IF10964, Made in China 2025 and Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress.
S&T Independence and Leadership 
The 15th FYP calls for “extraordinary measures” to reduce China’s reliance on foreign S&T and strengthen China’s S&T self-reliance and independent innovation capacity. It reinforces “indigenous” innovation as the core driver of China’s development, a direction that PRC leaders first set in 2006. PRC “indigenous” innovation can involve the acquisition of foreign technologies that are then adapted and rebranded as PRC capabilities; the PRC uses foreign commercial and research ties to fill capability gaps in advancing national goals. The FYP focuses on boosting PRC capabilities to build self-reliance in areas in which China currently depends on the United States, Europe, and Japan, including aircraft; agriculture; advanced equipment, instruments, and tools; energy; gas turbines; software; and semiconductors (see Table 1). The FYP also emphasizes upgrading legacy industries (e.g., steel, petrochemicals, shipbuilding), and boosting advanced manufacturing with “decisive breakthroughs” in advanced materials, equipment, machine tools, and high-end instruments, and industrial applications of artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. It calls for building PRC leadership in strategic and emerging sectors and making other “decisive breakthroughs” in core areas such as biotechnology, semiconductors, and software.
The FYP prioritizes developing PRC-controlled and vertically-integrated global supply chains with a central role for the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It sustains 14th FYP efforts to develop PRC research and development (R&D) capabilities to “seize the commanding heights of science and technology.” It seeks to expand the role of state capital and state-owned firms in the economy and the role of the Party in PRC firms. It elevates the role of state planning while looking to PRC firms to advance the plan’s goals and to lead innovation efforts. It seeks to develop China’s national economic security toolkit and unconventional use of antitrust, technical standards, investment, and intellectual property (IP) tools to support the commercialization and global expansion of technologies supported in PRC S&T and industrial plans.
Table 1. China’s 15th FYP Industrial Priorities
Advanced Materials: Specialty steel; high-temp. alloys; ultra-high-purity metals; advanced ceramics; high-purity silica, bio, and advanced polymer materials; high-performance fibers; multifunctional composites; and advanced rare earths.

Aerospace: Large civilian aircraft (engines, composites, electrical systems); BeiDou low-altitude satellite system (equipment, infrastructure, and industrial/consumer applications; globalize); and deep space defense projects.

Agriculture: Corn, cotton, grain and soybean production; pork and beef synthetic biology; seed industry/genetic seeds (85% self-sufficiency goal); advanced equipment; food processing; cold chain logistics; and fertilizer reserves.

Artificial Intelligence (AI): Robotics; intelligent vehicles; drones; machinery; and brain computer interfaces.

Digitalization: Infrastructure; 6G communications; national computing, data, and blockchain infrastructure; quantum technology; and AI models/deployment (industrial uses).

Energy, Critical Minerals: Solar cells; energy storage; batteries; green hydrogen; nuclear fusion; high-precision ground-based timing systems; and overseas resources access.

Instruments, Meters: AI inspection; extreme environment flow measurement/calibration; and quantum/in-situ metrology.

Industrial Machines, CNC Machine Tools: Advanced devices for sensing, connectivity, functional materials, and optoelectronics; precision bearings; gears/transmission devices; high-precision ball screws; hydraulic/pneumatic sealing parts; and motors/control systems.

Major Technology Equipment: Large liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships; CR450 high-speed trains; smelting equipment; chemical and petrochemical engineering equipment; gas and water turbines; and all-terrain agricultural equipment.

Marine Economy: Deep-sea engineering, prospecting, and equipment; energy and biological resources; distant fishery; shipping services; meteorology; and navigation services.

Medical: Novel drugs; biomanufacturing; and advanced equip.

R&D: Basic research, reform of S&T system/national labs; foreign S&T ties; attract foreign experts/R&D; incentivize foreign universities to create institutions in China; lead major global S&T projects; and establish global S&T bodies in China.

Semiconductors, Software: Mature-node, advanced, and optoelectronic chips; self-reliance in basic, industrial, and chip design/production software and equipment.

Services: Globalization of cultural, media, and professional services; defend PRC overseas interests and “show a China that is trustworthy, lovable, and respectable”; financial sector support for the full innovation and IP value chain.

Source: CRS with details from China’s 15th FYP.
Economy
The plan characterizes structural economic issues as “strong supply and weak demand” and sustains a production-based “dual circulation” policy that aims to create demand by increasing supply. This approach has already exacerbated China’s industrial overcapacity and dependence on exports. The plan raises, but does not propose solutions to address, issues such as provincial trade barriers and economic imbalances, unemployment, real estate risks, and high debt levels in local governments and financial institutions. It targets China’s per capita GDP to reach that of a middle-income developed country by 2035, but slowing growth and an aging population may challenge such goals even as new “fertility-friendly” policies seek to reverse the long-term demographic effects of China’s “one-child policy.” The plan continues 14th FYP efforts to digitalize the economy and deploy information technologies and AI, and uses pilot programs for trade, financial, and IP initiatives (text box).
Trade, Financial, and IP Pilot Programs
To counter offshoring trends, Hainan Province is reviving incentives for manufacturing that processes imported inputs for re-export (e.g., duty free import of raw materials, components, and equipment) and logistics. Hainan also is a pilot for services trade opening, blockchain technology, and aerospace launch sites. 
The plan features Shanghai as China’s financial center and calls for “cautiously” expanding global financial ties and the use of China’s currency, the renminbi (RMB), in global trade and finance. It seeks to create two-way financing for qualified investors and a cross-border RMB payment system, and to expand the amount and products in which foreign financial firms may invest. 
China is developing a central bank digital currency to try to influence global finance and e-commerce and diversify from U.S. dollar financing. Shenzhen and Hainan are piloting cross-border cryptocurrency trade and cash pooling of foreign exchange and the RMB. They are also promoting financial investment; cross-border financing for PRC technology firms; and the securitization and trading of data, energy, IP, and real estate assets. 
Financial incentives aim to support the full innovation and IP value chain from R&D to the commercialization of technologies. Shenzhen is piloting ongoing 14th FYP innovation efforts such as foreign research partnerships. 
China is using pilot zones for e-commerce, digital trade, data flows, and S&T innovation. It is seeking to expand PRC exports via overseas warehouses and trade zones.

Trade and Investment 
The 15th FYP also focuses on foreign economic policy. It assesses that U.S. trade policies are challenging the current global trade order and global economic growth and constraining China’s economic development prospects.
“Unilateralism and protectionism are rising, hegemonic and great-power politics threats are increasing, the international economic and trade order faces severe challenges, and world economic growth momentum is insufficient with accumulating risks.”
Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has been falling since 2021, and the plan seeks to promote the reinvestment of foreign firms’ earnings in China and to allow some FDI in advanced technology/manufacturing, R&D, energy, and services with selective, (“high quality”) and controlled (“autonomous”) market openings. The plan promotes PRC services exports—giving “equal importance to goods and services”—and seeks to move up the value chain in trade while expanding PRC exports of manufacturing inputs. In agriculture, the plan aims to create PRC-controlled global supply chains and diversify sources of imports. The PRC government is seeking to improve reporting systems for PRC foreign debt, inbound and outbound investment, and global industrial and supply chains to garner insights and enhance its policy levers as it expands trade remedy, export control, investment, and supply chain review tools. It seeks to support PRC firms in “mutually beneficial” overseas investments and protect PRC IP “involving foreign affairs” and the interests of PRC citizens and legal entities overseas.
China continues to seek to reform global trade, economic, and financial governance and shape global rules in areas such as AI, digital trade, renewables, and aerospace. The plan sees a key role for China in global bodies such as the G20 and the World Trade Organization while seeking to develop global infrastructure, technical standards, and rules through PRC-led initiatives such as OBOR/BRI. China seeks to further expand offshore in agriculture; AI; digital trade; data centers; mobile payments; smart cities; health; meteorology; renewables; tourism; and S&T. The plan seeks to expand China’s BeiDou satellite network and its applications. It prioritizes developing rail links with Europe, China’s inland ports, a Silk Road e-commerce zone, and the economies of Xinjiang and Fujian. It calls for financing to support PRC efforts from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, and China’s Silk Road Fund. In AI, China is seeking to create a global organization, platforms for cooperation, regulatory frameworks, and technical standards. The FYP also outlines PRC ambitions to become a maritime power by developing the maritime economy, creating global rules, and safeguarding PRC rights and interests. It advances military-civil fusion goals of creating interoperable civilian-defense standards and infrastructure; a “green channel” to use S&T advancements in military applications; and an advanced national defense S&T industrial system.
Issues for Congress
Given congressional interest in ensuring U.S. global S&T and economic leadership and competitiveness and in countering PRC statist economic and industrial practices, Congress may consider the extent to which to:
strengthen U.S. authorities to address PRC subsidies, market protections, and the PRC Party-State’s role in PRC firms and trade and investment activities; to protect the U.S. market; and to promote U.S. competitiveness;
strengthen and use U.S. authorities and enhance the U.S. role in global technical bodies to counter China’s unconventional use of antitrust, IP, and standards tools;
address China’s use of U.S. technology, expertise, research, and markets to boost its S&T capabilities; and
enhance supply chain security and trade, investment, and technology ties among U.S. allies and partners. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13204/IF13204.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13204.html
R48908,The U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service: Overview and Reform Proposals,2026-04-15T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T10:53:28Z,Active,Reports,"Shayerah I. Akhtar, Rebecca M. Nelson","Export Policy, Foreign Policy Institutions & Tools","The U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service (USFCS)FCS is a network of trade and industry specialists that supports U.S. companies looking to enter foreign markets and expand overseas. It is part of the International Trade Administration (ITA) at the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce).
U.S. government programs supporting U.S. businesses overseas have generated debate. Proponents maintain that such programs support U.S. jobs and advance U.S. national security, including by countering the global influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China). Skeptics argue that these programs are government subsidies that distort markets and favor politically connected firms. 
During the 119th Congress, Members have considered changes to the USFCS budget and structure and conducted oversight of its operations. For example, legislation has been introduced that would establish regional and sectoral priorities for the USFCS; and would move the USFCS and related programs to the State Department. The Trump Administration proposed cutting the USFCS budget in FY2026 by nearly half compared to FY2024. Congress did not enact the proposed cuts, and the forthcoming FY2027 budget request could renew debates about the budget. This report provides information about the USFCS and analyzes potential reforms options.

Commercial Service (CS)
Foreign Commercial Service (FCS)
U.S. Field
U.S. export assistance centers (USEACs)

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48908/R48908.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48908.html
R48907,Military Discharges: Character of Service and Eligibility for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Benefits,2026-04-15T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T10:53:27Z,Active,Reports,"Madeline E. Moreno, Kristy N. Kamarck, Daniel T. Shedd, Jared S. Sussman","Health Care, Military Personnel, Military Personnel, Compensation & Health Care, Veterans & Military Health Care, Veterans Disability Compensation & Pensions","Character of service refers to the Armed Forces’ evaluation of servicemembers’ conduct during their service. Generally, there are five statuses under which servicemembers can be discharged: honorable, general (under honorable conditions), other than honorable (OTH), bad conduct, or dishonorable discharge. A servicemember’s branch determines which discharge status he or she should be given. If a former servicemember believes there is an error in his or her service records or disagrees with the discharge status assigned, he or she may seek a discharge status upgrade by submitting an application to the appropriate Discharge Review Board (DRB) or Board for Correction of Military Records (BCMR). 
On occasion, Congress has enacted laws affecting review conducted by these military correction boards. In 2010, Congress enacted the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) Repeal Act (P.L. 111-321), which initiated the removal of restrictions on gay servicemembers. Pursuant to the DADT repeal, the Department of Defense issued guidance instructing the military review boards to grant approval of requests to change narrative reasons for discharge, characterizations of discharge, and reentry codes for former servicemembers if (1) the original discharge was based solely on DADT and (2) there are no aggravating factors in the record, such as misconduct. Further, federal law provides that military correction boards shall give liberal consideration to discharge reviews in which mental health conditions typically associated with combat operations may have been factors in the original discharge decisions. This liberal consideration equally applies when sexual assault or harassment caused the applicable mental health conditions.
A servicemember’s discharge status affects his or her eligibility for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) benefits, including disability compensation, certain pension programs, and medical care. For most VA benefits, former servicemembers must meet the statutory definition of veteran, which includes basic eligibility requirements. As relevant to this report, to achieve veteran status under the statute, a former servicemember must have performed active service in the Armed Forces and be “discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable.”
Because the phrase “other than dishonorable” does not match any of the discharge statuses issued by the Armed Forces, VA may perform its own evaluation of a servicemember’s character of service to determine basic eligibility for VA benefits. This process is called a character of discharge review. While an honorable discharge and a general discharge (under honorable conditions) are binding on VA and make former servicemembers eligible for most VA benefits, a dishonorable discharge is disqualifying for most VA programs. For discharge statuses that fall outside these categories (i.e., OTH and bad conduct discharges), VA evaluates the circumstances surrounding the discharge from service to determine servicemembers’ eligibility. Federal statutes and VA regulations bar individuals who engaged in certain conduct from receiving VA benefits. Therefore, VA evaluates former servicemembers’ service records to determine whether a statute or regulation (referred to as “statutory bars” and “regulatory bars” to benefits) precludes a servicemember from receiving VA benefits. If a servicemember is not barred from receiving benefits by statute or regulation, VA may determine that the discharge is “honorable” for the purposes of VA benefits. Any claimant who disagrees with a VA determination concerning his or her character of discharge may appeal VA’s decision through the agency’s appeal process.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48907/R48907.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48907.html
R48906,Inflation Reduction Act Methane Emissions Charge: Overview and Considerations for Policymakers,2026-04-15T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T10:23:13Z,Active,Reports,Jonathan L. Ramseur,,"On August 16, 2022, President Biden signed H.R. 5376 (P.L. 117-169), a budget reconciliation measure commonly referred to as the “Inflation Reduction Act of 2022” (IRA). Among other provisions, IRA amended the Clean Air Act (CAA) by adding Section 136. Section 136 directs the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to impose and collect a “waste emissions charge” (WEC) for methane emissions from specific types of facilities that are required to report their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reporting Program (GHGRP). This charge is the first time the federal government has directly imposed a charge, fee, or tax on GHG emissions. 
Since its inception, the methane charge has received considerable attention from some Members of Congress and a range of stakeholders. Some policymakers have raised concerns about economic impacts resulting from the methane charge, including impacts on natural gas prices. Some policymakers are concerned about the charge in the context of EPA regulations to address methane emissions from the same categories of new and existing facilities. Others point out that methane mitigation could be a key component of U.S. climate policy due to methane’s shorter-term climate impacts compared to other GHGs.
On November 18, 2024, EPA issued a final rulemaking to implement the WEC. EPA’s WEC rulemaking received attention under the Congressional Review Act (CRA). In February 2025, both the House and the Senate passed a joint resolution (H.J.Res. 35) disapproving of EPA’s WEC rule. President Trump signed the measure on March 14, 2025, enacting the resolution (P.L. 119-2). The CRA disapproval does not alter the statutory requirements of CAA Section 136 that direct EPA to implement the WEC. Accordingly, EPA may have to determine how to comply with Section 136 without adopting a rule that is substantially the same as the disapproved rule in violation of the CRA.
In the 119th Congress, P.L. 119-21, a budget reconciliation measure sometimes known as the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” which was signed by the President on July 4, 2025, altered the start date for the WEC. When first established by IRA, Section 136 directed EPA to start imposing the WEC on methane emissions released in 2024. P.L. 119-21 changed the WEC effective date from 2024 to 2034.
CAA Section 136 includes several provisions that narrow the scope of facilities and methane emissions that would be subject to the WEC. In 2024, EPA estimated that after these provisions were considered, the WEC would apply to approximately 20 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (MMTCO2e) of methane emissions. These emissions represented 0.3% of total U.S. GHG emissions in 2022.
In addition, the WEC is statutorily linked to an EPA CAA Section 111 rulemaking that applies to methane emissions from many of the same facilities that are subject to the WEC. The CAA Section 136 WEC provisions include a conditional exemption from the WEC based on the development of this CAA Section 111 rulemaking. EPA finalized this CAA Section 111 rulemaking in March 2024. EPA published a final rule in December 2025 that extends the compliance deadlines provided in the 2024 final rule. Until this CAA Section 111 rule is in effect in all states, the conditional exemption from the WEC would not be available. The extension of the WEC effective date in P.L. 119-21 provides additional time for this CAA Section 111 rulemaking to go into effect before the WEC is scheduled to take effect in 2034. 
A range of factors could play a role in determining the scope of emissions subject to the WEC and its ultimate effects, including (1) the EPA CAA Section 111 Regulation; (2) other federal climate and energy policies; and (3) international policies affecting U.S. natural gas facility operations. The recent statutory and regulatory developments raise a number of questions and considerations for policymakers regarding the WEC and its implementation. For example, one consideration concerns the consequences of the 2025 CRA joint resolution, which disapproved EPA’s 2024 WEC rule. It is uncertain what effects the enacted joint resolution will have on the implementation of the WEC, which is required by statute. Another consideration for policymakers pertains to the CAA Section 111 rulemaking that governs methane emissions from many of the same oil and gas facilities that are subject to the WEC. The scope and implementation of the WEC are directly linked with the CAA Section 111 rulemaking.",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48906/R48906.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48906.html
LSB11419,"Election Law and the Supreme Court in 2026: Pending Cases on Redistricting, Campaign Finance, and Mail-In Ballots",2026-04-15T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T10:53:27Z,Active,Posts,L. Paige Whitaker,,"As the November 2026 congressional elections approach, three cases addressing various aspects of election law are pending at the U.S. Supreme Court. In Louisiana v. Callais, the Court is considering the constitutionality of a state creating a second majority-minority congressional district to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended (VRA). In National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC) v. Federal Election Commission (FEC), the Court is evaluating the constitutionality of the federal limits on coordinated political party expenditures. In Watson v. Republican National Committee (RNC), the Court is considering whether the federal laws establishing Election Day preempt a state law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots that are cast by Election Day but received afterward. The Court is expected to issue rulings in these cases by the end of June or early July. Depending on the timing and the contours of the Court’s rulings, these cases could affect the 2026 congressional elections or future federal elections. These cases may also be of interest to Congress because they each involve federal statutes. Within the bounds of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress has the authority to amend the federal statutes underlying each of the three pending cases. This Legal Sidebar provides an overview of these three pending election law cases, listed alphabetically by case name, and briefly addresses considerations for Congress.
Louisiana v. Callais: Redistricting and the Voting Rights Act
In Louisiana v. Callais, the Supreme Court is considering whether a state’s “intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district” to comply with Section 2 of the VRA violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Callais is the latest, and possibly most consequential, in a line of recent Supreme Court cases that has involved Section 2.  
Although the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870, Congress enacted the VRA to achieve its goal of bringing “an end to the denial of the right to vote based on race.” Section 2 of the VRA prohibits discriminatory voting practices or procedures, including those alleged to diminish or weaken minority voting power, known as minority vote dilution. The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 2, under certain circumstances, to require the creation of one or more majority-minority districts in a redistricting map. A majority-minority district is one in which a racial or language minority group comprises a voting majority. The Court has determined that the creation of such districts can avoid minority vote dilution by helping ensure that racial or language minority groups are not submerged into the majority and thereby denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of choice. In recent years, the Court has considered whether societal changes have resulted in some of the VRA’s remedial measures no longer withstanding constitutional scrutiny because they do not reflect “current conditions,” with some Justices similarly suggesting that the principle may apply to Section 2.
Case Overview
The dispute in Louisiana began when the state legislature redrew its congressional map following the 2020 census and created one majority-minority district out of the six congressional districts apportioned to the state. Voters in the state and civil rights organizations sued in federal district court, arguing that Section 2 required the creation of two majority-minority districts. Following litigation, the Louisiana legislature redrew the congressional redistricting map, creating a second majority-minority district. 
In another federal district court, self-described “non-Black voters” in the state sued, arguing that the newly redrawn map was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. After determining that considerations of race predominated in drawing the second majority-minority district, a divided three-judge federal district court panel applied a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review, requiring the creation of the district to be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.” Assuming without deciding that compliance with Section 2 was a compelling interest for the creation of a second majority-minority district, the district court determined that such compliance would be “narrowly tailored” if it comported with the three preconditions articulated by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles: (1) “the minority group must be sufficiently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district”; (2) “the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive”; and (3) the minority group must be able to prove that the majority group “votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” The district court further explained that Supreme Court case law indicates that an aspect of the first Gingles precondition—that a district be “reasonably configured”—requires adherence to traditional redistricting criteria, such as being reasonably compact and contiguous. In this case, the district court determined that the challenged majority-minority district did not meet the first Gingles precondition because, in view of the “the State’s Black population [being] dispersed,” the legislature created the district “as a bizarre’ 250-mile-long slash-shaped district that functions as a majority-minority district only because it severs and absorbs majority-minority neighborhoods from cities and parishes all the way from Baton Rouge to Shreveport.” Therefore, the district court held that the map was “an impermissible racial gerrymander” in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and enjoined the State from using the map for any election. The Supreme Court stayed the decision pending an appeal.
The State of Louisiana appealed to the Supreme Court under a provision of federal law permitting direct appeals from district court three-judge panels. In November 2024, the Court noted probable jurisdiction and consolidated Louisiana v. Callais with the related case, Robinson v. Callais. Oral argument took place on March 24, 2025. On June 27, 2025, the Court ordered the consolidated cases to be reargued and subsequently directed the parties to file briefs addressing the question of “[w]hether the State’s intentional creation of a second majority-minority congressional district violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.” The Court heard reargument in the case on October 15, 2025.
Although the State of Louisiana defended the constitutionality of the second majority-minority district during the March 2025 Supreme Court argument, on reargument, the State maintains that all “race-based redistricting” is unconstitutional because it violates key principles of equal protection and fails a strict scrutiny standard of constitutional review. “Race-based redistricting” violates the command of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that “the government may never use race as a stereotype’” because the three Gingles preconditions amount to “government-mandated stereotyping,” the State asserts. In that vein, the State emphasizes how Section 2’s requirement of “race-based redistricting” is not time-limited even though the Supreme Court has held that any departure from the equal treatment of racial and ethnic groups “must be a temporary matter.” Under a strict scrutiny standard of review, the State argues that Section 2 is not a sufficient “compelling interest” because, among other reasons, (1) Section 2 is different from “the limited contexts” where the Court has sanctioned “race-based action,” (2) it has a “framework” that is “too amorphous,” and (3) it exceeds the power provided to Congress under the Fifteenth Amendment. According to the State, Congress’s authority to legislate under the Fifteenth Amendment requires “a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented . . . and the means adopted to that end,” but when last amending Section 2 in 1982, Congress failed to identify the requisite “history and pattern of actual constitutional violations.” Similarly, the challengers of the second majority-minority district argue that Section 2 cannot pass “congruence and proportionality review” because, among other reasons, the law “severely burdens” voters and states, and Congress failed to show how the burdens are justified by current conditions. Even assuming that Section 2 could be a constitutional remedy, the challengers maintain that the second majority-minority district fails a strict scrutiny standard of review because absent “evidence of specific, current, intentional discrimination,” reliance on Section 2 is not a compelling interest.
Defending its constitutionality, the supporters of the second majority-minority district who initiated the litigation seeking its creation argue that by prohibiting state actions that have a discriminatory result, and not requiring a “subjective” discriminatory intent, Section 2 “is an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment,” as the Supreme Court stated in Allen v. Milligan in 2023. Further, the supporters contend that the “limited scope” of Section 2 ensures that when a state remedies a violation of the law, the state’s interest “is sufficiently compelling to withstand constitutional scrutiny.” For example, they underscore how both the text of Section 2 and its application under the three Gingles preconditions create “additional constraints that limit the use of race for remedial purposes.” As to whether the remedies required under Section 2 are time-limited, the supporters proffer that the law contains a “built-in focus on current conditions” that avoids the need for an expiration date and that Section 2-required majority-minority districts have “a natural end point,” lasting only until a new census is conducted.
Considerations for Congress 
Depending on how the Court rules, the decision in Louisiana v. Callais could affect whether or to what degree states can create majority-minority districts in congressional and state redistricting maps going forward. If the Court issues its decision this term, it appears unlikely that most states would have time to redistrict for the 2026 congressional elections, in which primary elections have already begun. In that vein, the Court could delay implementation of the ruling based on “general equitable principles,” taking into account the proximity of the election and the complexities inherent in the administration of state election laws. In response to a ruling in Callais, within the bounds of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress could choose to amend Section 2 of the VRA or pass other legislation establishing standards for congressional redistricting, though a ruling that Section 2 is unconstitutional, either facially or as applied to redistricting maps in the absence of evidence of intentional discrimination, would restrict legislative options that permit the consideration of race in redistricting decisions.
NRSC v. FEC: Campaign Finance
In NRSC v. FEC, the Court is evaluating whether the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits a federal limit on coordinated political party expenditures. A provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), codified at 52 U.S.C. § 30116(d), and the relevant FEC regulations, promulgated at 11 C.F.R. § 109.37, governing political party expenditures that are coordinated with a federal candidate, are known as the “coordinated party expenditure limits.” Coordinated party expenditures are expenditures made by political parties in coordination with (i.e., with input from) federal candidates. Such expenditures mostly fund campaign advertising (i.e., party coordinated communications). In a 2001 decision, FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee (known as Colorado II to distinguish it from a similarly named case on party expenditures decided earlier), the Supreme Court upheld the facial constitutionality of the coordinated party expenditure limits. According to the Court in Colorado II, coordinated party expenditures have “no significant functional difference” from contributions made by a party directly to a candidate, and the Court had earlier held that contribution limits are generally constitutional. 
Case Overview
In NRSC v. FEC, the challengers—the senatorial and congressional committees of the Republican Party, along with then-Senator JD Vance and former Representative Steve Chabot (as federal office candidates)—sued the FEC, arguing that the coordinated party expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. The challengers also argued that the Supreme Court’s 2001 ruling in Colorado II is no longer binding because of subsequent Supreme Court precedent, exemptions to the limits that Congress added in 2014, and “the rise of unlimited spending by political action committees.” The en banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit) upheld the limits, determining that the Colorado II decision was binding precedent. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit characterized the holding in Colorado II as “questionable,” emphasizing that the Supreme Court’s recent campaign finance decisions have applied a different approach when evaluating the constitutionality of such laws. 
The challengers appealed the Sixth Circuit ruling, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on December 9, 2025. The question presented to the Supreme Court is: “Whether the limits on coordinated party expenditures in 52 U.S.C. § 30116 violate the First Amendment, either on their face or as applied to party spending in connection with party coordinated communications’ as defined in 11 C.F.R. § 109.37.” 
After prevailing in its defense of the coordinated party expenditure limits in the Sixth Circuit, the federal government in a “rare” occurrence has changed its position and now argues before the Supreme Court that the limits are unconstitutional. In view of the federal government’s decision to no longer defend the constitutionality of the limits, the Supreme Court has appointed an amicus curiae to brief and argue the case in support of the Sixth Circuit ruling. As a threshold matter, the amicus argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the merits in the case because it is moot as a result of the federal government’s decision to no longer defend the law. That is, according to the amicus, the challengers no longer face potential enforcement of the limits because the government now maintains that the limits are unconstitutional. On the merits, the amicus contends that the limits should be upheld because, as the Supreme Court held in Colorado II, they are “closely drawn” to serve a “sufficiently important” governmental interest of avoiding quid pro quo corruption by preventing donors from circumventing FECA’s contribution limits to candidates. Further, the amicus argues that Colorado II is binding precedent and overruling that decision “would massively destabilize campaign-finance law” by jeopardizing the constitutionality of other key provisions of FECA and unsettling the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence. 
In response, the federal government disputes the assertion that by changing its position the case has been rendered moot, because the challengers still “face a credible threat” that the limits could be enforced against them. On the merits, the federal government maintains that although the Supreme Court in Colorado II upheld the limits, subsequent “legal, statutory, and factual developments have so undermined it that it is no longer good law.” For instance, the government observes that while the Court in Colorado II determined that Congress can constitutionally limit campaign funds to lessen “undue influence,” subsequent Court rulings have held that Congress may seek only to ameliorate quid pro quo corruption and its appearance. 
Considerations for Congress
The Court’s ruling in NRSC could be consequential for the system of federal campaign finance during the 2026 congressional midterm elections or for future elections, depending on when the Court’s ruling takes effect. For example, one media report predicts that if the coordinated party expenditure limits are overturned, parties could “pour unlimited amounts into ads in competitive races across the country, making it easier for campaigns to benefit from that spending.” As the media report explained, coordinated party expenditures are often used to buy television advertising, which is less expensive when bought in concert with a candidate’s campaign, so if the limits are eliminated, political parties “would dramatically accelerate their purchase of ad time.”  
As a case of constitutional interpretation, a Supreme Court ruling in NRSC may provide guidance regarding the constitutional parameters of any campaign finance legislation that Congress might choose to enact. If the Court rules that the limits are unconstitutional, lawmakers disagreeing with that outcome would be limited to seeking a constitutional amendment to overturn the effects of the decision, as some Members of Congress introduced in response to the Supreme Court’s 2010 ruling in Citizens United v. FEC. 
Watson v. RNC: Mail-In Ballots
In Watson v. RNC, the Supreme Court is considering whether federal laws that establish Election Day preempt a state law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots that are cast by Election Day but received within a period of time afterward. Federal statutes, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 7, 2 U.S.C. § 1, and 3 U.S.C. § 1 (hereafter “the Election Day federal laws”), establish the Tuesday after the first Monday in November in certain years as the day of election for federal offices. Similar to some other state laws, Mississippi law permits mail-in ballots to be counted by election officials if they are received within five days after Election Day.
Case Overview
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Mississippi changed its election laws to permit the counting of mail-in ballots “postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five (5) business days after the election.” In 2024, Mississippi amended the law to apply to mail-in ballots transmitted by, in addition to the U.S. Postal Service, common carriers. In response, the Republican National Committee (RNC), the Mississippi Republican Party, and others (hereafter “the challengers”) filed suit against the Mississippi Secretary of State and other state officials (hereafter “State of Mississippi”) in federal district court, arguing that the Election Day federal laws preempt the state law by establishing “a uniform day” for electing Members of Congress and appointing presidential electors. The district court granted the State of Mississippi’s motion for summary judgment in July 2024 and the challengers appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit). 
In October 2024, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit unanimously determined that with enactment of the Election Day federal laws, Congress established “a singular day for the election” of Congress and the appointment of presidential electors. Based on the text of those federal laws, court precedent, and historical practice, the court concluded that Election Day is when “ballots must be both cast by voters and received by state officials.” Therefore, the court held that by allowing ballots to be counted if received up to five days after Election Day, the Mississippi law was preempted by the Election Day federal laws. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded.
The State of Mississippi appealed the Fifth Circuit ruling, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on March 23, 2026. The question presented to the Supreme Court “is whether the federal election-day statutes preempt a state law that allows ballots that are cast by federal election day to be received by election officials after that day.”  
Before the Supreme Court, the challengers focus on the text of the Election Day federal laws, maintaining that contemporary dictionaries define the term “election” to mean the process “of selecting officers” that concludes when the state receives a ballot, not when a voter casts a ballot. Further, the challengers emphasize how historical practices in the United States support their position because, dating back to the Civil War, states have not counted ballots that were received after Election Day. The challengers also rely on the Supreme Court’s 1997 ruling in Foster v. Love, holding that Louisiana’s open primary laws, which allowed for the election of a candidate before Election Day, were preempted by the Election Day federal laws. According to the challengers, Foster stands for the proposition that an “election must be concluded’ and consummated’ on election day through a final selection.’”
In response, the State of Mississippi argues that an “election” is when there has been a “conclusive choice of an officer” and that choice is concluded when voters cast their ballots. As Mississippi law requires that choice to occur by Election Day, the State concludes that its law comports with the Election Day federal laws. Similarly, the State counters that history confirms that the Election Day federal laws were enacted to address the challenges arising from states holding elections on various days and not because there was a problem with the date when ballots were received. In addition, the State contends that Mississippi’s law comports with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Foster in that “the conclusive choice of an officer” takes place by Election Day, because “all voters must cast ballots by election day, so the voters’ combine[ ]’ with officials’ on that day to take the actions’ meant to make a final selection of an officeholder.’”
Considerations for Congress
If the Supreme Court decides that the Election Day federal laws preempt the Mississippi law that permits the counting of mail-in ballots received after Election Day, similar laws in other states could likely also be held preempted. As a result, in federal elections, states would be permitted to count only those mail-in ballots received by Election Day. Although a preemption ruling in the case would affect only federal election ballots, at least one scholar has predicted that states, as a matter of administrative practicality, would likely decide to count ballots for state and federal elections under the same rules.
Whether the Election Day federal laws preempt certain state mail-in ballot laws involves a question of statutory interpretation. Therefore, Congress could decide to either maintain the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the laws in Watson v. RNC or amend the laws to either permit or prohibit states from counting mail-in ballots that are received after Election Day. The Election Day federal laws for House and Senate elections were enacted under Article I, Section 4, clause 1 of the Constitution, known as the Elections Clause, which confers upon the states the initial and principal authority to establish “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,” but provides Congress with the authority “at any time by Law [to] make or alter such [laws].” The Election Day federal law for the appointment of presidential and vice-presidential electors was enacted under Article II, Section 1, clause 4 of the Constitution, which provides that Congress “may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.”",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11419/LSB11419.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11419.html
LSB11418,Recent Developments in Hart-Scott-Rodino Merger Review,2026-04-15T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T10:53:08Z,Active,Posts,"Alexander H. Pepper, Jay B. Sykes",,"The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (the HSR Act) requires parties to mergers and acquisitions that exceed certain size thresholds to file a notification with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and abide by a waiting period before closing their deals. The purpose of this requirement is to give the DOJ and FTC the opportunity to decide whether to challenge deals while the merging parties remain separate entities, potentially avoiding harms that result from the consummation of anticompetitive transactions and the complications that may accompany the unwinding of completed mergers.
In recent years, the DOJ and FTC have sought to update the HSR reporting requirements. In 2024, the FTC, with the concurrence of the DOJ, adopted a final rule expanding the types of information that merging parties must include in their HSR notifications. A federal district court vacated that rule in February 2026, holding that it exceeds the FTC’s authority under the HSR Act and constitutes arbitrary and capricious action that violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). While the FTC has appealed that decision, the antitrust agencies have also requested public comment on other possible changes to the HSR reporting requirements. In the request, the FTC indicates that it is considering engaging in a new rulemaking process to modify the HSR requirements “[r]egardless of the outcome of the pending appeal.” 
This Legal Sidebar discusses the litigation over the FTC’s 2024 changes to the HSR regime, the FTC’s request for comments on other possible HSR changes, and the topic of HSR reform more generally. 
Background 
Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act prohibits mergers or acquisitions that may “substantially . . . lessen competition, or . . . tend to create a monopoly.” The DOJ and FTC (the Agencies) have largely overlapping jurisdiction to enforce this prohibition. Congress intended the Clayton Act’s prohibition of anticompetitive mergers “to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation.” 
The law did not, however, originally require merging parties to notify the government of proposed mergers before they closed. The absence of such a requirement allowed companies to consummate transactions that raised antitrust concerns before the Agencies could review them and consider their competitive effects. Antitrust enforcers thus urged Congress to establish a premerger notification regime, arguing that the consummation of anticompetitive deals resulted in interim harm to consumers and required the Agencies to engage in protracted litigation. Advocates of such a regime also contended that unwinding consummated transactions could be expensive and impractical, likening that effort to “trying to unscramble an omelet.” 
Congress ultimately heeded these calls, enacting the HSR Act in 1976. The statute imposes premerger notification requirements on parties who are planning transactions that exceed prescribed thresholds. Those thresholds involve the size of a deal and, in some cases, the size of the parties involved in a deal. The thresholds are updated annually based on a statutory formula. FTC analysis suggests that HSR-reportable transactions constitute around 15-20% of overall deal activity in the United States.
If a transaction meets the HSR thresholds, the required notification must be submitted to both the DOJ and FTC. All parties to a reportable deal must submit certain information set out in the HSR form. The Agencies then review the submissions to determine whether further investigation is warranted and which agency will conduct any investigation. The Agencies generally cannot publicly disclose HSR filings. 
The HSR Act establishes a waiting period (usually 30 days) in which the parties may not close the transaction. The reviewing agency may allow the waiting period to expire or, on request, grant early termination. The agency may also request further information from the parties by issuing a “Second Request,” which extends the waiting period for a certain period (usually another 30 days) after the parties substantially comply with that request. The parties and the agency may agree to extend this period.
If an investigation raises concerns that the proposed merger violates the Clayton Act, the reviewing agency may attempt to reach a negotiated settlement agreement with the parties to resolve the concerns or may seek to block the transaction. Both the DOJ and FTC have authority to request that a federal court preliminarily enjoin a proposed merger.
A transaction that the Agencies do not attempt to block is not immunized from future Clayton Act scrutiny. While rare, the Agencies may challenge consummated mergers, including those that did not meet the HSR reporting thresholds.
The 2024 HSR Rule
The HSR Act provides that the FTC shall, with the concurrence of the DOJ
require that the [premerger] notification . . . be in such form and contain such documentary material and information relevant to a proposed acquisition as is necessary and appropriate to enable the [FTC and DOJ] to determine whether such acquisition may, if consummated, violate the antitrust laws. 
In June 2023, the FTC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) involving changes to the HSR rules and premerger notification form, with the concurrence of the DOJ. In a statement, former FTC Chair Lina Khan framed the proposal as the first “top-to-bottom review” of the form since the passage of the HSR Act.
The proposed changes included a range of new disclosure requirements, including disclosures regarding the structure and rationale of proposed transactions, details regarding past acquisitions by the parties, information regarding the parties’ employees, and draft transaction documents. The FTC estimated that preparing an HSR filing would take an average of 144 hours under the proposed revisions, an increase from 37 hours under the existing form. 
In October 2024, the FTC issued a final rule implementing substantially modified versions of the proposed changes. In the final rule, the FTC dropped several proposed reporting requirements, including those concerning employee classifications and draft transaction documents. It modified others to minimize costs to filers and third parties. The FTC estimated that the average number of hours required to prepare an HSR filing under the final rule would be 68 hours. 
Commissioners Andrew Ferguson and Melissa Holyoak, who joined the FTC after the June 2023 NPRM, criticized the original proposals, but voted for the final rule. In doing so, Commissioners Ferguson and Holyoak credited “intense negotiations” among the commissioners for producing “dramatic differences” between the final rule and the original proposal. They also cheered an agreement to resume consideration of requests for early termination once the final rule entered into effect, ending a suspension of early termination that was implemented in February 2021.
Former Chair Khan, in a statement joined by former Commissioners Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Alvaro Bedoya, acknowledged that certain proposals were “pare[d] back” in the final rule, but described the rule as “a generational upgrade that will sharpen the antitrust agencies’ investigations and allow us to more effectively protect against mergers that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.” The statement placed particular emphasis on the following disclosures required by the revised HSR form: 
disclosures regarding entities and individuals that would have the ability to influence a combined company’s decision-making post-merger (a requirement intended to shed light on “complex and opaque entities, including private equity and minority holders”); 
information regarding supply relationships (a requirement intended to give the Agencies greater insight into potentially problematic vertical mergers); 
information about products and services under development that are not yet generating revenues (a requirement intended to help the Agencies police mergers that may threaten future competition); and 
disclosures regarding certain acquisitions of the merging parties within the previous five years (a requirement intended to help the Agencies assess whether a proposed transaction is part of a “roll-up” strategy in which a private equity firm or other investor acquires many small competitors in the same or adjacent markets). 
The final rule took effect on February 10, 2025. Ferguson, now the Chair of the FTC, endorsed the new form and rules, while noting his prior objections to aspects of the final rule and the potential for future adjustments.
The District Court’s Decision 
In January 2025, several business groups filed a lawsuit challenging the FTC’s 2024 HSR amendments in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiffs argued that the 2024 amendments were not “necessary and appropriate” within the meaning of the HSR Act because their costs substantially outweighed their benefits. The plaintiffs also alleged that the 2024 amendments constituted arbitrary and capricious action that violated the APA for similar reasons and because the FTC failed to give a reasoned explanation for rejecting less burdensome alternatives. 
The plaintiffs and the FTC ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In February 2026, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied the FTC’s cross-motion, concluding that the 2024 HSR amendments exceeded the FTC’s authority under the HSR Act and violated the APA. 
In holding that the 2024 HSR amendments exceeded the FTC’s authority under the HSR Act, the district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the phrase “necessary and appropriate” in the HSR Act required the FTC to establish that the benefits of the amendments reasonably outweighed the costs. The court then determined that the FTC had not made this showing. On the cost side of the ledger, the court noted that the Office of Management and Budget estimated that compliance with the 2024 amendments would result in approximately $139.3 million of additional annual fees paid by merging parties for “executive and attorney compensation.” The FTC identified two main categories of alleged benefits: detecting additional harmful mergers and saving agency resources. The court deemed both of these asserted benefits “illusory or, at least, unsubstantiated.” 
With respect to the detection of illegal mergers, the court found that the FTC had not shown that the 2024 amendments would prevent any illegal mergers not already prevented by preexisting HSR requirements. In rejecting this justification, the court explained that the FTC had not identified a single illegal merger in the 46-year history of the previous HSR form that the amended form would have prevented. 
The court was likewise unpersuaded by the FTC’s argument that the 2024 amendments would save the agency time and resources by allowing the FTC to more quickly conclude investigations and issue more targeted Second Requests. This justification failed, the court determined, because 92% of HSR-reported deals do not prompt any investigation or additional requests from the antitrust agencies. As a result, the court explained, the 2024 amendments impose costs on all HSR filers to produce benefits for at most 8% of reportable transactions. The court also deemed the proffered benefits in those 8% of cases “unclear,” indicating that the FTC had not specified or substantiated “how exactly the [2024 amendments] . . . will save time and resources.” 
Based on the above analysis, the court held that the 2024 amendments exceeded the FTC’s authority under the HSR Act because the agency failed to establish that their benefits reasonably outweighed their costs. 
The court proceeded to consider the plaintiffs’ APA arguments. Ultimately, the court concluded that the 2024 HSR amendments violated the APA’s prohibition of arbitrary and capricious agency action for two reasons. First, the court relied largely on its earlier analysis in finding that the benefits of the amendments did not justify the costs. Second, the court concluded that the FTC failed to consider less burdensome alternatives to the amendments, such as voluntary submissions and more targeted Second Requests. 
The FTC has appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On March 19, 2026, the Fifth Circuit denied the FTC’s motion to stay the vacatur of the rule pending the appeal. As of the publication date of this Legal Sidebar, the Agencies are accepting filings using the previous version of the HSR form and instructions. The Agencies have indicated, however, that they will continue to accept filings using the updated form reflecting the 2024 amendments.
March 2026 Request for Information 
On March 25, 2026, the Agencies launched a joint public inquiry requesting public comments on the effectiveness of the updated HSR form during the time in which it was in effect. The Agencies also indicated that they are evaluating “whether additional modifications to the [HSR] Form may be warranted to address certain topics based on developments affecting the HSR review process that have emerged over the past year.” Those topics include
whether to request that filers provide information regarding their compliance with legal obligations relating to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, and whether the current HSR form captures sufficient information on sovereign wealth funds and the sovereigns with which they are affiliated; 
whether to request information from filers regarding their contracts with, or direct and indirect sales to, the United States, regardless of whether there is currently a horizontal competitive overlap between the merging firms; 
whether to make explicit that an HSR exemption for certain acquisitions of voting securities “solely for the purpose of investment” does not apply when the acquiror uses its ownership of voting securities to influence a corporation’s competitive decision-making (an exemption that has been invoked in recent litigation challenging the conduct of large asset managers); 
whether changes to the HSR form and the HSR regulations are appropriate to address “acquihires” (acquisitions whose principal motivation is the acquisition of a target’s employees, as opposed to its assets), “reverse acquihires” (transactions in which one company hires another firm’s key employees and licenses its intellectual property but does not formally acquire the firm), certain sales/purchases of non-exclusive intellectual property licenses, and other novel transaction forms; 
whether, and under what circumstances, remedy proposals from merging parties that are offered late in the HSR review process should be subject to new or supplemental HSR filing requirements; and 
whether changes to the HSR regulations are warranted to carry out President Trump’s directive in Executive Order 14376 to “review substantial acquisitions, including series of acquisitions, by large institutional investors of single-family homes in local single-family housing markets for anti-competitive effects.”
The Agencies indicated that they will consider engaging in a new rulemaking process regardless of the outcome of the litigation over the 2024 final HSR rule. 
Considerations for Congress 
Congress has broad authority to shape the HSR regime. Congress could, for instance, amend the HSR Act to require merging parties to provide the Agencies with certain categories of information. The Merger Filing Fee Modernization Act of 2022, which required HSR filers to report any subsidies from a “foreign entity of concern,” offers the most recent example of such a measure. Alternatively, Congress could prohibit the Agencies from requiring merging parties to report certain categories of information. 
Several bills that would have expanded HSR reporting requirements have been introduced in recent Congresses. 
In the 119th Congress, S. 1796, the Housing Acquisitions Review and Transparency (HART) Act, would provide that all acquisitions of residential property by any person within a single calendar year shall be deemed to be a single acquisition for purposes of the HSR reporting thresholds. S. 3904, the American Homeownership Act, includes a similar requirement.
In the 118th Congress, S. 4412, the Stopping Threats to Our Prices from Bad Mergers (STOP Bad Mergers) Act, would have amended the HSR Act to require merging parties to report various information that may be relevant to the labor-market effects of proposed transactions. If a party to a reportable merger is subject to a collective bargaining agreement, the bill would have given the affected labor organization the right to provide the Agencies with information relevant to an evaluation of the proposed transaction.
In the 117th Congress, the Prohibiting Anticompetitive Mergers Act of 2022 (S. 3847 and H.R. 7101) would have required HSR filers to report a variety of additional categories of information, in addition to extending the initial HSR waiting period (for deals other than tender offers) from 30 days to 120 days. In announcing the 2024 HSR amendments, former FTC Chair Khan advocated legislation extending the HSR waiting period. She contended that the 30-day waiting period was adopted in an era when the Agencies received substantially fewer and substantially less complex HSR filings. ",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/PDF/LSB11418/LSB11418.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/LSB/HTML/LSB11418.html
IF13203,U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: FY2027 Budget Request,2026-04-15T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T10:53:09Z,Active,Resources,Eric P. Nardi,,"Introduction
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), an agency within the Department of the Interior (DOI), has a mission to conserve, protect, and enhance fish, wildlife, and plants and their habitats. Congress funds FWS through discretionary and mandatory appropriations. FWS discretionary appropriations typically are included in annual Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Acts. Discretionary appropriations fund many activities, such as resource management and conservation, construction projects, and payments and grants to states and other entities. 
This In Focus addresses FY2027 annual discretionary funding for FWS as proposed in the Trump Administration budget request. Selected issues for Congress include determining the amount of annual funding for FWS accounts and activities, the conditions of such funding, and whether to enact related Trump Administration proposals. 
FWS sometimes receives supplemental discretionary funding in addition to annual discretionary appropriations. For example, in recent years Congress has provided additional discretionary appropriations to FWS in budget reconciliation measures. Further, FWS receives mandatory (permanent) appropriations under various statutes. The Administration estimated $1.94 billion in FWS mandatory appropriations for FY2027.
FWS Discretionary Appropriations
Since FY2018, FWS received an average of $1.86 billion in discretionary funding (adjusted to 2025 dollars; see Figure 1). Funding for FWS has traditionally been spread across eight discretionary appropriations accounts (Table 1). For FY2027, the Administration requested $1.33 billion in discretionary funding for FWS. The FY2027 request was $323.2 million below (-20%) the FY2026 enacted amount of $1.65 billion, in P.L. 119-74, Division C. The FY2027 funding request included no discretionary appropriations for five FWS accounts: Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund, National Wildlife Refuge Fund, Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation Fund, Multinational Species Conservation Fund, and State and Tribal Wildlife Grants.
Figure 1. FWS Discretionary Funding: FY2018-FY2026 Requested and Enacted and FY2027 Requested
(Adjusted to 2025 dollars)
/
Source: CRS using data from FWS annual budget justifications covering FY2019-FY2027 and Appropriations Committee sources.
Notes: Amounts shown generally exclude supplemental funding, transfers, recissions, and cancellations. Adjustments for inflation (in September 2025 dollars) were calculated using the Consumer Price Index, Series CUUR0000SA0, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 1. FWS Discretionary Funding by Account
($ in millions)
Account
FY2026 Enacted
FY2027 Request

Resource Management
1,451.5
1,303.6

Construction
14.7
13.7

Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund
22.2
0.0

National Wildlife Refuge Fund
13.2
0.0

North American Wetlands Conservation Fund
49.0
10.0

Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation Fund
5.0
0.0

Multinational Species Conservation Fund
21.0
0.0

State and Tribal Wildlife Grants
73.8
0.0

Total
1,650.5
1,327.3

Source: DOI, Fiscal Year 2027: The Interior Budget in Brief, p. FWS-3. 
Notes: Columns may not sum to totals shown due to rounding. Figures do not include supplemental or mandatory appropriations. For account descriptions and components, see the FWS FY2027 budget justification. 
Resource Management Account
The Resource Management account has historically comprised the majority (88% in FY2026) of the FWS annual discretionary appropriation. For FY2027, the Administration request of $1.30 billion is $147.9 million less (-10%) than the FY2026 enacted level for this account. Table 2 shows the funding levels for activities within this account. The Administration did not request funding for the Science Support or Stewardship Priorities activities for FY2027. The Stewardship Priorities activity includes projects funded through earmarks. 
The FY2027 requested amount for FWS’s Ecological Services activity reflects a $150.4 million increase (54%) from the FY2026 enacted level. This increase is due, in part, to $178.0 million in funding requested for the proposed transfer of Endangered Species Act- and Marine Mammal Protection Act-related work from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to FWS. 
Table 2. Activities Within Resource Management
($ in millions)
Activity
FY2026 Enacted
FY2027 Request

Ecological Services
277.5
428.0

Habitat Conservation
69.8
66.9

National Wildlife Refuge System
522.0
417.0

Conservation and Enforcement
171.8
136.0

Fish and Aquatic Conservation
225.8
154.6

Science Support
30.8
0.0

General Operations
134.7
101.2

Stewardship Priorities
19.1
0.0

Account Total
1,451.5
1,303.6

Source: DOI, Fiscal Year 2027: The Interior Budget in Brief, p. FWS-4. 
Notes: Columns may not sum to totals shown due to rounding. The Administration refers to the Science Support activity as Science Applications. Listed activities include various subactivities (e.g., the Fish and Aquatic Conservation activity includes three subactivities). For information on activities and their components, see the explanatory statement on the FY2026 enacted appropriation and the FWS FY2027 budget justification. 
Other FWS Accounts
For FY2026, Congress appropriated $199.0 million for seven other FWS accounts (i.e., non-Resource Management). These accounts support construction, conservation, financial and technical assistance, and revenue sharing, among other activities (Table 1). For FY2027, the Administration requested $13.7 million for the Construction account (-7% from FY2026) and $10.0 million for the North American Wetlands Conservation Fund (-80% from FY2026). The Administration did not request funding for the other five accounts, citing varying reasons. They included that the funding was duplicative (in the case of the Cooperative Endangered Species Conservation Fund) and being reserved for domestic species (in the case of the Multinational Species Conservation Fund and Neotropical Migratory Bird Conservation Fund). 
Selected FY2027 Budget Proposals
Among other proposals, the FY2027 Administration request proposed to prioritize funding to expand visitor services and access in the National Wildlife Refuge System; improve law enforcement officer retention; and expedite environmental reviews for energy, mineral, and timber projects. The FY2027 request also expressed support for Congress to reauthorize the National Parks and Public Land Legacy Restoration Fund (54 U.S.C. § 200402) to help FWS (and other agencies) address deferred maintenance.
The FY2027 Administration request included some proposals that were previously submitted in the FY2026 request and not enacted by Congress in FY2026. One such proposal seeks to consolidate work of FWS’s Ecological Services program and NMFS’s Office of Protected Resources regarding the Endangered Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act. Functions transferred from NMFS would be situated in a new Marine Functions subactivity within the FWS Ecological Services program. The Administration stated that this consolidation is intended to reduce redundancies, improve species recovery outcomes, and streamline permitting activities. 
The FY2027 Administration request is $188.0 million above the FY2026 Administration request. Much of the difference ($178.0 million) is associated with the FY2027 proposal to move certain NMFS functions to FWS. The FY2026 request proposed a similar transfer of functions, but did not specify an associated increase in funding. For FY2026, Congress provided $511.2 million (45%) above the amount requested by the Administration ($1.14 billion) for FWS. Congress did not enact FY2026 Administration proposals to eliminate funding for any FWS discretionary appropriations accounts.
In response to staff reductions implemented by the Trump Administration, in P.L. 119-74, Congress directed FWS to maintain staffing levels in order to fulfill the agency’s statutory responsibilities and implement programs in a timely manner. For FY2027, FWS seeks to continue to restructure the agency’s workforce, as a part of the Administration’s broader actions to reduce the size of the federal workforce. The Administration proposed to reduce the total FWS employee count from 6,513 for FY2026 to 5,861 for FY2027 (a reduction of 10%).",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF13203/IF13203.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF13203.html
R48909,Artificial Intelligence: CRS Products,2026-04-14T04:00:00Z,2026-04-17T15:08:05Z,Active,Reports,"Laurie Harris, Rachael D. Roan",,"Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) technologies—including machine learning, generative AI (GenAI), and facial recognition—are demonstrating potential benefits across a variety of sectors of the U.S. economy. At the same time, the rapid innovation in and proliferation of AI tools have generated concern over their potential disruptive effects, such as generation and dissemination of misinformation, potential shifts in jobs and employment opportunities, and social, ethical, and security risks. Over the past few Congresses, Members have considered a variety of policies and legislation associated with AI technologies and their applications. With interest in AI remaining high, Congress may continue to engage in AI policymaking. 
To support Congress, CRS has assembled a list of policy experts and legal points of contact who can assist with issues related to AI. The contact list is available in CRS Report R48262, Artificial Intelligence: CRS Experts and Points of Contact, coordinated by Laurie Harris. Additional written and audiovisual CRS products on AI-related policy and legal issues, legislation, and executive branch actions are presented here, in the following categories:
AI Overview: Technology and Regulation—products that provide background information on AI in general, including a taxonomy of AI terminology, cross-sector issues, and topics related to AI regulation and governance.
Generative AI—products that focus on the subset of GenAI technologies; GenAI refers to AI models trained on large volumes of data that are able to generate new content, such as text, images, videos, computer code, or music.
AI and Biological Sciences—products that cover the intersection of AI and the biological sciences, including engineering biology and biological design, as well as aspects of laboratory automation and design.
AI and Defense—products that cover the intersection of AI and the defense sector, including emerging technologies used by the military. 
AI, Economics, and Labor—products that cover AI’s effect on the economy and labor.
AI and Elections—products that cover the intersection of AI and campaign finance policies and laws, including AI use in election campaign advertising.
Facial Recognition and Biometric Technologies—products that cover facial recognition and biometric technologies, including applications for their use and examples of use by federal agencies.
AI and Finance—products that cover the use of algorithms and AI technologies to provide financial services. 
AI and Health Care—products that cover applications of AI use that are relevant to health care and selected U.S. Department of Health and Human Services AI-related activities.
AI and Infrastructure—products that cover AI infrastructure, including data centers, semiconductors, and cloud computing infrastructure for AI development and AI-enabled services.
AI and Patents—products that cover the intersection of AI and patents, including patent-eligible subject matter reform and issues about AI patentability, such as whether inventions made using AI are patentable or inventions about AI are patentable.
AI and Right of Publicity—products that cover issues related to AI and the protection of “right of publicity,” often defined as a legal right to prevent unauthorized commercial uses of a person’s name, image, likeness, or voice.
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48909/R48909.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48909.html
R48905,U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA): Structure and Proposed Changes,2026-04-14T04:00:00Z,2026-04-16T11:23:48Z,Active,Reports,Zachary T. Neuhofer,,"The Act of May 15, 1862, established the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). While agricultural research was USDA’s initial focus, its size and responsibilities expanded over its more than 160 years. Newly created agencies within the department covered areas such as agricultural marketing, rural development, and conservation. Since then, USDA has undergone organizational changes; it established, consolidated, or eliminated agencies, offices, and presidentially appointed positions. Reorganization activities also have changed the shape, size, and location of the workforce and physical footprint of USDA and its agencies. As part of the second Trump Administration’s reorganization and workforce reduction efforts throughout the executive branch, the Secretary of Agriculture released a memorandum in July 2025 proposing further reorganization plans for USDA. 
Congress may organize the USDA through authorizing and appropriations legislation. For example, the Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act of 1994 (1994 USDA Reorganization Act; Title II of P.L. 103-354) established a structure that resembles the department’s current organization. Through appropriations legislation, Congress can direct or limit USDA’s ability to use discretionary appropriations to reorganize the department. Further, the Secretary of Agriculture has existing authorities to determine how the department will be structured to perform its statutory duties. For example, Section 4 of the Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953 (7 U.S.C. §2201 note) allows the Secretary to delegate USDA statutory functions to any office or agency within the department. 
The Secretary of Agriculture is a presidential Cabinet member. USDA’s agencies are overseen by Under Secretaries (currently eight) who oversee the department’s specific mission areas. USDA’s mission areas are: Farm Production and Conservation; Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services; Food Safety; Marketing and Regulatory Programs; Natural Resources and Environment; Research, Education and Economics; Rural Development; and Trade and Foreign Agricultural Affairs. The mission areas are carried out by the agencies in the department, which administer programs and promulgate regulations. For example, four agencies carry out the Farm Production and Conservation mission area: the Farm Production and Conservation Business Center, the Farm Service Agency, the Risk Management Agency, and the Natural Resources and Conservation Service. USDA staff offices cover functions such as communications, legal functions, and budget. The Office of Personnel Management estimated that USDA employed approximately 71,000 employees as of February 2026. USDA estimates that approximately 4,600 of these employees are in the National Capital Region (NCR)—the Washington, DC, area. Most USDA staff are located in regional, area, and county office locations across the country. For example, some agencies, such as the Economic Research Service and National Institute for Food and Agriculture, locate their staff primarily in Kansas City, MO. The Farm Service Agency and Natural Resources Conservation Service locate their employees mostly in state and county offices.
On July 24, 2025, the Secretary of Agriculture released a memorandum titled “Department of Agriculture Reorganization Plan.” The memorandum includes proposals to reduce the number of USDA employees in the NCR, vacate facilities in the NCR, reduce regional and area offices for some USDA agencies, and consolidate various administrative functions in the department. On August 1, 2025, USDA announced a public comment period for the plan. In December 2025, the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture was reported to state that USDA’s reorganization would be complete by the end of calendar year 2026. 
Congress has conducted oversight hearings on the reorganization plan, and some Members have introduced legislation that may affect it. On July 30, 2025, the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry held an oversight hearing to discuss the plan. In addition, agricultural appropriations legislation for FY2026 (P.L. 119-37, Division B) contains provisions that could affect USDA reorganization efforts, such as limits on the ability of the executive branch to use funds to move an office or agency outside of its mission area and limits on the department’s ability to close county offices. The Farm, Food, and National Security Act of 2026 (H.R. 7567) proposes amendments to the 1994 USDA Reorganization Act that would create new offices within USDA and amend or expand the functions of existing ones. Additionally, some introduced legislation would codify positions at USDA (e.g., the Chief of the Forest Service, H.R. 1762/S. 1061) or create new offices within the department (e.g., H.R. 2638, H.R. 3470, and S. 2692).
",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48905/R48905.2.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/HTML/R48905.html
IN12680,Recent Regulatory Changes to Bank Capital Requirements,2026-04-14T04:00:00Z,2026-04-15T11:23:49Z,Active,Posts,"Marc Labonte, Andrew P. Scott",,"Capital requirements are one of the primary ways banks are regulated for safety and soundness. (For background, see CRS Report R47447, Bank Capital Requirements: A Primer and Policy Issues.) Under leadership appointed by President Trump, federal bank regulators have released several proposed or final rules since 2025 that on net would effectively reduce how much capital banks are required to hold. These changes are taking place in the broader context of bank regulatory relief that regulators have pursued and the 119th Congress has considered. 
Capital is a relatively expensive source of funding for banks. Therefore, reducing required capital will lower banks’ funding costs, which could increase the provision of bank credit; however, holding insufficient capital would increase the risk of bank failure. 
Table 1 presents a brief description of five proposed rules and one final rule promulgated since 2025 affecting bank capital. Each rule applies to a different set of banks. Regulators separate banks with over $100 billion in assets into four categories for regulatory purposes based on their size and systemic importance. Category I consists of the eight U.S. global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Banks in the other three categories are progressively less systemically important. 
Table 1. Recent Rulemakings Modifying Capital Requirements
Changes to
Status/Date
Description

Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR)
Proposal (12/25)
Tier 1 capital/assets would be reduced from 9% to 8%, and the grace period for banks to remain in the CBLR program while not meeting the requirement would be extended from two to four months. 

Applies to banks with less than $10 billion in assets that opt into the CBLR framework.

Stress Tests
Proposal (11/25)
Proposed changes to the stress test model and the global market shock would effectively reduce banks’ stress test losses, which would reduce required capital under the stress capital buffer.

Applies to Category I, II, III, and IV banks.

Advanced Approach (Basel Endgame Re-Proposal)
Proposal (3/26)
Would standardize and simplify the capital calculations for large banks. Would eliminate the use of parallel calculations to determine risk-weighted assets, replacing the standardized and advanced approaches with one “expanded risk-based approach.” Would generally reduce risk-weighted assets, thereby reducing required capital for covered institutions.

Applies to Category I and II banks and banks with significant trading activity; other banks that opt in.

Standardized Approach and AOCI 
Proposal (3/26)
Would make changes to the definition of capital, reduce risk weights for certain assets, and adjust some of the methodologies used to make risk-weight calculations. Notably, would include most accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in the definition of capital. 

Applies to all banks that are not Category I or II or that do not opt into the CBLR regime. The AOCI changes apply to Category III and IV banks. 

Global Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB) Surcharge
Proposal (3/26)
Various changes to the G-SIB surcharge formula that would reduce the average capital surcharge from 2.7% to 2.3%.

Applies to Category 1 banks.

Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio (eSLR)
Final Rule (12/25)
At the holding company level, reduces the eSLR from 5% to 3% plus 50% of the G-SIB’s Method 1 capital surcharge. For the depository subsidiaries, reduces the eSLR from 6% to no more than 4%. A corresponding reduction based on 50% of the Method 1 surcharge would be made to the leverage-based total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC) requirements.

Applies to all Category 1 banks.

Source: CRS.
Regulators can raise or lower required capital in one of two general ways: by changing the ratio of required capital to assets or by changing how banks calculate their risk-weighted assets. The enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) and community bank leverage ratio (CBLR) rules reduce capital by lowering ratios, whereas the other proposals change risk-weighted asset calculations.
Figure 1 illustrates how much required capital across a bank’s holding company would decline on average for each category of bank if the recent proposed and final rules in Table 1 went into effect unchanged (relative to the requirements in place in November 2025). The cumulative effect of these rules would be to reduce required Tier 1 capital by 5.6% to 7.9%, depending on the type of bank. 
Figure 1. Cumulative Projected Effect of Recent Rules on Required Tier 1 Capital for Bank Holding Companies
/
Source: Regulators’ analysis in the proposed rules in Table 1.
Notes: Effects of the Endgame re-proposal on banks that are not in Category I or II are not shown. The AOCI proposal was published in the standardized approach proposal. 
For Category I and II banks, the Basel III Endgame re-proposal is projected to require banks to hold 1.6% more capital. (This is less than the 2023 Basel Endgame proposal, which would have also applied to Category III and IV banks and would have increased required capital by 9% for Category I-IV banks. The 2026 Endgame proposal is a re-proposal of the 2023 proposal.) However, three other recent rules would more than offset this increase in required capital, leading to a net decrease in required capital of 6%. 
Category III and IV banks would be required, under the standardized approach proposal, to include most parts of accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in capital, which would have the effect of increasing required capital by 2.6%. This increase is more than offset by the decrease in required capital from the rest of the standardized proposal and stress tests proposals, leading to a net decrease in required capital of 5.6% for Category III and IV banks. 
Banks with less than $100 billion but more than $10 billion in assets are subject only to the standardized approach proposal. Qualifying banks with less than $10 billion can choose between the CBLR, in which case they are subject to the CBLR proposal, and risk-weighted capital requirements, in which case they are subject to the standardized proposal. The CBLR proposal also reduces required capital, but the regulators did not provide an estimate of the percentage reduction. For the banks subject to it, the largest source of decline in required capital (6.4% to 7.9%, depending on the group) is attributable to the standardized proposal, not including its changes to the treatment of AOCI.

",https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/PDF/IN12680/IN12680.1.pdf,https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IN/HTML/IN12680.html